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Abstract 
In 1998, the Department of Defense in the United States released the first of a series of 
seminal policies on Information Operations (IO). Entitled Joint Publication 3-13, this instruction 
laid out for the first time, in an unclassified format, how the American military forces could 
utilise this particular element of power. As a relative newly defined activity, this publication 
proposed to revolutionise the manner in which warfare, diplomacy, business and a number of 
other areas are conducted. However, this radical transformation in the United States government 
. with regard to IQ has not occurred over the last decade and a significant gap exists in the 
9apability of the federal bureaucracy to support operations in this arena. While strategic policy 
and doctrine have been developed and promulgated, in most cases only by the Department of 
Defense, the actual conduct of IO activities and campaigns across the United States, are normally 
performed at a much more tactical level. This delta between theory and reality exists because the 
interagency organisations are often unwilling or unable to make the transformational changes 
that are needed to best utilise information as an element of power. In this research, the author 
. . 
has developed definitions and models that articulate not only why this delta exists, but also 
specific strategies for utilising IO in a manner by the United States federal organisations that best 
optiniises the inherent capabilities of this element of power. Specific recommendations are noted 
below, and will be laid out in greater detail throughout the paper: 
11 Develop an Academic Theoretical Construct for IO 
11 Understand that Different Approaches and Processes are Needed to Support IO 
11 Establish an International IO Standards Effort 
11 Meeting the IO Training Needs 
This research is more than just a reflection on the shifting nature of power. As the title of 
the research suggests, information is changing in this new era, and how a nation or federal 
agency understands that fact, will greatly increase its ability to manipulate power to their 
advantage. Thus the overall goal of this paper will be to bring together not only these disparate 
themes, but also the different threads of information to show the tremendous changes that are 
occurring today, in order to better demonstrate this revolution in power. In this research, key 
sources were be drawn on, all of which are relatively recent in origin, to show how the gaps in 
iii 
"'-~-~------------------~~-----~-------~----------
theory with respect to information, are perhaps one reason for the delta that currently exists in 
10. Likewise, the author also attempted to review the broad spectrum of published works on 10, 
that have become available over the last decade, in order to give a complete assessment of what 
needs to be done with respect to the federal bureaucracy in order to continue moving forward. 
Feedback from the project participants and the literature review also indicated that there were a 
number of areas that were considered deficient when one reviews and analyses these issues 
within the United States government with regards to the conduct 10. In addition, it can also be 
noticed that a series of common themes from both the literature review and research interviews 
that centre on a few key points - namely the desire for strategic goals, the use of standards, as 
well as integrated communication systems, tools, 10 metrics and the need for common training 
efforts to conduct 10 activities across all federal agencies. 
There was also a dichotomy between the stated desires of the interviewees, prominent 10 
authors and theorists as far as the 10 capabilities of the United States, the published theory on 
this subject and that actual tactical reality. This gap is the crux of this research and can be seen 
most clearly in the Conceptual Models, which emphasised a desire by many of the thesis 
participants for a more comprehensive series of strategic 10 efforts by the federal government, to 
truly maximise the power inherent in 10. However at the same time, there was also a realisation 
among many of the participants of this project that these actions would not happen on a timely 
basis, and that instead, a more realistic approach was probably more feasible, one that involved a 
broader set of criteria which might be more useful to try to solve these tough problems using a 
bottom up methodology instead. Likewise, a key concept that also arose in the conduct of this 
research is the understanding that the road to success with regard to 10 involved an actual 
limiting of the stated objectives, a 'boxing-in' if you will ofiO policy, into a more 'useable' set 
of concepts, definitions, theories and capabilities, that are attainable and feasible, with the 
resources available to the federal bureaucracy. This 'walking away' from the early 10 rhetoric to 
a more pragmatic approach is probably one of the most important items to take away from this 
thesis, in that many of the participants have come to understand that in order to succeed in 10, 
that they need to lessen their goals. This change can be seen most clearly in the Department of 
Defense where the original 10 policy issued in 1998 was deemed too radical and ambitious, and 
has since been modified as the federal agencies in the United States understand better what is 
truly needed to best utilise this new capability. 
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Chapter One ... Introduction: Understanding the 
Problem 
"The Next World War: Computers are the Weapons, and the Front Line is Everywhere ... " 
(Adams, 1998, p.3) 
The contemporary world is transforming itself into the Information Age, which has been 
called 'an era of networks' (Copeland, 2000; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1996, 2001). Loudly 
proclaimed by many as a revolutionary process throughout the world, it is interesting however to 
compare and contrast the differences between rhetoric and reality, especially in the employment 
of Information Operations (IO). A relative newly defined activity, this transformation of 
traditional uses of power promises to revolutionise the manner in which warfare, diplomacy, 
business and a number of other areas are conducted. However the gap between proposed 
capability and actual conduct of operations in the United States government is wide and while 
strategic doctrine and guidance may exist to best utilise the power of information, in fact, actual 
information campaigns are almost always conducted at a tactical level. Inthis thesis, the author 
develops definitions and models that articulate not only why this delta exists, but also specific 
strategies for utilising 10 in a manner that best optimises the inherent capabilities of this element 
of power. These ideas were taken from 100 background and research interviews conducted over 
a five-year period from practising mid-level officials of the interagency organisations in the 
United States that are involved in conducting information campaigns. It is hoped that these 
conclusio.ns developed in this project may be useful for future IQ planners, as well as senior level 
decision makers. This research was based on the following hypothesis, and will step through a 
rigorous theoretical methodology to develop a coherent set of findings as part of this thesis. 
Hypothesis: In the United States government, a significant gap exists in regards to the 
conduct of Information Operations. Strategic policy and doctrine have been promulgated, but in 
most cases, the actual IO activities and campaigns, are normally performed at a more tactical 
level. The delta between theory and reality exists because the federal bureaucracy is unwilling or 
unable to make the transformational changes that are needed to best utilise information as an 
element of power. 
1.1 Information Operations 
Information as an element of power is and has always been somewhat of a nebulous term, 
but in this new era it possesses a capability that is now considered crucial to the success of 
1 
American national security. However the ability to best utilise this element of power to support 
the requirements of United States government is still unknown. This is because IO crosses so 
many boundaries within the interagency process, that it is often·very difficult to quantify exactly 
what constitutes an information campaign. One reason for this is that you now have other 
organisations within the federal bureaucracy such as the State Department, which while they 
have traditionally concentrated on diplomatic efforts to support American interests abroad, are 
now instead being asked instead to facilitate strategic IO activities around the world. Not only is 
this kind of tasking abnormal for these different cabinet agencies, but it also belies their normal 
chains of communication and day-to-day procedures. So more often than not, the most recent 
attempts to conduct strategic high-level IO activities in the United States are instead aborted for a 
more tactical set of options that are normally conducted by the Department ofDefense as part of 
their standard set of operations. A good example of these dichotomies with the capability of IO 
is seen in three military activities conducted recently by American forces over the last decade. 
Whether it was Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq, the primary focus of these campaigns from the 
viewpoint of Washington, DC was on the military victory. In none of these operations, did IO 
play the transformational role that its advocates have predicted, and while a number of 
capabilities and related activities have been utilised, often with good success, at best these efforts 
are still almost all concentrated at the localised or tactical level. Nowhere has the strategic 
revolution in warfare advocated by informational power enthusiasts in the mid 1990's materialise 
as predicted and desired. 
This gap between the early theoretical desires for IO and the actual reality of operations 
conducted today is the focus of this thesis. For the contemporary world now is now witness to 
wholesale onslaughts of manipulated images, where nations, groups and individuals attempt to 
manage the messages that are received. Information campaigns have been advocated and 
theorised to be conducted in a very similar manner, whether merchandise like a soft drink is 
being sold or a threat to national security like weapons of mass destruction. This is the whole 
idea to which the acolytes of informational power advocate with respect to IO, namely that the 
mind of the consumer or the public needs to be influenced, to get them to believe in a product or 
cause. It is all the same in this new era these early IO enthusiasts contend, where the nature of 
power has radically changed, with perception management and computer network operations 
figuring prominently as new informational capabilities. To date, interviewees involved in this 
2 
research project have not witnessed this revolution in the use of information, which will 
transform the structure of power around the world. In particular, with respect to the specific 
American situation, the changes envisioned within the United States federal government, 
particularly with respect to influence campaigns, have thus far have not yet occurred as well, and 
in many cases foreign policy operations are still conducted using traditional military and 
diplomatic methods. 
1.2 Emerging 10 Theory 
However not withstanding these issues, the transformational ideas inherent in IO are 
crucial and must become a reliable capability of the American arsenal, because as the events of 
11 September 2001 indicate, military, political or economic power are often simply ineffective in 
dealing with these new kinds of threats to the national security of the United States. The 
aforementioned terrorist attacks were a blow to the American public and government images that 
affected the perceptions of many people in this country. The fear produced by the terrorist acts 
can only be defeated by using a comprehensive plan, in which information is a key element. In 
this new era, all factors of power must be utilised, for as some academics argue, in the future it 
will be 'networks that will be fighting networks' (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999). Good examples 
of this abound in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, where networks in 
the form of information campaigns fought networks made up of perceptions, and the side that 
will ultimately emerge from this epic conflict as the victor, is the one that can best shape and 
influence the minds of not only their adversary, but their allies as well (Advisory Group on 
Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, 2003). 
Unfortunately the shift from the industrial age to the information environment may not 
mean that the United States will forever remain the dominant player in the political arena. 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt also write that nation-states are losing power to hybrid structures within 
this interconnected architecture, where access and connectivity, including bandwidth will be the 
two key pillars of any new organization. They posit that truth and guarded openness are the 
recommended approaches to be used in both the private and government sectors to conduct 
business, and in their opinion, time zones will be more important than borders. It will be an age 
of small groups, using networks to conduct 'swarming' attacks that will force changes in policy 
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997a). Key features include: 
3 
• Wide open communication links where speed is everything 
• Little to no censorship, the individual controls his own information flow 
• Truth and quality will surface, but not initially 
• Weakening nation-states and strengthening networks (lbid, 1997b) 
The changes that are mentioned in their book Noopolitik are truly revolutionary and describe a 
profound shift in the nature of power. Unfortunately, this transformation has not been translated 
from a strategic concept to tactical actions (Kuusisto, 2004). Thus, the intent of this research is 
to fill that void, to describe why the early strategic theory on IO, do not match the current tactical 
reality. 
1.3 The Day-to-Day Reality of how 10 is conducted by the United States 
So while much of the early policy concerning IO stated the need for a more strategic and 
centralised execution philosophy of executing a top-down process by the American government, 
the day-to-day reality of operations is much different (CJCS MOP 30, 1993; DoDD S3600.1, 
1996; DoD JCS JP 3-13, 1998). This early concentration on the development ofhigh level IO 
strategy perhaps mirrors the philosophy of doctrine from an earlier era of the nation's history. 
During the Cold War, the United States and its allies and the Communist bloc were in a 
· psychological confrontation between two competing and essentially incompatible ideologies 
emanating from Washington and Moscow (Taylor, 2002). The Soviet Union and the Warsaw 
Pact were easily the most recognizable of the 'threats' to the free world, but other nations such as 
China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya were also part of the equation. This bipolar Cold 
War era was an arena of 'realist' conflicts, such as Vietnam, Korea, etc with states acting as the 
prime actors and anarchy a central theme. This was a 'war' in the real sense, in that nations were 
mobilised and armed forces were always at the ready to commit at a moment's notice if needed. 
A sense of urgency existed, so high-level doctrine and strategy were developed to meet these 
perceived needs; yet ultimately it was not the military or diplomatic efforts that succeeded in 
ending this effort, but instead the economic and to some extent the informational might of 
America that eventually prevailed. Today the former Soviet Union is a shadow of its past 
existence, with a population below the United States, and it has had difficulty deploying a 
number ofits forces in Kosovo because of equipment failures, (Clarke, 2000). 
In this post ColdWar era, when some of the greatest threats known to mankind such as a 
major surprise nuclear attack appear to many academics and politicians aslessened in intensity, 
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the fact that the United States is still under attack from a number of different enemies, including 
the AI Qaeda terrorist network seems curious. Once again, there are many reasons, but primarily 
it is because the perception of enemies has changed. Why is· this? Perhaps it is because the lack 
of equilibrium familiar during the Cold War, unrest in the Middle East, conflict in Southwest 
Asia are all significant factors in this new era. While there are still 'rogue states' (in United 
States terms) that can occupy the politicians and give credence to budget appropriations, other 
groups including extremist religious factions are freer to operate and to carry out attacks on the 
United States, in this post-:-bipolar period. Most of these Non~Govemment Organizations (NGO) 
or terrorist groups are no longer operating undemeath the umbrella of a superpower, and 
therefore have much more autonomy than ever before. Over the past 15 years, and especially in 
the last decade, there has been an explosion of attacks on the United States, some of which 
information has played a key role. While a number of these incidents were conducted by lone 
individuals, others were the work of activists, foreign military units, terrorists and even nation 
states. Each of these attacks hi-light the vulnerability of America and its population to these new 
types of warfare, where information and the integration of the govemment play a key role. For 
as mentioned previously, there is a tremendous gap between the theoretical potential of IO and 
its day-to-day implementation, and there are many times where the United States federal 
govemment is having tremendous difficulty in defending itself from informational attacks in this 
new environment. 
However, that is not to say, that the interagency organisations of the American 
bureaucracy have not recognised this delta and in their defence, many of these officials are 
attempting to better utilise information as an element of power. Evidence of this can be seen in 
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, reorganisation changes at the State 
Department, and the attempts to train an IO educated workforce in the form of authorised 
academic centres of excellence such Naval Post Graduate School, Idaho State University, New 
Mexico State University, Capital City College and other academic venues. Likewise, by 
managing information and using planning tools to synchronise, synergise, and de-conflict 
influence-based activities in an overall plan to affect the adversary, officials in Washington, DC 
have also attempted to enable the horizontal integration of these activities across the whole 
interagency and coalition environment. A good example of this was the efforts to coordinate the 
perception management messages of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
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and the United Kingdom during the Kosovo conflict in 1999 (ibid). While not perfect, the 
collaboration was an improvement over previous efforts. 
As part of this research, it was noted that this shift from one era to another is not without 
precedent. The United States became a world leader in the industrial age because it could 
mobilise the collective might of its population through mass production, automation, economic 
incentives and geographic location. To understand this revolutionary change in the role of 
information, it must be appreciated that this era of industrial might is in decline, and that the 
information revolution is now upon us (Toffler, 1970). However the ability for the United States 
government to conduct influence campaigns around the world is under a tremendous amount of 
stress and uncertainty. In previous generations, information practitioners could count on a 
monolithic enemy (the Soviet Union), and a somewhat static communications technology 
throughout the Cold War (broadcast network television and radio). This situation unfortunately 
created an erroneous belief that the information that was broadcast to the known adversary could 
be controlled; however, this is no longer possible in today's environment. The Internet and other 
emerging communication networks (wireless, peer-to-peer, etc) have forever destroyed the 
power formerly resident only in the government, and that asymmetry now gives the power of 
information to all. This is a good example of the power ofbottom-up execution and control. 
Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler alluded to this capability in their book War and Anti-War, where 
they talk about the de-massification of the media or the ability to compartmentalise influence 
campaigns (Toffler and Toffler, 1993). In addition, while federal bureaucrats could at one time 
count on the fact that they owned or could somewhat control the dissemination outlets for 
information; this is also increasingly no longer the case. The use of web sites, blogs, streaming 
video, portals and other 'alternative' news sources have ended the government's monopoly of 
information control, where this new technology is available. Incredible advances in 
communications are changing the information environment, and in many cases, this new 
technology is supporting the traditional cultural and economic issues of third world communities, 
which have given these populations a much greater power in this new dynamic. 
1.4 The Relevance of this Research 
It is this concept of power and control of information that is the core of this research. In 
this thesis, most of the analysis focuses on the key areas of perception management and 
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computer network operations within IO. The former is often referred to by different names 
depending on which branch of the United States government that you are referencing to include 
psychological operations (Defense ), public diplomacy (State), strategic communications 
(National Security Council) or influence operations (White House). In essence all of these terms 
can be considered analogous and in this text, the author has elected to use these terms somewhat 
interchangeably. Likewise computer network operations can also go by different names such as 
information assurance, computer security, cyber warfare, computer network attack, etc. Once 
again, the author has elected to use these terms interchangeably as well. In addition, while there 
are many other capabilities of IO, such as deception, electronic warfare and the like that could 
also be examined, this research was narrowed to the two key areas mentioned earlier, namely the 
perception management and computer network operations portion of IO. This is because it is the 
attempts to conduct these specific kinds of influence campaigns, where the United States 
government has had the most difficulties recently, and where the delta is the greatest between 
theory and reality, so it is hoped that recommendations from this research will offer the most 
potential for change within the federal bureaucracy. 
In this research, the use of a modified Soft Systems Methodology approach and active 
interviews was deemed most appropriate, as part of a qualitative procedure ... In order to get the 
trust from this large group of government and academic participants, the author interviewed 
some of them repeatedly over a multi-year period, in what has been labelled as developing a 
sustained and intensive experience (Creswell, 2003). Out of the original lOO background 
interviews, with 63 different people, a total of 40 key participants were ultimately selected, for a 
total 54 separate interviews, to best help the author understand not only the nuances of the 
problem, but also so that he could obtain the most current and accurate information about the 
current and future state of IO within the federal government. It is therefore the intent of this 
thesis to answer not only the research questions listed below, but also to gather and collect the 
opinions of these key individuals as to what should occur in the future by the federal bureaucracy 
to better utilise this element of power. Thus each of the survey questions used was designed to 
flesh out a different perspective of the United States government, to specifically examine the 
policy, personnel and organisational modifications that are ongoing within these agencies that 
were built in the industrial (second wave) era, as they attempt to tra~sform themselves. So, not 
only are the research interviews seeking to answer the 'what is' question from these surveys and 
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subsequent analysis, but the author was also attempting to answer the 'what should be' question 
as well. 
1.5 Research Questions 
1. Can a viable model be developed for medium to long-term strategic United States 
federal government information campaigns? 
2. Within a viable model, what are the essential components? 
3. Within a viable model, what is the most appropriate organisational structure? 
From these research questions and the subsequent data developed from the participants, 
the author was able to develop a comprehensive theoretical model of not only how IO is 
currently integrated into the United States government, but also how it could be integrated in the 
future to include changes to personnel, policy and organisations. However as mentioned 
previously, these efforts are not enough and there still exists a wide gap between rhetoric and 
reality with respect to IO. Therefore this research will examine the theory, policy, doctrine and 
strategy for IQ in the United States government as well, to determine how information as an 
element of power is actually utilised by the federal bureaucracy to conduct operations in the 
Information Age. This is achieved by using a systemic, long-term interpretive approach to 
collecting data from high profile individuals, who as mentioned earlier have various roles within 
the IO and associated government influence and/or perception management and computer 
network operations communities. To do this, the author has explored the differences between 
current IO theory and operations, which was done by utilising the Soft System Methodology 
process to define core concepts such as the environment, worldviews, clients, actors, owners and 
the transformation process through an active interview process. From this methodology, the 
author then developed two primary conceptual models, with 12 secondary views that attempt to 
explain the gap or delta of IO performance by the American government. From this qualitative 
data, a number of key themes were developed by the author, which were later verified with the 
original interviewees and validated by third-party independent IO academics. It is believed that 
this methodology enabled the doctoral process to be completed with sufficient academic rigour 
to ensure the accuracy and completeness required. 
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1.6 Summary 
This paper is an attempt to summarise all of the disparate efforts by the various 
components of the federal bureaucracy that have attempted to utilise different portions or 
capabilities of IO, with an emphasis on perception management and computer network 
operations. In addition, this research has also attempted to investigate how the key agencies of 
the United States government can use the inherent power of information, to better conduct 
influence or strategic communication campaigns in the future. Likewise, this research also tried 
to develop a series of models to better describe a strategy to best utilise IO by the United States. 
It is hoped that the outcome of this research will provide a process that can be used to transform 
these organisations, in a manner that will better allow them to understand and use the power of 
information to meet the threats in the future. For the bottom line is the question as to whether the 
federal bureaucracy can conduct an effective information campaign in this changing 
environment, while assuring the security of their networks and information systems in this new 
architecture? To do this, the United States may need to change its collective interagency 
structure that has evolved over the last 200 years, into a more networked organisation that can 
master the issues in the information age. This is a crucial issue, as it can be questioned if 
America will remain a dominant player during this new era, where industrial capacity is not 
nearly as important to a nation as its interconnectivity of information nodes? Thus to conclude 
this introductory section, it is the goal of this thesis to answer these questions while producing a 
model that better describes and develops a strategy for how the United States can best conduct 
information operations in this new era. 
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Chapter Two ... A Review of Information Operations in 
the United States 
"In an age when terrorists move information at the speed of an email, 
money at the speed of a wire transfer, and people at the speed of a commercial 
jetliner, the Defense Department is bogged down in the micromanagement and 
bureaucratic processes of the industrial age - not the information age. Some of our 
difficulties are self-imposed, to be sure. Some are the result of law and regulation. 
Together they have created a culture that too often stifles innovation .... 
The point is this: we are fighting the first wars of the 21st century with a 
Defense Department that was fashioned to meet the challenges of the mid-20th 
century. We have an industrial age organization, yet we are living . in an 
information age world, where new threats emerge suddenly, often without 
warning, to surprise us. We cannot afford not to change and rapidly, if we hope to 
live in that world." (Rumsfield, 2003) 
This quote by the for:nler Secretary of Defense emphasises the dichotomy that exists 
today within the Department of Defense of the United States government. The need for change 
is widely recognised across the bureaucracy but implementation has been slow and uneven. This 
condition unfortunately is symptomatic of the federal bureaucracy as a whole. In this next 
section, the author will outline the development of IO in America, as it has evolved over the last 
60 years and compare it to the available literature, to develop a cogent and coherent argument to 
understand the context of this research. While these publications are very diverse and range 
over many academic subject areas to include power, information, international relations, 
computer security and organisational theory, each will be linked by the author to the evolution of 
IO within the United States government to provide an understanding of their context. The reason 
for this diversity of literature is due to the incredibly broad nature of IO itself. Because the 
definition ofiO covers such a large number of subjects, at once it is everything as well as 
nothing, which makes it very difficult to understand where to frame the boundaries of the 
discussion. There is no clear line or easy demarcation to determine what clearly is or is not a 
part ofiO, so more often than not, the researcher is forced to cast his net far and wide in search 
of primary sources that allude to or reference this emerging capability. Therefore the reader will 
notice a wide variety of sources cited and alluded to as the author describes the development of 
this new warfare capability in the United States. 
Information Operations is a formal attempt by the United States government to develop a 
set of doctrinal approaches for its military and diplomatic forces to use and operationalise the 
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power of information. Per the original primary Department ofDefense policy on IO, the target is 
the adversary decision-makers and therefore the primacy of effort will be to coerce that person or 
group of people, into doing or not doing a certain action (Joint Publication 3-13, 1998). To 
affect the adversary decision-maker, IO attempts to use many different capabilities such as 
deception, psychological operations and electronic warfare, to shape and influence the 
information environment. This is a very high level and strategic approach to policy within the 
United States government but as mentioned in the first chapter, in reality, IO is more often than 
not, performed at a much lower or tactical level. Therefore this section of the thesis will be 
aimed at studying the available academic literature to evaluate the differences as IO has evolved 
into a full-fledged warfare area. 
2.1 Literature Review: An Introduction 
This research is unique and develops new theoretical concepts with regard to IO, for in 
the interviews conducted, few academic works were identified that concentrated on IO and none 
were discovered with respect to its conduct by the United States government. The most notable 
ones such as Rattray's andDunn's are mentioned and referenced in this chapter, but none of 
these previous studies, specifically fills this particular research area based on. the aforementioned 
hypothesis (Rattray, 2001; Dunn, 2002). Therefore in this section, the context of what has 
already been done and connected or linked to this study is examined. In addition, the need for 
this thesis is justified by identifying gaps in the academic literature as compared to operational 
reality of IO as it is conducted by the United States government today 
In this introductory portion of the literature review, the context is set by defining the key 
elements of power, information and information operations, within the construct of the 
traditional international relations theory, to show where it fits ... and noticeably, where it does · 
not.. This is done to give a baseline of knowledge from which to understand the concepts which 
will later be developed in this thesis. In addition, in this chapter, the overall trends in the 
literature with respect to IO, will be traced and developed into a larger picture of this warfare 
capability. One interesting aspect that the reader will notice almost immediately is the 
preponderance of government publications and official documents utilised in this research. 
There are number of reasons for this, most notably the fact that this research is concentrated on 
the United States government and therefore directives or instructions that have been issued from 
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an 'official' source tend to lend a lot of credence to the authenticity of the information. In 
addition, because 10 is an activity that spans multiple federal organisations, the number of 
government publications also tends to be high as each activity publishes its 'own' version of how 
it will conduct these particular operations. 
The literature review is divided into three parts - an introductory or definition section, the 
main body that traces the development within the United States government while comparing 
and contrasting the key events to the available literature, and a summary section that attempts to 
tie all of these publications together into a coherent picture. Therefore each of the articles, 
books or directives that were referenced, were done so because they have either contributed or 
directly influenced (both positively and negatively) to the evolution ofiO. For example, while 
some texts are included on the elements of power, these were done so only where it was in 
relation to information and 10. Also the author attempted whenever possible to use primary 
sources, so for example internet documents that were unsubstantiated, were not used, unless they 
were previously published in approved, vetted, or reliable source material. This included opinion 
pieces in blogs, websites or chat rooms and so as alluded to earlier, in this thesis, there will be 
extensive use of' official' publications, interviews and recognized journals, books and academic 
studies were utilised as the main source of academic literature for this research. 
2.2 Theoretical Constructs 
One of the challenges in this research is that it does not propose to update, challenge, 
adapt or confront any of the traditional theories of international relations. This is because the 
changes described in this research represent a profound shift in the nature of power. The thesis 
that lies before you discusses a huge transformation regarding power and information that has 
not been either fully accepted by academics schooled in the traditional theoretical schools, or has 
been part of a vigorous debate within the scholarly journals on these precepts. So in general, 
there tends to be is a shortage of ideas and thoughts, that is a comprehensive theoretical construct 
to adequately express these new ideas. As Rosenau (1998, p.33) relates, "A new lexicon is 
needed for this purpose ... there is a huge gap between our sense ofprofound transformations and 
our ability to grasp them from a huge shortage of the tools needed ... our vocabulary and 
conceptual equipment for understanding the emergent world lag well behind the changes 
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themselves". Therefore there is a gap, a need that exists for a new theoretical construct, one that 
can better model and explain events in this new Information Age. 
As many analysts realise, the quest for a new academic theory is normally unfulfilled, 
because we ask our models to do too much. To begin with, most theories do not predict, but 
instead give you ideas of what events are likely or not likely to happen. What theory does in 
reality is to help you organise facts, identify variables, and determine which factors are the most 
important. The understanding that there is no comprehensive theory of international relations 
often can go a long way toward explaining how useful thesemodels really can be. It can take a 
while to understand, that there is not one set of assumptions or stmcture that will answer all 
political questions of our times, but instead that theory can give you a map of the landscape. For 
all of international relations is about perception - the insight that an adversary or ally may have 
often comes from observation of the different forms of power that a state or group may have. 
Therefore, it was not surprising that in the past, since military power was often the easiest factor 
to measure or count that this element of power tended to be given the greatest weight in any sort 
of calculation. But as history has demonstrated on numerous occasions, the ownership of a 
preponderance of military does not always translate into victory. The fungibility of military 
power as expressed in Keohane and Nye's theory on complex interdependence is not nearly as 
high as many analysts believe, thereby giving false illusions as to its usability (Keohane and 
Nye, 1989). Other forms of power in the form of political, economic, social, religious and 
informational all play a role as well, because they are often hard to measure or calculate, their 
potential is often neglected or reduced in importance. Thus, it should be noticed in this research 
that a theoretical constmct and a proposed methodology has been developed that provide a 
hypothesis, a point of departure, a construct, and framework in which to more comfortably view 
the events as they occur. 
The primary focus of this research is divided into three areas- policy, organisation and 
training with respect to information, within the three main government agencies involved with 
foreign policy in the United States- namely the White House and the National Security Council; 
the Department of Defense and the State Department. The two key areas of IO that are examined 
for development are computer network operations and perception management, for as mentioned 
earlier, these are the two warfare areas that have changed the most within the last decade. 
Computer network operations as noted previously, is an umbrella term that encompasses a wide 
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range of cyber-related activities. For the purpose of this thesis, we will divide computer network 
operations into three parts: 
• Offensive - Computer Network Attack 
• Defensive- Computer Network Defense and/or Infrastructure Assistance 
• Support- Computer Network Exploitation 
Each of these areas has a role to play in this new and exciting warfare arena, with the very term 
denoting thoughts of cyber warfare and futuristic technology. While many people have visions 
of precision accuracy and war without needless violence, others have a vision of a more kindler 
and gentler form of warfare for man to evolve to. As many officials within the federal 
bureaucracy have come to realise as part of this study, attitudes about computer network 
operations often does not equate to reality. Thus while by definition computer network attack is 
a cmrent capability of the United States, some would say that it is so limited by legal, political 
and security constraints, as to make it virtually useless to the unified combatant commanders. 
Perception management is the other key area of IO that has changed significantly over the 
last decade. Through the use of computers, telecommunications, video, the intemet, e-mail and 
other technological advances, the ability to shape an image or conduct an influence campaign has 
increased greatly. Instances that are mentioned in this research include the use of a video camera 
by the Somalia warlord Aideed in 1993, the denial of service attacks by the Electronic 
Disturbance Theatre in 1998, and perhaps most influential, the timing of the second explosion at 
the World Trade Centre in 2001. All of these events were perception management campaigns 
designed to manipulate public opinion. In each case the tools used were all different, but the 
goal was the same - to produce an effect, or a perception in the mind of the target. As will be 
shown in this research, the ability of the United States government to affect this capability has 
also radically changed over the last decade. 
Earlier arguments about the growing role of information were set forth by Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye in their seminal book, Power and Interdependence, which describe in 
detail how these academics portrayed the changing role of information with regards to the power 
capabilities within the world political structure (Keohane and Nye, 1989, p. 23). Also mentioned 
previously were John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, who in a series of books culminating in their 
much heralded The Emergence ofNoopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy, 
together recognised that we now live in the information age- an era of networks, 
interdependence, international organizations and transnational activities (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
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1992, 1993, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1999). This latter set of authors stated their belief that nation-
states are losing power to hybrid structures such as non-governmental organizations and multi-
national corporations within this interconnected architecture. Access and connectivity, including 
bandwidth are two key pillars of these new organisations, while truth and guarded openness will 
be the approach used by both the private and government sector to conduct business. They felt 
that time zones were more important than borders, and foretold of an age of small groups, using 
networks to conduct swarming attacks that will force changes in policy. Key features as quoted 
by these two authors include these important points: 
• Wide open communication links where speed is everything 
• Little to no censorship, the individual controls his own information flow 
• Truth and quality will surface but not initially 
• Weakening nation-states and strengthening networks (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997, p. 441) 
2.3 International Relations Theories 
This lack of a defined theoretical construct surrounding IO led the author to first examine 
the methodologies that serve as a foundation for the international relations field. Through the 
use of theories and models, academics in this area hope to better understand the complicated . 
proceedings ofworld politics. Kegley (1995, p. 8) states that the "theory of international 
relations needs to perform four principle tasks. It should describe, explain, predict and 
prescribe". In this section, the three major categories or classic intemational relations theories -
liberal;realist and alternative are all examined in detail with respect to IO, to try to determine 
how well they can explain the changes brought on by this new element of power, All authors 
and theories are reviewed with respect to the four fundamental points outlined below: 
• Object of analysis and scope of enquiry 
• Purpose of social and political enquiry 
• Appropriate methodology 
• Is international relations distinct from, or related to other fields 
(Burchill and Linklater, 1996, pp. 16,-21) 
The theoretical constructs that comprise international relations are relatively new, with 
the field not separating from the larger domain of history until1919. Much of the outgrowth of 
international relations can be attributed to the academic reaction of the horrors of World War I. 
A need was felt to study the lessons learned from this conflict in an attempt to try to prevent a 
war of this magnitude from ever happening again. Thus the majority of the effort in the interwar 
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period was conducted by scholars from the United States and United Kingdom to answering the 
following three questions: 
• What had war achieved, other than death and misery for millions? 
• Were there lessons from the war that could be learnt to prevent a recurrence of conflict on 
this scale? 
• Was the war caused by mistake, misunderstanding or malicious intent? 
(Ibid, p.5) 
2.3.1 Liberalism 
The first ofthese academic theories to evolve within the new field of international 
relations was Liberalism, which grew as mentioned above as a reaction to the grim reality of the 
Great War. There are many sub-categories within the liberal framework, which include 
International Liberalism, Liberal Utopianism, Neo-Liberalism, Complex Interdependence and 
International Regimes. By definition, a liberal view of international relations believes human 
nature is essentially good or altruistic. There is a prevalent fundamental human concern for the 
welfare of others, and liberals believe that bad human behaviour is not a product of evil people, 
but rather evil institutions. War is thus not considered inevitable, and the liberals view war as an 
international problem, that can be avoided, and that international society must eliminate anarchy 
by reorganising itself (Kegley, 1995, p. 4). These beliefs contrast sharply with those from the 
realist viewpoint, with the object of analysis and scope of enquiry probably the biggest 
differences between liberals and realists. A good example of these differences is the study of 
internal state politics as an explanation of a nation's actions. Some liberal academics believe that 
it is precisely these internal politics that greatly affected the international economics. One 
researcher in particular argued that domestic politics were the overriding concern of the majority 
of the policymakers and that any benefits associated with international policies were often 
outweighed by the high political price at home (Simmons, 1994, pp. 4-18). The study ofhuman 
activity also seems to be a main focus of liberal research, with whole books devoted to the study 
of how nations begin wars. One liberal academic assumed that man is intelligent and is somehow 
trapped by his decisions. This leads to a discussion of why man starts wars or once in a conflict 
yet refuses to get out of one when he knows better (Maoz, 1990, p. xii). This paradox can be 
compared to those who attempt to analyse why there are cases of misperception in world politics. 
Likewise any avenue of liberal beliefs is often concerned with the study of the causes, 
consequences, perceptual errors, beliefs, and images that are used by decision-makers (Jervis, 
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1976, p. 3). These academics felt that the "perceptions of the world and of other actors diverge 
from reality in patterns that we can detect and for reasons that we can understand." (David, 1991, 
p. 235). Thus, one purpose of the liberal enquiry is to demonstrate how we can better understand 
man and the factors that affect his political decisions. The anarchy that is so prevalent in the 
realist theory is present but within the state system, not at the international level. The states are 
not acting as independent units pursuing national interests but rather as vehicle for leaders own 
personal gain (Ibid, p. 237). 
If the methodology liberals use to study their craft is examined, most will agree that it is . 
from a traditional viewpoint with an emphasis on history, law and philosophy. A good example 
is analysis of international regimes, where one researcher uses the international aviation regime 
to compare and contrast the efficiency of different theories. 
The positional of all regime theorists, regardless of whether they are institutionalists or 
modified structural realists, can be translated into a single hypothesis: Given the 
considerable interdependence in the world, which necessitates cooperation among states, 
international regimes are pervasive in the international system-particularly in issue areas 
that lie outside the zero-sum realm of security - and once created, they are likely to 
persist (Nayar, 1995, p.143). 
Do liberals believe that the study of international relations is a separate and distinct academic 
field? Yes, because to be effective, they must reach out to other domains and use research 
conducted in these different disciplines. For example, Jervis believes that psychologists work 
with respect to international relations is important, but he is wary of applying it directly to case 
studies. On the other hand, he also believes that "most international regimes scholars have paid 
no attention to psychology - that they have failed to recognize the importance of misperception" 
(Jervis, 1976, p. 6). Likewise he also understands that if decision-makers recognise the 
limitations of their mindsets and if they attempt to try to see the world the way the other sees it, 
then they may be able to decrease the cases of misperception. Specifically, he suggested that to 
expose implicit assumptions and give a decision-maker more freedom of choice, he should 
encourage the formulation and application of alternative images. While this may be 
accomplished by the divergence of interests, goals, training and information available within any 
large organization, often times this is not enough. It is often difficult, psychologically and 
politically, for any one person to examine many alternatives, so instead Jervis suggests they 
should employ devil's advocates. There are limits to the utility of a third-party opinion that is not 
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truly neutral, but overall Jervis believed that a minority view is needed to guard against cases of 
misperception. It is then that these devil's advocate's can ensure that new information, rather 
than calling the established sub-goal into question, will not be interpreted within the old 
framework (Jervis, 1976, pp. 415-416). 
2.3.2 Realism 
Liberalism was the first major theory of international relations and it was the 
predominant focus during the interwar period. It was not until the late 1930's and the 
publication of The Twenty Years' Crisis that a major alternative international relations theory, in 
the form of realism, was championed (Carr, 1939). This theory was later refined to neo-realism 
by the effects of World War Il, and the onset of the Cold War (Morgenthau, 1967; Waltz, 1990). 
The 'realities' of power politics during this period also did much to cement the realist theory's, 
into the predominant school Qf thought within international relations for the next 40 years. The 
major beliefs of realism start with the idea that man is by nature sinful and wicked. He lusts for 
power and you cannot eradicate this instinct, while the struggle for power is an all-consuming 
goal, with all other interests subjugated. Therefore nations will define the acquisition of power 
as in their best interest and will build military capabilities to maintain and defend themselves. 
The military will always be considered the primary source of power, and states will not rely on 
allies to protect them plus treaties with other nations are only useful for balancing power. While 
these ideas do not constitute all of the concepts of realism, they should give the reader a broad 
view of the theory's basic assumptions. Included under the broader category of realism are 
additional sub-areas entitled Neo-Realism, Structural Realism, International Political Economy 
and Decision Making Theory. 
As opposed to liberal theory, the realists are mainly focused on the international system 
and the nation states in their research. This is evident in Morganthau (1967), which many 
consider the first academic to advocate a realistic theory on international relations. Based on 
lectures given at the University of Chicago, he tried to differentiate realist theory by listing its six 
principles and defining power, including the many elements and factors. Also, he attempted to 
give realism a scientific approach and then conducted a very detailed analysis of the limitations 
of power and the problems in world politics. Morgenthau's opus was and still is considered a 
magnificent attempt to produce a grand theory of international relations. 
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Realism as a theory, has evolved greatly in its social and political enquiry from its initial 
development. The change was mainly an attempt to show how the anarchical nature of the 
international system is the overriding determinant on man. First expounded by Waltz (1990), 
who took the themes from realism that had been espoused by Carr and Morganthau, he later 
refined them and developed a new theory which is now known as neo-realism. In his seminal 
work, Waltz used philosophers such as St Augustine, Hobbes, Kant and Spinoza, to show that 
the root of all evil is man, and thus man is the root of the specific evil of war (Waltz, 1990, p. 3). 
Waltz also quotes Rousseau to say that he finds the major causes of war neither in men nor in 
states but in the state system itself (Ibid, p. 11 ). These arguments and others are steps on the 
road to Waltz's theory that international relations are characterised by the absence of truly 
governmental institutions. It is this anarchy that forces states to act the way that they do. This is 
because "each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best. Force is a 
means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process 
of reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitable arise among similar units in a condition of 
anarchy" (Ibid, p. 238). Dessler in his International Organization article What's at Stake in the 
Agent-Structure Debate? tries to take Waltz one step further by developing a structural model of 
international relations. This transformational structural theory Dessler argues, can better explain 
and develop decision-making processes, horizontal linkages and a more comprehensive ontology 
(Dessler, 1989, pp. 441-474). 
· This development of new international relations theory is the heart of the debate between 
neo-realists and neo-liberals. Some of the most contentious ideas are not about theory as much 
as the factors that define a theory. For example, power as mentioned earlier, is a major focus in 
the study of realist theory. David Baldwin attempts to address these issues by analysing what 
exactly power is and how does it relate as a variable. He reviews much of the doctrine in this 
area and his general consensus seems to be that power is not as well defined and useful as many 
people believe. He thinks the term is too loosely used, that there should be much more defining 
or narrowing of its use and the issue of fungability is not nearly as great as many theorists would 
desire (Baldwin, 1980, pp. 161-180). 
The methodology used by realist's can also be quite traditionalist. Keohane explores the 
growth of international organisations and their influence in the international regimes that has 
significantly changed the dynamic in the last decade. Some of this is due to the extensive 
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amount of international cooperation since World War 11, although Keohane (1984, p.3) warns 
that "a rising level of cooperation may be overwhelmed by discord, as increased interdependence 
and governmental intervention create more opportunities for policy conflict". He believes that 
international regimes "enhance the likelihood of cooperation by reducing the costs of making 
transactions that are consistent with the principles of the regimes. They increase the symmetry 
and improve the quality of the information that governments receive" (lbid, p. 244). 
The study of international regimes by realists is also important in that it shows an 
evolving theological methodology to perhaps a closer relationship with liberalism. Nayar (1998 
p. 168) shows this aspect in his article on aviation. Although primarily concerning international 
regimes, in his conclusion Nayar states that realism is more robust than previously given credit 
for. He believes that liberal institutionalism considers international regimes as representing 
shared values and norms of an evolving, ifnascent, international community transcending 
interstate conflict. N ayar then goes on to state that realism regards international regimes as 
related to interests and capabilities of states, and that any cooperation among states is regarded as 
contingent and transient. Thus, it is his belief that structural realism emerges with the superior 
explanatory power in the case of international regimes. Keohane has a similar argument, namely 
that hegemony is not as important as cooperation, and that "cooperation is viewed by 
policymakers less as an end in itself than a means to a variety of other objectives" (Keohane, 
1984, p. 10). He also states that while hegemony may be used to create cooperation, it is the 
willingness of governments to remain within international regimes long after they could have left 
which is similar to what Nayar argued in his article. 
Also, Realists take, a scientific approach to their study of theory methodologies. In 
Lebow and Stein's (April1990, pp. 347-352) article in World Politics, the authors proceeded to 
denigrate many of the so-called tests and data that deterrence theorists had used. They 
questioned the validity and reliability of the data, the application of the deterrence definition, and 
how intent can be verified. Realists tend to address technology issues readily, for example, in an 
International Studies Quarterly article, der Derian (1990) addressed some of the problems that 
operators are experiencing in conducting business in modern society. The speed at which 
decisions are made and information passed often overwhelms the policy-maker. This model 
sounds similar to what Jervis was arguing about the rise of misperception by decision-makers. 
Der Derian also believes that 'speed is the essence of war' and that time is more important than 
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geography for success on the battlefield. In this article, Der Derian tries to bridge differences in 
theoretical approaches mainly by arguing that the post-structural ideas ofKeohane "can grasp-
but never fully capture- the significance of these new forces for international relations" (Der 
Derian, September 1990, p. 307). 
Thus, the ideas of technology and the use of it in foreign policy is often crucial to realist 
mindset, and are also implicit in the development ofiO theory. The factors that der Derian 
discusses in his article - simulation, surveillance and speed - can all be summarized by 
information technology. This is also the general consensus and thrust of the article by Shapiro 
(September 1990, pp 329-339) in International Studies Quarterly. In this paper, Shapiro 
basically argues that no longer is foreign policy limited to diplomats and the government but has 
instead become available to the masses due to technology. There are more players involved with 
a variety of interests and equities that must be met in order for an issue to be resolved. Some of 
these new players are multi-national corporations, the media, as well as non-governmental 
organizations. Whoever they are, in Shapiro's view the masses are complicating the discourse of 
American security policy. The media in particular gain Shapiro's ire, because he believes that 
they have altered the ability of the government officials to conduct foreign policy. This is very 
interesting, because much of the realist's consternation evolves from the fact. that the nation 
states are losing control in this new era,. Politics are becoming more complicated because there 
are multiple players with different agendas that all have access to the playing field now due to 
the rise of information technology. These factors are exactly what make advocates ofiO so 
excited, because the power of the government is being transferred to the people. 
2.3.3 Alternative Theories 
The final category of international relation theories reviewed as a possible construct for 
this thesis includes all of the so-called alternative issues. It has only been in the last two decades, 
since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, that a major challenge to the dominance of realism and 
liberalism has erupted within the international relations field. Some of these controversies were 
caused by the collapse ofbipolarity, others by the perceived eroding stature of the nation-state. 
Whatever the reason, a whole host of alternative and competing theories have arisen that have 
challenged many sacred assumptions about international relations. These consist of Marxism, 
Critical Theory, Feminist Theory, Ecological Theory, Post-Modernism, Institutionalism and 
21 
Constructivism. Because of their diverse backgrounds there is no standard definition for 
alternative theories. Instead advocates try to focus more on these types of alternative issues, 
bringing them out ofthe margins to ensure that their equities are.adequately addressed. 
The object of analysis in alternative international relations theory often addresses subjects 
that have been neglected by traditional international relations research. Likewise their social and 
political interest areas tend to be vastly different than 'mainstream' academics. This can be seen 
in Christine Sylvester's (1994) book Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Post 
Modern Era. She argues that all of the great international relations debates would have been 
affected by feminist theorising had women been included. This lack of feminist insight Sylvester 
argues not only limits the effectiveness of these theories but also shows to the extent that the 
international relations field is parochial in its scope of enquiry. The 'typical' methodology 
utilised by international relations academics is also attacked by Sylvester in her book, as too 
limited and not exclusive enough of all viewpoints (Sylvester, 1994, p. 4 ). 
Alternative theories, more than any other, tend to broaden the field of international 
relations. Finnemore (1996) argues that scholars in the international relations field would do 
well to look into the academic work being conducted in sociology. Although Jervis had argued 
that psychologists were limited in their ability to solve issues within international relations 
theory, Finnemore believes the opposite to be true. She states that the institutionalist research 
conducted in since the 1970's has done much to provide evidence of global cultural 
homogenisation. The growing interdependence that she sees is a product of a 'Westernisation' 
of the world in which the notion ofbureaucracies and markets are flourishing. In addition, 
because of the idea that a nation-state is the 'only' legitimate unit that can operate in the modem 
society, many areas are being pushed into becoming a state, when they are not equipped to do so 
(Finnemore, 1996, pp. 328-336). Thus, she argues that it is sociology's work on the individual 
and institutionalism that need new emphasis in our current era. Research conducted on 
education policy, the cultural awareness that an individual receives from the state is crucial to the 
development of the nation's identity. She argues that by understanding the sociologist's research 
into the spreading of western values, the international relations scholar may well better 
understand some of the factors that they face around the world. Likewise Simmons (1994, p. 
283) work on international economics has important comments for adherents to the game theory 
model as well. Her research indicated that the internal political situation so overwhelms any 
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other thought processes, that many extra conditions are often added on as new factors, making it 
is virtually impossible to try to compare and contrast equivalent behaviour. 
In conclusion then, the value of an academic theory is based on its usefulness in 
adequately assessing world politics. With the dramatic events started by the end of the Cold 
War, the liberal ideology has regained much of its former status and has seriously challenged 
realism as the pre-eminent theory within the international relations field. This is not so much 
because that the liberal theorists predicted all of the events of the preceding decade, but more 
importantly that realism as a theory did not! Likewise the alternative theories, while maybe not 
representing a grand international relations theory, have nonetheless chipped away at the 
importance of realism for not addressing the many factors that these advocates see as important 
modifiers. There are many ideas that influence political decisions and all of these must be taken 
into account in forming a comprehensive academic theory. For no matter what ideology or 
theory a researcher represents, they still must argue and ensure that their model can meet the four 
goals described in this paper. This is the basic question that every student must ask - is this 
theory relevant and does it describe in adequate terms the events that are being studied. For if a 
. theory cannot describe, explain, predict and prescribe accurately the world politics then is it 
really a theory at all? 
2.4 Definitions of Power, Information and 10 
"Traditional measures of military force, gross national product, 
population, energy, land, and minerals have continued to dominate discussions 
of the balance of power. These power resources still matter, and American 
leadership continues to depend on them as well as on the information edge ... 
Information power is also hard to categorize because it cuts across all other 
military, economic, social, and political power resources, in some cases 
diminishing their strength, in others multiplying it ". 
(Nye and Owens, 1996, p.22). 
After a thorough review of the different academic theories that comprise the International 
Relations field, there were none in whole that matched to the issues involved with regard to 10. 
So an analysis of power and information was undertaken next. Power can mean many things, to 
many people. Generally its use is understood, that is, who has power and who does not. Power 
is also one of those ubiquitous terms that everyone seems to understand but few can actually 
define. Hans Morgenthau defined the elements of national power as geography, natural 
23 
resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national 
morale and the quality of diplomacy and government (Morgenthau, 1967). Nowhere in 
Morgenthau's definition is the use of information seen as an element of power. So this begs the 
question - have the elements of power changed over the last four decades? A short answer is yes 
and no, depending on the sources that one reads. For example, in a recent study by RAND, a 
revised view of power was suggested that combined national resources and performance to 
create an updated version of military capability as shown below: 
National resources 
Technology 
Enterprise 
Human resources 
Financial/capital resources 
Physical resources 
National performance 
External constraints 
lnfrastrLtctural capacity 
Ideational resources 
Military capability 
Strategic Conversion Combat 
resources + capability = proficiency 
Figure 2.1 -Views of Power (Source: Tellis et al, 2000, p. 8) 
Notice in this diagram, that technology is rated as the number one national resource as opposed 
to the more traditional concepts such as Morgenthau's that primarily involved physical assets. 
This is a huge change from older analyses which concentrated much more on a mere 'counting' 
of military assets and industrial plants. This RAND study goes straight to the concept that in 
essence symbolises the massive changes inherent in the Information Age, namely that the 
traditional power structure of the international community is being radically altered, thereby 
allowing nations, non-,governmental organisations, small groups and even individuals to gain an 
inordinate amount of power, based solely on their information technology capability. These 
ideas are emphasised even more by the RAND researchers as they explore this concept further in 
the aforementioned study. These ideas can be seen in greater detail even more in the following 
diagram, as the critical areas of technology are analysed, such as in this case, the location of 
information and communications. This revised ordering of resources that comprise power is 
definitely a change from previous studies in which more traditional emphasis was placed on 
natural resources. 
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National Resources 
• Technology 
• Enterprise 
• Human 
resources 
• Financial/capital 
resources 
• Natural resources • Information and communications 
• Materials 
• Manufacturing 
• Biotechnology and life sciences 
• Aeronautics and surface transportation 
• Energy and environmental 
Figure 2.2- Revised Reordering of Technologies (Source: Tellis et al, 2000, p. 12) 
Not everyone agrees with these concepts, and sometimes they do not even agree from the same 
research group! In another conference sponsored by RAND and the Central Intelligence 
Agency, analysts attempted to update the definitions and ranking's of nations visa vie power, and 
the main elements considered still consisted primarily of military and economic factors, that is, 
gross domestic product. Technology was sometimes included in this study, but information per 
se, as a separate and discrete stand alone element of power was never elucidated (Treverton, 
2001, p. 17). 
Taken together then, while there is a general understanding that change is needed in this 
new information environment, at what rate or pace is not always agreed upon. There are many 
academics that advocate a more gradual view of the changing emphasis of power and 
information is appropriate. For example, Tempestilli (1995) made the argument for the greater 
emphasis on the military uses of the informational element of power in his Master's thesis, 
Waging Information Warfare: Making the Connection between Information and Power in a 
Transformed World (Newport, RI, Naval War College). This is a slightly different slant than 
advocated by some academics who have called for a separate informational component or 
agency in the United States government similar to a cabinet agency. For if one examines the 
United States government closely, it is organised in this manner, namely with cabinet agencies 
centred around each of the traditional respective areas of power - Department of Defense 
(military), State (diplomatic), and Treasury or Commerce (economic), with each having their 
own informational component. There are also interagency organisations such as the National 
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Security Council or National Economic Council that still favour the concept of these three major 
elements of power (military, diplomatic and economic). Nowhere does a Department of 
Information exist in the United States government, because this form of power is still viewed by 
many as being very different from the more traditional elements, and in fact most of the 
participants in this research still did not advocate a separate branch or cabinet agency for 
information. Tempestilli agrees with this concept as well, and argues that each of the major three 
elements of power- militarily, diplomatic and economic, already in fact have informational 
components and that the United States government does not need a new Cabinet agency to focus 
solely on this element of power. This horizontal integration of information vice a vertical 
division as its own element has both good and bad aspects from an 10 policy perspective. 
Tempestilli argues, and the author agrees as well, that the cross fertilisation between the 
informational components is better than a single monolithic centre for information. This concept 
follows a majority of the participants in this thesis who also advocated for a greater horizontal 
integration across the interagency spectrum. From a policy perspective, this can be seen in Joint 
Publication 3-13 Information Operations that lists 10 as an 'Integrating Strategy', that is, one 
that can bring together these disparate warfare areas (JP 3-13, 1998). Thus as Tempestilli 
originally advocated, and has been borne out in countless interviews for this thesis, the use of 
informational power tends cuts across the entire United States government structure and is not 
easily pigeonholed into a traditional cabinet structure. This is both a strength and weakness for 
understanding the power of information, because it cannot be viewed in a traditional manner like 
the military or diplomatic elements. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Tempestilli was only one of many authors that were 
commenting on the perceived notion of a revolution in military affairs that were occurring in the 
mid 1990s. For example, there was a huge emphasis in the 1995-1996 timeframe, where a large 
number of articles by various authors highlighted the issues involved with the technological 
evolution of information. Cohen (1996) was one of these contributors during this period who 
argued for a change in reorganisation of the United States military to coordinate power in the 
information age. His concept was an attempt to solve the problems with incorporating 
information into the traditional hierarchical government structure, and while his argument was 
not answered immediately, there has been over the last decade, a number changes that have 
occurred, which in essence completed the reorganisation that Cohen advocated. As will be 
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alluded to later in this chapter, the American government, has significantly altered its 
organisational structure with respect to the functions ofiO. As the participants stated throughout 
the interview process, more still needs to be done, to close the gap between strategic policy and 
the tactical reality ofiO. A good analogy that is often used to answer the question about why IO 
is taking so long to become established within the United States government is to simply look at 
the introduction of aviation into the military services starting with World War I. The fact that it 
took a good two decades to realign and transform those military forces into truly utilising the 
power inherent in airpower, should not be lost on anyone. The same can perhaps be said of IO, 
namely that it will take time and hard work, perhaps on a similar timeframe as aviation for its 
potential to be truly realised. 
2.4.1 Changing Views of Power 
This research was conducted over the first decade after JP 3-13 was published (1999-
2008). Based on the previous analogy, it could be thought that significant changes should have 
occurred with respect to these new views of power. For, if information is now accepted as an 
element of power, should there not be dramatic changes as well from previous theories? Is the 
power of information new or different, as some advocates believe, or has infmmation always 
been an element of power, but it could never be properly utilised. Said in another way, has 
information always been an element of power and it is only now that technology can manage and 
harness this power? Critics of this new view of power have argued that because the world access 
to the Internet is not universal, this new technology cannot truly change global politics. Wriston 
(1997) notes that while maybe this is true, it is also irrelevant. The standard has been set, and the 
benchmark is high, for these new views of information flow must be understood and respected. 
In fact, the percentage of overall access and connectivity to the internet are on the verge of 
exploding as the combination of cellular technology and cheaper interface devices proliferate. 
However, the question is whether access to technology necessarily equates to greater 
power to a group or nation. Once again, the short answer is that it depends. As Treverton (200 1) 
relates in the report from RAND, 
"State power can be conceived at three levels: (1) resources or capabilities, or 
power-in-being; (2) how that power is converted through national processes; (3) and 
power in outcomes, or which state prevails in particular circumstances. The starting point 
for thinking about-and developing metrics for-national power is to view states as 
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"capability containers." Yet those capabilities--demographic, economic, technological, 
and the like-only become manifest through a process of conversion. States need to 
convert material resources into more usable instruments, such as combat proficiency. In 
the end, however, what policymakers care most about is not power as capability or 
power-in-being as converted through national ethos, politics, and social cohesion. They 
care about power in outcomes. That third level is by far the most elusive, for it is 
contingent and relative. It depends on power for what and against whom" 
(ibid, 2000, p.ll). 
What is interesting about this third concept, is that while it may be the most difficult to achieve, 
from an 10 perspective, it may also offer the most promise. One only has to review the four 
definitive bombing surveys of World War II or Vietnam, to quickly realize that military power 
often does not translate at all into desired outcomes. Clodfelter (1989), a retired Air Force 
officer, said as much in his book, The Limits of Air Power, The American Bombing of North 
Vietnam. For as the well-researched and documented official reports from the US Air Force 
allude, the massive bombing operations in all of these conflicts did not necessarily and in many 
cases, did not at all translate to shifts in the affected government or populations attitudes. As one 
veteran (and perhaps jaded) military officer once quipped, "If the only tool you have is a 
hammer, ever problem looks like a nail" (Hubbard, 2004). So too is the case of trying to take 
military power, in this case aviation assets, and translate them into recognisable outcomes. More 
often than not, this is not an easy task, as alluded to by many of the interviewees. 
The traditional central concepts of power in the form of national resources, and the need 
to convert those resources into power and instruments of power, are solely but surely a key point 
of the last few pages as different academics have added and changed the common views of 
power. In addition, since 10 as an academic study area crosses many issue lines, the 
development of suitable theoretical constructs has not always been easy with respect to power 
and information. A series of attempts that should be widely recognised can be attributed to 
Alvin and Heidi Toffler, who are probably the most prolific social authors with their three books 
Future Shock (1970), The Third Wave (1984) and War and Anti-War (1993). So profound is the 
influence of this couple and their publications on the Department ofDefense and United States 
government that probably more than any .authors, they have had the greatest effect not only on 
the general public, but also on governments around the world. It is their futuristic forecasts more 
than anything, of how we as a people are evolving with respect to the power of information, that 
have made them most famous. But they are not alone. Similar ideas about how the elements of 
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power and information are viewed and used are shown in other literature as well. For example, 
Kuehl (1997, 2000) from National Defense University argues that information is an equal 
element of power just like its counterparts from the military, diplomatic and economic realms. 
In fact in the United States military, the acronym DIME (Defense, Information, Military and 
Economic) is often used to express this concept- namely that there are number of elements that 
make up power, and that the military aspect is not the only one that should be utilised. 
2.4.2 Soft Power 
The concept of 'soft power' is not new. Haskell (1980) was an early adopter of this 
philosophy, in her discussions on the idea of information as an element of power. In her article 
on foreign policy, not only did she advocate the inclusion of information as an element of power 
but she also included the social aspects of power. Still others like Nye (1990) have brought forth 
the concept of 'Soft Power', which includes informational elements as well. In fact, Nye has 
continued an emphasis on this theme over the last 18 years with a number ofbooks and articles 
as the world has evolved in the post-Cold War era. An extremely interesting concept, 'Soft 
Power' basically argues that one can significantly influence other nations through the cultural . 
and informational aspects of its society. As opposed to 'Hard Power' in which analysts can often 
'count' or conduct intelligence to determine the potential of a perspective country, 'Soft Power' 
instead is a more influential or persuasive type of capability, and can be viewed by some, as a 
theoretical construct that span the gap between strategic policy and tactical operations of IO. In 
fact, 'Soft Power' may in fact be the one capability that can attain that elusive 'outcomes' that 
was mentioned in an aforementioned RAND report (Nye, 1990; Treverton, 2001). 
But what is Soft Power? It was originally defined by Joseph Nye as a concept that 
emphasises the power of attraction, as opposed to the power of coercion. All forms of power are 
extremely hard to measure, and this is no exception. Some ideas that were forwarded in the 
second RAND study alluded to earlier, have attempted to develop metrics to measure power as 
shown below: 
• Access to information. The government monopoly has eroded 
• Speed of reaction. Markets react in seconds, but governments are much slower, so the 
information technology (IT) revolution inevitably moved action away from governments 
toward nimbler organisations 
• New voices. The process created new channels of information and new, credible voices. 
The loudest voice, that of government, has become less dominant 
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• Cheaper consultation. Because of nearly unlimited bandwidth, communication costs 
began to approach zero. Coordinating large and physically separated groups becomes 
much cheaper 
• Rapid change. Governments, by nature, are more likely. to sustain the status quo than 
drive change, and so non-state actors are often the drivers by default 
• Changed boundaries in time and space. Information Technology again is driving the 
change, just as the invention of the printing press undermined the church's role as broker 
between people and their God. (Treverton, 2001, p. 13) 
Are these the only metrics available? Of course they are not and yet it is these 'outcomes' as 
mentioned previously that are most desired by government officials. A recent series of reports 
by RAND on the 'Information Revolution' illustrates the growing collection of data that is 
becoming available on information technology in particular. These include the number of 
internet users, the internet market size and high-technology exports. So there are actually some 
metrics that are available, which of course is key because this kind of data as it relates to IO, may 
give researchers the ability to measure the factors that are needed to achieve outcomes without 
the use of military power. Of course, what is interesting about these concepts is that it is exactly 
the ideas that these three aforementioned authors advocate, which while radical in their time, 
have been generally accepted today. The problem is, and thus the reason for this research, is that 
there still remains a gap between the high level strategic theory of IO, and its actual day-to-day 
operations. The inability of the United States government to translate these lofty concepts, the 
actualisation of the power of information, still remains elusive as alluded to throughout this 
literature review. 
Chuck de Caro (2003), a former Cable News Network reporter and Special Forces 
member, has taken this concept of 'Soft Power' even further with his idea of 'SoftWar'. In his 
view, de Caro argues that conflict in the future can consist mainly of perception management 
campaigns with television as the primary medium. He believes that the vast majorities of 
populations around the world get their informational news from the television and that influence 
operations should be conducted using professionals from the entertainment industry. This 
concept is probably one of the more coherent, cogent and perhaps radical argument's that has 
evolved out of the IO debate, and Mr de Caro was interviewed on multiple occasions to draw out 
further his ideas. It will be interesting as time goes on, to see how far he gets with these concepts 
with respect to IO. 
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2.5 The Information Age 
So from these books and articles, can it be assumed that information to the masses 
translates directly into power? 'Perhaps' is the probably once again the answer. When 
Gutenberg developed the printing press, it vastly increased the ability of the average person to 
access the written word, from what had been an exclusive privilege of the elite. Today the media 
is much freer than in the past, but there are still many instances and locations where information 
is still rigidly controlled. The RAND studies on the Information Revolution around the world 
demonstrate these facts over and over. Throughout this series, questions were asked such as how 
has information technology changed political dynamics within the countries of a given region, as 
well as how are the respective governments using information technology as a tool to govern. In 
their review, the authors from RAND analysed the political dynamics, from a largely 'bottom-up 
viewpoint' of the actions and initiatives of citizens, civil society, non-governmental 
organisations and political parties, in actions as diverse as organising protests of government 
policies to the overthrow of sitting regimes (Hachigian, 2001, p.55). The results of these surveys 
are fairly dramatic, with sharply rising access to information technology across a broad segment 
of the world's population. 
Likewise, in understanding the dichotomy not only between the 'softer' and 'harder' 
aspects ofiO, some books offer additional views on the power of information, with regard to the 
development ofiO .. For example in The Art of Information Warfare, Forno and Baklarz (1999) 
closely' examine the perception management aspects of the power of information, and discuss the 
specific deficiencies resident in the United States. These authors attempted use the writings of 
Sun Tzu as a model to relate to the different aspects of IO, and while they succeeded in some 
aspects, in others they were notably short, mainly because they did not address the computer 
networks operations aspects of information warfare. In addition, while Forno and Baklarz did 
address gaps for the United States government with respect to IO, they did not have realistic list 
of corrections or mitigations that could be utilised by the federal bureaucracy. 
If all ofthese changes are combined with the capabilities ofinformation technology and 
the role of the media with respect to the government, it can be noticed throughout the literature 
rev~ew, the dramatic changes that have occurred with respect to the elements of power in the 60 
years since the end of World War II. Felman (1993) notes as much in describing the historical 
trends of relationships between these two entities and his belief that media pools were not the 
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future answer to 'handling' the press in combat. Written after Operation Desert Storm, it is 
interesting to see how the intervening decade leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom allowed the 
military an even better understanding of the power of information, and this was reflected in the 
press coverage of the latter campaign. However, it is still very difficult to generalise how the 
control of the media reflects directly on this element of power. These changes are very 
interesting, because in two separate documents published by the US Department of Defense and 
State Department, it is readily apparent that both cabinet-level agencies are mutually coming to 
the understanding of the need for change in their informational policy in this new environment 
(Joint Publication 3-13, 1998; U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2000). In fact, 
both of these documents are great examples, as mentioned earlier of the theoretical disconnect in 
10 between strategic policy and tactical reality, mainly because both of these aforementioned 
documents were ahead of their time. For as noted by the participants noted over and over in their 
interviews, while neither publication has fulfilled its original mandate or promise, they have at 
least paved the way for additional intellectual discussion on the relationship between 10 and the 
federal government. 
From a theoretical and strategic 10 perspective, Joint Publication 3-13 was the seminal 
document for not only the United States military but also other organisations across the federal 
bureaucracy (ibid). For the first time, the Department o.fDefense issued in an unclassified 
format, the definitive concept of how America plans to conduct operations in the information 
age. This pamphlet showed just how important the Joint Chiefs ofStaffviews this particular 
element of power and how it can be used to affect the world politic. In effect, Joint Publication 
3-13 defined for the first tirr1e the strategic vision of what 10 truly could do for the United States 
government. But there have been issues and disconnects in this Department ofDefense policy, 
from its very inception in 1998 and a number of attempts have been made to rewrite or update 
this doctrine to make it more user friendly. As this research was being finished, a new update to 
this policy had recently been released, to accommodate all of the changes that are occurring 
within the military with respect to 10. The updated 10 policy is more constrained and resembles 
the original narrower Command and Control Warfare definition as defined later in this chapter. 
The new 10 policy has also tried to substantially narrow the theoretical gap that exists today. 
But one has to ask if this is a step back in 10 theory or is it more of an admission of the reality of 
how the United States can really conduct operations in this warfare area? While there is no 
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definitive answer, the author believes that it is probably the latter, based on the data collected 
throughout this thesis interview process. 
This 2000 publication by the State Department also echoes the changes reflected in 
academic journals, as well as from other military sources by emphasising the need for a new 
style of diplomacy, one more akin to the US Department ofDefense's 'Revolution in Military 
Affairs'. The areas that are highlighted in all of the publications listed above also continue to 
focus on new computer systems, notably information technology, that can be used to better aid 
the traditional diplomatic missions of the State Department. Likewise a shift from traditional 
secretive diplomacy to a more open public diplomacy role has been advocated as well, with calls 
for increases in financial resources and a reformation of the United States foreign affairs 
agencies (Brookings Institution, 1997). These were not the only sources that can highlight the 
importance of the management of information as a source of power. Another good example is 
Taylor's (1999) British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy, which is 
perhaps the only book that has been dedicated to analysing the power of information with respect 
to propaganda, public diplomacy, psychological operations and deception. Taylor ties together 
these disparate and obscure missions, in an attempt to understand the role of perception 
management in the 20th century (Taylor, 2002). 
These views on the changing role of power in the information age are also reflected in 
other publications as well. Metzl (200 1) wrote an article that shows the mindset of senior 
Clinton Administration officials as far as the potential of perception management, in particular 
public diplomacy and international public information with respect the changing role of power. 
Entitled ''Network Diplomacy" and published in Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 
what is especially interesting is that much of this article was written while Dr Metzl was serving 
in key roles with the development of Presidential Decision Directive 68 International Public 
Information at both the National Security Council and the State Department. Interviewed over a 
four year period (1999-2003), he was very insightful in his comments about how the United 
States government bureaucracy attempted through the implementation of new policy to come to 
grips with the power of information (Metzl, 2000). The inability of the White House (both the 
Clinton and the second Bush Administrations) to follow-through on Presidential Decision 
Directive 68 or really any strategic communications, public diplomacy or international public 
information effort on a long-term basis is crucial to the arguments of this thesis. For as noted by 
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many participants in this doctoral research, in interview after interview, while it is notable and 
laudable that all of these documents are released and that a tremendous amount of effort has gone 
into their research and publication, because progress in making these changes has been very 
slow, it has and will continue to take a long time to fully realise the true capabilities of IQ. So 
unfortunately with respect to power, the general consensus from the literature and interviewees is 
that the gap between IO theory and reality may continue to exist for the foreseeable future, and 
that a viable theoretical construct does not exist at this time. 
2.5.1 Changing Views of Information 
Taken together, all of these references help to define the changing evolution of power. 
This is advantageous, because it gives a baseline from which to understand the new roles of 
information. Taken as a reference term, information can be very perplexing. It can be 
technically oriented to mean the packets of data on the internet and a piece of electronic 
bandwidth, or it may be more socially oriented to mean human-to-human contact, but in reality, 
information is really much more than that. Information in a nutshell is really the glue that binds 
the power process together, and without it, there can be no international systematic structure. 
Therefore just like power, information also has many meanings to different people. However 
this document uses the following current definition articulated by the United States military in 
the aforementioned Joint Publication 3-13 (1998, p. 131). 
1. Facts, data or instructions in any medium or form 
2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in 
their representation 
Information is more than just a definition. An admirer of the concept of the information 
society has stated, "Information exists. It does not need to be perceived to exist. It does not need 
to be understood to exist. It requires no intelligence to interpret it. It does not have to have 
meaning to exist. It simply exists." (Webster, 1995, p. 27) .. It is concepts such as this, which can 
make it difficult for the layman to understand how information can be a source of power, or used 
as a weapon. Formerly the control of information could be somewhat restricted to official 
government channels. However, this is no longer the case, not only because of the 
aforementioned changes in the computer and telecommunications industry, but also because of 
the interconnectivity of the world as well. For example, some analysts such as Brown (2002) 
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believe that the power of information has now shifted to the masses and away from the 
government. "Compared with 10 years ago, the world is a more seamless informational space, as 
we move from a world of distinct national informational spaces into a more trans-national 
informational sphere" (ibid, p.4). However, there are other academics as eluded to earlier, who 
in fact believe that nothing radical has changed with respect to information and power. This 
dichotomy was extremely apparent to the author in his research interviews and in fact produced 
the two opposing conceptual models shown in Chapter Eight for the use of 10 in the United 
States government. 
2.5.2 The Role of Information in Warfare 
In addition, just like power, with respect to this definition of information, there are· a 
number of publications that have appeared over the last decade which seem to address the role of 
information in this new environment. For example, Henry and Peartree (1998) argue for a new 
political theory based on the power of information. Participants in this research agree with this 
need as shown in later chapters. In fact, the search for a suitable theoretical construct was a long 
and involved pr~cess, because of the diverse and complicated nature ofinfol1Uation. Not 
withstanding these issues, this is not to say that political theorists have not tried to develop new 
theoretical constructs with respect to IO. For example, as mentioned earlier, RAND has been 
very active in writing proposals for new informational policy for this era. The first of these was 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt's (1997a) In Athena 'sCamp, which was quickly followed by another 
manuscript, entitled Strategic Information Waifare Rising (Molander, 1998). In both of these 
books, the authors argue for a policy shift with an emphasis on the national or strategic level of 
war, where the use of information should be able to leverage the most power. Interestingly 
enough, it is this call for strategic 10 actions, and the subsequent lack of follow-on examples, 
that is really the whole crux of this research, namely that there ~s a delta between tactical 10 
activities and strategic policy. A third book published by RAND during this time period, The 
Changing Role of Information in Warfare, (Khalilzad and White, 1999) also offers a strategic 
promise of the utilisation of this new found power. But once again, there is little follow-on 
progress from the United States government, as the Department ofDefense did not make the 
wholesale changes as proposed in this book. Instead what has happened instead over the last 
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decade has instead been a series of small but discrete steps to slowly grow the Department of 
Defense's capability with respect to 10, all of which will be laid out later in this chapter. 
The next publication byRAND, Noopolitik (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999) is especially 
interesting, because the authors have attempted to redefine political theory with respect to 
international relations. They attempted to develop a new international relations strategy based on 
the power of information, in the process trying to answer Henry and Peartree's call for a new 
political theory for the power of information. Likewise in Noopolitik, Arquilla and Ronfeldt also 
argued that there is a gap between perception management and computer network operations in 
10 that has not been adequately addressed by the United States government, and that more 
strategic analysis must be conducted. These authors believe that since there is no overall 10 
policy for the whole of the United States government, that one must indeed be developed, to be 
pulled together from disparate pieces, to build a doctrine that can be analysed as a coherent 
whole. To quote the authors, "Strategy, at its best, knits together ends and means, no matter how 
various or disparate, into a cohesive pattern" (ibid, p. 5). Arquilla and Ronfeldt also stated, that 
they believe that these two ideational poles encompassed by perception management and 
computer network operations are in fact the keys to developing an overarching 10 theory and 
that in order for their new theory to succeed a strategic analysis or linkage should be developed 
between these often disparate and insular communities (ibid, p. 3). As will be seen later in this 
section, attempts to build this overarching strategy have fallen short. Likewise, the linkages 
between the different portions ofiO are not nearly as strong as Arquilla or Ronfeldt advocated. 
So unfortunately it appears from the research participants that a lot of the 'promise' of the power 
inherent in information and for that matter 10, is still not realised by the United States 
government. 
2.5.3 The Role of Information on Government Organisations 
For a number of years, academics have tried to analyse these changes, with respect to the 
power of information. For example, RAND embarked on a three-year long study of the effects 
of the information revolution on governmental organisations. Key discussion areas included the 
political, governmental, business, financial, social and cultural dimensions. Such changes were 
noted by the RAND analysts as occurring for two general reasons: 
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• Traditional mechanisms of governance (e.g., taxation, regulation and licensing, etc.) 
are becoming increasingly problematic, as the information revolution allows action 
beyond the reach of national governments. . 
• The distribution of political power is changing, as new non-state actors are being 
empowered by the information revolution, in the business, social, and political realms, 
at the sub-national, trans-national, and supra-national levels. 
These academics believed that governments will have to find mechanisms to deal with these 
changes and with these new actors for different nations often take different approaches. How 
this is accomplished will, of course, define the roles of power and information in the nation state, 
and especially the United States as it relates to this new environment. Other RAND publications 
about information have followed as well, including a study in 2000 entitled, Information and 
Biological Revolutions: Global Governance Challenges (Fukuyama and Wagner, 2000). This 
text examines the new elements confronting political leaders in the post-Cold War era and 
offered suggestions for change. An additional study by Libicki (2000) on the governance and 
development of the global information grid was published that same year. In an analogy to this 
research, Libicki debates whether the United States Air Force should adopt a top-down 
centralised approach to management of these services, or a more decentralised bottom-up 
approach. In this particular case, Libicki believes that it is inappropriate for the military branch 
to develop an enterprise-wide management control (or a top-down approach) at this time. This 
series of thoughts were very similar to data derived from other research participants, but there is 
still ·somewhat of a disconnect in all of these RAND studies, because they fail to acknowledge 
the large gap between their proposed strategic doctrines of IO and the day-to-day reality of 
tactical operations. So there still exists a serious difference between what many academics 
believe is possible to do with respect to IO and what in fact the United States government is 
willing to do in practice. This delta still exists today as evidenced by the data gained from the . 
interviewees in this research project. 
However RAND was not the only semi-government agency interested in the power of 
information. The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association was also busy 
pu~lishing a series on Information Warfare over this four year period as shown below: 
• CyberWar: Security, Strategy and Conflict in the Information Age (Campen, 
Dearth and Goodden, 1996) 
• CyberWar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Reality (Campen and Dearth, 1998) 
• CyberWar 3.0: Human Factors in Information Operations and Future Conflict 
(Campen and Dearth, 2000) 
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Written as an anthology, these books emphasise the evolution of the strategic and theoretical 
analysis of the warfare area since 1996. It is interesting to notice how Armed Forces 
Communications and Electronics Association also stressed the same key areas as Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, namely perception management and computer network operations. Two of the editors, 
Douglas Dearth and Dr Dan Kuehl, were interviewed on multiple occasions for this research and 
contributed valuable insight into the changing role of information with respect to power in the 
United States government. Unfortunately for a variety of reasons, this series was discontinued 
after the third edition, and no follow-on books are likely to be published. Offering an 
opportunity for 20-25 respected practitioners of the tradecraft, to update the general public and 
academic community on 10 activities, this series has been sorely missed. It was in the original 
Cyber War manuscript, that one can see much of the hope and promise that constituted the 
'Revolution in Military Affairs' movement of the mid 1990s. Overall the contributors of this 
series appear to be generally optimistic about the future of information warfare, but there was 
also cautionary tales, especially with talk about the threat of Cyber War. However that being 
said, in all aspects, this was another series of seminal publications, a set of ideas that framed 
much of the discussion for 10 when it was only starting to be recognised as a unique warfare 
area. The editors of the original Cyber War book were also fortunate to be able to include an 
introduction by Thomas Rona, the original creator of the term Information Warfare. Developed 
two decades earlier, he recognised the value of information and data within the context of 
nuclear war and the bipolar threat that existed at that time. Rona tied in the threats to the civilian 
infrastructure from 10, which was quite unique, and led to a nice dialogue among the disparate 
commentators in this series. He also understood that changes in information brought threats not 
to just the warriors in the field but civilians and society as well. 
Therefore from these books, articles and interviews, it can be understood that there are 
many factors in the equation of power with respect to the changing role of information. Some of 
these scholars believe that information is now the most important element of power, because it is 
the most fungible or transferable ofthe different fundamentals of influence, which would relate 
to the fundamental shift, alluded to throughout these publications on 10. There are concerns by 
some o( these authors that the rise of information as element of power is diminishing other facets 
and concepts of power such as sovereignty. As noted by Rosecrance in The Rise of the Virtual 
38 
State, the fungibility inherent in information gives the average citizen much more power than 
they had previously in the industrial era (Rosecrance, 1999). At one's fingertips is information 
previously only accessible to the rich and powerful. Communication around the world has 
increased so much that now country to country dialogue is not solely limited to diplomats but is 
instead conducted through millions of other conduits. These immense changes, as noted by 
Rosecrance, allude to the difficulty that countries, such as the United States face in this new 
environment. Likewise, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999) also discuss these same issues, most 
specifically the role of information in the conduct foreign policy, as another element of power in 
conjunction with military, diplomatic and economic elements. These academics also 
acknowledge that it is exactly this ability to manipulate and manage the power of information, 
which makes concepts such as IO so useful but also so much a destabilising factor to the status 
quo. For what all ofthese authors understand and relate in their publications is how in today's 
environment, groups, organizations, nation-states and even individuals can now influence policy 
at the systemic level simply by using information. This was not necessarily the case during the 
Cold War, but the vast explosion in technology, particularly in telecommunications and media 
propagation over the last 15 plus years, has forever changed the control over this power 
paradigm (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997a). 
This change and recognition that informational power in the form ofiO, is changing the 
way that the United States conducts its military and foreign policy initiatives can also be seen in 
other articles and books besides the official publications already mentioned (Joint Publication 3-
13, 1998; US Advisory Commission, 2000). Fulton (1998) stated as much and describes how the 
State Department must change to adapt to the influx of informational power. For probably more 
than any governmental bureaucracy, the State Department had a near monopoly on control of 
communication between governmental leaders, but with the advent of the internet, 24 hours news 
channels, satellite television and worldwide newspapers, that is certainly no longer the case 
today. Unfortunately, few if any ofFulton's suggestions were followed through because in 
2000, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy published a similar follow-on study 
entitled A New Diplomacy for the Information Age. Unfortunately again, little was done to 
change this federal agency and today, the State Department continues to grapple with these 
changes. Per the research participants' comments, few if any of any of these studies or critical 
recommendations for changing this cabinet agency have been implemented. But what is also 
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interesting, is that these studies all mirror the Defense Department's voluminous output of 
publications during the same time period. For instance, Fulton's tome was in effect a corollary 
to Joint Publication 3-13 published the same year. The joint publication will be explained in the 
next section, but in essence, both of these documents were attempts by their respective federal 
organisations to come to grips with the power of information, and incorporate it into their 
processes and methodologies. 
There are obviously other writers on this subject, with a large number of books talking 
about IO, Computer Warfare, Cyber Security and Net War having all been published in the last 
decade. For example, Adams (1998) forecasted a multitude of changes in the information world 
due to the increased connectivity of the globe. While Adams did not emphasise globalisation as 
much as connectivity, there is clearly a linkage between the two as shown by Stephen Flanagan, 
Ell en Frost and Richard Kugler in their National Defense University series on globalisation and 
national security. Entitled Challenges of the Global Century: Report of the Project on 
Globalization and National Security, this two volume set which features 50 chapters on a far 
ranging set of topics including strategic implications and emerging priorities for the United 
States, as well as the challenges ahead, including both global and regional trends (Flanagan et al, 
2001). Both of these books are emphasising the new roles of information around the world and 
how it is changing the dynamics of power. In addition, this 18 month project confirmed some of 
the key themes with respect to the changing role of power and information as they effect the 
United States government, as noted by the interviewees, to include the impact of the media and a 
bifurcated world order. 
Other authors and social scientists have also examined the effects of information as it has 
affected the United States government, and come to their own interesting conclusions as well. 
One of these is Gleick (1999; 2002), a journalist, who offered a rather unique perspective on not 
only the evolution of the information society, but also its cumulative changes to people and the 
way that they live in the American culture. Blending science and cultural journalism, Gleick like 
Adams offers different perspectives on the effects of the increased information flow, and how it 
is speeding up aspects of life in the United States. Unfortunately Gleick is more of an observer 
of the changes brought on by the Information Age and therefore offers no concrete solutions for 
improvement by the United States government. Rheingold (2000: 2003) is similar as well; both 
of these publications comment on the incredible changes in society around the world as a result 
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of information technology and how this new found power has empowered these citizens to 
conduct new initiatives. Once again, there is little useful advice or recommendations for changes 
on how to best utilise 10 in this new environment. However from an author's perspective, what 
makes these two author's so useful with respect to 10, is their ability to cobble together disparate 
ideas that range across a wide spectrum of the information environment and bring them together 
in one place, that is commercially available to all. It is exactly these kinds of books that senior 
level government leadership can read and try to get a feel for how fast the world is changing 
around them. In addition, these real-world examples are incredibly useful to help explain the 
paradigm shift that is occurring with the information revolution that may not be readily apparent 
to all. 
2.6 The Rise of Information Operations 
Even with the publication of all of these books and articles, 10 is still not understood very 
well. Too many lay people, 10 is simply computer warfare, but as has been emphasised, 10 is 
really about much more than that. In the United States, 10 is an attempt by the federal 
bureaucracy to develop a strategy to use all of the capabilities of information to affect the many 
issues that it deals with in the post-Cold War era. With these changes in the .elements of power, 
has come the realisation that militarily the United States could not solve all of its problems 
through kinetic means. 10 is therefore an attempt to bring these different facets of power to bear 
on a11 adversary in a synergistic manner to achieve our national objectives. For a long time, it 
was hard for the Department of Defense to address or even intelligently discuss the concepts of 
10. This was because there was no common, or readily available directive or publication 
available. This led to questions and confusion regarding definitions and lexicon that could not be 
fully addressed until the release of a coherent strategic policy, in the form of Joint Publication 3-
13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations published in October 1998. For the first time, the 
Department of Defense was distributing in an unclassified document, the doctrinal principles 
involved in conducting 10, which was obviously was a key milestone in the development and use 
of 10 within the United States government . 
The real key as emphasised by many participants to making 10 effective across the 
federal bureaucracy per Joint Publication 3-13, was to ensure the goal that the horizontal 
integration and coordination of the interagency organizations are conducted early on mainly that 
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is in the peacetime environment. IO can be a very effective tool for shaping the environment in 
the pre-hostilities phase, so that the actual need for hostilities may be avoided or minimised. 
However that is not always possible. There are still differences in definitions, notwithstanding 
the publication of Joint Publication 3-13. This is due to the fact that while IO was explicitly 
defined in 1998 by the Department of Defense, the concepts of information warfare go back 
earlier, to two different Department ofDefense directives issued in 1993 and 1996 respectfully. 
In addition, there are other subtleties between these two warfare or mission areas as well, with 
. the primary doctrinal difference is that information warfare contains six elements and is mostly 
involved with the conduct of operations during actual combat, while IO on the other hand, 
includes these six capabilities and two sometimes integrated or related activities. Likewise, IO is 
not only broader than information warfare, but is also intended to be conducted as a strategic 
campaign throughout the full spectrum of conflict from peace to war and back to peace, across 
the federal bureaucracy. Thus for all these reasons, IO is considered much more comprehensive 
than information warfare, and it is in IO that the full integration across government agencies and 
with private industry must occur (Joint Publication 3-13, 1998). 
Information Warfare 
Elements 
Computer Network Attack 
Deception 
Destruction 
Electronic Warfare 
Operations Security 
Psychological Operations 
Information Operations 
Capabilities 
Computer Network Attack 
Deception 
Destruction 
Electronic Warfare 
Operations Security 
Psychological Operations 
Related Activitie~ 
Public Affairs 
Civil Affairs 
The elements, capabilities and related activities of information warfare and IO as listed 
above, are separate and discrete warfare elements. Most have very old traditions and long-
standing histories that do not necessarily mean that every action conducted in these areas is 
always associated with IO. There are elements of destruction that are not part of an IO 
campaign, likewise not every public affairs activity has to be tied to information operations. In 
reality, all elements and their components of national power, in order to succeed, should be 
integrated into a satisfactorily planned, designed and executed information strategy. If this is not 
done, than the United States may not attain its national security goals in the new millennium. 
The concept of IO is intended to use these different capabilities and related activities to 
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produce effects in an integrated fashion. Therefore, while one can try to use all eight capabilities 
and related activities to conduct an operation, more often than not, a good 10 plan will probably 
only incorporate a few of these warfare areas (Giessler, 2002). The basic idea is that one does 
not always have to resort to kinetic means, and instead for 10 to work properly, the operators 
must understand the environment, assess their interests and the adversary's pressure points, to 
use whichever capability or related activity that will best affect the adversary. 10 is thus much 
more of an intensive study of not only your adversary, but also your own forces, which is more 
than perhaps many current military commanders have grown accustomed to (Kuehl, 2002). 
2.6.1 Information Operations Development in the United States 
As mentioned earlier, the use of information to influence foreign audiences is not new. 
Throughout this century, the United States has attempted to use information namely in the form 
of public diplomacy as a tool to influence foreign audiences around the world. President 
Woodrow Wilson created the Creel Committee on Public Information in 1917 and during the 
Second World War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Office of War Information, 
which included theVoice of America (Campden and Deatih, 2000; Armistead, 2003). This . 
agency and its overseas component were the forerun11.er of the United States Jnformation 
Agency, which was for almost 50 years was the home to public diplomacy within the federal 
structure. Defined as government activities intended to understand, inform and influence foreign 
publics, public diplomacy is one ofthe forms ofiO, along with perception management, strategic 
communications and influence campaigns that comprise the crux of this thesis. It was this 
strategic use of information that became a key factor ofUnited States foreign policy in the Cold 
War, where information was disseminated to worldwide audiences by television and radio 
broadcasts, in the form of a state-to-state dialogue. And we were not alone. Nations throughout 
history and to this present day have tried to use information to influence other countries as well 
as their own citizens since time immortal. How successful they were in those attempts often 
depended on a number of factors including cultural and psychological biases, as well as their 
means and methods of technology used to transmit that information. 
These ideas are not new. The Science of Coercion (Simpson, 1994) and Psychological 
Operations and Political Warfare in Long-Term Strategic Planning (Radvanyi, 1990) are only 
two of the more prominent publications that offer detailed academic examinations of 
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psychological operations portion ofiO. Considered the most difficult to execute, and perhaps 
hardest to understand, it is these perception management topics or the 'softer' side ofiO which 
seems to need the most future research as indicated by the various authors of these tomes. But 
there is a big difference between offering future research topics as opposed to concrete solutions 
to ensuring the tactical reality ofiO as a mission area. So in many aspects, both of these texts 
fall short of offering a viable solution to incorporating IO into the day-to-day operations of IO. 
This aspect was also enumerated by a multitude of the research interviewees who suggested that 
it was the 'softer' side ofiO, where the greatest gap existed between strategic policy and tactical 
reality. So it is good that the perception management or strategic communications portion of IO 
policy, appears to be changing the most in the recent version of the new Joint Publication 3-13, 
as the Department of Defense comes to the realisation that their doctrine must more closely 
match their capabilities. 
However, IO in the United States government is not just about perception management 
and in fact as mentioned previously, computer network operations play a major role as well. 
With the tremendous advances in computers and technology, the nature in which governments 
and countries interact has changed dramatically as well. A number of books have attempted to 
address these issues, some of which were written by authors previously mentioned. For example 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (200 1) published another book Networks and Netwar in which they 
describe the future of terror, crime and militancy. It follows the theme of their earlier work, The 
Advent ofNetwar, with a collection of essays from a distinguished collection of authors mainly 
written from a social Netwar perspective. A good update to their previous books, it is in this new 
publication that Arquilla and Ronfeldt were able to. expand on the emphasis on the importance of 
the networks, as an enabling framework for IO. Luckily the editors were also able to add an 
afterword, in the months after the events of 9/11 to tie together their themes. 
Likewise, Owens and Offley (200 1) presented their ideas on ensuring the adequacy of 
United States military power through more cooperative uses of information, joint operations and 
more emphasis on flexibility by the respective services in their book, Lifting the Fog of War. 
Not a pure IO book, Owens and Offley did however tie in some of the strategic concepts 
associated to this warfare area, and highlighted the follow-on efforts from the earlier revolution 
in military training efforts that are especially illuminating from an IO perspective. Other authors 
have also attempted to write about the development ofiO within the United States government 
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as well, including Alberts (i996). Later revised in 2002, this pamphlet, is part of a series funded 
by the Department of Defense, fostered a debate and helped to frame the course of changes 
within the United States military. In this book, a number of strategies are debated about the right 
course to insure that America has the best military for future operations and how IO plays a 
major role in much of this debate. The overall consensus from this discussion is that the strategy 
of IO must be very closely related to actual conduct of warfare (Alberts, 2002). Likewise, Hall 
(2003) generally agrees with both of these assessments in his book Stray Voltage: War in the 
Information Age. He also notes the same tendencies in the United States government as in this . 
thesis, namely that there is a significant disconnect with regards to the maturation of strategic IO 
within the federal bureaucracy. In addition, and this is significant, Hall is knowledgeable enough 
from a series of tours within the Department of Defense and United States government to 
understand that this new warfare area cuts across many operational boundaries and that it is not 
just enough to concentrate on the technical aspects ofiO to be successful, and that the 'softer' 
aspects must be understood as well. 
Moving on to other 'strategic' aspects ofiO policy within the United States government, 
a number of authors have written books on the technical aspects or the 'harder' side of IO. 
Denning (1999) fmmerly ofGeorgetown University and now with the NavalPostgraduate 
School, linked the computer network operations with IO in her book Information Warfare and 
Security In this seminal publication, she addressed a number of information security concerns 
including information assurance, and was one of the first authors to lay out in an unclassified 
forum, these key aspects of IO. Two other publications that were mentioned earlier, The 
Information Revolution and National Security (Copeland, 2000) and Strategic Waifare in 
Cyberspace (Ratray, 2001) are similar to Denning' s work in that the authors also compared the 
development of current national strategy with efforts to coordinate cyber policy and offered 
recommendations for the future. All three of these books analysed the links between power, 
information, doctrine and security policy, and are good sources to connect the 'harder' and 
'softer' aspects ofiO. In addition, these books are also important because it was during this 
period in which the Department of Defense was laying out the current policy on IO in the form 
of Joint Publication 3-13, as well as standing up the key IO organisations that will be described 
later in this chapter. 
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On a final note, a significant development for IO from a theoretical standpoint was a 
doctoral dissertation by Dunn (2002) that was published by the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology in Zurich. Entitled Information Age Conflicts: a Study of the Information Revolution 
and a Changing Operating Environment, the prime difference in her approach from this thesis 
was the use of structural realism as her theoretical construct. Dunn confronted the dilemma of 
the inconsistencies in her theory by trying to build a model that delineated key challenges 
associated with the information age. She examined all of the traditional international relations 
theory and one by one, dismissed them as inadequate to truly explain the changing environment. 
Even her proposed choice of structural realism, she admitted had major flaws in its use as a tool 
for modelling the power of information, and so in some aspects Dunn was restricted in her ability 
to adequately explain IO. In addition, she also understood the constraints of all forms ofrealism, 
which maintain the state as the primary actor. For as noted earlier, because of the radical 
changes in the power structure within this new era, the state is no longer the primary player in 
the information age. So it was this reason and others that will be delineated in later chapters that 
it was decided not to use an international relations type of theory as the backbone for this thesis 
and instead the theoretical construct proposed for this dissertation utilised Soft Systems 
Methodology, because it was able to accurately model the power of information and how it is 
radically changing the traditional power structure around the world. 
2.6.2 From Hiroshima to the Berlin Wall- The Cold War Era 
As explained earlier, IO is not new and there are great examples of the different parts and 
· capabilities of IO with the United States government. Historical data abounds on the capabilities 
over the last 60 years, with a good illustration as shown below from the immediate post World 
War II era. In this specific case, the Truman Administration wanted to strengthen and coordinate 
the foreign information measures in order to attain United States national objectives, specifically 
from a perception management perspective. As an attempt to stop the spreading spectre of 
Communism, the National Security Council passed an executive directive, National Security 
Council4, Coordination of Foreign Information Measures on 17 December 1947 (NSC, 1947). 
This policy was expressly designed to combat the extensive propaganda campaign currently 
being conducted by the Soviet Union at that time. Written to exploit and promote the message of 
economic aid that the United States was delivering to a number of foreign nations, especially in 
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Europe, this policy directive was also crucial in the interwar period, for there was no existing 
government agency which was tasked to conduct strategic information campaigns for the 
American public. Therefore this policy document was meant to serve as an interagency 
coordination mechanism, led by the Secretary of State. 
Coincident with these efforts by the National Security Council to develop organic 
information programs was a concern within Congress about the State Department's ability to 
propagandise United States citizens as well as foreign nationals. Therefore new legislation was 
enacted to ensure a separation existed between these two capabilities. It is somewhat amazing in 
this era of a throw away and disposable society, that much of the government agencies discussed 
in this paper are actually constrained by a law more than half a century old. In fact, the Smith-
Mundt Act which was passed in 1948 specifically forbids the United States foreign policy 
apparatus and in particular the State Department from conducting propaganda on American 
citizens. Much of this concern by Congress was in direct response to the immediate post World 
War 11 period, in which the conduct of public affairs and psychological operations within the 
United States government security structure was unrestrained. There were operations conducted 
by the Office of War Information and the United States Information Service, inside and outside 
of the continental United States that quickly raised a number of questions about the propriety of 
these activities. Therefore to ultimately coordinate the activities of the foreign affairs 
organizations, the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act popularly known as 
the Smith-Mundt Act, was enacted as a sweeping legislative bill that directed among other items, 
the forbiddance of the State Department from conducting propaganda, psychological operations 
or public affairs on the American public. Interestingly enough, today it still stands and is in effect 
as a major restraining component on 10 efforts within the United States government. 
This new act created a serious dilemma for the State Department in 1948, because it 
created a dichotomy between existing policy and operations. The new Assistant Secretary was 
supposed to conduct public diplomacy with a target audience of foreign nationals abroad, and 
was also supposed to manage a public relations campaign for the State Department, aimed for 
domestic consumption. There is an extremely fine line between building information tools on 
the same subject for two different audiences (Bernhard, 1997). To make matters worse, the 
Smith-Mundt Act actually made it illegal to conduct public diplomacy on the American people 
and directed that separate budgets exist for public diplomacy and public affairs. So not only did 
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these staffs have to differentiate products between their different audiences, but they also needed 
to do so under separate operating authorities and budget tasking. This was too much to ask, and 
so a decision was made in 1952 to stand up a new organisation, the United States Information 
Agency, whose sole purpose was to create a public diplomacy arm that could in fact conduct 
these activities legally, but only abroad and then only to foreign citizens (lbid). 
Thus for almost 50 years, the United States Information Agency was the main 
organisation responsible for the conduct of public diplomacy and information campaigns by the 
. federal government. Formed in 1953 under Reorganization Plan No. 8 of the Smith-Mundt Act, 
this new activity encompassed most of the information programs of the State Department at that 
time (Armistead, 2003). The lines of authority for this new agency when it was created were 
unique, not only because it operated as an independent organization, with the director of United 
States Information Agency reporting to the President through the National Security Council, but 
also because the director coordinated his own separate budget. These factors and resentment of 
their freedom within the agency would become major elements in later reorganisation efforts by 
the State Department over the next five decades. 
Moving rapidly forward 25 years, we see that the development of IO as a major military 
doctrine in the United States government is really a relatively new phenomenon, and while the 
first known use of the term information warfare was in 1976 by Dr Tom Rona, much of the 
critical thinking about this subject did not begin until the early 1980s (Campden and Dearth, 
1998). This was due primarily to the size of the former Soviet Union's military, which greatly 
concerned United States military analysts and planners. From 1975-85, the former Soviet Union 
often outnumbered United States conventional forces 3: 1, and, while the United States may have 
had a qualitative advantage, there are times when only sheer numbers count. In the Pentagon, 
military strategists were looking for methods to cut down on the former Soviet Union's 
advantage by attempting to counter traditional strengths with asymmetric non-nuclear attacks. In 
addition, these analysts noted that the former Soviet Unionrelied heavily on electronic warfare 
or radioelectrionyaborba (Radio Electronic Combat) in much of its doctrine, and there was a 
feeling that the United States government must combat this threat as well (Munro, 1991). It was 
in this era, that some of the early ideas about effects-based planning or IO began to evolve. 
In addition, efforts were also underway during this period to strengthen the use of public 
diplomacy as a tool for the United States. On 6 March 1984, the Reagan Administration 
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published a policy entitled National Security Decision Directive 130, US International 
lliformation Policy (NSDD 130, 1984). This document was envisioned to be a strategic 
instrument for shaping fundamental political and ideological trends around the world on a long-
term basis and ultimately affecting the behaviour of governments (Campden and Dearth, 2000). 
Written by the staff of the 'great communicator', it is not surprising that President Reagan would 
believe in the transformational power of information. Recognizing that a strong international 
interagency capability was needed, National Security Decision Directive 130 was a successor to 
National Security Council Directive 4. 
2.6.2 The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Global War on Terrorism 
These changes during the Reagan Administration were just the beginning of a maturation 
of 10 policy in America. It was in the first Bush Administration and the demise of the Soviet 
threat to the continental United States in 1989 that the greatest shift in policy with respect to 10 
began in the United States government. From the lessons learned during the experiences from 
the Cold War, it has became clear to war-fighters that the side that controlled the most 
information, and retained the ability to accurately manipulate and conduct an influence campaign 
was going to be victorious (Owens and Offley, 2001, p.lOO). This was most apparent 
immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, when strategic planners at the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
began to think and write new strategy, most of which was highly classified, on the use of 
information as a war fighting tool. In fact, the first document, Department ofDefense Document 
TS3600.1 was kept at the Top Secret level throughout its use, due to the restrictive nature of this 
new strategy (TS3600.1, 1992). 
While this publication started a dialogue on information warfare within the Department 
of Defense, its classification ultimately restrained a more general doctrinal exchange. Thus the 
need for a strategy to fit these revolutions in technology still existed, so a new concept entitled 
Command and Control Warfare was quickly developed. Officially released as a Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum ofPolicy 30 Command and Control Warfare (8 March 1993), 
this document laid out for the first time in an unclassified format, the interaction of these 
different informational disciplines, which when combined together could give the war-fighters 
the information warfare advantage (CJCS MOP 30, 1993). Command and Control Warfare as 
originally defined, contained the following five pillars: 
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• Destruction 
• Deception 
• Psychological Operations 
• Operations Security 
• Electronic Warfare 
Intelligence supported these five pillars in order to conduct both offensive and defensive aspects 
of this capability. While some quarters of the military greeted this new concept of warfare with 
enthusiasm, others were wary of any new doctrinal developments. However, the ability to 
integrate these different military disciplines to conduct nodal analysis against enemy command 
and control targets was also highly lauded as a great improvement (Ibid). Many units and all 
four military services in the United States developed command and control warfare cells and 
began training in this new doctrine throughout the mid-1990s. But there was a conflict between 
the Joint Staff and Defense Secretariat doctrine, since information warfare was a much broader 
attempt to tackle the issue of information as a force multiplier, while command and control 
warfare was more narrowly defined to apply only to the five pillars mentioned above (CJCS 
MOP 30, 1993; S3600.1, 1996; TS3600.1, 1992; JP 3-13, 1998). The fact that the United States 
was writing strategy to conduct operations in peacetime against nations was considered very 
risky, therefore official information warfare policy remained highly classified throughout much 
ofthe 1990s (Pilecki, 2000). 
The United States military also recognized the need to develop commands and agencies 
to conduct 'these types of warfare in the information age and therefore, even though doctrine was 
still in the formative stage, organisational changes began to occur in the early 1990s. The Joint 
Electronic Warfare Centre at Kelly AFB in San Antonio, Texas, was renamed the Joint 
Command and Control Warfare Centre in 1993, and would later be renamed the Joint 
Information Operations Centre in October 1999 and finally the Joint Information Operations 
Warfare Centre in 2004. The uniformed services also created a number of other new agencies 
beginning in 1995, to include: 
• U.S. Air Force- Air Force Information Warfare Centre 
• U.S. Army- Land Information Warfare Activity -later changed to the 1st Information 
Operations Command 
• U.S. Navy- Fleet Information Warfare Centre -renamed the Naval Information 
Operations Command and now subordinate to Navy Network Warfare Command 
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In addition to organizational changes by the services, new courses and schools were also being 
developed to teach new tactics. The National Defense University created a School of 
Information Warfare and Strategy in 1994, that was a fulllO-inonth-long academic curriculum 
designed to immerse the National War College students in the academic theory ofinformation 
warfare. Held for two years, the National Defense University graduated 16 students the first year 
and 32 in the second. However, the course was subsequently cancelled in 1996. This may have 
been due to a belief that information warfare instruction needed to be disseminated to a wider 
audience, so shorter courses and classes were developed instead, to teach a larger audience of 
National Defense University students. These existed for several years, including a five-day 
intermediate information warfare course for mid-grade officers and a two-day information 
warfare overview for senior officers, but by mid-2003 all were eventually cancelled (Giessler, 
2004). IO was still taught at the National Defense University as a series of embedded lectures in 
different curricula. In 2008, there was also movement to reinstate IO as a major subject topic at 
this institute, with the establishment of a Masters level program. The other official Department 
ofDefense joint course on information warfare is also taught at National Defense University's 
Joint Forces Staff College, formerly the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, V A. Held for 
two weeks, seven times a year, the current Joint Information Operations Staff and Operations 
Course is aimed primarily at mid-grade officers or civilian equivalent government personnel, 
who are serving in an IO cell or billet with a joint agency. A planner's course that takes these 
students' to the next level was also developed in 2001 and is still widely taught. 
Thus, doctrine continued to develop after the publication of Command and Control 
Warfare doctrine in 1993. The formation of information warfare agencies and commands in the 
1995- 1996 period, not only filled voids in the services but also helped to resolve the conflict in 
the development of information doctrine and policy within the United States government. There 
was a concerted push for declassification and better understanding of these concepts within the 
Department of Defense during this time frame, which resulted in the publication of Department 
ofDefense Directive S3600.1, Information Operations (9 December 1996). By downgrading 
this document to the Secret level, Department of Defense opened IO to a wider audience. In a 
related effort, the Defense Science Board also published its report on Information Waifare-
Defense in November 1996. Together these two documents attempted to clarify the differences 
between this older doctrine, and for the first time introduced the use of computer network attack 
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as an IO capability (S3600.1, 1996). However, there were other issue areas that referenced or 
alluded to IO in the unclassified arena during this time period as well to include Presidential 
Decision Directive 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations in May 1997. Written after 
the debacles in Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda, this directive was developed to integrate political, 
military, humanitarian, economic and other dimensions of United States government planning 
for complex contingencies, which included the informational aspects. Widely lauded at the time, 
subsequent studies and commentary reflect that in fact, little was changed by this Clinton 
Administration policy directive (Scarborough, 1999; Hamblet and Kline, 2000). 
Thus, the formation of information warfare agencies and commands in the 1995-1996 
time frame, also somewhat helped to resolve the conflict in the development of IO doctrine and 
policy within the United States government. However, since the Department ofDefense 
Directive S3600.1 was still classified Secret, it also limited greater discussion on the differences 
between IO and information warfare. But this constraint was somewhat muted because the 
Department ofDefense also presented in 1996, a white paper written to establish a vision for 
how the United States military will operate in the uncertain future entitled Joint Vision 2010. 
For the first time, in an unclassified format, IO was formally defined as 'those actions taken to 
affect an adversary's information and information systems while defending one's own 
information and information systems' (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, 1996, p. 69). To 
implement this vision and achieve 'full spectrum dominance,' four operational concepts were 
introduced'in this publication. 
• Dominant manoeuvre 
• Precision engagement 
• Full dimensional engagement 
• Focused logistics 
The essential enabler for all four of these concepts was doctrinally encapsulated as 
information superiority (Ibid). Defined as "the capability to collect, process, disseminate an 
uninterrupted flow of information, while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the 
same," information superiority consists of three components of which information operations 
was a prime factor. In addition to these doctrinal changes, the period of the mid-to-late 1990's 
was also a time of early experimentation. In the same time period, the aforementioned Joseph 
Nye and retired Admiral Bill Owens were also recognising that the United States should take 
advantage of its information superiority in the post Cold War era, and published an article in 
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Foreign Affairs, entitled 'America's Information Age'. This piece collaborated much of what 
the Department ofDefense was attempting to do with their Revolution in Military Affairs, in this 
case by describing the move by the country into a 'Third Wave', away from an industrial nation 
and more toward an informational society (Nye and Owens, 1996). But once again, one sees in 
this particular article, the advocates for 10 developing a high level strategic policy, but little 
information on how to actually achieve these goals. In addition as was noted in this article, with 
these perceived advantages came threats as America is most often recognised as the nation with 
the most vulnerability from a cyber attack. Other authors followed Nye and Owens beliefs, 
advocating a radical change in the manner that the United States government could conduct 
warfare. These concepts were cited by authors as diverse as Winn Schwartau' s comments on an 
'Electronic Pearl Harbor' to Adams vision on the future of war, and the advent of 'NetWar', 
'Strategic Information Warfare' and well as the concept around strategic warfare in cyberspace 
(Schwartau, 1996; Adams, 1998; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1996, 2000; Molander, 1998; Ratray, 
2001). However, the theoretical disconnect in all of these articles continued to exist, because the 
changes advocated by these authors were often too radical and too fast for the Department of 
Defense to can-y out. 
For example, Schwartau (1996) is probably at least as well known for his book on IO, 
Information Warfare: Cyberterrorism- Protecting Your Personal Security in the Electronic Age, 
as opposed to his testimony before Congress, and his annual 10 conference, INFOWARCON, 
that was held each September in Washington, DC unti12003. His efforts to heighten awareness 
about 10 often seemed over the top, but he believed that he was successful in getting the 
American population to understand about this new threat (Schwartau, 1996, 2003). The problem 
that resulted though from these methods was once again a disconnect between lofty promises of 
new and wonderful capabilities with respect to 10 and the reality of what could actually be done, 
especially in the early stages ofiO between 1995-2001. In the author's opinion, this 
sensationalism ofiO in that time period actually did .something of a disservice to the emerging 
warfare area, because it oversold the reality of what 10 could do. Unfulfilled promises then led 
to dissatisfaction, which may have led to disbelief. Ultimately hype needed to be separated from 
reality, in order to move ahead with the 'real' capability and the author believes that this has 
been accomplished over the last decade as 10 has been 'operationalised' and brought into the 
mainstream of Department ofDefense operations. 
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Likewise James Adams in his book The Next World War: Computers are the Weapons 
and the Front Line is Everywhere, also to an extent oversold the problem (Adams, 1998, 2000). 
His publication was more of reflection and observation of trends, much like Rheingold and 
Gleick's works, which are mentioned earlier in this chapter. But what Adams did do, which the 
author felt was beneficial, was to show that the traditional boundaries of warfare, had been 
removed in the information age, and that no longer could the American citizens count on the 
military to protect them. While Adams was not the only author to understand this important 
point, his book was one of the more useful in explaining the consequences of this new 
environment. Likewise, the same can also be said of Arquilla and Ronfeldt' s book The Advent of 
Netwar. One of a series of publications by these prolific authors on this topic, what distinguishes 
this book from their others, is the emphasis on a new kind of warfare, one fought by networks 
against other networks (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1996). Interestingly enough, this concept has also 
been adopted by the US military, in particularly the US Navy. Entitled 'Network Centric 
Warfare' and championed by retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, this idea has gone a long 
ways in at least one service towards operationalising IO (Cebrowski, 2003). This is very 
. interesting, because in this case, one actually had a concept that was advocated and accepted by . 
the Department of Defense, with regard to the utilisation of 10. As noted in his interview with 
the author, Vice Admiral Cebrowski echoed many of the key points in these books, when he 
discussed these huge changes that were occurring, especially as power shifts from the industrial 
age to an information era. 
Another of these early advocates of IO was Roger Molander who also expressed similar 
thoughts not only in his book, Strategic Information Warfare Rising, but likewise during his 
interview with the author (Molander, 1998, 2003). He understood that the threats in this new 
environment were not from traditional adversaries but instead from a variety of organisations and 
entities that were not previously thought to possess this type of capability. While much of his 
book focused on the cyber threat, this author believes that the intervening five years between its 
publication and the interview for this research has shifted some ofMolander's views. Obviously 
the events of 9/11 had occurred as had the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, all of which may 
have contributed to Molander's emphasis on the 'softer' side ofiO, especially strategic 
communications during his interview in 2003. It would have been interesting to see if the same 
shift had occurred with Greg Rattray as well. The author of Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, 
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this US Air Force officer's PhD dissertation from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology was 
also completed as was his interview for the research, before the events of9/11 (Rattray, 2001). 
Rattray' s thesis had a huge emphasis on Cyber Warfare, and orie has to wonder how this book 
might have been changed if it had been published later, after September 11th, 2001. Rattray 
though unlike virtually all of the other authors mentioned earlier, did however get a chance to 
operationalise his theory, when he was selected to be a commander for a United States Air Force 
10 Squadron in San Antonio, Texas in 2003. 
2.7 The Latest 10 Policy Changes: The 10 Road Map 
In these next two sections, a very detailed review of the most recent changes in 10 policy 
and organisations will be undertaken to compare to the recommendations that constitute the 
Conceptual Models developed in the last chapter. To begin this process, undoubtedly the most 
significant recent policy change that impacts 10, from an American standpoint, was the 
publication of the 10 Road Map (Department ofDefense, 2003). This directive proposes a way 
ahead for the United States military forces specifically with regard to the future ofiO. The 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review identified 10 as one of six critical goals supporting Department of 
Defense transformation, and it set fotih the objective of making 10 a 'core capability' for future 
United States forces. The 10 Roadmap further identified three critical areas in which United 
States capabilities must be improved. The first of these was an improved ability to 'fight the 
net', and this desire stemmed from the realisation that in an era of 'network centric warfare', 
protecting the networks on which the Department ofDefense depends is an essential to United 
States military capability. The second of these critical areas was the need to 'improve' 
psychological operations in the Department ofDefense. This translated to making it more 
integrated with and supportive of national level themes and objectives, as well as to enhance 
United States ability to impact adversary decision-making. Finally, the third crucial area that 
needed to be improved was the need for the United States forces to conduct offensive operations 
in/via the electromagnetic spectrum- to include both computer network attack and electronic 
warfare capabilities. 
From these three critical areas, the 10 Roadmap further recommended a series of actions 
to improve overall offensive 10 capabilities of the Department ofDefense. The first of these was 
to develop a common understanding ofiO, and it offered a new definition ofiO that would 
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eventually be issued to the joint world doctrinally via a revised Joint Doctrine Publication 3-13 
and a revised Department ofDefense Directive 3600 (JP 3-13, 2006; DoD S3600, 2006). The 
10 Roadmap also stressed the need to both consolidate oversight ·and advocacy for 10, while 
simultaneously delegating capabilities to the Combatant Commanders, and to do this the US 
Strategic Command's 10 role was expanded and strengthened, to the point where the Strategic 
Command became in effect 'the 10 command'. This need to create a core of trained and 
educated 10 personnel, and the requirement to improve the ability to analyse 10 operations and 
effects, were both cited in the 10 Roadmap 's recommendations. In addition, there w.ere also 
suggestions for the improvement of each of the five 'core competencies' ofiO as defined by the 
Roadmap- namely computer network operations (which includes attack, defense and 
exploitation), electronic warfare, military deception, operations security and psychological 
operations. The need to clarify the 'lanes in the road' between psychological operations, public 
affairs, and public diplomacy was also emphasized as well. Finally, IO's place in the budget 
process needed increased transparency, to clarify what resources 10 actually had and what would 
be needed to provide a stronger, more robust and more comprehensive set of capabilities. All in 
all, the full 10 Roadmap laid out 57 specific recommendations designed to develop specific 
elements of the overall recommendations as discussed above. 
The new definition of 10 published in the 10 Roadmap was very much centred on the 
military aspects of information, and was almost a verbatim return to that contained in the early 
1990s doctrine for command and control warfare, defining 10 as 'The integrated employment of 
the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological 
operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and 
related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated 
decision-making while protecting our own' (U.S. Department ofDefense, 2003, p. 11). This 
new definition was a significant narrowing ofiO's scope downward from what had been laid out 
in the 1998 Joint Doctrine Publication 3-13, which defined 10 as "actions taken to affect 
adversary information and information systems while protecting our own" (JP 3-13, 1998). That 
earlier approach was much broader and more inclusive of other federal 10 activities, and tended 
to focus on effects rather than means. It was also more difficult to resource. Traditionally the 
military services are responsible for 'organising, training, and e~uipping' forces, and they 
complained that nothing in the original1998 definition could be directly tied to military 
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programs. The new 10 Roadmap definition, on the other hand, could be immediately tied to 
several long-standing and well integrated force programs. The new definition also included 
several controversial elements, most of which were related to the word 'influence'. The 'lanes in 
the road' issue contained in the recommendations was the most controversial element, because it 
brought together into one discussion, several activities and communities that traditionally have 
viewed each other with great suspicion. The links and relationships between public affairs 
(whether Department ofDefense or State), psychological operations, military deception, and 
public diplomacy (at State, which viewed the new IQ term 'defense support to public diplomacy' 
with scepticism) are undeniable in a theoretical sense, but in the 'real world' of the federal 
government where turf battles, organisational cultures, and concerns over roles and 
responsibilities, all intermix to create an environment that often does not embrace change. 
The 10 Roadmap 's definition of IQ was actively formalised across the military services 
as mentioned previously with the release of the newly-revised Joint Doctrine Publication 3-13 
(JP 3-13, 2006). The old Joint Publication 3-13 had been in effect for more than seven years, 
during which much had changed in the IO environment. While the old doctrine had perhaps 
emphasized organisational measures, the new one makes several conceptual advancements as 
well. To begin, it described the information environment as a synergistic interaction of three 
dimensions: the physical, with the infrastructures and links of information networks; the 
informational, representing the actual material being carried by the physical networks; and the 
cognitive, of the perceptual element, where the human mind applies meaning to the information 
and which was described as the "most important" of the three. It also removes the term 
information warfare from the official lexicon, and while most of the rest of the world still uses 
information warfare as the most descriptive and commonly understood term for this, the 
Department of Defense on the other hand has officially dropped it. The new Joint Publication 3-
13 explicitly links IQ to the Defense Department efforts to 'transform' itself, and it emphasizes 
the importance ofiO's multinational and coalition elements. The role ofUnited States Strategic 
Command as the chief advocate and proponent for IQ is also emphasised, and its mission of 
coordinating IQ across geographic areas of responsibility, such as between combatant commands 
in Europe and Asia, and across functional boundaries, is described in greater detail than before. 
The relationship between strategic communication and IO is also stressed, and it provides a 
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definition, albeit perhaps a misguided one and misleading one for information superiority (Joint 
Publication 3-13, 2006). 
In addition to these high level strategic changes in 10 policy across the department of 
Defense, the American military services have also either published or revised their doctrines for 
· 10 in the last few years. The Marine Corps published Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 
3040.4, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations in July 2003; the Army 
published a new Field Manual (FM) 3-13 Information Operations in November 2003; while the 
United States Air Force also published a new Air Force DoctrineDocument (AFDD) 2-5 
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Information Operations in January 2005 (US Army War College, January 2006). All of these 
new directives reflected their individual Service's perspectives on warfare and 10, and not 
surprisingly viewed 10 through the lenses of air, land or naval warfare. The final policy action 
with respect to the Department ofDefense to be discussed came in late 2006, with the United 
States Air Force's 'claiming' of cyberspace as one of its three core operational environments. 
While some saw this as nothing more than a turf grab for new missions and resources, in truth 
the Air Force had stated for more than a decade that it operated across three physical 
environments: air, outer space, and cyberspace. In December 2005, the United States Air.Force 
Chief of Staff, General Michael T. Moseley, and Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne, 
issued a new United States Air Force mission statement declaring that cyberspace was a core 
mission area for the Air Force, and they followed this policy statement in late summer 2006 with 
actions to create an Air Force major command for cyberspace operations that will stand 
alongside both the Air Combat Command and Air Force Space Command (Bennett and Munoz, 
4 November 2006). 
2.7.1 Policy Changes: Offensive 10 
Even with the major emphasis by the Department ofDefense on the IO Road Map, the 
most radical change with regard to offensive 10 policy changes have not occurred in the 
traditional realms ofiO, but instead in the more 'nebulous' regions such as strategic 
communications, public diplomacy, international public information, perception management 
and psychological operations. A logical place to review the recent 10 policy changes in these 
areas, will involve the federal interagency cooperation and coordination efforts. This is because 
while no National Security Presidential Directive has been released on strategic communications 
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or IO, a significant number of new strategic guidance directives have been published, beginning 
with the new National Military Strategy published in 2005, and the new National Military 
Strategy on Cyberspace Operations, all of which require significant coordination across the 
different federal agencies. Likewise other key National Strategies addressing on cyber security, 
homeland security, and critical infrastructure protection have also been approved, which help to 
give an overarching framework to IO. As will be addressed later, while the two Policy 
Coordination Committees created by National Security Presidential Directive 1 remain in 
existence, in April 2006 a new Policy Coordinating Committee for Public Diplomacy and 
Strategic Communication was created, chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Ms. Karen Hughes (U.S. Department of State, 2006). What of 
course is significant about Ms Hughes is her proximity and close working relationship with 
President George W. Bush. 
However from the perspective of perception management and strategic communications 
policy, a true comparison of doctrine versus requirements desired by the participants instead 
begins a decade earlier in 1997 with the publication of the Clinton era Presidential Decision 
Directive 56,.Managing Complex Contingency Operations. Unfortunately if one examines the 
attempts to develop a more recent and overarching 10 doctrine with respect to interagency 
aspects of the "softer" side of IO, particularly psychological operations, international public 
information, public diplomacy and strategkcommunications, those efforts have been less than 
successful. Even before the events of 11 September 2001, there had been efforts by the White 
House to update and rewrite a new National Security Presidential Directive to focus on influence 
at the strategic level, specifically with the release of a Defense Science Board report on Managed 
Information Dissemination in 2001. Written by public diplomacy professionals and led by its 
Chairman Vince Vitto during the transition period between the Clinton and Bush 
administrations, it laid the groundwork for the 2004 Defense Science Board Report on Strategic 
Communications, but because it did not come from the Executive Branch, much of its 
effectiveness appears to have been lost. In addition, a new National Security Council Policy 
directive on Strategic Communications, which was to rely on the three earlier National Security 
Council directives (NSC 4 (1947), NSDD 130 (1984), and Presidential Decision Directive 68 
(1999), was were supposed to be issued in 2002. However that did not occur, for a variety of 
reasons, mostly political as cited in the research interview process (Jones, 2003). Some of this 
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may have been due to the debacle concerning the Office of Strategic Influence in February 2002, 
which in effect hamstrung the Bush administration in its attempts to develop a cohesive strategic 
communication effort, however there were a number of other reasons as well that are cited 
throughout this thesis. Thus the ultimate failure of the executive branch to promulgate a strategic 
policy in this area of 10 probably occurred more as a case of general inertia and political 
unwillingness, than any other factor. 
These failures are not totally representative of all efforts on the offensive aspects ofiO. 
In fact a number of significant changes have occurred within the U.S. government with respect to 
broader policy area of public diplomacy. For example, the term Strategic Influence has 
disappeared in lieu of the term Strategic Communications, and since April 2002, the Department 
ofDefense has regrouped and pressed on to conduct strategic influence operations under this 
new name (Parker, 2004). However even then, progress has been somewhat slow, and in many 
cases very sporadic. For example, the current structure of the new Policy Coordinating 
Committee for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication within the National Security 
Council constitutes an attempt by the Bush administration to develop a strategic communications 
. capability. Under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and 
Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, attempted to oversee an overarching United States government 
strategy for Strategic Communications, but early gaffes and missteps spelled to its loss of 
prestige with her departure in 2007. 
This is very ironic, because it was only in late 1999 that the United States Information 
Agency was dismantled, and its functions shifted under the greater umbrella of the State 
Department in what many saw as a hostile takeover. In fact, in three successive years (2002, 
2003, and 2004) Representative Henry Hyde (R-NY) proposed the reconstitution of the United 
States Information Agency, in a number oflegislation attempts such as Information Protection 
Act of2002- HR 3969 (Kovach, 2004). None of these legislative efforts were successful, nor 
have the recommendations in either Defense Science Board on Managed Information 
Dissemination ever been accepted, which means that in the last decade, little has been done to 
rebuild a United States Information Agency like capability. 
However other changes are also still occurring with respect to the relationship between 
10 and the larger issue of strategic communication and influence. As the military conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have continued, more recommendations continue to come from various 
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independent and quasi-government efforts regarding the need for a greater perception 
management capability by the United States government , to combat the adversary in the Global 
War on Terrorism, as shown by some of the these documents-cited below: 
• Building America's Public Diplomacy Through a Reformed Structure and additional 
Resources, U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (2002), 
• U.S. Public Diplomacy, U.S. General Accounting Office (2003), 
• Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy, 
Council on Foreign Relations (2003), 
• Strengthening U.S.-Muslim Communications, Center for the Study ofthe Presidency 
(2003), 
• How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy, Heritage Foundation (2003), 
• The Youth Factor: The New Demographics of the Middle East and the Implications 
for U.S. Policy, The Brookings Institution (2003), 
• Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy 
in the Arab and Muslim World, U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 
(2003). 
All of these publications, as do many of this research's participants in particular emphasise the 
need for a greater perception management capability within the federal bureauqracy. This idea is 
crucial because as the events of September 11, 2001 indicate, military, political, or economic 
power is often ineffective in dealing with these new kinds of threats to the national security of 
the United States. These attacks were a blow to the American public and its perception of the 
government, and the fear produced by the terrorist acts can only be defeated by using a 
comprehensive plan in which information is a key element, or as John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt argued, the concept of networks fighting networks (Armistead, 2007). Both Operation 
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom represent campaigns fought about perceptions, 
and the side that will ultimately emerge as the victor is the one that can best shape and influence 
the minds of not only their adversary, but their allies and even neutrals and uncommitted parties 
as well. The changes are truly revolutionary and describe a profound shift in the nature of 
power. Unfortunately, this transformation has not been translated from a strategic concept to 
·tactical actions (Kuusisto, Kuusisto and Armistead, 2004). 
2.7.2 Policy Changes: Defensive 10 
Not all interviewee's on this project focused solely on offensive 10 policy, and indeed 
much of the energy and enthusiasm by the participants also centred around defensive 10 policy 
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as well. In the last decade, good examples of the development of 10 defensive policy can be 
seen primarily in the Information Assurance and Critical Infrastructure Protection operational 
areas. In the next section, all of the updates to federal 10 policy' in these areas will be discussed 
and their relationship to the desires of the interviewees analysed as well. 
2.7.2.1 Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Critical Infrastructure Protection as a discrete issue within 10 began with the 1998 
issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 63 by the Clinton Administration. In addition, the 
events of 9/11 affected this area greatly, and the Bush Administration has followed this initial 
effort with several policy and organisational changes of its own. Although the National Strategy 
to Secure Cyberspace was issued after the terrorist attacks, the strategy was written and 
coordinated before that date, and reflected the efforts of the Bush Administration's then-advisor 
for infrastructure protection, Richard Clarke, who had also had the major hand in the Clinton 
Administration's efforts in this area. In 2003, the Bush Administration also issued two further 
strategies, namely the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures 
and Key Assets, and the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. All of these strategy and guidance documents 
reflected the same basic philosophy of the earlier Presidential Decision Directive 63, namely that 
the task of conducting Information Assurance and Critical Infrastructure Protection at the 
national level was too difficult a task for unilateral government or business-sector solutions and 
thus required a partnership between all parties: owners, users, and the national security 
apparatus. The Defense Department had recognised the importance of this issue earlier, and 
indeed the Department ofDefense was one of the principal instigators of a series of national-
level studies that began in the early 1990s on these issues, and within the Joint Staff, which is 
responsible for Department ofDefense wide communications, the J-6 directorate has been one of 
the central players in this area. In early 2006, the J-6 created a new office, the J-6X, and 
assigned it the responsibility of developing a National Military Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, 
the name being chosen to obviously parallel the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, written 
in the 2001-2002 timeframe. Although this effort was unable to meet its initial and overly-
ambitious timeline of 120 days from start to finish, by the end of2006, the new National 
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Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations had been signed by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 
Likewise in 2001 under Executive Order 13 231, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the 
Information Age, the Bush administration re-designated the Committee for National Security 
Standards, as the primary group to provide a forum for the discussion of policy issues, sets 
national policy, and promulgates direction, operational procedures, and guidance for the security 
of national security systems through the Committee for National Security Standards Issuance 
System as shown in the Committee for National Security Standards documents 4011-4016. Also 
from a Critical Infrastructure Protection standpoint, there has been an equally prodigious output 
of directives and memorandum from the Clinton and Bush Administrations over an eight year 
period including as an example, three Executive Orders (13010, 13064 and 13231), a Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 7, and three Government Accountability Office Reports all issued 
in close proximity (March, April, and May 2004), to support this area of Information Assurance. 
What all of these disparate elements of the business and governmental interests did was to move 
forward Critical Infrastructure Protection as a vital and useful component of 10. However, 
because most of the infrastmcture portion of Critical Infrastructure Protection is predominantly 
owned and operated as a function of the commercial sector, progress has been uneven, with some 
segments, notably banking and finance, advancing more rapidly than others. This disparate 
focus is especially noted in the three General Accountability Office reports that highlight 
deficiencies in not only the efforts of the business sector but the federal government as well. 
2.7.2.2 Computer Network Defense 
In addition to Critical Infrastructure Protection, the development of additional policy with 
regard to Computer Network Defense has been a major component as part of a broader 
discussion by the Department of Defense on the alignment of IO into offensive and defensive 
capabilities that match better to their functional organizations. For if International Public 
Information (Clinton Administration) or Strategic Communication (Bush Administration) is 
normally considered the "offensive" aspects of this warfare area, and then Information 
Assurance with its related functions of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Computer Network 
Defense are more in the defensive realm. In fact the foremnners of lA in the form of 
Information Security and Computer Security have long and distinguished histories within the 
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defense bureaucracy. A good example of this regards a portion of information assurance that 
centres on computer security assessments plus the certification and accreditation process. The 
original methodology for information assurance was known as the Department of Defense 
Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP -
Department ofDefense Instruction 5200.40, which was in existence for 10 years and was 
replaced in late 2007, by a new certification and accreditation policy entitled the Department of 
Defense Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP). What this 
new process does is to force the program managers to evaluate their system from a 
confidentiality, integrity and availability standpoint on the value of the information protected. 
To do this, the program managers must determine the confidentiality, robustness and mission 
assurance category of their architecture by discussing and analysing the system with key 
personnel, such as the user representatives, system administrators, information system security 
managers and certification agent. This doctrine was a concerted attempt by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense to lay out a new methodology for ensuring the security of its networks and 
applications, by standardizing the process through well-recognized lA controls. This is 
important because this new policy tightens the protection of the government and Department of 
Defense by enforcing standards across the enterprise. 
There have also been other directives on computer network defense such as The National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, which ties into critical infrastructure protection as part of a larger 
effort to protect America. An implementing component of The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security and complemented by a National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets, all of these documents were developed to allow the American 
public and commercial industries to secure the portions of cyberspace that they own, operate, 
control, or with which they interact. Once again, these documents reiterate one of the key 
lessons of this process, namely that 10 does not have to be a top-down effort, because power has 
been shifted to the masses as part of the information age, but the protection of America must now 
be disseminated as well. Citizens of the United States are very accustomed to having the 
military or armed forces act as their protector against adversaries, but in the information age that 
is not always possible or practical. 
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2.8 Defensive 10 Policy that led to the Stand up of the Department of Homeland 
Security 
As noted above, securing the population is a difficult strategic challenge that requires 
coordinated and focused effort from our entire society, the federal government, state and local 
governments, the private sector, and the American people. That is what is different about this 
current era and what must be accepted in order to truly understand the power inherent in 
information. The final new policy and organizational initiative from a defensive IO perspective, 
has actually been the creation and development of a Department of Homeland Security. During 
the fall of2000 and the spring of2001, a 14-member bipartisan commission headed by former 
Senators Gary Hart (D-CO) and Warren Rudman (R-NH) released a three part series on the new 
threats to national security. Entitled the 'United States Commission on National 
Security/Twenty-First Century', their initial report Road Map for National Security: Imperative 
for Change, attempted to summarise, based upon the changing environment, the new threats to 
the United States, especially with respect to information (United States Commission on National 
Security I 21st Century, 15 February 2001). These reports proposed radical changes in the 
structures and baseline processes of the governmental apparatus to ensure that America did not 
lose its global influence or leadership role. 
In an eerie coincidence (or perhaps not), the recommendations provided by this group 
provided much of the foundation for the changes that occurred after the attacks of September 
11th, 2001. While initially scoffed at by academia and the federal bureaucracy, the suggestions 
of this commission on national security in fact foreshadowed much of the changes that have 
occurred over the last five years. Equally as disturbing with regard to threats to national security 
and the role of information was a series of comments made by then Central Intelligence Agency 
Director George J. Tenant before the United States Senate select Committee on Intelligence on 7 
February 2001. In this testimony, Tenant stated that "the threat from terrorism is real, it is 
immediate, and it is evolving .... Terrorists are also becoming more operationally adept and 
more technically sophisticated ... for example, as we have increased security around 
government and military facilities, terrorists are seeking out "softer" targets that provide 
opportunities for mass casualties." 
2.8.1 United States 10 Policy Problems and Successes 
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Even with all of these official documents and changes in the 10 policy and organisation 
within the United States government, there have still been a number of issues that have proved 
difficult to resolve with regard to 10. The problem, as aclrnowledged by many 10 authors and 
theorists, as well as the participants in this study, is that the building of the actual respective 
steps of the day-to-day tactical operations of 10 from the lofty aspirations of 10 theory down to 
is very difficult. A number of participants alluded to need for centralised authority and the 
requisite will power from the federal authorities that were needed to make these dreams come 
true, yet there were also a significant number that advocated a bottom up approach which could 
work just as well. To a person, most interviewees aclrnowledged that it may indeed be a long 
time before the United States government organisational, personnel and doctrinal changes catch 
up to the conceptual power of information, which was lauded nearly a decade ago as the term 10 
first became popular. So in the broadest sense a disconnect still exists between 10 theory and 
reality. This can be seen in the initial rush of excitement about information warfare and the 
Revolution in Military Affairs in the 1995-1996 timeframe. While the development of this 
relatively new concept continued unabated; and a number of exercises were conducted during 
this period, yet there was still a gap in the performance of IQ as noted by the research 
participants. The computer network attack operations conducted during the 1996 and 1997 
exercises were particularly effective and drew attention to the fact that the Department of 
Defense was vulnerable to this type of operation (Pilecki, 2000). But as the next two case 
studies will demonstrate, there is still much work to be done. While. some areas of IO have 
progressed well, there are other areas, which for a variety of reasons over the last decade have 
not progressed as satisfactorily as one would have hoped. 
For example, much has been written on the potential threat posed for the targeting of 
computer networks and related infrastructures by individuals or groups for terrorist purposes. 
However a substantial portion of this literature has been sensationalist, focusing narrowly on 
technical computer security issues, and has failed to link the discussion of 'cyber-terrorism' with 
the broader issues relating to either terrorism or policy responses to it (Devost, 2003). It is 
precisely because of this interdependence between the changing nature of global terrorism, and 
the increasing vulnerability of the critical infrastructures, that makes this topic and issue so 
important. In this next section, the author will examine the development and role of critical 
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infrastructure protection within the United States government as it relates to 10 and compare and 
contrast its success to other areas, specifically perception management. 
2.8.2 United States Critical Infrastructure Protection Policies prior to 9/11 
During the Cold War, United States national security policy was focused on minimising 
the possibility of strategic nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. There was a general 
understanding of the nature of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and most of the international 
security efforts of the United States (and the West in general) were directed at countering it. But 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and with it the relatively static bipolar world 
order, the strategic certainty provided by this structured threat disappeared. The spectre of 
global nuclear war was replaced by a wide range of diffuse unstructured threats and challenges. 
The reality of this new security environment was brought home to the United States with the 
bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993. A little over two years later, the scene 
was replayed when domestic terrorism struck at the nation's heartland on the morning of 19 
April1995 at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. 
These events raised awareness of the threat posed by terrorism to the United States, but 
tangible policy outcomes took a little longer to emerge. The first key Clinton Administration 
response to the evolving terrorist threat was to promulgate Presidential Decision Directive 39 US 
Policy on Counter-Terrorism. This new doctrine articulated a four-point strategy that sought to 
reduce· vulnerability to terrorist acts, to deter terrorism, to respond to terrorist acts when they 
occur, and measures to deny terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction, while integrating 
both domestic and international measures to combat terrorism. Presidential Decision Directive 
39 was novel in that it specifically identified the vulnerability of critical infrastructures and 
potential terrorist attacks as issues for concern. But in general, this new policy generally lacked 
sufficient bureaucratic teeth to achieve meaningful outcomes. What the doctrine did accomplish 
however was to raise the profile in the United States government, because previous critical 
infrastructure protection policy had tended to be overshadowed by other elements of United 
States national security policy (Cordesman & Cordesman, 2002: pp. 1-2). 
Part of the reason for this rising awareness, was the increasing interconnectedness of the 
information age, which has created a range of dependencies and vulnerabilities that were 
historically unprecedented. Following the terrorist attacks on the Alfred Murrah Federal 
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Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection was established by Executive Order 13010. While this group was a natural follow-on 
to Presidential Decision Directive 39, in an informal sense, it also consolidated a range of 
uncoordinated critical infrastructure protection policy development activities occurring across 
government (Ratray, 2001, pp. 339-340). Likewise Executive Order 13010 also directed the 
establishment of an interim Infrastructure Protection Task Force within the Department of 
Justice, chaired by the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI) (Vatis, 1998). The purpose of this 
task force at the FBI was to facilitate coordination of existing Critical Infrastructure Protection 
efforts under the broad umbrella of the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection. The Infrastructure Protection Task Force was chaired by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, so that it could draw upon the resources of the Computer Investigations and 
Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center, which had been set up there in 1996 (Ibid.). So in 
essence, the Infrastructure Protection Task Force represented the first clear effort to establish 
coordinating arrangements across different government agencies and within the private sector for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
In the final report by the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection in 
· 1997, this group produced a document entitled Critical Foundations, whose key finding noted 
that while there was no immediate overwhelming.threat to the critical infrastructures, there was 
in fact a need for action, particularly with respect to the protection of the national information 
infrastructure. The report also recommended a national critical infrastructure protection plan, 
with clarification of legal and regulatory issues that might arise out of such a plan and a greater 
overall level of public-private cooperation for critical infrastructure protection (PCCIP, 1997). 
To follow through on these findings, from late 1997 to early 1998, the Presidential Commission 
on Critical Infrastructure Protection underwent an interagency review to determine the Clinton 
Administration's overall response to this policy initiative (Moteff, 2003, p. 4). Even as that was 
underway, concrete outcomes were already beginning to emerge by February 1998, as the 
interim Infrastructure Protection Task Force was amalgamated with the Computer Investigations 
and Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center, and made permanent within the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation under a new title, that is, the National Infrastructure Protection Center (Vatis, 
1998). 
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The recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection were also given practical expression on 22 May 1998 with the release of two policy 
documents: Presidential Decision Directive 62 Counter Terrorism and Presidential Decision 
Directive 63 Critical Infrastructure Protection. These two documents were the culmination of 
the ClintonAdministration's efforts at policy development for Counter Terrorism and Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, and in a sense, Presidential Decision Directive 62 was a direct 
successor to Presidential Decision Directive 39. However, this new directive by the Clinton 
Administration provided a more defined structure for counter terrorism operations, and presented 
a focused effort to weave the core competencies of several agencies into a comprehensive 
program. Also in common with Presidential Decision Directive 39, Presidential Decision 
Directive 62 sought to integrate the domestic and international elements of United States counter 
terrorism policy into a coherent whole structure. 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 was also the document that implemented the 
recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection report, as 
interpreted through the prism of that inter-agency review panel. Identifying twelve sectors of 
Critical Infrastructure Protection that needed.additional support, this directive appointed 
government lead agencies for each of these sectors, and established coordination mechanisms for 
the implementation of these measures across the public and private sector. In particular, 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 vested principle responsibility for aligning these activities in 
the Office of the National Coordinator, which had been set up under Presidential Decision 
Directive 62. Presidential Decision Directive 63 also established the high level National 
Infrastructure Assurance Council, to advise the President on enhancing the public/private 
partnership for Critical Infrastructure Protection. In addition, this directive called for a National 
Infrastructure Assurance Plan, which would mesh together individual sector plans into a national 
framework. Finally this document also authorised increased resources for the National 
Information Protection Center, and approved the establishment of sector Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers to act as partners to the National Information Protection Center. 
There were also additional updates in the last year of the Clinton Administration, with 
minor changes to Critical Infrastructure Protection policies. Version 1.0 of a National Plan for 
Information Systems Protection was released in January 2000, as a direct result of the call in 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 for a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan (Defending 
69 
America's Cyberspace, 2000; Moteff, 2003, p. 19). It is interesting that given the priority 
reflected to cyber security issues by the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, that the National Plan primarily addressed the national infrastructure protection rather 
than Critical Infrastructure Protection as whole (Defending America's Cyberspace, 2000). This 
is interesting because as noted in Presidential Decision Directive 63, Critical Infrastructure 
Protection cannot be limited to just the federal infrastructure because in today's information 
environment, one cannot separate the public from the private sector. Other changes also 
occurred in the waning days of the Clinton Administration, when in June 2000, the Terrorism 
Preparedness Act established the Office of Terrorism Preparedness within the Executive Office 
of the President. It role was to coordinate Counter Terrorism training and response programs 
across federal agencies and departments. Like the Office of the National Coordinator established 
by Presidential Decision Directive 62, the Office of Terrorism Preparedness was not granted 
budgetary authority, and often had to rely on persuasion rather than a formal chain of command 
to achieve its objectives. 
When the second Bush Administration came to power in early 2001, there was some 
consolidation .of existing Critical Infrastructure Protection arrangements. The collection of 
senior Critical Infrastructure Protection groups was consolidated.into one Counter-Terrorism and 
National Preparedness Policy Coordination Committee reporting to the National Security 
Council (Moteff, 2003, p. 8). And while some debate occurred on future directions for Counter 
Terrorism and Critical Infrastructure Protection policy, these bore no fruit prior to the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11th, 2001 (Ibid.). So in practice, during the first nine months 
of the second Bush Administration, the bulk of the Counter Terrorism and Critical Infrastructure 
Protection arrangements in place in the United States were largely a legacy of the previous 
Clinton Administration. 
Thus to summarise, in the decade prior to the September 11th, 2001 attacks, with the 
international aspect of the terrorist threat to the United States becoming more evident, significant 
policy updates were being promulgated by the White House. These terrorist incidents which 
demonstrated the international character of the terrorist threat included the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing, the June 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, the plans 
to attack United States airliners in Southeast Asia in 1996, the attacks on United States embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania, and the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000. In response to all of 
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these incidents, Presidential Decision Directive 39, Presidential Decision Directive 62 and 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 were all incorporated as measures to combat terrorism abroad 
and Critical Infrastructure Protection domestically. But while the international dimension of the 
evolving terrorist threat was acknowledged directly in policy, they were in actuality largely 
overshadowed by the domestic aspects of United States Counter Terrorism and Critical 
Infrastructure Protection policies which were implemented during this period. 
2.8.3 United States Critical Infrastructure Prote.ction Policies after 9/11 
The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 led to fundamental changes to the United 
States government's approach to Critical Infrastructure Protection issues. On 8 October 2001, 
Executive Order 13228 established the Office of Homeland Security, to be headed by the 
Advisor to the President for Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, the former Governor ofNew 
Jersey. The purpose of the Office of Homeland Security was to develop and coordinate a 
national strategy to protect the United States against tenorist attack, in light of the new threat 
posed by 'global terrorism. This directive also established a high level Homeland Security 
Council, which was responsible for advising the President on all aspects of homeland security 
(Executive Order 13228, 2001). The following day, appointments were made for the National 
Director for Combating Terrorism, General Wayne Downing and the Special Advisor to the 
President for Cyberspace Security, Richard Clarke via Executive Order 13231. What is 
significant about these appointments is that Downing had previously been the Commander-in-
Chief of the United States Special Operations Command, so his appointment reflected a greater 
prominence for the international and overtly military dimension of United States Counter 
Terrorism policy. In addition, this directive also created the President's Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Board, whose duty was to recommend policies and strategies for the protection of 
critical information systems. The same Executive Order also established the high level National 
Infrastructure Advisory Council to provide advice to the President on these key issues (Moteff, 
2003, p. 10). 
These efforts were not the end of new policy development with regard to Critical 
Infrastructure Protection in the aftermath of 9/11. In July 2002, the Office of Homeland Security 
released the National Strategy for Homeland Security, whose purpose was to integrate all 
government efforts for the protection of the nation against terrorist attacks of all kinds (Ibid, p. 
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11 ). In effect, the strategy updated the measures enacted under Presidential Decision Directive 
63 in light ofthe post September 111h, 2001 environment. This new strategy did not create any 
additional organisations, but assumed that a Department of Homeland Security would be 
established in the near future (Ibid.). This document was updated in September 2002, when the 
President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board released for comment, the draft National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. In effect,.this document was the proposed successor to the 
Clinton Administration National Plan for Information Systems Protection as illuminated in the 
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. But while the issue of the draft plan was welcomed, 
concerns were expressed that it lacked the regulatory teeth to prompt action by the private sector, 
which of course goes back to the some of the original faults embedded in Presidential Decision 
Directive 63, namely that there must be a tight coordination between the public and private 
sector. 
The most obvious consequence of the revised United States approach to Critical 
Infrastructure Protection in the aftermath of9/11, occurred in November 2002, with the creation 
of the Department of Homeland Security (lbid, p. 11 ). This new agency consolidated the bulk of 
United States federal government agencies dealing with homeland security, consisting of over 
170,000 employees, into one department headed by a cabinet-level official (Ibid.). Representing 
the most fundamental change to United States national security arrangements since their 
inception in 194 7, the Department of Homeland Security is comprised of five directorates: 
• Management, Science and Technology 
• Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
111 Border 
• Transportation Security 
111 Emergency Response and Preparedness (Department of Homeland Security Organisation, 
2003) 
What is very interesting and significant, as was noted earlier in this section, is that the 
Department of Homeland Security closely resembled some of the measures that had been 
proposed by the US Commission on National Security/21st Century (Moteff, 2003, p. 8-9). But 
as also mentioned earlier, it was only after the events of September 11th' 2001, that the political 
imperative for significant organisational change for Critical Infrastructure Protection emerged. 
Further action with regard to this IO warfare area was also continued within the Bush 
Administration in 2003, with the release of three more policy documents as shown below: 
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11 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 
11 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets 
111 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
At the same time, the release of Executive Order 13286 abolished the President's Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Board and the position of Special Adviser on Cyberspace Security 
(Ibid, p. 10). The National Infrastructure Advisory Council was retained, but now reported to the 
President via the Department of Homeland Security. Combined with the departure of key staff 
associated with cyber-security issues, these measures raised concerns that cyber-security issues 
were being marginalised in the new arrangements (Ibid, p. 23-24). 
Taken together, what this section lays out is the evolution of Critical Infrastructure 
Protection within the United States government. Conducted in fits and starts, it is often only 
with the tremendous political pressure brought' on by the terrible acts of9/11, that many of the 
changes recommended by these different blue ribbon committees and groups have been adopted. 
However, there is still more to do, as most of the authors of these panels and staffs understand. 
This is because so much of Critical Infrastructure Protection is tied to the partnership between 
the public and private sector, and no matter what is promulgated on the federal side, until the 
corporate executives are convinced of the return on investment from these initiatives, then the 
true potential of these directives may never be realised. For that is a key point missing from 
some of these publications and emphasised by the research interviews; namely, that Critical 
Infrastruqture Protection cannot be mandated to the business world, but instead an education 
campaign must be conducted, to show why these efforts are justified. To date, the author does 
not believe, nor does the literature show, that this training has occurred. 
2.8.4 PDD-68 International Public Information 
It was also during this timeframe of Critical Infrastructure Protection development, that a 
major effort by the United States government to improve its perception management capability 
was also begun. Not listed in the original Joint Publication 3-13 policy, perception management 
is generally considered to be comprised of a number of sub-elements including public affairs, 
influence campaigns, public diplomacy, psychological operations, deception and covert action. 
In reality, perception management is simply the ability to shape an image or conduct an influence 
campaign. Defined by the Department of Defense as shown below, perception management is 
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also seen as a key focus of change within the United States government. 
"Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives and objective reasoning; 
and to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official 
estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behavior and official actions favorable 
to the originators objectives" (Joint Publication 1-02, 1998, p. 340). 
In addition to the publication of the seminal doctrine of Joint Publication 3-13, the White House 
and the Department of Defense have also realised that they needed better coordination with 
regard to IO, since these influence campaigns are often conducted long before the traditional 
beginning of active hostilities (Metzl, 2003). This interaction between federal agencies within 
the executive branch also brought about a renewed emphasis on developing the correct IO 
organisational structure. As alluded to earlier in this chapter, the State Department was engaged 
in a major organisational shift, as the United States Information Agency component was brought 
within the greater cabinet agency. The actual legislation that amended the structure of the State 
Department is known as H.R. 1757 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. 
Divided into three parts, it is in Division A, Title III-V where the abolition of the different State 
Department functions are discussed in detail (U.S. Department of State, 1998). What is very 
· interesting is that the actual language of the bill states that its purpose is to strengthen and 
coordinate United States foreign policy, by giving the Secretary of State a leading role in the 
formulation and articulation of foreign policy through the consolidation and reinvigoration of 
foreign affairs functions (Ibid). To do this, the writers ofthis bill proposed the elimination of the 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, United States Information Agency and 
the United States International Development Cooperation Agency. By definition, the State 
Department's mission is to advance and protect the worldwide interests of the United States 
(Armistead, 2002). The United States Information Agency on the other hand was designed to 
understand, inform and influence foreign publics as a means of promoting US national interests 
and dialogue between Americans and their institutions and counterparts abroad with its 7,000 
employees (Ibid). The United States International Development Cooperation Agency and Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency were smaller agencies with very specialised missions, but 
under this proposal, all of the functions, personnel and funding from these organizations as well, 
would be transferred to the State Department to increase the power of the cabinet level agency. 
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The Department of Defense and State Department were not alone in the organisational 
changes with respect to the power of information and perception management. In late 1997 and 
throughout 1998, the National Security Agency under the leadership of Richard Clarke, the 
aforementioned Special Adviser on Cyberspace Security as well as the director of the Trans-
national Affairs working group, began to develop the framework for what eventually became 18 
months later, the Presidential DecisionDirective 68 International Public Information policy 
(Metzl, 2003). Originally not all executive level organizations agreed on the need for an 
information policy and so not only did they need to be convinced of its importance but also about 
the timeliness of this issue (Ibid). To do this, the National Security Council integrated this new 
information concept into the larger reorganisation effort of the State Department. In addition, 
Department ofDefense officials were also meeting in November of 1997 to build a sub-group to 
support the larger construct of Presidential Decision Directive 56, Managing Complex 
Contingencies (Dorflein, 2000). This earlier policy document had been signed as a tool to help 
the interagency process cope with complex contingencies as mentioned earlier and its main 
output was the development of an executive committee, one that would meet and help make 
executive decisions during a crisis. The problem, as laid out by National Security Council 
Director Richard Clarke in his 'Terms of Reference', was that if one waits until a crisis has 
occurred to get together and form a committee, then one cannot use the power of information to 
help shape the environment (Metzl, 2003). Instead, Clarke suggested at this 25 November 1997 
meeting, that there was a need for the group to develop a process to build a construct that would 
allow the United States to plan much earlier for an information campaign. Thus, the primary 
task of this interagency group was to study the issue of how the United States government used 
information over the next six months and conduct an assessment of United States and multi-
lateral for planning, coordinating and conducting perception management activities within the 
context of the Presidential Decision Directive 56 construct (ibid). 
What is especially interesting when you compare the combining of public diplomacy and 
public affairs under the mantle of International Public Information is that the decision made in 
1997, is exactly the opposite conclusion that the Truman Administration came up with nearly 50 
years earlier. In 1948, the State Department officials dealing with these same two issue areas, 
thought it was too difficult to coordinate under one office and so they were split, and the United 
States Information Agency was formed (Armistead, 2002). In fact, as mentioned earlier, 
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Congress was so concerned about the possible propagandising of the American public that they 
passed the Smith-Mundt Act, which legislated that the State ;Department could only conduct 
public diplomacy abroad and only then to foreign nationals. Obviously technology has changed 
much over the last five decades, and the ability to segregate or separate access to information is 
much more difficult today. For example, how does one ensure that an Internet-based web-site is 
only viewed by a foreign audience, especially given the fact that video and audio-streaming 
technology, radio and television broadcasts can now be sent around the world? Are the changes 
to information and perception management affecting the nature of public diplomacy? It is these 
types of questions and many others that had to be answered by this interagency working group as 
they struggled to find consensus on their new policy. 
However, change does not come from just the development of policy alone. As most 
bureaucrats understand, the real power of an organisational change and especially a large one 
such as at the State Department, often only results from funding and personnel moves (Kovach, 
2004). Thus it was not until August 2000, more than 16 months after the original signing of the 
Presidential Decision Directive 68, that the first uniformed military officer was stationed at State 
Department and it was only at that time that true progress. began to occur in moving forward on 
·this initiative (Ward, 2001). For while former State Department officials lik~ Jamie Metzl, Peter 
Kovach and Joe Johnson had all done an incredible job of keeping the flame and spirit of 
International Public Information alive, their job was not to function as planners. Therefore what 
was truly needed to make this program work, was an action officer and staff who could be 
assigned to run a program. As one of the participants stated, the biggest problem with 
International Public Information early on was that there were no operators (i.e., no one or no 
group to operationalise the process), and until they were brought onboard, little overall progress 
was made (Ibid). 
2.9 United States Federal Organisational Changes 
The changes or the lack of alluded to at the US State Department in the section above are 
symptomatic of an overall trend within the federal government toward IO. To assume that over 
the last decade, that there have only been major changes to IO in the form of public policy by the 
federal bureaucracy, would be a mistake, for organisationally the landscape of IO has shifted 
dramatically as well. One analogy often used to describe the changing role ofiO from an 
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organisational perspective, has been 'suburbanisation' of this warfare area. Ten years ago, with 
the huge emphasis on the revolution in military affairs, and the introduction of information 
warfare, grand themes and terrible scenarios were described in great detail to the public and 
Congress alike. These included the like of 'Electronic Pearl Harbor,' 'CyberWar,' and other 
similar threats that provided a degree of 'hyped emphasis', which while helping to introduce the 
vulnerabilities associated with 10, often distracted from the overall goal as well. This was 
because these sensationalistic briefs tended to bring about an alarmist type of atmosphere, which 
also had the unfortunate effect of desensitising personnel to the real dangers inherent in 10, 
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which often tended to be more mundane and technologically complex. For example, early 
descriptions of cyber attacks often foretold of massive panic as hackers brought down the power 
grids in the United States. However when this actually happened on the 14th of August 2003 in 
the northeast portion of the United States due to a fault in a power plant, it was not panic that 
ensued, but instead millions of people who were relieved that it was in fact only a technical hitch 
and not a terrorist attack instead. What followed was not pandemonium, but instead with a 
bemused attitude and perhaps predictable New York spirit, a long walk home in a hot and 
powerless day, which more than anything was a perhaps refreshing demonstration of peoples' 
resilience. 
So in fact, the Electronic Pearl Harbor did occur as predicted, however not due to a cyber 
attack, but instead more to a mechanical error. And it is this movement from the Wild West 
attitude surrounding 10 to a more operational or 'suburbanised' effort that probably best reflects 
the overall theme ofthis section in particular and this research as a whole. For no longer can 
federal agencies develop 10 solutions alone or in a vacuum, and so what will become 
increasingly apparent to the reader is that the changes to 10 policy and organisations in the 
United States tend to become less profound but more detailed and with more depth and substance 
as time passes. What has changed specifically is the awareness that when integrated planning is 
conducted, its results can synchronise the efforts of many different commands, Services, and 
agencies, so that the value-added benefits of an information campaign quickly become apparent. 
In addition, because information efforts are often conducted long before the traditional beginning 
of active hostilities, the need for the White House and the Department of Defense to coordinate 
between themselves and other government agencies and departments has brought about a 
renewed emphasis on the information organisational architecture. 
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2.9.1 The Effects of 9/11 on IO Organisations 
The events of September 11th, 2001 were a tremendous wake-up call for the Bush 
administration and how it conducted IO at the executive level. In the days immediately after 
these attacks, the State Department was looking to the executive branch and the National 
Security Council for guidance on building an organisation to support a strategic information 
campaign. Unfortunately however, leadership was slow in forming, for in the period after the 
terrorists' strikes, there was a significant amount of confusion within the government, and this 
paralysis carried over to the conduct of IO as well. For these first five to six weeks at the 
National Security Council, there was an absence of knowledgeable, experienced people to deal 
with strategic influence campaigns, as well as the normal intra-organisational discontent and turf 
battles (Jones, 2003). At that time, the Clinton-era National Security Council document, 
Presidential Decision Directive 68 International Public Information had been effectively muted, 
so there was no office dedicated at National Security Council to conduct a strategic perception 
management effort. The Joint Staff ended up during major portions of this crucial period simply 
contracting out their. perception management campaign to the Rendon Group, a civilian company 
that specialises in strategic communications, under a contract with the Department ofDefense 
(Jones, 2004). Gradually, as the campaign on terrorism continued throughout the fall of2001, a 
number of influence plans and strategies were developed to create a working operational group, 
yet the hoped-for National Security Presidential Directive still remained in a holding pattern 
within the interagency process. 
In November 2001, in accordance with National Security Presidential Directive 8, which 
established the Office of Combating Terrotism and outlined General Wayne Downing's roles as 
Deputy Assistant to the President and National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor 
for Combating Terrotism, a new position of Senior Director for Strategic Communications and 
Information was stood up and filled by a very expetienced Army psychological operations 
officer, which helped to bting a level of competence to the staff (Jones, 2003). Likewise duting 
the immediate aftermath of the terrotist attacks, Alistair Camp bell, the Communications Director 
for Btitish Prime Minister Tony Blair had suggested to Karen Hughes, Communications Director 
for the Bush administration, to form a seties of Coalition Information Centers to concentrate on 
getting the pro-Ametican message to the world media. Eventually three of these centres were set 
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up, in Washington, D.C., London, and Islamabad, with the facility in Pakistan actually occupying 
an old United States Information Agency building. All together, these groups perform 
admirably, focusing on public affairs and public diplomacy, however some critics argued that 
these organisations concentrated on U.S. domestic partisan politics instead of focusing on the set 
of global audiences now accessible via a 24-7 news environment (Armistead, 2003). Other 
critics have argued however, that these Coalition Information Centers generally worked well, by 
informing domestic and foreign press within their time cycles during the early phases of · 
Operation Enduring Freedom, and they also eventually utilised a United States government 
spokesman who could speak Arabic and thus appear live on the Al Jazeera television station. Of 
course looking back, one cannot be sure that this really was a success story, because one must 
ask the question of why it took so long for Ambassador Christopher Ross to appear on AI 
Jazeera? This may have been because the White House was slow to see the need for United 
States' presence on AI Jazeera until external pressure became so bad that it actually forced Colin 
Powell and Condoleezza Rice to appear on this Arabic TV station using translators. In fact, AI 
Jazeera constantly invited them for interviews early on, but these invitations were rebuffed and 
AI Jazeera was actually blacklisted from early White House press conferences. Eventually the 
response was changed, but the delays in addressing this crucial audience, and it should have been 
recognized much earlier (Rendon, 2003). Foreign media always needs to be addressed in this 
Global War on Terrorism and the fact that it took so long to make key United States. government 
personnel available to these media sites was rather depressing and was perhaps an indication that 
at the highest levels the United States Government did not understand the true nature of this new 
battle-space. 
Yet all was not totally bleak. Before she left the Bush administration in its first term, 
Karen Hughes formed the Office of Global Communications, ostensibly to force the public 
diplomacy community resident within the Department of State and in the field, to do a better job 
of explaining overall United States policies (Armistead, 2003). Created out of frustration with 
the perceived lack of effort at Foggy Bottom, this office coordinated with the interagency Global 
Communication Strategy Council. An evolutionary process and a follow up to the Coalition 
Information Center, this White House staff also coordinated with the National Security Center, in 
a quid pro quo relationship. The departure ofHughes and later General Downing from the Bush 
administration probably spelled the ultimate demise ofthe Office of Global Communications and 
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further White House Strategic Communication efforts, in the early post-9/11 timeframe (Alter, 6 
May 2002, p. 49). There are those however, who don't believe this was Office of Global 
Communications mission at all, and instead its real task was to be the influence arm of the White 
House and to get the President's message out as an element of his re-election campaign for 2004. 
While this would be a normal and understandable objective of any White House-based 
communications effort, suspicions remain that the then-director of White House 
communications, Karen Hughes, quickly acted in early 2002 to put the new strategic 
communications Policy Coordinating Committee on hold because of fears that it would interfere 
. . . 
with this mission (Jones, 2003). The fact that shortly after the election ofNovember 2004 this 
Office of Global Communication quickly and quietly ceased operations could be a support for 
this interpretation. 
This emphasis on the domestic audience can also have negative effects in other ways too. 
To begin with, there is a lack of understanding about what words or phrases mean to other 
audiences, for example some may be instantly hostile to an Islamic audience, while others may 
have an impact poorly understood by Westerners. 'Axis of Evil', 'Infinite Justice', and 
'Crusade' are great examples of Bush administration's public diplomacy missteps. In addition, 
the White House did not collaborate well with State Depaltment specialists who understand the 
implications of such pl1rases and their misuse of these actions and words have seriously hurt the 
Bush administration in its global war on terrorism. Some quip that a serious review of Samuel 
Huntington's Clash of Civilization's is not out of the question. Likewise the use of commonly 
used Islamic terms to label our adversaries may have a negative and unintended consequence. 
For example, including suicide bombers and terrorists under the label 'jihadists' may have 
actually be seen as legitimising them and their actions. Labels and terms are used in many cases 
because they are easy and in the common lexicon, yet it often not understood how they appear 
and what they mean in other cultural contexts. For in a 'war of ideas', words cannot only serve 
as ammunition, but are often the main weapon (Armistead, 2007, p. 158). 
The IO organisational changes at the interagency level got more convoluted 
as the Global War on Terrorism continued (Foer, 2002). The J-3 Director of Operations on the 
Joint Staff formed the Information Operations Task Force, led by the J-39, to be responsible for 
IO, but that group was more technically oriented, so there was still a role for the Department of 
State in the diplomatic arena (Pilecki, 2002). A Strategic Information Core Group was also 
80 
formed within the interagency structure, but overall, the general consensus was that not much 
was accomplished with this organisation because they were never empowered or recognised by 
the major departments to possess the ability to get things done: In this atmosphere of Operation 
Enduring Freedom and the ongoing war in Afghanistan, the Office of Strategic fufluence was 
established by the Department ofDefense in November 2001, in an effort to coordinate its 
strategic perception management campaign and because of a perceived leadership void, with the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict in the lead. The 
Office of Strategic Influence organization was comprised mostly of personnel with psychological 
operations and civil affairs backgrounds, with a mission to respond to and negate hostile 
propaganda, using mostly human factors and a little technology (Timmes, 2002). It appeared to 
be placed to work well, because it had financial resources, and it was also a Department of 
Defense organisation, yet it quickly ran foul of two critical interagency IO organisations (Rotzer, 
2002c ). This is because the Office of Strategic Influence group had been placed at Department 
ofDefense, not at State Department's Bureau for International Information Programs, because 
some believed that it's more operational tasks may have been more easily accomplished from 
within the Department of Defense. By doing this, the Department of Defense gave the ultimate 
rejection to the Presidential Decision Directive 68, which may have stemmed from the overall 
belief that the strategic perception management campaign had been wrongly placed by the 
Clinton administration, and that instead, an office should have gone to the Department of 
Defense· or National Security Council instead. 
At a meeting on 16 February 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved the 
office, however the senior Department ofDefense Public Affairs official Victoria Clarke did not 
concur, and her opposition manifested itself almost instantly. On 19 February, the first article 
critical of the new organisation appeared in the New York Times, was released while both 
Rumsfeld and Clarke were in Salt Lake City, Utah at the Winter Olympics. It was reported that 
Rumsfeld was livid but could not do much due the political concerns created by the allegations 
that the Office of Strategic Influence would lie to the media to conduct disinformation 
campaigns. As satirically reported by Mark Rodriguez in the Washington Post electronic journal 
Insight, the demise of this Department of Defense office was a political turf-battle with Clarke 
leading her own disinformation campaign to retain control of all public affairs efforts, exactly the 
charge she made to the press about Office of Strategic Influence, which was later investigated 
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and proven unfounded (Ricks, 2002). Politically embarrassing to Secretary of Defense and the 
President, it was very comical to watch the government officials deny the need for an office in 
the United States to conduct strategic perception management campaigns. Every nation 
participates in these activities, but almost all deny their existence. Even foreign news agencies 
put a satirical touch on their reporting as they watched the American officials attempt to explain 
away the obvious (Woodward and Balz, 2002; Rotzer, 2002a; Creveld, 2002). 
All of these organizational shifts with regard to strategic communications allude to a 
question that has arisen over the last 10 years, namely where should a strategic perception 
management campaign office be located? Presidential Decision Directive 68 put the 
International Public Information activities at the State Department in 1998 where it foundered for 
two years due to lack of budgetary authority, manning, and empowerment. In addition, the 
International Public Information group was also hampered by the interagency process. While the 
draft National Security Presidential Directive on Strategic Communications has repeatedly 
recommended the need to embed the strategic perception management capability in an office in 
the National Security Council, the Defense Science Board for Managed Information 
Dissemination in 2001 reiterated the desire to keep the authority at the State Department 
· (Gregory, 2003). This argument for keeping the Policy Coordinating Committee at National 
Security Council was centred on the desire to keep this organisation in a steady state. The 
National Security Council is by definition, the single organisation within the United States 
government responsible for turning interagency positions into recommendations to the President. 
It looks at international affairs and foreign audiences in an operational manner, which was 
greatly missing from the International Public Information way of doing business. So there is 
strong logic behind this argument as well. The counter-prevailing suggestion for putting the 
Policy Coordinating Committee in Department of State was led by David Abshire, who believed 
that a Tom Ridge-like figure was needed to drive the program (Fulton, 2003). However, there is 
also a concern that any strategic communications effort led by the Department of State will be 
focused more at public diplomacy I public affairs rather than strategic influence issues. 
All of this effort was eventually overcome by events. With the initial departure of Karen 
Hughes from the White House in 2002, most of these activities lost their momentum. For it was, 
after all, Karen Hughes who made the Coalition Information Centers happen during the early 
stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. She understood how effective public diplomacy could 
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be on the War on Terrorism. The Coalition Information Centers were so successful during the 
fall of2001, mainly because ofthe President's influence, and also because there were effectively 
no constraints. In effect, they didn't have to filter information· through a number of layers of 
bureaucracy, because normally, Congress is very concerned with the Smith-Mundt Act, an early 
Cold War-era piece oflegislation that prohibited the delivery to the domestic American populace 
of any foreign-targeted information (Gregory, 2003). 
As the events surrounding the Office of Strategic Influence debacle of early 2002 
indicated, the widespread concern towards activities of the State and Defense Departments may 
have not been the case when it comes to the White House. With the creation of the Office of 
Global Communications and its assigned mission of explaining the United States policies, the 
White House felt a great need during Operation Enduring Freedom to expand their frame of 
reference, for example to influence those Islamic nations and populations that reject out of hand 
any information coming from western sources. This theme was emphasised Hoffman (2002) of 
Internews Network in his Foreign Affairs article, "Beyond Public Diplomacy," in asking the 
quintessential question "How can a man in a cave- out-communicate the world's leading 
communications society?" In doing so, he thus strikes a chord for more concerted strategic 
communication efforts by the United States government. Therefore, the Department of State still 
needs to enlist moderate Arabic nations to help in this project, but this desire runs into the 
roadblock of how current American efforts in Israel/Palestine conflict are seen across the Islamic 
world and exploited by Islamic radicals, sometimes via overt disinformation, as clear evidence of 
a 'United States-Zionist alliance'. The conflict in southern Lebanon in summer 2006 merely 
added fuel to this fire. Often the United States government does not necessarily see the 
connection between the Palestinian conflict and events in Iraq, but the entire Arabic world 
instantly does. So now the White House is even losing out on trying to get the moderates to push 
our message. Plus the debacle concerning the Office of Strategic Influence in February 2002 
also stalled any of the subsequent Bush administration's attempts to develop a strategic 
communication effort, and essentially this controversy put the National Security Council 
Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee on hold, until the creation in April 
2006 of the new Public Diplomacy/Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee, 
chaired by Karen Hughes as discussed previously (Armistead, 2007). 
83 
Thus the mission and structure of the new Policy Coordinating Committee constitutes an 
attempt by the Bush administration to develop a long-term capability to conduct public 
diplomacy and strategic communication. While there is still no overarching United States 
government strategy for Strategic Communication, despite the fact that the White House has had 
a Counterterrorism Information Strategy since December 2001, there can be little doubt that the 
proposed strategy circulated for coordination by Karen Hughes in late 2006 was an attempt to 
answer this long-sought government-wide effort. The irony is that it was over a decade ago that 
the United States Information Agency was dismantled, and its functions shifted under the greater 
umbrella of the Department of State. In fact, as mentioned previously, Representative Henry 
Hyde (R-NY) proposed numerous times the reconstitution of that agency, in his legislation to 
bring back capabilities that had so recently been diminished, for much ofthis legislative proposal 
mirrors efforts by the Defense Science Board for Managed Information Dissemination working 
group. While the State Department did not agree with this concept, the new structure suggested 
by the Karen Hughes-chaired Policy Coordinating Committee may go even beyond what existed 
previously in terms of a strong centrally influence and communication program. Therefore, the 
demise of the United States Information Agency may have contributed more to the failing of 
· Presidential Decision Directive 68, and thus the need for a new structure and capability to 
conduct global influence than any other action to date (Ward, 2001). 
For in the end, it is not a new organisation that will drive a strategic communications 
effort, but instead a shift in the mindset of the White House and the National Security Council. 
The need to push senior officials to conduct briefings at 0700 Eastern Standard Time, to match 
Middle Eastern news cycles, or to ensure United States Arabic speakers are available on AI 
Jazeera, are becoming much more accepted and understood methods of doing business. These 
ideas are now conventional wisdom as the value of strategic communications rise within the 
Bush administration. To be effective, one cannot just think in news cycles (24/7 around the 
world), but instead also in decades, for example, expanding exchange programs such as the 
Fulbright Scholarship program, so that the United States government can be much more effective 
in a strategic management campaign. This latter example could be an example of one of Karen 
Hughes' "Four Es" of Public Diplomacy: engage, exchange, educate and empower. In effect, 
there needs to be an issues agenda versus a value agenda. Input from this research indicated the 
need to take a short- and long-term approach to these problems, but it must also be led from the 
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top down, with full White House and National Security Council leadership to ensure full 
interagency participation (Jones, 2004). The second Bush Administration has repeatedly tried 'to 
talk the talk' of public diplomacy and strategic communications, and at all levels, from Vice 
President Cheney through Secretary of State Rice to Under Secretary Hughes, quotes and sound 
bites referring to the need to do these tasks better abound. But, what is really needed now is real 
evidence of resources, organisations, people and operations that enable an effectivelong-term 
strategic communications campaign. It is only then that a true strategic perception management 
campaign will succeed, and the power of IO be realised by the. United States. 
2.9.2 Case Study in Organisational Changes regarding Translating Power into 
Outcomes - Kosovo (1999) 
The next section demonstrates a good case study during this same time period on the 
effects of perception management and the United States government, with the associated 
successes and failures per the military operations in Kosovo. This was a massive air campaign 
conducted by a coalition of United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation air forces 
against the former Yugoslavia over its policies of genocide in the Serbian province ofKosovo. 
The allied coalition flew over 34,000 combat sorties in a 78-day period of bombing, inflicting 
massive destruction on Serbia's economic infrastructure in early 1999. Rather than bringing 
stability to the region, as IO doctrine dictates, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's operation 
actually-created greater regional instability and the potential for future conflicts. 
The strategic bombing campaigns first described by the renowned Italian air power 
theorist General Giulio Douhet and executed by the Allies against Germany in World War II are 
supposed to be a thing of the past for the United States. Douhet envisioned a total warfare where 
a nation's military, industry, and population were attacked to bring about a swift and total defeat. 
IO doctrine, on the other hand, does not advocate attrition bombing attacks and wholesale 
destruction against an adversary. Indeed, the advent of precision-guided munitions and effects-
based targeting has added a whole new dimension to using physical destruction as an information 
weapon. The mere ability to destroy one of an adversary's high value targets while leaving the 
surrounding area virtually unscathed sends a very potent psychological message. First, it 
demonstrates the precision, lethality, and superiority of American weapons technology. More 
importantly from an IO perspective, limiting collateral damage and physical destruction gives the 
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adversary less ammunition for hostile propaganda directed against the United States. Second, 
the United States military has now so conditioned the international media to low collateral 
damage and precision engagement, that when the occasional accident occurs and a non-military 
target is hit, the media will tend to amplify the effects of the accident. By its sheer excellence, 
the United States' recent aerial campaigns have inadvertently set an inescapable standard for 
minimising collateral damage. However, there is much more to IO than just a targeting or 
destruction campaign. 
Therefore, both the domestic and foreign publics expect United States to avoid inflicting 
massive collateral damage and civilian casualties since it has the technological means to do so. 
Failure to accomplish this strategy makes the United States a target of criticism by domestic and 
foreign media and politicians alike. The very manner in which the United States uses physical 
destruction may in fact provide an information tool for an adversary. When the United States 
uses physical destruction to manipulate the behaviour of an adversary, it must defend itself 
against the hostile propaganda of that adversary and strive to maintain absolute credibility. 
Therefore, it is critical that the public affairs and psychological operations messages describing 
the use of physical destruction be absolutely accurate. While sounding impressive, this lofty list 
· of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation achievements later proved fairly inaccurate. In what may 
have been an overzealous desire to demonstrate positive results from a two-month-old air 
campaign that was beginning to draw considerable international criticism, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation put its credibility on the line with statements like this the Serbian military knew to 
be inaccurate. Given that the National Army force in Kosovo was the target of United States 
international public information and psychological operations efforts, any loss of credibility with 
the target audience ultimately only harmed these operations. 
Therefore although the original premise from the allied leadership was that this would be 
a short strategic bombing operation, in reality, the war quickly began to drag on, as the effects of 
the strikes did not faze the Serbians. In fact, it was not until almost eight weeks into this 
campaign that IO type strategies were developed to try to use new methods to bring pressure on 
Milosevic himself. The bombing didn't bring about the desired results, and so other tactics were 
needed against the dictator. Some of these specific attempts to conduct an information campaign 
were aimed at discrediting his policies, while at the same time undermining Milosevic's 
economic means to continue the conduct of the war (Arkin, 2001). To do this, high-level 
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diplomats from the allied coalition conducted near simultaneous press briefings emphasising the 
fact the Serbia as a nation was condoning Milosevic's genocide actions. In the meantime, 
bombing missions were conducted against specific factories and industries that were funding the 
upper leadership. Detailed and tailored messages were also sent to these same Serbian 
government officials, trying to influence them to shift away their allegiance from Milosevic. 
Together all of these actions taken together, along with the military, diplomatic and economic 
pressure are what many people believe helped to bring an end to this conflict. One may not 
know for sure, because much of the details are still classified, but reports are starting to leak out 
slowly, that it was the infmmation campaign rather than the bombing campaign that was 
ultimately successful as a perception management tool that ultimately outed Milosevic from 
Serbia (lbid). 
To summarise, Kosovo will probably rank as the Second Information War. Through the 
use of advanced information dissemination including faxes, e-mail and web pages, as well as 
perception management campaigns, this conflict was fought for the hearts and minds of a 
worldwide audience. Where the ultimate changes were actually made, was the detailed, tailored 
targeting of the key.individuals that could affect the decision-makers. That is what was different 
about this operation and the use of information. In was key that in this conflict information was 
recognised as the primary weapon that was used to bring about a decisive end to a conflict. 
2.10' Summary 
What all of these reports emphasise is the need for a much greater capability with regard 
to perception management and strategic communications within the United States government. 
The mere fact that these publications continued to be released means that the progress envisioned 
by these various advocates of IO has simply not materialised. In examining these studies and 
recommendations of the official United States government IO efforts with respect to the global 
war on terrorism, it is interesting to compare these reports to a series of articles compiled by the 
Washington Quarterly, and edited by Alexander Lennon entitled, The Battle for Hearts and 
Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks. Published in 2003, these articles 
attempt to show how useful information can be to the United States for campaigns such as 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. While it will be interesting to see if 
any of the recommendations of either the semi -official or commercial publication make it into 
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the next version of Joint Publication 3-13 or other official 10 policy, it is fascinating that a 
number of these articles in Lennon's book advocate the potential of perception management for 
future operations, and that its proper conduct will be key to success in the future. It was also 
noted by Lennon that in the greater umbrella ofiO, it is the area of perception management 
which is the most rife with confusion and misinterpretation, because there is such a fine line 
between psychological operations, public affairs, influence campaigns, public diplomacy, 
intemational public information, strategic communications and propaganda (Lennon, 2003). 
From a different perspective with regard to perception management in the United States 
govemment, Nancy Snow in her two books, Propaganda, !ne and Information War actually 
argues that the United States govemment has too much power with respect to information, and 
uses that power to control society by limiting dissenting opinions and free speech, especially in 
the Bush Administration after the events of9/11 (Snow, 1998; Snow, 2003). This opinion is not 
widely shared by the participants of this research, but that being said, all views are valid and 
should be taken into consideration as part of the methodology of this thesis. In addition, as noted 
in later sections, while the author attempted to select a diverse group of interviewees for his 
. research, in some cases, that is not always possible, because a high-level of knowledge about 10. 
·was a key factor. So it is very interesting to get totally different opinions on the use of 10 within 
the United States govemment from authors such as Nancy Snow. To summarise this section, of 
the two areas ofiO policy of the United States govemment that were selected to analyse in 
detail as part of this research, namely computer network operations and perception management, 
it has been the former that has been more successful in its implementation over the last decade. 
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Chapter 3 - Philosophical Frameworks and Research 
Methodologies 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology utilised in this research, as well as the rationale 
for this selection. Methodology is normally considered the study of methods and is often 
regarded as a 'structured approach' with which a researcher 'thinks' about a problem. It is a set 
of guidelines which helps to stimulate the intellectual process of analysis, while focusing the 
process on reality (Wilson, 1984, p. 6). Methodology can also be considered the study of 
principles of method used, or a higher-order term for methods (Jackson, 2000, p. 11). Likewise 
methodology can also help to solve a paradigm, which is an entire constellation of beliefs, or a 
'basic' set ofbeliefs that guide action (Kuhn, 1970, p. 146; Guba, 1992). Some academics have 
also stated that "methodologies are simply meaningless congeries of mindless choices and 
procedures unless they are rooted in the paradigms" (Guba & Lincoln, 1988, p. 114). By this 
definition, a paradigm must therefore imply a choice of methodology, which can be defined as 
'the fundamental or regulative practice' which guides the research process (Seale, 1998, p. 8). 
Therefore, by implication from these definitions listed above, methodologies and paradigms are 
normally linked together. As will be seen in these next few chapters, methodologies do not have 
to imply an individual method, although some do tend to favour certain processes, however, it is 
not ordained that one follows another. 
From these concepts, methodology is also related to theory, although often in a 
subordinate role (Jackson, 2000, p. 16). Theory is sometimes described as an internally 
consistent set of empirical propositions that help us to explain and predict, as well as describing 
relationships between variables, which in turn have attributes or values. Attributes are thus 
characteristics or qualities that describe an object, while variables are logical groupings of 
attributes. Together these two concepts and their respective relationship lie at the heart of theory 
(Babbie, 2001, pp. 29-32). In addition to the study of methods and theory, methodology is also 
about processes, and how a particular problem can be solved. There are different ways to do 
this, and some of the choices are outlined in this chapter. For example, the researcher may 
choose to use inductive reasoning (particular to general), vice deductive (general to specific) 
because the researcher's observations lead in that direction. Perhaps the data itself may describe 
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the approach taken apd lead the methodology in a qualitative or quantitative direction, thereby 
determining for the researcher the actual process utilised (Ibid, p. 37). Of course, the overall 
goal of any research is to ensure that no matter what methodology is chosen, the approach itself 
is one that can adequately ensure a systematic process is utilised - one that provides a theoretical 
construct tied to reality with sufficient academic rigor. 
3.2 A Frameworkfor Design- Elements of Inquiry 
So in essence, methodology is also a framework in which the research can be explained 
and unaerstood. The study must be able to relate to the broader and common body of knowledge 
(that is, the paradigm) and the goal for methodology is the use of a disciplined approach to 
research independent of the personal biases of the researcher. For all quality research efforts 
must use some sort of framework for design, or 'ideas' in which knowledge about the situation 
being researched is expressed. These relevant elements can be seen in Figure 3.1: 
I 
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Framework of Id 
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Yields 
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Methodology 
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Applied to 
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Area of Concern 
Figure 3.1 -Elements Relevant to any piece of research 
(Checkland and Howells, 1998, p.13) 
In general these methodologies can be divided into three different approaches-
qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods. Each of these structures in turn has three elements 
consisting of philosophical assumptions (knowledge claims), general processes (strategies of 
inquiries) and detailed procedures (methods), that can all be used to help frame the problem 
. (Creswell, 2003, p. 3). Sometimes referred to as elements of inquiry, this structure or 
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framework is the most basic unit of analysis, which makes it an essential part of any research 
project. Therefore in this thesis, a standardised process, as described above, is utilised as part of 
this project, with a section described below for each of the different elements of inquiry. For 
example, Chapter Two consisted of an extensive literature review which constitutes a series of 
knowledge claims or philosophical assumptions of the state of IO in the United States 
government. In this chapter, the different prospective strategies of inquiry are examined and 
analysed to determine the best methodology that should be utilised. Finally, in Chapters Four 
and Five, the actual method used in this thesis is delineated as a set of detailed procedures which 
includes data collection, as well as how the research analysis was conducted. 
As mentioned previously, there are three main choices or approaches of methodologies 
which include quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods. In this chapter, all of these will be 
reviewed and analysed to determine the one most suited for this particular thesis. For in any 
research project, the elements of inquiry are needed help to 'frame' or 'structure' the process. 
The use of a planned approach also helps the researcher to determine the philosophical stance of 
project, to develop a strategy or plan of action that links methods to outcomes, and finally to 
. decide on the actual series of techniques and procedures to use (Ibid, p. 4). It is this process of 
conceptualising these elements of inquiry, which helps to determine what kind of 'approach' will 
be used in a particular research effort. These sociological paradigms are documented by Burrell 
and Morgan in their classification framework, as shown in Figure 3 .2. This grid allows an 
academic to relate different methodologies, from a societal and system viewpoint to build a 
framework in which to conduct their research. 
The Sociology of Radical Change 
Radical Radical 
Humanism Structuralism 
Interpretative Functionalist 
The Sociology of Regulation 
Figure 3.2 - Analysis of Social Theory 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979) 
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However, it is not just the theoretical lens that are the most important factor in deciding on a 
particular methodology, there are also other features that play a crucial role as well. While 
academic studies tend to gravitate to certain types of research into categories that have proven 
over time to best frame a particular set of data or theoretical constructs, it is not always a strict 
rule or formal law. Likewise, the hard line that formally existed between qualitative and 
quantitative studies has changed, with the rise of the mixed methods as a research methodology 
in its own right. These changes have led more to more of a consensus on the need for a 
continuum of practices, which range the gamut of the available approaches (Ibid, p. 4). The use 
of a dynamic approach to the selection of the research process will be seen in this thesis as well. 
This is because the selection of a methodology ultimately determines the whole nature of data 
collection and philosophical assumptions that the researcher makes about their thesis, and so the 
choices that are eventually made are crucial to the overall success of the project. 
3.3 Knowledge Claims 
Often considered a set of assumptions, knowledge claims are based on the orientation of 
the researcher. This can be affected by a number of factors, including epistemology, ontology, . 
positivism, post-positivism, idiographic, and nomothetic issues, as well as inductive or deductive 
reasoning. Taken together, these concerns build a framework for the methodology based upon 
the data and the pre-conceived 'views' of the researcher. For example, the term epistemology is 
of Greek origin and means knowledge. Often concerned with the philosophy of how one learns, 
epistemology is also related to methodology, since the latter involves the method of 
understanding knowledge. Another term that is important concerns ontology, or the branch of 
metaphysics concerning with nature and relations of being. As opposed to epistemology which 
is concerned with knowledge issues, ontological arguments are more related to being or 
existence. Therefore, the stating of a knowledge claim simply means that the researcher starts a 
project with certain assumptions about how they will learn and what they expect to learn during a 
particular inquiry (Creswell, 2003, p. 6). This is in essence, the development by the researcher 
of a theory that describes their reality or the 'what is' state, which relates to the overall original 
need for a methodology. Theory does not determine 'what should be', nor can it settle debates 
about values (Babbie, 2001, p. 25). Instead theory can be a search for reality which often 
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depends on a viewpoint taken- in a broadest sense, the 'framework' which ultimately provides a 
philosophical background for the research. These philosophical views can be divided into two 
main areas - modem (positivism) or post-modem (post-positivism), and the decision on which 
one to use will strongly influence the sense of reality that a researcher may possess (Ibid, p. 21 ). 
The post-positivism approach has been expanded recently to include a number of additional sets 
of alternate post-positivism knowledge claims, which will be examined later in this chapter to 
include constructivism, advocacy or participatory and pragmatism viewpoints (Creswell, 2003, p. 
6). 
In addition, these views or 'orientation' can also be expressed as dialectics or 
explanations of research conducted. For example, the question of whether this research is 
concerned with a single or unique event (idiographic) or is it more interested in explaining a 
class of situations (nomothetic) also needs to be determined. Some theorists believe that 
Aristotle may have been the original source for the distinction between nomothetic and 
idiographic sciences (Nagel, 1961, p.547). Both words have their origin in ancient Greek, with 
nomos equating to laws and idios meaning private or personal. Although not labelled as such, 
Aristotle did describe the difference between seeking to establish abstract general laws for 
indefinitely repeatable events or processes as compared to understanding the. unique and non-
recurrent. These terms themselves while first noted by Levin in 1835 and Windelband in 1915, 
were not widely used until the advent ofBrunswickian research (Brunswick, 1956). However, 
since that time, their concepts have become generally accepted in academic research, and play a 
major role in helping the researcher understand the definition of their studies. For example, in 
general a nomothetic approach is most often associated with the use of quantitative methods such 
as statistical averaging. In this manner, large groups of people can be investigated in order to 
find general rules of behaviour that apply to everyone. Likewise the idiographic approach is 
normally best suited for qualitative methods such as case studies or individual interviews, where 
a personal, in-depth understanding of a subject can be achieved. These methods are often very 
flexible and conducted over a long-term with good examples being Freud in 1909 and Piaget in 
1953 (Jackson, 2000). In the case of this particular research, an idiographic approach was 
followed, due to the long-term active interview phase that allowed understanding and 
comprehension of the complexity of the interviewee's thoughts. 
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In developing the research methodology, the type of reasoning or logic used is also 
crucial. The two major systems as mentioned previously include deductive and inductive, which 
together form a system oflogic. The former is a level of thinking that moves from the general to 
the specific while the latter works in the opposite manner. Deductive reasoning often follows the 
steps of first developing a theory and hypothesis, then using observation and experimentation to 
confirm or deny the original theory. It is more restrictive in nature and is focused on proving a 
hypothesis. Inductive reasoning on the other hand, normally begins with specific observations in 
which patterns or similarities are noted and from that structure a tentative hypothesis is proposed, 
which in turn often evolves into a set of theories. In the case of this particular research, a 
combination ofboth types of reasoning was ultimately utilised. This can be seen early in the 
research, where theories and hypothesis were proposed based on knowledge claims and literature 
reviews by the author. However from the observations and actual interviews, it quickly became 
apparent that in fact, the early conclusions did not support the original hypothesis. This is 
because 'other' patterns had emerged from the data, and from these similarities, an updated 
hypothesis was finally developed that resulted in the theoretical construct for this research. Thus, 
it was a combination ofboth deductive and .inductive reasoning that was finally utilised in this 
research. 
Of course whether an inductive or deductive theoretical construct is used with a 
positivistic or post-positivistic viewpoint, and idiographic or nomothetic reasoning, it is 
sometimes a combination of these approaches working together as a framework or paradigm, that 
serve as a fundamental model or frames of reference for a researcher to organise their 
observations (Babbie, 2001, p. 42). It is the latter which tend more than any other areas, to truly 
define the selection of a methodology, so in essence more emphasis should be placed on the 
reason for its selection. In the next few pages, descriptions of the dissimilarity between the 
'viewpoints' available for the choice of research methodology will also be described. This is 
because the differences between positivistic and post-positivistic often lead to a very different 
ontological and epistemological perspective. The positivistic outlook tends to have more of a 
realist perspective and utilises singular reality ontology, with a very objective and dualist 
epistemological viewpoint. This methodology also tends to be more experimental, with a 
manipulation of the data to verify a hypothesis. Therefore, this approach contrasts with the post-
positivistic standpoint which possesses a critical realistic ontological perspective and a modified 
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objectivistic epistemology. That methodology is often modified to be experimental as well, 
which still tends to manipulate data to verify a hypothesis, yet there is also an element of 
discovery. Thus in summary, for knowledge claims, the philosophy used by a researcher often 
depends on the 'view' or paradigm utilised. Therefore, all research is based on assumptions 
about how the world is perceived and can best be understood as part of an epistemology, or 
knowledge claim. In the next section, the two main philosophical schools of thought- positivism 
and post-positivism, of which there are several variants, will be discussed to show how the 
particular methodological approach for this research project was developed. 
3.3.1 Positivism 
This particular study of society is normally attributed to Auguste Comte (1822), from his 
observations which formed much of the foundation of what is now considered the philosophy of 
Positivism (Babbie, 2001, p. 44). Scientific rationale was the basis ofhis research, with 
optimism as a main characteristic (hence the term positivism). This knowledge claim's central 
thesis is that all of society can be observed and explained in a logical and rational manner to 
determine the absolute truth, which was also a key attribute. What this approach often translates 
·to is a rejection of meta-physics and a focus on empiricism, in the fact that science should only 
concentrate on that which one can measure or observe. Deductive reasoning, with the 
development of testable theories and a heavy focus on scientific experiments were all central to 
the positivistic view of the world. The backbone of much of modern-day social research, 
positivism was considered the primary philosophic knowledge claim for over 150 years and was 
not seriously challenged until the advent of post-positivism of the 1980s. It was only with the 
inability of many researchers to fully explain human nature in a positivistic manner which 
eventually drove the development of a whole range of alternate knowledge claims such as post-
positivism and others. 
3.3.2 Post-Positivism 
The first of these different viewpoints to emerge is entitled post-positivism and this 
knowledge claim position challenges the traditional notion of 'absolute' truth of knowledge 
(Phillips and Burbules, 2000, p. 29). In fact, this philosophy is a wholesale rejection of the 
central tenants of positivism, namely the idea that any individual can see the world perfectly as it 
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really is. Post-positivism recognises that one cannot be 'positive' unless one proves 
scientifically a particular outcome, and it is also considered deterministic in that causes are the 
factors that probably determine effects or outcomes. In additfon to being reductionist, post-
positivism also relies on the need to test small and discrete sets of ideas. Relying heavily on 
empirical observation and measurements, the normal outcome to this scientific approach is to 
support or refute a theory (Creswell, 2003, p. 7). In the post-positivism world, the following 
assumptions are always key: 
• "Knowledge is conjectural and absolute truth can never be found 
• Research is a process of making claims and then refining/abandoning them 
• Data, evidence and rational considerations shape knowledge 
• Research seeks to develop relevant true statements 
• Being objective is an essential aspect of competent inquiry" 
(Phillips and Burbules, 2000, p. 29) 
The ultimate conclusion in a post-positivistic view, is that an individual begins with a theory, 
collects data to support or refute that theory and then makes revisions and conducts more tests 
(Creswell, 2003, p. 7). 
3.3.3 Constructivism 
Constructivism - also called Interpretivism or Social Constructivism, is an alternate 
knowledge claim that seeks to understand the world, through a number of different views. The 
basic premise is that the individual must actively 'build' knowledge and skills while information 
exists within these built constructs, rather than in the external environment (Bruner, 1990; 
Ullman, 1980; Gibson, 1979). However, most advocates of constructivism agree that it is the 
individual's processing of stimuli from the environment and the resulting cognitive structures 
that produce adaptive behaviour, rather than the stimuli itself (Harnard, 1982). Meanings are 
normally considered complex and varied, with the belief that the knowable world is that of the 
meaning attributed by individuals, and reductionism is not a normal practice. This latter 
assumption comes from the fact that when most people are faced with complex, real-world 
problems set in social systems, problems occur with the use of reductionism and the natural 
scientific method (Checkland, 1981). Therefore, the goal ofConstructivism is to rely on the 
views of the participants themselves, so in essence the research questions become very broad and 
general in type. This practice allows the interviewees to 'construct' the meaning of a situation, 
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through 'social' interactions that maximises the participant's ability to interpret the interactions c 
themselves (Creswell, 2003, p. 8). Interpretative researchers understand their role in the process, 
namely that "any research on human or social systems will inevitably change them and make a 
virtue ofthis fact" (Jackson, 2000, p. 15). In addition, the use ofconstructivism and active 
interviews often presents "rich, descriptive narratives at a micro level, to provide detailed 
descriptions, which allow readers to make sufficient contextual judgments to transfer outcomes, 
themes and emerging understanding from the case studies to alternative settings" (Pickard, 2002, 
p. 2). Consisting of a number of assumptions, such as shown below, constructivism as a theory 
is often considered part of the interpretivism school and a qualitative methodology as shown 
below: 
• "Meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are 
interpreting. Qualitative researchers tend to use open-ended questions so that participants 
can express their views. 
• Humans engage with their world and make sense of it based on their historical and social 
perspective -everyone is born into a world of meaning bestowed by our culture. Thus, 
qualitative researchers seek to understand the context or setting of the participants 
through visiting this context and gathering information personally. They also make an 
interpretation of what they find; an interpretation shaped by the researcher's own 
experiences and backgrounds. · · 
• The basic generation of meaning is always social, arising in and out of interaction with a 
human community. The process of qualitative research is largely inductive, with the 
inquirer generating meaning from the data collected in the field." 
(Crotty, 1998,p.43) 
A key point for the academic utilising this alternate knowledge claim, is that they must recognise 
that their own view 'shapes' their perspective. Therefore, they must be particularly cognisant of 
their own actions during the active research phase, particularly during the interviews and data 
collection portion. It is the development of 'rich pictures' of the individual realities, which gives 
constructivism it's most useable factors in the rich narratives and detail, but this of course, is also 
its greatest limitations. The validity of these 'rich pictures' and how their applicability can be 
transferred to create credible research with rigor-, is a crucial point for any academic proposing 
the use of constructivism as a methodological approach. Attempts have been made to develop a 
framework in which these 'rich pictures' could be 'fitted' from one context to another 
(Erlandson, 1993; Lincoln, 1992; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). From these findings, what in 
essence normally happens is that researchers must 'position' themselves, or actively 
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acknowledge their role, prior to understanding their interpretation of the research. Therefore 
unlike post.,positivism, the start is not a theory to prove or disprove, but instead the use of 
Constructivism tends to lead to the development of a theory from the data of the research 
(Creswell, 2003, p. 9). In comparing and contrasting constructivism to positivism or post-
positivism, a more relativist ontology is normally seen, namely one that possesses multiple 
realities and is more holistic in nature. Likewise the epistemology in a Constructivism 
methodology is often subjective or interactive with the researcher as part of the subject, with 
more interpretation and interaction between the researcher and subject, which will tend to lend 
an outcome which is dependent on context and time, with a working hypothesis that will 
ultimately lead to a better understanding of the problem (Pickard and Dixon, 2004, p. 2). 
3.3.4 Advocacy/Participatory 
This knowledge claim takes social constructivism even further to ensure that 
marginalised or disadvantaged people are still included in the process. To do this, a political 
agenda of reform is included as part of the research, and in fact the ability to actually change the 
lives of participants can be a factor as well. Social issues are critical to this area, and typically 
form the basis or focal point of the research. Because this is a participatory strategy, 
collaboration between the researcher and interviewees often is very high. The participants tend 
to play a very active role in the research, and the results are often seen as their 'voice' for reform 
and change (Creswell, 2003, p. 10). Key features that are often seen in an advocacy or 
participatory knowledge claim include: 
• "Participatory action is recursive or dialectical and is focused on bringing about change 
in practices 
• These studies often begin with an important issue about the problems in society 
• The aim is to create a political debate so that change will occur 
• This knowledge claim engages the participants as active collaborators." 
(Kemmis and Wilkinson, 1998, p.21-22) 
3.3.5 Pragmatism 
The final alternative knowledge claim examined is the pragmatism, which focuses on 
actions, situations and conditions rather than antecedent issues as in post-positivism (Creswell, 
2003, p. 11 ). The focus is on solutions to problems, not on the method or process and so any 
approach can be utilised. Therefore, the consequences of actions, lead researchers to a problem-
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centred, real-world orientation in the pragmatic knowledge claim. Often used by mixed methods 
researchers, the pluralistic strategy has the following key characteristics: 
• "Pragmatism is not committed to any one system of philosophy or reality 
• Individual researchers have a freedom of choice in their methods, techniques and 
procedures 
• Pragmatists do not see the world as an absolute unity 
• Truth is what works at the time - investigators can use both quantitative and qualitative 
data 
• Researchers look to the 'what' and the 'how' to research based on their intended 
consequences 
• Agree that research always occurs in social, historical, political and other contexts 
• Pragmatists believe that we should stop asking questions about reality and the laws of 
nature." 
(Cherryholmes, 1992, p. 14) 
3.3.6 Knowledge Claim Methodology Selected for tb.is Thesis 
Knowledge claims are basically philosophical assumptions which are recognised as part 
of the basis to begin any research project. Using one of these aforementioned knowledge claims, 
a paradigm or viewpoint can be determined by each academic toward their subject. In this 
. particular research, the use idiographic logic, to study a series of unique events, coordinated with 
a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning and the use of a constructivist approach, was 
deemed the best process to address the particular problem. In the next section, the different 
strategies of inquiry will be examined to determine the best methodological approach for this 
particular thesis. 
3.4 Strategies of Inquiry 
The determination of a methodology that best 'fits' a particular problem, often involves 
the analysis of the theoretical perspective stance. In order to derive a philosophical assumptions 
or knowledge claim for this project from a large number of interviews conducted over a long 
time period, a part of both the background and research phases of the research were used to 
determine the philosophical assumptions of a selected panel of experts or interviewees. This 
kind of field research in the form of active interviews is often considered well suited to the study 
of social processes over time. Ultimately the results of this type of open-ended questioning are 
delineated later in the form of a general set of requirements and research questions that emerged 
from information gathered (Babbie, 2001, p. 276). Thus, developing an overall theory is a 
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complex activity and time consuming activity, far more than just a mere set of findings, and in 
the end, research is therefore supposed to offer an explanation about phenomena (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998, p. 22). In this case, it was the structure of the problem that drove the author 
toward a particular approach. By its very nature, IO can be characterised as an 'immature' 
concept due to lack of or inaccurate theory and research, which closely in some instances 
resembles the current state of this issue area within the United States government. 
From the aforementioned sections on alternate knowledge claims, the researcher can 
normally ascertain the theoretical perspective or philosophical stance, of a particular research 
. . . 
project, by studying the information gathered during the process. In addition, the data developed 
from the participants can normally lead to a particular plan of action or strategy, that is, a method 
or process. Therefore, the decision on the use of a particular methodology often results from the 
information and participants' availability, as well as the nature of the problem itself, in addition 
to the customer's needs, which can drive the researcher toward a particular approach. For like 
the knowledge claims, strategies of inquiries can be divided into three general areas, with a 
number of subsets delineated as well: 
• Quantitative 
• Experimental Designs 
• Surveys 
• Qualitative 
• Narratives 
• Phenomenology 
• Ethnographies 
• Grounded Theory 
• Case Studies 
• Mixed Methods 
• Sequential 
• Concurrent 
• Transformative 
In later sections, each of these three main approaches will be examined, with a number of 
specific methods identified. The intent is to not reinterpret these various approaches but instead 
to compare and contrast them, so that an appropriate methodology can be selected for this 
particular research. Likewise an overview of the qualities of each of these main approaches or 
methodologies is reviewed below, with an attempt to differentiate the main features of each. 
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3.4.1 Quantitative 
In a quantitative approach, the hypothesis and research questions are often based on 
theories that the researcher seeks to test. A theory is considered ··a set of interrelated constructs 
(variables), definitions and propositions that presents a systematic view of phenomena by 
specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining natural phenomena 
(Kerlinger, 1979, p. 64). Theory is therefore often used in a deductive manner and placed toward 
the beginning of the plan for a study. In doing so, theory in effect becomes a framework for the 
entire study: an organising model for the research questions or hypotheses and for the data 
collection procedure (Creswell, 2003, p. 125). In fact, these types of studies tend to operate 
more within the deductive model methodology of fixed and set research objectives, including an 
extensive set of definitions early in the research proposal. So in a quantitative approach, an 
entire section of the research proposal is thus devoted toward explaining the theory for a 
particular study, as opposed to letting the theory emerge from the data (Ibid, p. 119, 144). Based 
on this type of process, this methodology is normally considered more 'measurable' than other 
strategies of inquiry because of the widespread use of metrics and definable features. This is not 
always the case and the continuum of data between quantitative and qualitative methods is 
becoming ever more ill-defined as more integration occurs in the fields of research. However, it 
is probably safe to say that the use of a hypotheses and research questions based on the testing of 
theories tends to lead toward a 'sense' that this methodology is more quantifiable or measurable. 
Typically, a quantitative method consists of experimental designs and eo-relational 
studies or surveys, in which metrics can be obtained, but they can also include elaborate 
structural equation models (Ibid, p. 13). A survey design provides a quantitative or numeric 
description of trends, attitudes or opinions of a population by studying a sample of that 
population. In general, the components of the survey include a design or purpose, the population 
and sample, the instrumentation, any variables and the data analysis (Ibid, p. 154). General 
quantitative procedures can also be seen as pre-determined, utilising instrument based questions 
that collect discrete data to conduct statistical analysis (Ibid, p. 17). In an experiment, 
investigators may also identify a sample and generalise to a population, with a basic intent to test 
the impact of a treatment on an outcome, controlling for all other factors that might influence an 
outcome. In addition, an experimental method normally follows a standard form to include 
participants or subjects, variables (independent or dependent), instrumentation and materials, 
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procedures and measures (Ibid, p. 172). The intent of a quantitative approach is thus to reduce 
the unknown factors to a minimum to make the test as 'scientific' as possible. This 
reductionistic analysis is a key feature of the quantitative methodology. Thus to summarise, the 
typical features of a quantitative methodology is the overall emphasis on the post-positivist 
perspective, with its associated deterministic and reductionistic attitude combined with empirical 
observation and measurement portions generally leading to the verification of a postulated 
theory. 
3.4.2 Qualitative 
In this approach, the typical strategies include ethnographies, grounded theory, case 
studies, in addition to phenomenological as well as narrative research (Ibid, p. 15). Inquirers 
typically state questions as opposed to objectives or hypotheses, and these research questions 
often assume two forms - a central question and associated sub-questions (Ibid, p. 1 05). In turn, 
these questions also generally become more like 'working guidelines' rather than 'truths' to be 
proven later (Thomas, 1993, p. 35). So in reality, often a qualitative approach is considered 
more of an exploratory type of research, where a topic, variables and theory base are unknown at 
the beginning of the project (Creswell, 2003, p. 75). Janice Morse states that the characteristics 
of a qualitative research problem are often centred around the fact that: (a) the concept is 
'immature' due to a conspicuous lack of theory and previous research; (b) a notion that the 
available theory may be inaccurate, inappropriate, incorrect, or biased; (c) a need exists to 
explore and describe the phenomena and to develop theory; or (d) the nature of the phenomenon 
may not be suited to quantitative measures (Morse, 1991, p. 120). 
Therefore qualitative researchers often use a 'lens' or perspective to guide their study. It 
is an inductive or evolving methodological design, in which inquirers define fewer terms in the 
proposal, and the theory or hypothesis is allowed to evolve over time (Creswell, 2003, p. 144). 
Characteristics of qualitative research often include the following items: 
• Review the needs of potential audiences for the proposal. 
• If there is some question about their knowledge, present the basic characteristics to use as 
an example. 
• Takes place in a natural setting. 
• Uses multiple methods that are interactive and humanistic. 
• The methods of data collection are growing and increasingly involve active participation 
by the interviewees and sensitivity to the participants in the study. 
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• Qualitative research is emergent rather than tightly prefigured. 
• Qualitative research is fundamentally interpretative. 
• The researcher views social phenomena holistically. 
• Systematically reflects on who the researchers are in the inquiry and is sensitive to their 
lmowledge claims. 
• Uses complex reasoning that is multi-faceted, iterative and simultaneous. 
• The researcher adopts and uses one or more strategies as a guide for procedure. 
(Ibid, p. 144, 183) 
Qualitative research is therefore normally considered more interpretative than a quantitative 
approach, with the inquirer typically involved in a sustained and intensive experience with 
participants, in which theories are not formulated at the beginning of the study, but instead are 
allowed to emerge as part of the research process (Ibid, p. 184). Based on the qualities defined 
above, and the need to deal with 'messy' issues, in this thesis, it is this type of strategies of 
inquiry, namely a qualitative approach, which is followed. 
3.4.3 Mixed Methods 
There are significant differences between quantitative and qualitative research as 
indicated earlier. In fact two different research cultures have arisen from these paradigms with 
"one professing the superiority of deep rich observational data" and the other the virtues of 
"hard, general ... data" (Sieber, 1973, p. 1335). These purists on each side have suggested an 
'incompatible thesis' that these two paradigms cannot and should not be mixed. In today's 
world, academic research is becoming increasingly interdisciplinary, with a more complex and 
dynamic nature, and therefore methodologies that tend to complement one another are gaining in 
attractiveness. If a continuum with qualitative research anchored at one pole, and a quantitative 
research can be visualised as anchored at the other, the mixed methods research covers the larger 
set of points in the middle (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 15). Based on the fact that all 
methods have limitations, the mixing of these different strategies has been suggested as a way to 
neutralise or cancel the inherent biases of the two dominant methodologies. This is because 
mixed methods studies have both a qualitative and quantitative foci, and they will bring in both 
questions and hypotheses in the development of a purpose statement (Creswell, 2003, p. 114). 
Likewise the use of a mixed method combination approach to research allows the academic in 
the definition phase of research, to include a separate section for theory development if the study 
begins with quantitative data collection. If the study begins with qualitative data collection, then 
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the theoretical terms will probably emerge during the research and will be defined later in the 
findings or results section of the final research study (Ibid, p. 144). Either way, this approach 
allows flexibility to the investigative methods, by not limiting the researcher to one prescribed 
methodology over another. 
The three typical procedures often ascribed to this type of mixed method methodology 
include sequential, concurrent and transformative. The first of these seeks to elaborate on or to 
expand the findings of one method with another method. This is opposed to the second type of 
mixed method methodology (concurrent) in which the researcher brings together both 
quantitative and qualitative data to provide a comprehensive analysis. Finally in the latter 
procedure (transformative), the researcher uses a theoretical lens as an overarching perspective 
within a design that contains both quantitative and qualitative data (Ibid, p. 16). Together these 
strategies give a wider array of options to the researcher, which they can then use to build their 
approach, design process of research, to ultimately develop a set of actual procedures or methods 
to conduct their academic studies. 
3.5 Methods 
The third stage to the theoretical construct or :framework for design is the determination 
of the actual research methods that will to be utilised for the study. While this topic will be 
discussed in much greater detail in Chapters Four and Five, suffice it to say that the actual 
method used tends to be driven by a combination of the researcher and data available for the 
project. In general, any of the three methodologies documented to date (quantitative, qualitative 
and mixed method) could be used on any academic study, for it is a combination of the 
knowledge claims and strategies employed as part of the research, as well as the data received, 
that will ultimately lead the researcher to employ a particular approach. For example, if 
experiments and surveys are primarily being used as part of their data collection, a quantitative 
approach may work best. This is because these approaches often attempt to determine the cause 
and effect of a hypothesis, while reducing the number of variables, all the while trying to prove 
or disprove a theory. This type of method could fit best with a post-positivist type of knowledge 
claim, as opposed to a constructive or participatory one. In another example, the researcher 
maintains multiple meanings from the information gathered in their interviews, using open-ended 
emerging data, to develop themes, which emerge in the form of narratives or case studies. This 
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methodology is typical of a qualitative approach, and while normally considered as interpretative 
(constructive), it can also have an advocacy perspective, that has a social or historical 
background. The final method discussed is the mixed approach; which tends to be the most 
pragmatic of the three. Employing procedures borrowed from both quantitative and qualitative 
methods, it is considered a consequence-orientated, problem-centred and pluralistic approach 
(Ibid, p. 16). Thus the actual method utilised, whether a survey, interviews or case studies, is 
often determined by the knowledge claims and strategies of inquiries that best fit a particular 
researcher's needs and data. 
If the knowledge claims are the theoretical perspective of a research project, and the 
strategies of inquiries are the approach, then the final element is the design process or the method 
of data collection and analysis (Ibid, p. 5). These latter tasks are the actual techniques and 
procedures utilised in a project, and the decision on which to use, often just as the data itself, 
drive the research toward a particular methodology or approach. For example, the difference 
between closed or open-ended questions, can lead to a pre-determined or emerging approach. 
Likewise the data itself, whether it is text, image or numeric, often lays constraints on the 
researcher that could ultimately determine the theoretical outcome of a particular study. So the 
· method with which data are collected and analysed also plays a very important role in the 
determination of the methodology used by a researcher. Obviously, there must be a match 
between the original problem and methodology and certain types of social research often call for 
specific approaches as described below (Ibid, p. 21 ). 
3.6 Summary- The Reasons for Selection of a Qualitative (Interpretative) 
Methodology 
In this chapter, the options for the selection of a certain particular methodology for a 
research approach have been laid out in detail, and in this particular project, the design 
framework that was eventually chosen is a qualitative (interpretative) approach. This departure 
from using an established theory (post-positivism or post-modernism), advocating an action 
agenda (participatory) or focusing on results (pragmatic), all tends to lead to the examination of 
the constructive knowledge claim position (Creswell, 2003, p. 6). In this particular framework, 
multiple and varied subjective meanings and experiences are crucial as the researcher attempted 
to understand the complexity of the subject (10) vice utilise a m~re reductionist attitude. For as 
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noted by Jackson (2000, p.2) attempts to apply reductionism and the natural scientific method 
generally, to social and organizational problems, have not been a happy one and have yielded 
only limited success. Likewise Ashby wrote in a similar vein when he stated that the way not to 
proceed in approaching an exceedingly complex system is by reductionist analysis (Ashby, 
1956). Constructivism is therefore an attempt to help the researcher make sense of, or interpret, 
the meanings that other's have about the world, where theories are generated or developed to 
. follow a pattern of meaning (Creswell, 2003, p. 9). To reiterate, the following are key 
assumptions normally associated with social constructivism or interpretivism: 
• "Meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are 
interpreting 
• Humans engage with the world and make sense of it based on their historical and social 
perspective 
• The basic generation of meaning is always social, arising in and out interaction with the 
human community" 
(Crotty, 1998, p.43). 
It is from the reasons stated above, namely the use of a philosophical approach in a 
constructivism know ledge claim, with a strategy of inquiry that allowed the use of a 
collaborative and a change.oriented focus by the participants, to collect open-ended emerging 
data from the interviews. All of which ultimately determined the best and primary methodology 
for use in this particular research (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 18). That is because this research 
was not begun with any pre-conceived theories in mind, but rather an open-minded approach to 
an area of study, which allowed a qualitative approach to ultimately emerge from the data. 
Therefore, based on these parameters and the data available, the decision was made to use 
an interpretative (qualitative) methodology in this research. Conducted under the general 
heading of constructivism research, this methodology allowed the study and comprehension of 
the subtle nuances in attitudes and behaviours of the participants with regard to the conduct of IO 
in the United States government as a whole. In addition, these procedures using interviews and 
in-depth questions also allowed for a greater depth of understanding under a qualitative 
approach. This is due to the inherent flexibility of open-ended and multi-threaded questions, 
which allowed the ability to modify and change the framework design at any time. From that 
perspective, a methodology grounded in the constructivism knowledge claim, which is part of 
the interpretivist school, appeared to offer the best approach in which to gain insight, 
understanding and hopefully a meaningful guide to future action. Thus, the use of general 
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procedures or methodology in the form of a qualitative approach, utilising emerging methods, 
with open-ended questions, and a variety of data (interview, observation and documental), which 
allowed themes and theories to develop and emerge, was deemed to be more effective than other 
methodologies. Finally, the detailed procedures actually used ensured the inclusion of multiple 
and varied opinions necessary for dealing with the 'messy' issues involved with IO in the United 
States government. Taken together, it was this selection then of a constructivism approach, as 
part of the qualitative field as the overall methodology for this research based on the criteria that 
were available. 
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Chapter 4 - Methodological Approaches 
This research focuses on gaps in the performance by the United States government during 
IO campaigns and activities with regard perception management and computer network 
operations. These aspects were chosen, as an attempt to narrow the research focus to relevant 
issues in this large and diverse topic area. Arquilla and Ronfeldt recognised the divergent nature 
IO in their book Noopolitik, where they discussed the dichotomy that existed between the 
different elements. The key to research success as related by these authors "was to develop the 
connection between the two poles, which define opposite ends of a spectrum of security 
concerns ... " and to ensure that "the technological and ideational aspects should be linked by 
strategic analysis" (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999, p.ix). 
Thus a primary goal of this chapter is to investigate a number of philosophies of the 
qualitative (constructive/interpretative) framework that are appropriate to this investigation. This 
section illustrates the basic paradigms or traditions that exist and ultimately to justify the actual 
methodological approach taken in this research. The philosophical background or strategy of 
inqtiiry that was thought best suited to this problem was then selected to match the respective 
issue area. For a research methodology is not only a process, but it is also a way of thinking 
about and studying social reality (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 3). It is not a 'guaranteed 
solution', but instead more of a 'structured approach' or a "set of guidelines which stimulate the 
intellectual process" (Wilson, 2001, p. 6). This is opposed to a method or coding which can be 
thought of as the specific tasks or steps in a research project. This approach to research was 
outlined earlier with a format of knowledge claims (Chapter 2), strategies of inquiry (Chapter 3) 
and detailed procedures (Chapter 4). Therefore in this chapter, the analysis of different 
methodologies is conducted and the actual method utilised will be laid out in great detail. 
4.1 A Review of Qualitative (Constructive) Approaches 
In the examination of quantitative and mixed methods options, it was the use of 
qualitative procedures involving open-ended questions and interview data, which became the 
more appropriate approach to this 'complex' issue of IO, after this academic area was thoroughly 
reviewed. IO is considered a 'messy' problem, and so it is difficult to quantify or analyse in a 
reductionist format. Specifically as described in Chapter 3, the constructivist position was 
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selected because it promoted a better understanding of this particular problem set. Likewise the 
use of multiple participant interviews with different 'weltanschauung' (roughly translated this 
means 'worldview') and the generation of theory from data was seen as a better 'fit' to the 
conduct of 10 research. This is opposed to a more post-positivism approach with its reductionist 
and deterministic nature, or an advocacy approach that is ch:::mge or issue oriented, or a 
pragmatic approach which tends to focus too much on problem solving and reality. None of 
these other types of qualitative approaches 'fit' this particular research problem as well as, the 
constructive framework which was outlined in the preceding chapter. In addition, because 
constructivism is part of the interpretative (qualitative) school, it falls into the category that some 
analysts believe might provide data richer in meaning, than similar quantitative types especially 
when dealing with perception management type issues and human emotions (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998; Stem, 1980). 
4.1.1 Analysing Research Traditions 
Qualitative research is often represented by an interpretative or natural approach, 
grounded in philosophical assumptions, with multiple sources of information and a narrative text 
utilised by the researcher (Creswell, 1998, p. 15). The types or 'varieties' of research traditions 
were examined previously with a qualitative (constructive or interpretative) approach selected 
from the available options (Tesch, 1990). Some of the qualitative strategies that could have been 
used include Ethnographies, Case Studies, Phenomenological, Biography or a Narrative 
Research such as Grounded Theory. These traditions are derived from a wide variety of 
disciplines including the humanities, social sciences, psychology, philosophy, sociology and 
anthropology (Creswell, 1998, p. 5). These approaches can also be grouped together as action 
research, which is an iterative process that combines theory and practice through change and 
reflection with a mutually acceptable framework (Avison et al, 1999, p. 94). Likewise 
qualitative strategies can also be analysed in a number of ways. For example, in this research, 
the traditions were examined by foci or manner in which data is collected, their central purpose 
or foci and method of collecting data, as well as the theoretical perspective, including their 
relationship to social science theory (Creswell, 1998, p. 37, 112). Finally, the organisational 
structure itself must be examined, if it involves people in multiple hierarchical layers, which tend 
to be 'messy' or 'fuzzy', because of different and conflicting objectives, perceptions and 
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attitudes (Avison et al, 1999, p. 95). In the following paragraphs, each ofthese approaches to 
differentiating research methodologies will be evaluated and investigated to determine their 
suitability for this research. 
The analysis of these different qualitative approaches is crucial to the successful selection 
of a research tradition, as shown in Figure 4.1. For example, a biography or biographical study 
can be defined as the "studied use and collection oflife documents that describe turning-point 
moments in an individual's life" (Denzin, 1989, p. 69). This is opposed to phenomenological 
approach which is derived from the concept of 'lived experiences', 'phenomenon' or 
'consciousness of human experiences' (Polkinghorne, 1989). First developed by Husserl, in the 
late 19th century, the phenomenological approach emphasised a philosophy on 'meaning', rather 
than causal explanation of human behaviour (Jackson, 2000, p. 46). For if phenomenology 
emphasises the meaning of an experience for a number of individuals, then the process of 
studying their reaction to that phenomenon, is called grounded theory. This tradition attempts to 
develop hypotheses to the way humans react to these phenomena, which in turn generate the01ies 
based on these primary interviews. This is an empirical approach to the study of social life 
through qualitative research and analysis that codes the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). By 
relying on fieldwork to generate interview and ethnographic data from which to analyse human 
actions, the conventional grounded theory has focused on generating the 'basic social processes' 
(Clarke, 2003, p. 557). This is different to a biographical project that often involves a single 
individual as opposed to a phenomenological or grounded theory investigation, which typically 
utilises multiple interviewees. Likewise Ethnography, which describes and interprets a cultural 
or social group as a whole, is based on their learned patterns of behaviour and customs (Harris, 
1968). An even more rigidly bound system is the Case Study, which can have multiple 
constraints, all of which affect the data (Creswell, 1998, p. 112). In addition, the prolonged time 
period involved in an ethnographical investigation differentiates it from a case study, which is 
bounded by time and place as part of a system (Stake, 1995; Merriam, 1988). Finally, to further 
differentiate these different traditions, grounded theory and case study based projects require the 
researcher to locate the 'right' people from a larger sample as opposed to an ethnographical 
project which studies the group or culture as a whole. In the case of this particular research, the 
interviewees were a diverse group, located around the world, and were not necessarily confined 
by their positional, authoritative or regulatory occupation. These factors tended to point to a 
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grounded theory or a modification of a grounded theory as the best approach with regards to the 
collection of data or foci. 
A Case Study 
A Portrait 
A Case 
Individual Cultural 
Group 
An Ethnography 
A Biography 
A Phenomenology 
A Concept or 
Phenomenon 
8 
I 
A Grounded Theory 
Figure 4.1 - Differentiating Traditions by Foci 
Likewise, qualitative approaches can also be approached from a theoretical perspective. 
Related to the discussions of knowledge claims and strategies of inquiry in Chapters Two and 
Three, these are philosophical assumptions or paradigms that tend to guide the researcher toward 
a particular methodology. These include the ontological, epistemological, axiological, rhetorical 
and methodological approaches, each of which will be described below. For as stated in chapter 
3, a methodology is a description of how to think about the process of analysis prior to doing it, 
that is "thinking about how to think. .. which for many an unnatural process is" (Wilson, 2001, p. 
8). Knowledge claims can then simply mean that the researcher starts a project with certain 
assumptions about how they will learn and what they expect to learn during a particular inquiry 
(Creswell, 2003, p. 6). The reality of the researcher depends on their viewpoint taken, or the 
'framework', methodological approach or paradigm, any of which can ultimately provide a 
philosophical background for the research. One of these frameworks that can be used to serve as 
a viewpoint is the ontological approach, where the researcher often asks questions, such as -
What is the nature of reality? (Moustakas, 1994). This is more of a post-positivistic approach as 
opposed to epistemology, in which the researcher attempts to minimise the 'objective 
separateness' between themselves and the research. For instance, in an epistemological 
framework, the researcher often becomes in effect an 'insider' (Guba and Lincoln, 1988, p. 94); 
It is these methods, that utilise epistemologically and onto logically based approaches in the 
pragmatic mode, which have the ability to use grounded theory as a perspective so that in fact 
that the researcher can be an 'acknowledged participant' from their knowledge claim background 
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(Clarke, 2003, p. 555); On the other hand, Axiological approaches expose the biases inherent in 
research, to question the role of values and will often include the researcher's own interpretation 
as part of the final analysis. This type ofweltanschauung (worldview) is followed even more 
dramatically in a rhetorical philosophical type of assumption, which is a more generalised study 
that focuses on the use of metaphors, with much of the writing done in the first person and 
including personal stories from the interViewees in the research narrative (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985; Stake, 1995). This is opposed to the methodological approach, which is a 
conceptualisation of the research as a process. fu this tradition, the researcher works from detail 
to general,_using inductive logic to allow a methodology to emerge from the data. This type of 
paradigm or framework was mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, with the acknowledgement that 
in this particular research, a combination of both types of reasoning (inductive and deductive) 
was ultimately utilised. 
The researcher can also decide on the type of qualitative methodology based on how their 
research fits into general social science theory. In this traditional process, a research project 
attempts to frame the study or develop a theoretical lens to explain, predict and generalise about 
how the world operates (Creswell, 1998, p. 84; Flinders and Mills, 1993). This classic process 
has a continuum of study that advances from an early research phase of gathering data and 
asking questions (before) to the data collation and ultimately examination and analysis phase 
(after). As shown in Figure 4.2, the five traditional approaches of a qualitative methodology 
mentioned earlier in this chapter all fit on this continuum in a variety of different areas, based on 
the method with which they are conducted. For example, in an ethnographical or 
phenomenological approach, researchers tend to begin their studies with strong views or 
frameworks on how they will conduct their research. All of these methodologies centre on some 
type of theoretical construct wherein the individual 'voice' and the interpretative nature of the 
research. This as opposed to biographies and the case studies that tend to vary considerably in 
their use of theoretical constructs, hence a position more toward the middle of the 
methodological construct. At the other extreme is grounded theory, where a tremendous amount 
of data is collected and analysed before a construct begins to emerge, with more recent work 
shifting toward more constructive assumptions and epistemologies (Charmaz, 1995; 2000). With 
deep roots in symbolic sociology and pragmatic philosophy, the grounded theory method can 
112 
also be viewed as a total theory and methodology package with an interpretative, constructionist 
epistemology (Clarke, 2003, p. 559). 
BEFORE AFTER 
Ethnography 
Phenomenology 
Biography 
Case Study 
Grounded Theory 
Figure 4.2 - Extent of Theory Use in Qualitative Approaches 
4.1.2 Narrowing the Selection Criteria 
The path in this thesis to a qualitative approach and a specific research method was not a 
straight-forward one. The subject topic and research material tended to favour an interpretative 
methodology, one that could effectively model the effects ofiO in the United States government. 
This need to 'consh·uct' theory and develop themes and hypotheses as the research was 
conducted, tended to lead toward qualitative h·aditions such as intemational relations, 
organisational, decision-making and systems methods. Because the researcher had an extensive 
background in international relations theories, it was only natural that the fi rst analysis of the 
problems associated with IO began here. The inability of this particular type of theoretical 
consh·uct to answer the demands of information revolution, however eventually meant that all 
types of international relations theories were ultimately abandoned in the course of this research. 
Likewise, research was also conducted in organisational or decision-making theory on the same 
premise, namely that this methodology could help to understand or model the use ofiO in the 
United States govemment. Unfortunately, this was not to be the case and this type of 
methodology was abandoned as well . Finally systems approaches were also examined as a 
means to finding an appropriate process to utilise for the study of IO. In the next several 
sections, each of these researcq processes is laid out in detail to document the decisions made 
toward finding the best interpretative approach to conduct this research. 
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4.2 International Relations Theories 
Obviously from these discussions, developing a possible methodology in which to frame 
and conduct this research on IO was very difficult. All three major approaches including 
quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods were examined, to determine the appropriate 
theoretical construct that would best apply to the role of this research area in the United States 
government. In general, theories are considered as internally consistent sets of empirical 
prepositions that allow situation to be explained and predicted, or in other words, theory allows 
the researcher to describe, explain, predict and prescribe. The traditional international relations 
theories such as Realism, Neo-Realism, Liberal Internationalism, Complex Interdependence 
Theory, Social Constructivism or Collective Security have together not been able to adequately 
model the complex changes that are occurring in the Information Age. At first glance, this 
would not seem the case and in fact, IO would seem a natural area for the advancement of the 
use of these types of common international relations political theories. There are elements of all 
of the major categories (liberal, realism and alternate) in IO, and it could be thought that one of 
these constructs would certainly 'fit' and encompass their attributes. However, after careful 
analysis, it appeared that this is not the case. Each of these 'new' concepts, which are the core of 
the information revolution, are compared in this chapter to the basic philosophical ideas of these 
classic international relations constructs and in the end, these theories were considered 
inadequate as will explained in greater detail in this chapter. 
One of the reasons for this is that a number of these traditions revolve around the use of 
the nation-state or regimes, which typically incorporate a tacit or explicit set of norms and/or 
rules around which actors expectations converge. Of course, this is the opposite of anarchy, in 
which no government or policing occurs at or above the nation-state level, so there are no 
developed sets of laws or sense of community. The problem with these concepts and the 
growing power inherent in the information revolution is that the authority that is normally 
focused at a centralised and hierarchical manner for the 'traditional' international relations types 
of scenarios is being upended by the rapidly growing influence inherent in the new information 
age. Thus, from the research process, and the results obtained from the interviewees, it is the 
democratisation of power and the 'flattening' of communications and networks as well as 
organisations, that makes this issue area so difficult to place in a classical international relations 
theoretical context.' 
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liberalism Reall$m Alternate Theories 
Liberal Internationalism Neo-Realism Marxism 
Neo-Liberalism Decision-Making Critial Theory 
Utilitarism Feminist Theory 
International Regimes JJI Green Theory 
Complex Interdependence Functionalism Post-Modernism 
International Political Economy Neo-Functionalism Constructivism 
Table 4.1 - Categories of International Relations Theories 
Typically divided into three broad categories - Liberalism, Realism and Alternate 
Theories, Figure 4.3 shows. those different categories that comprise international relations 
theories as well as a number of sub-theories branched off from the dominant themes. While this 
table is not a list of all of the possible international relations theories available, this chart and the 
subsequent discussion, will cover some of the major options and gives the reasons why these 
constmcts were not considered the best methodologies to use in this study. 
4.2.1 Liberalism 
To begin this analysis of traditional constructs, the first 'recognised' international 
relations theory in the form of liberalism will be examined. Arising from the Treaty of 
W estphalia in 1648 and the development of the interstate system, Liberalism also can be 
attributed to philosophers and scholars of this period, when mankind shifted to a period of 
enlightenment and scientific discovery in the Middle Ages (Zacher and Mathew, 1995, p. 111). 
For with the rise of nation-states came sovereignty and a centralised power in a federated 
structure. Therefore, the advent of the modern systemic structure, aligned with the rise of 
Liberalism and what many academics consider the 'original' international relations theory that 
developed from classic foreign policy development and diplomatic interactions (Owen, 1998, p. 
145). In addition, as the nation-states evolved in Europe, a balance of power also developed as 
the different leaders and monarchies attempt to expand their influence. Early 'mles' were set as 
these kings attempted to limit their 'wars' to a restricted nature, designed more to readdress 
differences within the constraints of the system, rather than incorporate drastic changes. 
Likewise, colonies were founded as technology developed the need for new markets, and 
commerce expanded beyond the continent. 
While Liberalism is often considered the original international relations theoretical 
construct, in fact all three of the major streams of international relations- realism, liberalism and 
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alternate theories can in fact be traced to key philosophers of this period, namely Hobbes, Kant 
and Grotius respectively (Doyle, 1986, p. 1164). These philosophies developed concepts which 
are still studied and considered essential to the focus of international relations today. In fact, all 
of these high-level doctrines and diplomatic theories were attempts to link together the nascent 
and evolving nation-states in Europe, to reduce the then constant state of warfare in that region 
(Zacher and Mathew, 1995, p. 113). Key concepts li}ce the balance of power were emerging that 
allowed the nations and their leaders to eventually develop a full spectrum of choices that range 
from transitory alliances to permanent alliances and regimes. The rise ofnation-states in 
Western Europe was not a smooth or predictable transition, as evidenced by the French 
Revolution, with the evolution of nation states drastically changing the political landscape as 
well (Ibid, 112). No longer were kingdoms ruled on the whims of the monarchy and instead the 
leadership of these nations began to appraise the power of the masses. Wars were no longer 
fought for limited gains and instead the beginnings of total war were felt (Owen, 1998, p. 143).· 
The ability of a nation to mobilise its people, and the industrial base to prepare for conflict were 
rapidly becoming dominant factors in the international arena. However, order was still preserved 
in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars as the Concert of Europe is founded in 1820. 
Masterminded by Metternich of Austria, as well as his diplomatic colleagues from the Great 
Powers, this system of alliances and collective security was to last almost a century until World 
War I. France was once again brought back into the fold of nations, while Liberalism survived 
as the pre-eminent international relations theory based on the balance of power principles 
(Doyle, 1986, p. 1157). 
Nevertheless, there were challenges to this predominant theoretical construct because of 
the particular environment of diplomatic activity and military operations of this era. The 
'international' character of these ideas is obviously evident, but what is probably more 
interesting is the fact that much of this diplomatic activity tended to be very insular and 
conducted in a closed environment. One of the major factors of the balance ofpower construct 
often included the 'linking' together of nations in alliances or ententes to mitigate the possibility 
of armed conflict (Zacher and Mathew, 1995, p. 114). Therefore, international relations during 
this period was in fact much more of a 'closed' relationship of the principals and the general 
willingness to never take any action 'too far.' Likewise another factor was the consensus that 
leaders of these nascent nation states would ultimately work for the 'good of mankind' (Kegley, 
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1995, p. 4). This attitude pervaded much of what is considered classic liberalism, liberal 
internationalism and liberal utopianism. As will be examined in follow-on sections, some 
academics have found the general liberalism construct wanting when there is an examination of 
actions from a 'selfish' or realist viewpoint thus, the emergence of Realist and Neo-Realism 
theories, as will be shown in the section 4.2.2 .. 
4.2.2 Realism 
Realism arose from significant international events such as the revolts in the Germanic 
States in 1848 and the Crimean War in 1856, which were major conflicts that threatened the 
peace developed by the Concert of Europe, and hence the limitations of Liberalism (Holsti, 1995, 
p. 37). Both of these disruptions were very important because in the end, virtually every Great 
Power was involved in one way or another in these wars (Terriff et al, 1999, p. 33). Other 
threats to Liberal Internationalism also occurred as the once feudal lands of Germany began to 
coalesce under the leadership of Bismarck with two wars of German secession in 1867 and 1871, 
in which this dynamic leader once and forever brought together the principalities of the German 
nation. In doing so, Bismarck revolutionised regional politics by creating a very strong nation in 
central Europe that in essence could threaten any of the other Great Powers. The advent of 
'RealPolitik' by Bismarck forever changed the balance of power within Europe in the 1870's as 
well as ultimately forming the basis the Realism movement (Evera, 1998, p. 79). This theory 
was later' given acade~ic rigor by Carr and Morganthau, who publisheq their academic tomes in 
1939 and 1948 respectively (Terriffet al, 1999, p. 11). This major portion of international 
relations theories has been instrumental in shaping and changing the emphasis away from 
Liberalism, because realists focused on the states, with a cyclical approach to world affairs. 
These academics doubted the ability of the nation-states to maintain sustained cooperation 
because they believed in the concepts of anarchy, mistrust, conflict and the use offorce (Waltz, 
1990, p. 25). These beliefs however ran contrary to prevailing Liberalism theories and over 
time, counter-arguments arose in the form ofNeo-Liberalism and Alternate theories as 
mentioned earlier. For one of the problems with Realism, has always been its lack of predictive 
powers, especially with regard to the demise of Communism and the Cold War (Kegley, 1995, p. 
5). Thus it is natural that other theories would arise as challenges to this theoretical construct in 
the late 1970s and 1980s, such as Complex Interdependence, International Regimes, etc., as 
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mentioned previously. 
Of course, the Realists countered with new theoretical constructs of their own in the form 
ofNeo-Realism. The prime advocate of this update to Realism was Kenneth Waltz, who 
published two seminal books, Man, the State and War in 1959 and the Theory of International 
Politics in 1979, both of which stressed anarchy and its consequences on the fundamental reality 
of world affairs (Terriff et al, 1999, p. 14). Because Neo-Realists believe that anarchy shapes the 
nation states, this deterministic viewpoint advocates that countries and their leaders do not have 
much freedom of movement or choice. Neo-Realism focuses as does Realism on nation-states, 
with anarchy as a central component, from a systemic perspective, and Waltz believed that 
anarchy socialises nation-states to be similar in their actions (Ibid, p. 36). This is key and forms 
the basis ofNeo-Realism, in the fact that Waltz argued that anarchy socialises units to be 
functionally similar. Interesting enough, but this leads to the question that if the power of 
information is also not a socialising force as well, would it not force nations to act in a standard 
manner? These arguments by Waltz were spread over both books, with a' focus in the first book, 
on the three levels of interaction between nation-states and the latter book, on the systemic level, 
in which he advocated that'anarchy is a key and central theme. A final potiion of the Neo-
Realist theory concerned the distribution of power. Because these academics argued that 
anarchy is constant, and that it socialises nation-states, the only change can ultimately arise in 
their mind, is one that will only come from the redistribution of power (Holsti, 1995, p. 39). 
Neo-Realism has not proven to be an adequate theory to explain the changing role of 
international relations, especially in the information environment. This dichotomy was noted as 
well by Myriam Dunn, where she examined all of the traditional international relations theories 
as a methodological basis for her dissertation, and in turn dismissed each of them except for one 
(Dunn, 2002). In the end, she reluctantly settled on a newer version of Realism (Structural), but 
still regarded this theory as somewhat inadequate to truly explain the changing environment of 
IO. Other academics have agreed, that Neo- Realism has its inconsistencies, and ultimately 
major flaws in its use as a tool for modelling the power of information (Glaser, 1994, p. 60). 
This last section on neo-realism also emphasises the true constraints of this international 
relations theory, and some academics felt that it was best situated for those political constraints 
and factors of the Cold War (Kegley, 1995, p. 8). 
For in reviewing the primary themes of this research and its emphasis on information 
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with regard to international relations, the distribution of power and how it is changing is a major 
factor that needed to be considered. It must be understood within the whole concept ofiO, is 
that power has been transferred to the people in a more horizontal structure. It can be asked if it 
is true, that if there are really no alternate choices available to nations as advocated by N eo-
Realism, are leaders constrained in their actions, and ultimately, is anarchy relevant to the 
information revolution (Ibid)? Once again, IO does not limit choices and in fact it is just the 
opposite, with the information revolution broadening the number of selections available. A final 
question that of course must be answered is that if the power of nation-states is distributed to the 
masses as emphasised in Chapter One, does that mean that the Neo-Realist theories are still 
current or were they rendered obsolete by the end of the Cold War (Ray, 1995, p. 341)? 
For a careful examination of the aforementioned international relations type of constructs 
such as Liberalism or Realism, or any of the Alternative Theories, brings forth the conclusion 
that none of these theories were adequate for this study because they do not accurately reflect the 
changes that have occurred in the new political environment. They do not meet the criteria of an 
interpretative approach, with a grounded theory, that uses inductive and deductive reasoning. So 
in the end, an international relations type of theoretical construct was ultimately not selected. 
4.3 Organisational or Decision-Making Theory 
International relations theories are not the only types of methodologies or processes that 
are available to examine for this thesis, because the development and evolution ofiO within the 
United States government also demonstrates many of the classic examples of decision-making 
theory. From the 1930s onward, three different models of management competed for precedence 
in the academic fields of organisational theory: specifically the traditional approach, human 
relations theory and systems thinking (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1981 ). Other quantitative methods 
such as surveys, experimental test plans, statistical analysis, and sampling are also available as a 
methodology. However, based on the pre-existing knowledge philosophical assumptions, an 
interpretative or qualitative approach was determined to be the best methodology for this 
hypothesis. In addition, upon examination of these three elements of inquiry (knowledge claims, 
strategies of inquiry and methods), the area of decision making theory was also determined to be 
a possible source for a methodology for this thesis. For as Wheatley summarised in his writings 
on organisational theory, the role that chaos plays with leadership and relations between people 
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and their environmental settings is very important (Wheatley, 1992, p. 20). He felt that 
enterprises can be managed through broad concepts and only a few guiding principles, and not 
rely on elaborate rules, task definitions or structures, but instead to trust in chaos and self-
organisation (Ibid, p. 21). Capra noted similar relationships in his three theoretical concepts 
which brought in an ecological viewpoint, specifically around the beliefs that the 'pattern of 
organisation, structure of systems and process' were all important (Capra, 1996, p. 153). He 
believed that these three concepts are interdependent and when taken together, create what Capra 
calls the "key criteria of a living system" (Ibid, p. 156). Therefore based on these concepts and 
further analysis, the following organisational theories models and decision-making theories will 
be defined and analysed as to the applicability to the hypothesis of this thesis centred on the use 
of 10 in the United States government. 
4.3.1 Rational Actor Model 
With regard to Decision-Making Theory, most of these will be classified into two types: 
classical and behavioural. Often the classical model can also be called the rational actor, 
normative or utilitarian approach because it assumes that .events are well controlled and certain 
(Loke, 1996, p: 5). The Rational Actor Model attempts to explain international events by 
recounting the aims and calculations ofnations or governments (Allison, 1971, p. 10). The 
emphasis in this model is on the nations and how they will act in a prescribed manner that can be 
. studied and analysed by academics. Under this theory, the state's actions are considered 
unanimous and constitute that particular units posture toward a unique dilemma. The Rational 
Actor Model generally speaking also believes that the nation state is the only player on the world 
stage. This is a very important fact, in the idea that the state is the sole actor in the world politic. 
So firmly entrenched is this idea in international relations theory that it was not until relatively 
recently that other models have begun to arise and gain prominence. Understandably the 
Rational Actor Model is a very general approach to looking at state's actions and academics in 
the international relations field have long recognised the inherent limitations in this model. 
However if a theory is to be understandable it must be somewhat simple and normally this may 
mean smaller or more uniform type of units. Therefore while theorists have understood the 
deficiencies associated with Rational Actor Mode, for a variety of reasons it is still being used 
because it can explain many concepts. That is because in this theory, actors understand their 
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goals and objectives, they know that for each action, consequences will result and they as 
rational actors will be able to rank these in order of preference. The actor's also understand the 
alternatives that are available and these can be ranked within their respective categories for 
consequences and results. The variations that arise from these consequences will often affect the 
accuracy of a decision-maker's choice, but normally the actor will select their choice as to which 
action ranks highest in the listing of attributes. 
Thus the Rational Actor Model theory assumes a lot of facts are known, and those 
involved in large bureaucracies understand that that is not always the case. There are many 
factors that are not going to be known, so it will be very difficult for the actor to rationally 'rack 
and stack' his alternatives, which often instead forces decision-makers will often make choices 
based on incomplete or non-existent data. For example Selznick in his analysis of organisations, 
found that he diverged considerably from the traditional view that they were instruments of 
rational action (Selznick, 1948, p. 13). He saw that organisations instead were cooperative 
systems with both formal and informal aspects, and that rational action embodied in the formal 
structure was modified by the social needs of individuals (Jackson, 2000, p. 64). Such 
cooperative systems were also subject to the pressure of their environments,.to which some 
adjustment had to be made. Organisations were therefore more often found themselves acting as 
'adaptive structures' that had to modify themselves to their goals and change themselves in 
response to environmental circumstances (Ibid). In addition, as mentioned earlier, the state does 
not always act in a unified manner. There are many factors that can affect a nation's policy and 
one of the primary issues is the nature of organisational processes. The famous speaker of the 
United States House ofRepresentatives Tip O'Neil once said "that all politics is local," and he 
was correct. This logic applies just as well to bureaucratic policies. The United States 
government is not one monolithic organised bureaucracy but instead a sprawling mass of 
different departments, agencies and activities all competing for the same budget dollars. Each 
organisation has its own distinct culture and in fact, it is very much like pre-W estphalia 
Germany, with a number of loose federations and kingdoms existing somewhat peacefully. 
While nominally the President is in charge of the government, in fact it has often been noted that 
the power of the administration has become much diluted compared to a century ago. While 
many people may think that this is a recent phenomenon, look at what President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt said about his dealings with the government bureaucracy over 60 years ago. 
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The Treasury is so large and far-flung and ingrained in its practices that I 
find it impossible to get the actions and results that I want ... But the Treasury is 
not to be compared with the State Department. You should go through the 
experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking; policy, and action of the 
career diplomats and then you know what a real problem was. But the Treasury 
and the State Department put together are nothing as compared with the Na-a-
vy ..• To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You 
punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally 
exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started 
punching ... (Allison, 1971, p. 86). 
4.3.2 ·Organisational Process Model 
Hopefully, these analogies lead to the consideration of the fact that bureaucratic politics 
are not all that rational and that there are many other factors to consider in determining what 
makes a state act the way that it does. Kenneth Waltz in his seminal books, The Man, the State 
and War as well as Theory of International Politics, also emphasised that states were forced to 
act the way that they do, because of the international systemic factors. If you substitute 
individual bureaucrats for nation-states and the interagency process for the world politics system, 
then as stated earlier, portions of Waltz's theories could apply with regard to IO. Likewise, if 
organisations are viewed as systems, a much richer picture of these groups is provided than 
supplied by the traditional and human relations model (Jackson, 2000, p.l25). So in effect, these 
government officials are affected by the overall bureaucratic process at the systemic level that 
constrains their ability to act in an independent manner. However, this analogy notwithstanding, 
individual bureaucrats can often make decisions that, once completed, will override national or 
even strategic concerns. This idea is what Allison has referred to as the Organisational Process 
Model. He believed that governmental behaviour can therefore be understood less as deliberate 
choices and more as outputs of large organisations functioning according to standards of 
behaviour (Allison, 1967, p. 67). This portion of decision-making theory often refers to the 
second category of models as the descriptive type. Also called behavioural, cognitive or 
heuristic, these approaches usually try to take more elements of decision making into 
consideration (Loke, 1996, p. 6). This line of thinking often fits well with organisational politics 
and bureaucratic operations because they tend to be very complicated, simply because they are 
not monolithic entities. Organisations have routines, and most behavioural patterns are 
determined by previously established procedures. In addition, they can be represented as, or 
primarily geared to, ensuring survival and continuity of themselves as systems. So like 
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organisms, organisations were only acting and reacting to influences upon them in ways best 
designed to ensure their own survival (Jackson, 2000, p. 63-64). While it may be interesting to 
watch politicians talk about change or initiate a new focus iti a particular area, more often than 
not, that revolution will be overcome by the bureaucratic process. These routines normally 
consist of: 
• Standard Operating Procedures 
• Programs 
• Repertoires 
Each of these processes can and do contribute to the method in which decisions are made. Thus 
although it still cannot explain everything, often the Organisational Process Model can be very 
effective in determining the outcome of a particular scenario if the dynamics of the organisations 
involved is understood. 
4.3.3 Bureaucratic Politics Model 
Organisations, just like the government are also not a monolithic group. There are 
individuals within activities and agencies that have agendas, and these have to be considered 
. . . . 
when developing models for decision-making. This model is referred to as the Bureaucratic 
Politics Model, where bargaining is a central tool. It is this emphasis on coalition building 
within the Bureaucratic Politics Model that is important, because it often explains why decisions 
that seem to be made rationally at the time, may later when viewed from a distance seem 
inconsistent with a nation or organisation's goal (Peterson, 1996, p. 23). So even though it would 
be nice to try to discount these factors in constructing models for international relations theory, 
often it cannot be done because that decision is reached as a result of the actions of a number of 
players. These bureaucrats are acting and making decisions on many different issu~s based not 
on a strategic objective but mainly by the results from politics and how it affects them personally 
(Ibid, p. 21). The organisation as a system approach views survival rather than goal attainment 
as their raison d'etre (Jackson, 2000, p. 126). Interestingly enough, much of the research in this 
area focuses on the individualistic societies like North America or Australia, where it is perfectly 
normal for an individual to not only make decisions, but to also be responsible for the 
consequences as well This is a very complex arena and much more study is required. Typically 
though in order to satisfy all of the stakeholders, decisions are often watered down or are 
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compromised so much .Sometimes as to be virtually useless. Selznick recognised this when he 
noted that organisations made adjustments in response to both internal and external factors, 
independent of the individuals involved, so in fact organisations ·were acting like organisms, 
reacting to influences in ways best designed to ensure their own survival. Katz and Kahn also 
noted as much, namely that organisations are systems with their own goals, and their main 
purpose is to maintain a steady state and to survive (Jackson, 2000, p. 65). 
Governments are huge bureaucratic machines and they need professionals to make things 
happen efficiently within this environment. Some excel better than others do, but nonetheless all 
must operate in the same arena. Power is shared and in a zero sum game, differences will occur 
and it is within this construct that decisions are made and politics is at its most important role. 
When it comes to international politics, many of these rules would be overcome by the sway of 
presidential pressure, however, that is not always the case. For not all bureaucrats owe their 
position or authority to the President, and therefore unless a decision affects them directly, 
presidential pressure usually is not a factor in the bureaucratic process. 
In describing the mindset of interagency bureaucrats, the analyst must be very careful 
about which cultural biases are present during that analysis. A number of incremental key 
decisions that seem totally logical at the time may over the long-term lead to. disastrous results 
(Fisher, 1997, p 14). Therefore, no matter what theory is used to analyse a situation, care must 
be taken about reading too much into its utility. However for the sake of this discussion, 
Rational Actor Model, Organisational Process Model and Bureaucratic Process Model are good 
models to analyse the decision-making process within the governmental hierarchy, but they do 
not necessarily reflect a good theoretical construct for understanding the role ofiO across the 
United States government. This is because, while the decision making models may be good at 
attempting to explain the way that federal bureaucracies operate, the role of information is 
drastically 'flattened' hierarchies even more, with power being rapidly pushed away from 
centralised governmental entities. In addition, organisational theories also do not meet the 
criteria of an interpretative approach, with a grounded theory, that uses inductive and deductive 
reasoning, as discussed earlier. So as a theoretical process, in the end, neither decision making 
nor organisational theory was deemed suitable for use as methodology as part of the theoretical 
construct or framework for this research. 
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4.4 Systems Theory 
The scientific revolution as mentioned in Chapter Three spawned the positivist 
movement and with it the development of scientific theory and the use of reductionism to 
understand and analyse problems. However, not all issues can be resolved by breaking them into 
smaller parts, and in fact, many problems can only be resolved if they are examined as a whole 
or in a 'holistic' manner. "Problems occur with the use ofreductionism and the natural scientific 
method ... when we are faced with complex, real world problems set in social systems ... which 
are the very problems we encounter in abundance today and which most threaten our 
organizations and societies" (Jackson, 2000, p. 10). Therefore a reaction to the failure of natural 
sciences and to these complex issues was the growth of post-positivist or systems thinking. 
Central to this change was a similar increase in the use of the term 'holism' or the need to review 
a subject as a whole vice a series of parts. This latter idea is the crux of systems thinking, for 
those academics, who advocate system approaches, who will want to understand the problem as 
a whole, and to do so, they may often want to use models rather than laboratory experiments to 
determine their solutions. This is because "models are used most often whenever we reach value 
judgements about a particular situation though frequently they are implicit and unquestioned 
(Wilson, 2001, p. 1)." In addition "models of any kind are not descriptions of the real world, 
they are descriptions of ways of thinking about the real world" as shown in Figure 4.4 (Wilson, 
2001, p. 4). 
Reality 
-Complex 
-Messy 
Unique, Valid, Non-Contentious 
Descriptions of Reality 
Are NOT Possible 
n Leads 
...t} to 
The Need to Distinguish Between 
and ways of describing how 
to think about it 
Ways of Thinking about the 
Real World (Concepts, Models) 
-Simple 
·Precise 
• Contains People • Defensible 
-
Figure 4.3- A Necessary Distinction for the Analysis of Organisational Problems 
(Wilson, 2001, p.5) 
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Utilising ideas from Aristotle and Plato, the systems tradition later grew from 
philosophers such as Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and Mane Spinoza for example, advocated against 
reductionism with concepts such as the illogicality of trying to break the universe into smaller 
parts (Honderich, 1995). Likewise Kant, the philosopher par excellence of the Enlightenment, 
was eager to push rational thought to the limit, but he was also aware of limitations imposed by 
human themselves on reductionism (Jackson, 2000, p. 35, 44). Hegel on the other hand, believed 
that nothing was real except the whole and that reductionism was not a substitute (Russell, 
1961 ). So while separate items may exist, they were in reality only aspects of the whole, a 
notion which eventually became Hegel's famous dialectic. In relation to this research, Hegel's 
dialectic also tends to lend itself to the notion of deriving a process from inquiry, which matches 
quite well to the interpretative approach. The final philosopher who contributed to the 
development of systems thinking was Marx, who is considered by many to be a 'dialectical 
materialist'. In his classic writings, he tackled the complex issue of class struggle in a holistic 
manner. As attributed to Althusser, Marx's best known interpreter, social totality is the 
interrelation between "relatively autonomous" instances, and that history is not pre-determined. 
Taken together, these philosophers have contributed to a view that encompasses the 
totality of the system, or a holistic viewpoint, which can be considered to be very systems 
oriented, and has served as an influential backdrop to the growth of this theoretical methodology 
(Jackson, 2000, p. 45). These academics were searching for an interpretative outcome or a series 
of emergent properties that would arise in their research as it evolves in a holistic manner (Ibid, 
p. 1 ). Systems thinking can therefore also be seen as a reaction to the failure of natural science, 
or the scientific revolution that attempted to solve complex 'messes' or real-world problems that 
were set in social systems (Ackoff, 1981; Checkland, 1981). Systems thinking is different 
because it is committed as part ofholism, to looking at the world in terms of 'whales' that 
exhibit emergent properties, rather than in believing in a reductionist fashion (Jackson, 2000, p. 
18). Likewise, the addition of people into the problem adds complexity to the situation, when 
they play multiple roles, each with their own interpretation of the system, and what they are 
trying to achieve (Wilson, 2001, p. xiv). Finally, in addition to the holistic viewpoint, the 
'problem-solving' applicability of systems thinking to real world problems is also seen as a 
benefit. 
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The recent history of this holistic approach started with publications on cybernetics and 
the General System Theory, which gained huge popularity in the·1950s through the 1970s, as 
systems thinking became a major influence on a number of academic fields including the 
management sciences (von Bertalanffy, 1950, 1968; Wiener, 1948; Jackson, 2000, p. 2). 
Conceived as a new scientific doctrine which applies to systems behaviour, cybernetics is 
derived from the Greek word kybemetes, which means the art of steermanship, but has also been 
applied to the term 'governor', in both its technical and political forms (Jackson, 2000, p. 67). 
Made famous by Norbert Wiener in 1948, where he stated that Cybernetics was a true 
interdisciplinary science, it was based on the general laws on control and communication. It is 
similar to General System Theory as both are considered a general science of 'wholeness', for 
they enabled scientists in different and specialised disciplines to communicate with each other, as 
well as providing models capable of being utilised across a variety of academic research areas 
(von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 37). These two disciplines, while only representing a small portion of 
the overall growth of systems thinking in the 1940s and 1950s, did however significantly 
enhance this methodology to become a true trans-discipline, one that combines a variety of 
research backgrounds including philosophy, biology, sociology, management and organisation 
theory, control engineering and the physical sciences (Jackson, 2000, p. 43) .. So while there are 
many influences for the development of systems thinking during this time period, in general it 
can be said that much of the emphasis by the academics associated with the rise of systems 
thinking, was focussed on the process of finding methods and processes that they could model 
and provide solutions for 'complex problems' from a holistic viewpoint. 
From these different historical influences, four general types of approaches have evolved 
within the greater tradition of system research. These include the Functionalist, Interpretative, 
Emancipatory and Post-Modem methods, all of which share the overall systemic background, 
but differ significantly in their specific methodology. However the Functionalist School was, 
especially at the beginning of this period, still dominated by positivism, as would be expected 
from a process derived initially from the scientific method. Originally composed mainly ofhard 
systems approaches, over time, a number of academics including Ackoff, Checkland, 
Churchman, Hoos, Lilienfeld and Rosenhead compiled a catalogue of criticisms that 
demonstrated the limited domain of applicability (Jackson, 2000, p. 136). The biggest limitation 
is that hard approaches must have their objectives clearly defined at the beginning of the 
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methodological process. This is very difficult to do in a complex issue area and the limitations 
ofhard approaches are realised where multiple weltanschauung exist (Ibid, p. 137). In addition, 
since hard systems models are normally constructed according to the positivist method, their 
inability to be more flexible, in order to tackle problems of greater complexity, often render them 
incapable of capturing the subjective intentions of human beings (Ibid, p. 154). This is shown in 
the inability of hard systems models to change or modify their worldviews, which limit their 
objectivity. The fact that traditional hard systems thinking is unable to deal with ill-structured or 
strategic issues, slowed the development of the Functionalist school in the 1970s and 1980s, 
which eventually led to the rise of other methodologies within the system tradition as mentioned 
above. 
The functionalist tradition was, for a long time, the only approach to systems thinking 
and it is only recently that other approaches have evolved. Of course, the problem with the 
functionalist system approaches, from the interpretative and emancipatory perspectives, is that 
they do not restrict their advocacy of instrumental reason to where it might be more appropriate, 
that is, to deal only with 'technical issues' (Jackson, 2000, p. 209). Thus it is not surprising that 
there would be a rise in a number of other approaches, included the interpretative school, which 
can be considered the 'softer' side of the system methodologies. The interpretative systems 
approach is frequently referred to as 'soft systems thinking,' because it places emphasis on 
people rather than technology, structure or organizations. Key areas of concern include 
perceptions, values, beliefs and interests, accepting multiple perceptions of reality (Jackson, 
2000, p. 211). Likewise "soft" is also another word for ill-defined, that is, a system that is not 
hard or rigidly defined (Wilson, 2001, p. xiv). Examples of these types of interpretative 
approaches include Ackoffs Social System Sciences, Checkland's Soft Systems Methodology, 
and Senge's Soft Systems Thinking (Senge, 1990). By using different definitions for 'systems', 
academics such as Checkland, Flood, Senge and others, matured the overall tradition of system 
research and grew it in different areas by resting it upon alternative philosophical and 
sociological assumptions. Checkland for example noticed himself in 1981, the similarities 
between his research and social theory, and in doing so, believed that the interpretative tradition 
to be more relevant than the functionalist model in solving the difficult problems (Jackson, 2000, 
p. 59). This shift in thinking would ultimately result in the development by Checkland of Soft 
Systems Methodology, where systems are seen as the mental constructs of observers rather than 
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entities. In this manner, an objective existence in the world and systems is transferred 'from the 
world to the process of inquiry into the world' resting on the interpretative 'sociological 
paradigm' (Checkland, 1983, p. 34; Jackson, 2000, p. 101). What this means is that the actual 
methodology of 'thinking' about the process is the most important component, vice the problem 
itself. The key point as noted by Jackson (2000) in his book on system approaches, are that the 
interpretative paradigm provides the theoretical home for soft systems thinking (Ibid, p. 41 ). 
Checkland also found similar affinities between Soft System Methodology and social theory, 
with the interpretative tradition more relevant than functionalism (Checkland, 1981; Weber, 
1964, p. 88). 
Interpretative sociology provided significant theoretical assistance to Soft System 
Methodology, while Marxist sociology as a representative approach likewise played a similar 
role for emancipatory and critical systems thinking (Johnson, 2000, p. 61 ). Brocklesby and 
Cummings noted as much, when they suggested that two competing philosophical backgrounds 
support emancipatory systems thinking (Brocklesby and Cummings, 1996). The first begins 
with Kant and then stretches through Hegel, Marx and Habermas and as mentioned previously, 
primarily concerns human beings. The second is more concerned with self-emancipation and 
derives from Kant, Nietzche, Heidigger and Foucault (Ibid, p. 741). Overall, this tradition of 
systems thinking focuses on the fact that the current social order is seen as suspicious and reform 
is desired. Similar in some aspects to the advocacy or participatory methodologies as discussed 
in Chapter Three, emancipatory systems can be divided into two types, namely 'modern' and 
'post-modern'. Good examples of the former include Habermas, Capra and Ulrich, all of which 
were reviewed for applicability to this research (Habermas, 1974; Capra, 1996; Ulrich, 1983). 
From these approaches, a set of generic rules for an emancipatory systems methodology could 
consist of the following statements: 
• A structured way of thinking, that is focused on improving real-world problem situations 
• Uses systems ideas as the basis for its intervention strategy 
• Understanding that the real-world can be systemic in alienating individuals or groups 
• The use of models to enlighten the alienated and oppressed about their situation 
• The process of intervention is systemic and aimed at improving the problem situation 
• Exhibit conscious thought on how to adapt to particular circumstances 
(Jackson, 2000, p. 329) 
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Thus stated, functional and interpretative system approaches rest on a belief in social order and 
consensus that aim to promote integration so as to improve existing social systems - that is, they 
help to buttress the status quo. These approaches specialise in identifying contradictions in 
social systems, the existence of conflict and the domination of some groups over others (Ibid, p. 
330). In general, the emancipatory tradition is not one that could support this research. There are 
however, some ideas that could have applicability, namely the three central and interdependent 
concepts that are central to Capra's theory, which consist of 'patterns of organisation, structure 
of the system and process.' These discrete concepts align quite nicely with the approach of this 
research, namely on the personnel, policy and organizational focus of IO within the United States 
government (Capra, 1996, p. 153). 
The final category is the Post-Modern Systems approach which is a method unto itself. 
In fact it cannot fit into Burrell and Morgan's (1979) four paradigms, which is shown in Figure 
3.2, because the post-modernism stance is very much in opposition to all of these ideals. This 
method seeks through "deconstruction and critical thinking, to reclaim conflict and ensure that 
marginalised voices are recognized and heard. It adopts an ironic and playful disposition in 
order to ensure diversity and encourage creativity ... " (Jackson, 2000, p. 333). For if positivism 
is more behavioralist, sharing much of common beliefs of intemational relations theories, than 
post-modernism on the other hand, accepts the centrality of relativism and ideation (Terriff at al, 
1999, p. 111). Shown below are generic rules of this type of approach: 
• The focus is on disrupting real-world problem situations by critically questioning all 
opinions and accepted methods 
• Using systemic and anti-systemic ideas as the basis for its intervention strategy 
• Exhibit conscious thought and emotional response for each particular circumstance 
• Findings may change the real-world problem situation, including the underlying 
theoretical rationale 
(Jackson, 2000, p. 348) 
A relatively new approach to theoretical constructs in both the international relations and 
systems thinking traditions, post-positivism or post-modernism has evoked controversy from the 
more traditional academics. Much ofthis debate stems fi·om the 'supposed' lack of empirical 
content, where "participants dispute each other's terminology and methodology without 
addressing common issues" (Mearsheimer, 1995, p.92). It is these later points, where nothing is 
'real' in the post-modernism approach, that probably more than any factor, rules out this tradition 
of systems thinking as a method for this research (Wallace, 1996, p. 311 ). For in the end, the 
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problems with the evolution and development of 10 within the United States government are in 
fact real and cannot go away with discussions of abstract concepts or theory. 
4.5 The Choice of a Methodology 
The selection of a method for this research was thus as noted, a continuing series of 
efforts to find the best process. Methodology looks at the principles behind the use of models, 
methods, tools and techniques that can help to provide understanding and usually in the case of 
systems thinking, to bring about change (Jackson, 2000, p. 91). As stated previously, the 
purpose of the original background research, was to help focus and mould a concept for the 
enhanced utilisation or the 'to be state' of 10 by the United States government in this new era. 
Based on these observation's and the comments and critiques of a 100 interviews conducted over 
a five year period, it became apparent as shown in Chapter Three, that a qualitative approach was 
the best methodology to utilise in an analytical fashion to the problems associated with 10. As a 
methodology, a qualitative approach as mentioned in Chapter Two, also allows the use of the 
interviewees or subject principals who are embedded into the system being researched to help 
derive the hypothesis from the data. This is similar in effect to the use of' grounded theory', in 
which models are typically derived or systematically generated from data and analysed through 
the research process (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 12). "One of the most developed inductive 
research methods is that of grounded theory ... where the researcher starts with minimalist a 
priori constructs, inquires deeply into organisational behaviour and events while gradually 
testing and forming theoretical constructs" (Leonard and McAdam, 2001, p. 180). As stated, 
grounded theory allows a researcher to begin a project without a preconceived theory in mind, 
and instead theory is allowed to emerge from the data itself, as it does in soft system 
methodology. Both Strauss and Corbin agree that theory derived from data is more likely to 
resemble 'reality', which is similar to the verification and validation steps devised by Peter 
Checkland when he developed Soft System Methodology (SSM). Patton had similar comments 
when he stated, "Qualitative evaluation inquiry draws on both critical and creative thinking ... " 
(Patton, 1990, p. 434). 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the origin, foci, philosophical and 
theoretical frameworks, as well as the data itself of a particular research area, all play an 
important role in the determination of the methodological approach. In this particular case, the 
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origin of the change in the power of information and IO in the United States government is an 
analysis of a social change. Combined with ingredients of the humanities, social sciences and 
sociology all mixed together, this research tends to point to the use of a biography, ethnography 
or grounded study. In addition, the foci of the research was also to understand the development 
of IO in the United States government, which many interviewees expressed as a concept more 
than a single phenomenon, one that affects a group, which can be modelled toward a theory of 
change. Therefore, the qualitative approaches of grounded theory, ethnography and 
phenomenology were considered the most important factors in this particular analysis. Likewise 
from a philosophical perspective, the process in this project was one of active research, which 
utilised multiple interviews, to constantly bring in new and unique perspectives which is more an 
ontological or methodological approach. Also in reviewing the research methodology from a 
social science theoretical perspective, the thesis problem and area of interest, tended to lend itself 
more to a collection of data and analysis first, which reflects a biography, case study and 
grounded theory approach. Finally, the data collection method lent themselves more toward a 
grounded theory approach because the interviewees were individuals who had taken an action or 
participated in a process that was central to the development of IO in the United States 
government. 
Taken all together, it becomes apparent, that a grounded theory or modified version 
appeared to be the best type of qualitative approach in which to conduct the actual research. In 
addition, 'after numerous interview sessions, it also became apparent that open-ended questions, 
when used properly, best allowed the collection of participant meanings and nuances, as well as 
personal values which were extremely valuable in this effort (Babbie, 2001, p. 240). So in 
general, the basic characteristics in his research method followed were similar to those advocated 
by the noted grounded theorists (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 7): 
411 The ability to step back and critically analyse situations 
411 The ability to recognize the tendency toward bias 
• The ability to think abstractly 
411 The ability to be flexible and open to helpful criticism 
• Sensitivity to the words and actions of respondents 
• A sense of absorption and devotion to the work process 
The use of the initial exploratory interviews and questions, not only helped to conceptualise the 
meaning of variables to be studied, but also allowed the interviewer and participants to be open 
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to further interpretation and change. This open dialogue also allowed the path of the interview to 
be continually open to change. It was also useful for drawing out multiple meanings and varied 
viewpoints with regard to IO, and this approach also drove this research to ultimately follow a 
qualitative approach to include attributes such as appropriateness, authenticity, credibility, 
intuitiveness, receptivity, reciprocity and sensitivity (Rew, Bechtel and Sapp, 1993). Based on 
these attributes, the traditional international relations or decision making theory were as noted 
previously deemed inappropriate for use as a theoretical construct for this research. In 
examining the alternative approaches available, if appears from the systems framework that 
. . 
problems viewed from within the interpretative paradigm (subjective, sociological or regulatory); 
seem to be much 'softer' than the more traditional functionalistic or hard systems approach, and 
therefore more useful in this case. In essence, this interpretative paradigm is thus in many 
senses, the theoretical 'home' for much of soft systems thinking, which was deemed most useful 
in researching IO (Ibid, p. 24, 41). In addition, systems thinking are also considered a 
transdiscipline, because its theories, models and methods add value to a variety of fields. 
Likewise, there is also a resonance between systems thinking and real-world practice, so there 
was a sense that these methodologies could be of use in this research (Jackson, 2000, p. 100). 
From these knowledge claims, a philosophical approach to research began to develop in 
the form of a qualitative methodology as a version of modified grounded theory to be 
implemented through specific procedures of SSM (Crewell, 2003, p. 4). For a methodology, or 
in this case a theoretical construct, often provides a sense of vision of where the analyst wants to 
go with their research, Likewise, because of the amount of background research previously 
conducted, this project could be started with a constructivist view of the knowledge claim 
positions, as opposed to a more post-positivist, advocacy or pragmatic approach. By doing this, 
the research was open to analysing multiple methods, with different weltanschauung and 
assumptions through this interpretivist stance (Ibid, p. 12). As developed by Peter Checkland at 
the University of Lancaster in the 1970s, SSM is particularly effective in analysing 'vague' or 
'unstructured' problem situations at the strategic level (Jackson, 2000). It does so by defining 
not a problem but instead a situation that is problematic (Wilson, 2001, p. 7). In addition, this 
theoretical construct of SSM also questions the privileged role of experts, and instead explores 
different values to ensure that they are included in this theory, with the overall aim to encourage 
learning by examining a number of viewpoints. 
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There is an incredible amount of flexibility inherent in SSM, and this process has been 
recognised as a 'practitioner's' methodology, namely one that provides the professional with 
'relatively' solid reference points (Checkland, 2000, p. 800). These anchors allow the SSM 
practitioners the ability to 'allow' their theories and frames to come apart, so that they can 
recognise and engage that which is shifting and turbulent in their practice (Schon, 1983, p. 270). 
This 'coming apart' is expected and it is a rich source oflearning, because SSM is both flexible 
and dependent on the user for input (Checkland, 2000, p. 801). Of course this flexibility and 
useability of SSM is also what makes it difficult to generalise about, however, proper use will 
allow the practitioners to internalise the principles to a high-degree of capability. Soft System 
Methodology is also a methodology for action learning and each facet is interconnected and 
important on its own right (Ibid, p. 802). These 'cycles oflearning' promote ideas about what 
could or should be used to attack those messy or unstructured problem situations. Because SSM 
practitioners think in layers or on multiple levels simultaneously, they have the ability to bring 
clarity to confusing situations. So in essence, what makes SSM different and unique from other 
variants of system thinking is that it provides a framework, or a 'hearing methodology' in the 
form of weltanschauung (lbid, p. 807) .. This ability to define what is important in the problem, 
. and addresses it from different viewpoints through weltsanschauung so that alternative 
perspectives can be compared and contrasted is crucial to the success of SSM in these complex 
or 'messy problems (Jackson, 2000, p. 98). 
Based on these multiple data points and in depth analysis of the different theoretical 
constructs, SSM was selected as the method for this research because it allows for the use of 
political, issue-oriented, collaborative and a change oriented research questions, to collect open-
ended emerging data from the participants, with a primary intent of developing themes within the 
methodology construct (Creswell, 2003, p. 18). In addition, SSM rests upon the interpretative 
sociological (constructive) paradigm, which was also deemed best suited for this research study, 
because by its very nature, 10 can be characterised as an 'immature' concept due to lack of or 
inaccurate theory and research, which closely resembles the current state of this new idea within 
the United States government (Jackson, 2000, p. 99). 
4.6 Summary 
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After careful review and analysis, a decision was made to use an alternative process that 
was based in the interpretative (constructive) school, related to grounded theory, and housed 
within the greater systemic tradition. From the factors mentioned above, SSM was selected as a 
method for this research with active research as a qualitative methodology that incorporated 
portions of grounded theory. This process was chosen after analysing the alternatives and 
understanding that the 'open-ended or messy' nature of the problem ultimately drove the 
research in this particular direction as shown in Chapter Three. This is because the primary goal 
of this research was to conceptualise the current state of IO within the United States government 
and, if possible, formulate a reason for the delta or gap in strategic policy and tactical day-to-day 
operations. In addition, a subset of that objective was to specifically address these emerging 
issues from a policy, personnel and organisational perspective. From these many factors, SSM 
appeared to be the 'best' theoretical construct to utilise in this thesis, namely because as a 
methodology, it best matched the decision matrix criteria from Chapter Three. In addition, SSM 
was also selected due to its inherent ability to problem solve 'messy' issues, its use of multiple 
viewpoints, its cyclical nature, and finally, the fact that SSM generated root definition and 
conc.eptual models that could show the status of IO within the United States government. 
As many analysts recognise, information is changing the way in which the United States 
conducts business around the world, which includes military deterrence and peace-keeping 
operations, foreign policy and as well as world-wide economic development. The interviews 
conducted for this research tended to confirm this perception, namely that the power of 
information is being recognised for what it really is and that governments as well as other non-
governmental organizations around the world are beginning to address the issues involved with 
using information. However, the data that were developed from the interviews also recognised 
that the full power of information is not yet a full-blown reality, but instead the capabilities of 
this nascent element of power is being implemented in different manners within the power 
structure of the United States. Ultimately, the theoretical construct of SSM was utilised because 
in conjunction with the viewpoints of the participants, a consensus arose between the 
interviewees that a large amount of input was needed from a diverse group to help in ensuring 
that in this process the key aspects and importance of IO was emphasised in a very systemic 
manner~ In conclusion, there were many different research methodologies that could have been 
used. Early proposals that centred around international relations theories such as Complex 
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Interdependence and Noopolitik were eventually discarded as not being rigorous enough to meet 
the demands of this concept, as well as in some cases these theories are not processes but instead 
mere viewpoints of the affected academics. Likewise the inability of decision-making or 
organisational theories to meet the needs of this research, also led to their non-adoption. 
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Chapter 5 - Research Method 
In this research, SSM was used by IO practitioners in real situations using a series of 
collaborative approaches. As the basis for the series of research questions developed for this 
thesis project, the use of SSM is thus considered a part of the interpretative or constructive 
school of research. Normally regarded as a tradition within systems thinking, SSM was 
developed in the 1970s from the failure of the established methods of systems engineering to 
solve difficult or messy complex problem situations (Chec,kland and Sholes, 1989, p. xiii). As a 
methodology, SSM is derived from the research by Peter Checkland, as well as other academics 
including Davies, Howell, Sholes and Ulrich (Checkland, 1981; Checkland and Davies, 1985; 
Checkland and Howell, 1993; Checkland and Sholes, 1989/1990; Flood and Jackson, 1991; and 
Ulrich, 1994). This intepretivist process assumes that everyone's opinion or weltanschauung is 
valid and each should be incorporated into the overall problem solution. In addition, this 
tradition also assumes that researchers are producing their own mental constructs of the system. 
"In essence, SSM supports the derivation of a roadmap from the 'what is' to the 'what might be' 
by engaging the organisation in a structured and logical debate about itself and what it should be 
doing" (Wilson, 2001, p. x). It is different, because it is not objective, nor democratic, but 
instead SSM attempts to take into account each and everyone's opinion, so that these individual 
or different viewpoints are not left out from the majority opinion. This is shown in "the fact that 
the research which produced SSM started out from a base in systems engineering indicates that it 
was part of the strand of research which concentrates on situations in which people are trying to 
take action" (Checkland and Sholes, 1989, p. A39). In other words, it is an organised method of 
tackling 'messy' situations in the real world, because it is based on systems thinking, which 
enables SSM to be highly defined but still very flexible in its use as well as broad in scope (Ibid, 
1999, p. 1 ). "SSM certainly brings clarity to confused situations, because it encourages thinking 
in layers" (Jackson, 2000, p. 807). 
5.1 The SSM Approach 
As outlined in Chapter Three and Four, the SSM process is an appropriate methodology 
to use on this issue area, because it allows the use of political, issue-oriented, collaborative and a 
change oriented research questions, to collect open-ended emerging data from the participants, 
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with a primary intent of developing themes within the methodology construct{Wilson, 2001, p 
18). In addition, because a qualitative approach was deemed best suited for this research study, 
(see Chapter Three), the use of SSM was also considered appropriate because by its very nature, 
IO can be characterised as an 'immature' concept due to lack of or inaccurate theory and 
research, which, in some instances, resembles the current state of this issue within the United 
States government. Thus, the problem situation tracks well to the steps of SSM, as shown later, 
which attempts to explain how IO is actually conducted by the United States government today 
('as is state') and how in theory it could accomplished in the future ('what might be'). The 
actual goal or aim of SSM is shown below in this quote, which lays out in a broad context, the 
concept behind SSM. 
SSM is a methodology that aims to bring about improvement in areas of social 
concern by activating in the people involved in the situation a learning cycle which is 
ideally never ending. The learning takes place through the iterative process of using 
system concepts to reflect upon and debate perceptions of the real world, taking action in 
the real world, and again reflecting on the happenings using system concepts. The 
reflection and debate is structured by a number of systemic models. These are conceived 
as holistic ideal types of certain aspects of a problem situation rather than an account of 
it. It is taken as given that no objective and complete account of a problem situation can 
be provided (von Bulow, 1989, 16, p. 38). 
Soft System Methodology is a not positivist or materialistic approach, which would not suit this 
problem because the particular emphasis of this research deals with influence aspects ofiO. 
" ... SSM as a methodology, starts by defining not a problem, but instead as in this case, a 
situation that is problematic" (Wilson, 2001, p. 7). Soft System Methodology is well suited to 
situations where organisational stakeholders can have input into the management output, which 
was the case in this research effort. There can also be a quandary in the fact that SSM is 
normally considered a methodology rather than a series of techniques. However, SSM can be 
used as a method but it will never be independent of the user (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. 
285). In addition, as an analytical technique, SSM possess a number of key features which are 
quite useful in the study of IO to include: 
• Strategic approach that is fotward looking 
• Rule-based and intellectually rigorous, yet although flexible enough to apply to all types 
and sizes of organizations 
• Defensible so that conclusions could be confidently justified to in a way that anyone can 
understand 
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• Consensus building so as to achieve the essential ingredient aka 'buy in' (Wilson, 2001, 
p. ix). 
The basic design of SSM was first developed by Peter Checkland in 1981, which in its first 
iteration was developed as a seven-stage process of enquiry, entitled Model1, as illustrated in 
Figure 5 .1. While this approach was later updated and is often called Model 2, it was decided 
that the original version (Model 1) as shown below was the best methodology for this research 
project, because of its simplicity and transparency to the stakeholders (Checkland and Sholes, 
1999, p. Al3). Although Figure 5.1 shows a circular or serial approach, SSM can also be 
accomplished in a less lineal progression, which was the case in this research. 
5.1.1 SSM - Steps and Procedures 
It is from this standard methodology and the steps as described above, which make up the 
most common process actions that were used throughout the timeline of this project. The stages, 
which are recursive, produce the following four outcomes, as will be described later in this 
chapter. 
Rich Picture: The research began with a series of interviews that produced data about the 
problem situation. This data is the core of this process, because it allows the researcher to find 
out about a problem situation, including its cultural and political aspects. This is the phase, in 
which the Clients, Actors, Transformation, Worldview, Owners and Environment (CATWOE) 
elements are all defined by the interviewees. Separated into sections based on the CATWOE 
areas, this· data is then aggregated and collated into categories that could be compared and 
contrasted throughout the project. From these categories, a series of figures or Rich Pictures 
were developed, that described an overall view of what the problem is, and in the case of this 
research, what is acquired from the information received during the interview process. 
Root Definition(s): From the data correlated in the CATWOE categories, and described in the 
Rich Pictures, a series of Root Definitions are extracted from these collated answers. Formulated 
as the relevant purposeful activity models, the Root Definitions also serve as a characterisation 
of the 'ideal' solution formed during the interview process. If there are differences of philosophy 
or incompatibilities, this is not a problem because more than one Root Definition can be utilised. 
In addition, just because the Root Definition may be incompatible, that does not mean that they 
are mutually exclusive. Ultimately, the Root Definitions serve as a basis for the further 
development of the research in the form of Conceptual Models, with the data directly linked to 
CATWOE and the interviewees. 
Conceptual Models: In this phase, the participants in the study debate the situation, using 
models, to seek changes which would improve the situation and are regarded as both desirable 
and culturally feasible, as well as the accommodations between conflicting interests which will 
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enable improvement actions to be taken. These are defined as high-level task models and are 
derived solely from the ideal Root Definitions. Normally developed from the interview process, 
these Conceptual Models represent processes or methods of achieving a goal, which may not be 
the typical method of doing business in reality. 
Verification and Validation Phase: It is in this stage, where the models are challenged to see if 
they are both 'Feasible' and 'Desirable', in a validation stage. In essence, it is this portion of 
SSM, where the research is examining the Root Definitions and Conceptual Models to determine 
the correct action in the problem situation that could possibly bring about improvement. Finally 
the models are also verified by the interviewees, to ensure that they include the opinions and 
weltanschauung of all ofthe interviewees (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. A15). 
In addition, because SSM uses an inductive research method in which the researcher starts with 
minimalist a priori constructs, and then begins to inquire deeply into organisational behaviour 
and events, it is only natural that as the research is conducted, 'theoretical constructs' are 
gradually tested and formed (Leonard and McAdam, 2001, 78, 2, p. 181). 
1. The Problem 
Situation: unstructured 
c 
A 
T 
w 
0 
E 
Real World. 
Systems Thinking 
4. Conceptual 
Models 
Figure 5.1- Soft Systems Methodology: Source: Checkland Scholes (1999) 
5.1.2 Soft System Methodology - Its Limitations, and its Benefits 
While SSM is the methodology of choice for this particular research that does not mean 
that it is without its own limitations. However, based on the comments of the interviewees, as 
well as the criteria that was reviewed for narrowing down of the possible alternatives for a 
research methodology in the selection process as shown in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, the 
benefits of this approach appear to outweigh the limitations. This is the case even with the 
modifications made to this methodology, particular the lack of group setting of all interviewees. 
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For within the United States government, it is hard to have a very large group of important 
stakeholders to meet together or gather in such a consensual manner for an academic experiment. 
In addition, the physical and chronological separation between these important government 
officials often makes it impractical to have them all together to conduct research by the normal 
SSM methods proposed (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. 280). Likewise, the participants are 
often involved in real-world operations and so a 'virtual' method of bringing the participants 
together was the primary method utilised in this research by having each participant interviewed 
in the same way using the same methodology (Babbie, 2001, p. 268). In addition, since the 
interviewees were spread all over the world, an attempt to build a 'Rich Picture' of the problem 
situation was utilised by conducting 100 interviews independently and using a standard set of 
survey questions, to collate the data. 
However, there are drawbacks to this approach. Because of the lack of interaction 
between participants, there is not the normal give-and-take between the thesis interviewees that 
would occur in a group setting. Of course there can be downfalls with any approach, and this 
one like others has its own unique flaws. "In action research, the researcher wants to try out 
theory with practitioners in real situations, gain feedback from this experience, modify the theory 
as a result of this feedback, and try again, with each iterative session of the action research 
process adding to the theory" (Ibid, p. 95). So for this project, theory was instead developed 
through a comparative methodology looking at the same problem situation in different settings 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 1993, p. 35). Studies have shown that group dynamics for academic 
research have their own drawbacks as well. This is important because there are many factors 
that would inhibit a government official from being totally frank and honest in a larger group-
type environment. Thus the use of one-on-one questioning also allows those people that tend to 
defer to more 'dominant' personalities to actually speak their mind and have their opinions 
heard. For it would be enormously difficult to have all of these people in the same room and all 
be contributing 'equally' to a discussion. This is why the formal interview process is actually 
considered better in some aspects, because it allows the author to 'draw' out valuable 
information from the participants in a more comfortable setting. This was done not only for the 
comfort of the government official that was participating, but also develop a level of detail and 
trust that may not have occurred in a less familiar environment (Babbie, 2001, p. 181). In 
addition, using the interviews as working guidelines, rather than as settings for so-called 'truths' 
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to be proven, allowed instead for a dialogue that utilised words such as 'what' or 'how' to 
suggest an open or more emerging design as opposed to closed. words like 'why' which are more 
consistent with a quantitative approach (Creswell, p. 1 06). Thus it was from these decisions and 
analysis, it was the use of open-ended type questions as part of the field research, with the 
participants in their natural settings that was considered crucial to the overall success of the 
effort (Babbie, 2001 , p. 240). 
So in essence, the benefits of SSM far outweigh any limitations imposed by the interview 
process, because it is a qualitative approach, using open ended questions to understand the 
conduct of IO in the United States government (Creswell, 2003, p. 182). The selection of SSM 
as a methodology was not a fast or straight-fotward process, as alluded to in Chapter Four, and 
there was initial difficulty in developing a framework for IO in the United States government. 
Overall , it took about three years ofbackground interviews to truly understand the magnitude of 
the problem and it was only during the third set of formal interviews, that an adequate process 
was developed by the patticipants themselves. It was at that point, where it finally became clear 
that an interpretative approach was needed and once SSM was selected, that the Rich Pictures, 
Root Definitions and Conceptual Models were all developed from the formal interview data to 
better understand the issue area. 
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5.2 The Interview Process: Use of Selected People to build up a Rich Picture 
As part of the research methodology, active interviews with key personnel were used as 
an attempt to build up a series of Rich Picture and ultimately Root Definitions as well as 
Conceptual Models. A number of primary interviews were conducted with key personnel since 
1999, and a variety of government officials were repeatedly met to discuss the role and evolution 
of IO within the USG. Of these key participants, 40 were selected for this study due to their 
positional and institutional knowledge, breadth of information and willingness to undergo 
repeated interviews. 
These interviewees are part of the overall global IO community and were either involved 
with computer network operations, strategic communications, perception management, cyber 
security, critical infrastructure protection or homeland security efforts of the United States 
government at the present time, or were recently employed in that capacity in the past. These 
people ranged from academics and Department of Defence officers, to State Department and 
National Security Council directors, legislative assistants, congressionally appointed staffers and 
bureaucratic officials (see Figure 5.2). In addition, these participants worked at all different 
levels of the government, and some of them are very high-level government personnel, that are 
not always very easily accessible. However the overall consensus was that all of the personnel 
interviewed had valuable insight on the conduct of IO in some aspects within the federal 
bureaucracy. The nationalities and professions of the interviewees included Americans and 
citizens of other nations, inside the government, military and academics. Each participant had a 
different worldview, and each in their own way was able to give critical information for use in 
this thesis. This is important, because the interviewer was the only constant in the interview 
process, there is a possibility that some bias could be introduced in this grouping from the 
interviewee's responses. It was felt that some of that bias was overcome by the fact that all 
interviews were conducted by the same person, in the same manner, with the same questions 
(Babbie, 2001, p. 280). This reasoning (discussed in Chapter 4) was that an 
advocacy/participatory stance, using with an SSM methodology, would hopefully eliminate 
extreme bias. It is generally observed that when conducting interviews, especially when using an 
advocacy or participatory framework that the analyst always views the data through a filter or 
lens based on their education, social and historical context. This is unavoidable, but can be 
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minimised if the researcher takes care to understand that this phenomena is occurring. Termed 
the Hawthome Effect, this problem can be alleviated if there is sensitivity to the issue, so that a 
researcher can avoid most of the major issues (Babbie, 2001, p. 278). 
5.2.1 Why Was This Group Chosen? 
The final40 interviewees were chosen using a number ofvarious factors. Many were 
considered as experts in the various fields field of IO such as influence campaigns, strategic 
communications, perception management, psychological operations, computer network 
operations and information assurance that were also familiar with the operations of the United 
States government. Many of the government officials, who held key positions in IO staffs or 
commands, were names that were added to this list. In addition, other IQ personnel who were 
supporting organisations in the United States government were also used to add more 
participants to the initial interview matrix. An additional strategy that was enlisted to flesh out 
the participant pool was to use references from other interviewees and try to 'spiral' closer to the 
more prominent officials. For example, the first person to be interviewed promised to get time 
with a prominent futurist. Likewise, a mid-grade Department of Defense civil servant helped to 
coordinate an appointment with a member of the Joint Staff. Also included on the list, were a 
number of academics who have studied this issue and while their background is varied, they all 
have one thing in common, namely that they have either worked with some part of the broad 
continuum of information operations in the government or business world or have studied it as 
an academic. 
5.2.2 The Range of Weltanschauung Expressed - Why this is Relevant to the 
Research Questions 
The demographics ofthe formal interviews as shown in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.1 denote a 
significant number of federal officials, military personnel and academics that met the criteria. 
The federal bureaucracy is a very complicated set of organisations and while an incredibly 
eclectic group of people could have been interviewed about the IO capabilities in order to obtain 
diversity, the goal of this research to develop a series of models to answer the study question. So 
if a prospective participant has no understanding of IO policy, training or agencies, if they do not 
know the doctrine, procedures, operations, or any of these other detailed facets of this thesis, 
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then they probably cannot give an educated and useful series of answers that will further 
contribute to the body of knowledge, and thus were not ultimately chosen to participate in this 
project. All together, after a number of background sessions that were conducted as early as 
May 1999, the final round of formal interviews began on 13 February 2003 and ran for 14 
months to finish on 1 April2004, with 40 participants over multiple meetings as shown below. 
# Firstlrtterview Second Interview Third Interview Affiliation 
1 19-Feb-03 NPGS 
2 19-Feb-03 NPGS 
3 14-Apr-03 26-Apr-04 Aerobureau Corp 
4 15-Apr-03 DoD 
5 16-Apr-03 CFR 
6 16-Apr-03 Highlands Forum 
7 16-Apr-03 24-Nov-03 26-Mar-04 State Department 
8 17-Apr-03 25-Mar-04 Consultant 
9 17-Apr-03 25-Mar-04 Consultant 
10 18-Apr-03 1-Apr-04 The Rendon Group 
11 21-Apr-03 RAND Institute 
12 21-Apr-03 Ctr Naval Analysis 
13 21-Apr-03 Consultant 
14 22-Apr-03 NDU 
15 22-Apr-03 RAND Institute 
16 22-Apr-03 31-Mar-04 State Department 
17 23-Apr-03 1-Apr-04 DoD · 
18 23-Apr-03 GWU 
19 24-AQT-03 OGC 
20 25-Apr-03 RAND Institute 
21 13-May-03 RAND Institute 
22 10-Jun-03 DoD 
23 10-Jun-03 1-A_j)f-04 State Department 
24 10-Jun-03 DoD 
25 10-Jun-03 DoD 
26 10-Jun-03 GWU 
27 2-Jul-03 TRC 
28 2-Jul-03 FCO 
29 3-Jul-03 University of Leeds 
30 3-Jul-03 Consultant 
31 3-Jul-03 SNDC 
32 4-Jul-03 ADF 
33 4-Jul-03 Deacon University 
34 4-Jul-03 Kings College 
35 4-Jul-03 1-Apr-04 NDU 
36 6-Aug-03 Monash University 
37 7-Aug-03 JFSC 
38 12-Aug-03 19-Nov-03 23-Apr-04 C4ISR 
39 13-Aug.-03 1-A_QI'-04 NSC 
40 13-Aug-03 24-Mar-04 State Department 
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Table 5.1- Formal Interviewee Schedule 
Continuing the discussion on why particular people were chosen, knowledge of IO was a 
higher criterion, and was more often chosen for potential interviewees rather than their divergent 
background. For example, to determine the weltanschauung of each participant, the following 
two questions were asked first as part of the standard interview process: What is your 
background? What are your beliefs with respect to information and power? From this 
background data, the graphs and tables shown in Figure 5.2 were created to show the overall 
demographic representation of the interviewees as a group. As yol! can also see in Table 5.1, the 
interviewees consisted not only of personnel holding key IO related positions in the United 
States government, but also those academics from around the world who have written and 
studied the topic for a· significant period. The ultimate goal was to always get knowledgeable 
input from the participants who were closest to the subject as part of this process to ensure the 
best data possible. Major efforts were made to widen the interviewee pool, and as will be noted, 
a diversity of opinion was indeed gained, as shown in the dichotomy in the two Root Definitions 
and 14 Conceptual Models. In effect, these results were total opposite of each other with one 
group ofinterviewees proposing a top-down solution, while the other favoured a more bottom-up 
approach. So to conclude and summarise the questions about the interviewee pool for this 
research- all of the participants of this study were involved in the IO community from some 
aspect or the other, and yet they encompass very divergent and radically different views on the 
subject: 
5.3 Formal Research Phase: The SSM Process in Use 
From the formal interview process, very basic ideas began to emerge in the form of Rich 
Pictures. A number of diagrams were developed that helped to categorise the 63 different 
CATWOE elements, all of which were aligned with the answers provided by the thesis 
participants, and from these six CATWOE categories, the interviewee data plus the Rich Pictures 
- two separate and distinct Root Definitions emerged. From this step, two primary and 12 
secondary Conceptual Models were formed to expand on the themes delin~ated by the 
interviewees. All of these SSM steps were then verified by 16 of the original 40 participants in 
the spring of2005, when another set of interviews conducted. Also during this validation 
process, data was cross checked with the interviewees to make sure that what they said was 
146 
indeed correct and that the nuances imparted during their individual sessions was updated, with 
any changes noted in updated CATWOE and Root Definitions. Gaining feedback from this 
experience, the original theories encapsulated in the SSM devices as shown above, were then 
modified as part of the process therefore adding value to the theory (Avison et al, 1999, p. 95). 
The final step was the use of an independent third party set of IQ professionals to validate the 
whole process. Conducted as part of the 4th Annual European Conference on Information 
Warfare (July 2005) at the University of Glamorgan, in Pontyphidd, Wales, this last group was 
very useful in their ability to discem that this entire process and methodology had been rigorous 
and academic in nature. 
5.3.1 Finding out about a Problem Situation: The Gathering of the Interviewee 
Data 
From the very beginning of this research project, there was a sense of unease among the 
participants caused by an overriding concern that a problem existed in the IO community. 
Problem situations were considered vague and unstructured, and without precise terms. Thus, 
any analysis of this issue area had to consist ofbuilding a series of diagrams with the richest 
possible data in the picture of the problem situation (Jackson, 2000, p. 247). For example, the IO 
policy and doctrine that has been evolving since the 1990s in the United States, shows clearly the 
dichotomy between what the theorists thought or wanted with respect to the American military 
forces. In addition, the organisation of the national security apparatus to accomplish the 
missions and tasking associated with IO are also drastically different than the perceived and 
actual capabilities of the overall organisation or system. The system in this case, is an entity 
such as a federal agency, which receives inputs and produces some outputs, that is, the system 
itselftransforms the inputs into the outputs (Checkland, 1981, p. 9). In the United States 
government, because the actors are.from disparate organizations, services, commands and even 
cabinet agencies, the interview data was thus used to bring the disparate thoughts together, to 
conceptualise the feeling that there was indeed a 'problem', in the conduct of IO in the United 
States government. 
5.3.2 Developing Rich Pictures from the Interviewee Data 
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A useful way of starting this process is though what is !mown as a 'Rich Picture'. This is 
literally a picture of what the situation is taken to be (Wilson, 2001, p. 35). Humans are always 
making use of models whenever we reach value judgements about a particular situation though 
frequently they are implicit and unquestioned. This is because, models of any kind are not 
descriptions of the real world, but instead they are descriptions of ways of thinking about the real 
world (Ibid, p. 1, 4). 
Making drawings to indicate the many elements in any human situation is 
something which has characterised SSM from the start. Its rationale lie in the fact that 
the complexity ofhuman affairs is always a complexity of multiple interacting 
relationships, and pictures are a better medium than linear prose for expressing 
relationships. Pictures can be taken in as a whole and help to encourage holistic rather 
than reductionist thinking about a situation" (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. A16). 
The following three 'pictures' shows how some of these ideas coalesced as the interviews were 
conducted and are the first attempts as part of the SSM process, to collect the thoughts of the 
interviewees. The "W" stands for 'world view' or 'weltanschauung' and as seen in the figure 
5.3, the initial thought was a division centred on three primary groups. All of the data from this 
research is also available in the Appendices. 
W1Mt mJSt the Unit«[ Statts fidem/ 
burouuacy aa:onplish ftuma pdicy, 
pe!Sonrxi atd orgmizatioml t/fort, 
to lxtter utilize irfanmtWnas an 
dm1!l1t if fXJW!r to mH the thrmts 
ifthej'tttunf 
Wl - Government 
W2 - Academic 
W3- Public 
Figure 5.3 - Rich Picture #1 
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In the first Rich Picture, it was generally recognised by most participants that there were a 
number of different views that could affect the power of information within the United States 
government. It was also felt that that these three broad categories represented most of the more 
notable interests; however a number of comments were directed from a constructivism approach 
- such as can a person be in more than one group at the same time? Of course this is true, so in a 
follow-on iteration (#2), the next Rich Picture evolved to try to give more granularity and 
transparency to the differences in the attitudes of the representative groups. 
us ~ 
Citizens 
~ ~ 
~ 
Media 
US Politicians Official 
USG 
us 
Opinion? 
....................... x ......... 
World Opinion • • 10 ",.,. 
& Events? 111111 
Figure 5.4 - Rich Picture #2 
~ 
Media 
~ ~ 
Academia c;fovemment 
Religious 
Leaders 
While there was more information added to this second diagram, in the end, the 
participants of this study thought that it was still not enough and that the picture should be 
expanded even more. The resultant figure is shown below in Figure 5.5 and while it contains 
basically the same list of characters or groups that can affect the body politic as in Figure 5.4, 
what is different is the changes wrought by the information age, namely the greatly increased 
connectivity. For in today's environment, almost all the participants agree that the ability for 
small groups or even individuals to affect world opinion has increased greatly. So the resultant 
effect in the evolution of the Rich Picture in Figure 5.5 is to grow a virtual spider-web of 
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integration, as the Internet, Satellite television, cellular telephones and other forms of technology 
drastically alter the forms and methods in which people around the world communicate with 
each other. In addition, what this has also done as alluded to in Chapter One, is to hasten the 
transfer of power from 'official' government organisations to other centres of influence, as 
information has grown as an element of power. A number of entities have recognised this trend 
and attempted to use this growing capability inherent in IO to their advantage, as shown in later 
chapters of this thesis. It is this drawing out of the interviews and analysis, with a range of ideas 
to improve the problem situation, that is expressed by each interviewee from a different 
viewpoint that makes SSM so unique (Jackson, 2000, p. 247). Therefore it was these types of 
perceptions and others like these that led to the maturation of the Rich Picture and the eventual 
development of the Root Definitions and Conceptual Models, in the form of what the 'system is' 
and what the 'system must do'. Of course what was most interesting was the incredible amount 
of cross communication or the 'horizontal' sharing of power, which is an inherent characteristic 
of the traits of the new information age . 
5.3.3 
•• 
•• ....... 
............ 
IIIIIIEIIIIIIIIIIIIIII'IIII'Illl 
Figure 5.5 - Rich Picture #3 
Categorising the Data through CATWOE Analysis 
• • 
.. .. 
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The process that was followed for this research eventually produced two diametrically 
different concepts from a larger body of material drawn from the background and formal 
research questions and interview process. To do this, the SSM process identified the six main 
issues that need to be defined using the CATWOE acronym- customers, actors, transformation 
process, weltanschauung, owners, as well as environmental constraints. The purpose of the 
CATWOE mnemonic is to ensure that the Root Definition is'well formulated and to ensure that 
the Conceptual Model produced is a defensible model. In addition, the CATWOE mnemonic is 
also a test of the structure and words chosen in the Root Definition (Wilson, 2001, p. xvii, 23). 
These CATWOE elements were pulled from the 54 final interviews by the author with 40 
participants that were grouped into a rough or draft CATWOE. While this initial inventory was 
good, it was also rather unwieldy, so after further discussion and interviews with the research 
participants, this original list was pared down to a more manageable level to build final 
CATWOE elements as well as the final Root Definitions. For the real key and the core of the 
CATWOE methodology, is the pairing together of the transformation process with the 
weltanschauung of the different interviewees (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. 35). ''This is 
because SSM provides a structured way of identifying and capturing different points of view, 
distilling those differences through the use ofCATWOE and Root Definitions" (Checkland, 
2000, 13, 6, p. 804). This importance of identifying the correct elements ofCATWOE, has been 
alluded to throughout this section, and later in this chapter, the author will define these terms and 
give them meaning and context 
Customers 
Customers are the victims or beneficiaries of the transformation process. For this study, 
the customers of current and potential future updates to the 10 capabilities of the United States 
government are numerous and varied. While some participants indicated that the 'message' was 
aimed at foreign populations and governments, others stated instead that many of these influence 
campaigns were intended instead for the American people. The victims or beneficiaries of the 
transformation process were also named as the federal bureaucracy itself, the Department of 
Defense and also military organisations from other countries. The following definitions are 
described for the term of customer within the context of this thesis: 
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United States government- This included the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches, the 15 Cabinet Departments to include the Department of State, Department of 
Homeland Security, Department of Commerce, Department of Justice plus Department of 
Defense and all combatant military forces 
Federal bureaucracy- The level of government that includes the interagency cabinet 
departments alone 
American Public - The average citizen, one who does not work for the United States 
government, nor is a consultant or lobbyist employed to support the federal bureaucracy 
Foreign citizens -The population of other nations that are not employed by their 
governments or military forces 
Actors 
Those who would do the transformation process, however the actual people who would 
qualify varied widely among the interviewees. There did seem to be a broad consensus that 
while individuals could conduct IO on their own, by and large for this study, it was primarily IO 
conducted by the government at the interagency level and in the military services that were the 
primary focus. In the opinion of the participants, this is where in actuality the vast majority of 
IO actions and operations were conducted: 
• Interagency- The 15 different cabinet level organizations and other federal agencies that 
are above the State and local levels. 
• The National Security Council, including all offices in the Executive Branch and White 
House that work with this directorate. 
• White House- The Presidential Administration and the Executive Branch. 
• The Department ofDefense, including all military agencies and affiliated services and 
organisations. 
• The State Department- The cabinet agency, all of its different embassies and missions 
located around the world and its associated dependent departments. 
• The former United States Information Agency that was absorbed by the State Department 
in 1999. Now known as the "I" Branch of that agency. 
Transformation Process 
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The conversion of input to output is often referred to as the transformation process. The 
diagram below (Figure 5.6) shows a model that the author developed from the interview process 
to describe this translation effort by bringing together the key different elements. For example, 
data is the combination of input through a specific user interface. Likewise the context of the 
message is developed from the environment and specific time period. Taken together, data in a 
certain context can be described as.information, and when combined with real-world events, this 
becomes knowledge as shown below. The knowledge is then used as a form of output to 
complete the circle. In addition, as will be covered in other portions of this thesis, the ultimate 
success of this transformation is to ensure the efficacy, efficiency and effectiveness of this 
methodology, through the process as described above. 
Environment 
Data Context 
Figure 5.6 - Information and Knowledge Flow 
Weltanschauung 
This is the weltanschauung of the interviewees, which makes the transformation process 
meaningful in the context of the problem (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. 35). As referenced in 
Jackson (2000, p. 60), this concept was originally developed by Dilthey, as well as Checkland 
who utilised it to demonstrate that in order to understand human behaviour, we must interpret it 
according to people's actual intentions (Ibid). "One of the most obvious characteristics of 
human beings is their readiness to attribute meaning to what they observe and experience. 
153 
Indeed, human beings are not simply ready to attribute meanings, they cannot abide 
meaningless" (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. 2). In addition, what marks SSM different than 
other systems thinking processes or interpretative approaches, is that it provides a framework, 
which can use the clues from the participants to gather information. In reality then, it is a 
'hearing methodology' which takes all inputs available in the form ofweltanschuung or your 
world view (Jackson, 2000, p. 6, 13, 807). Because the sample for this research project consisted 
ofknowledgeable individuals that could give meaningful input and advice on the status of the 
conduct of IO in the federal bureaucracy, in the final data it is not surprising that there was 
something of a consistency in the weltanschuung of a portion of the participants. An attempt 
was made, somewhat successfully, in gathering a set of divergent views and opinions from this 
same group of interviewees. A significant ~ffort to diversify the pool of individuals to give a 
more varied perspective was made, with interviewees coming from not only within the federal 
bureaucracy but also from outside not only the United States government but America as well. 
So beyond serving government officials, there were also academics, retired military officers and 
even foreign nationals who were knowledgeable on this subject, and thus became part of this 
study .. All of these personnel were included to ensure that valid input from all different aspects 
of the opinion spectrum was received, a varied weltanschuung if you will. 
Owner or Owners 
These are the people who could stop the transformation process. Within the United 
States government, this may refer to those bureaucrats or officials who perceive that the changes 
brought on by the Information Age, will diminish their power base. In addition, owners are also 
personnel who control the process, who are directly involved in the day-to-day activities of the 
United States government and IO missions. It is these personnel, who also manage the 
tremendous amounts of appropriation issues involved, that can be affected when organisations 
are flattened or the architecture is changed. 
Environmental Constraints 
These are elements outside the evaluated system, which are taken as a given or a 
standard. Good examples of these include information systems, networks, connectivity, video 
and teleconferencing capabilities, as well as the media, Internet, television and radio. It can also 
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include social perceptions, fiscal controls, cultural issues and historical biases. These constraints 
can limit the ability in some cases for the free and unfettered flow on information which is often 
a necessary ingredient for the success ofiO. Finally it is this combination of the transformation 
process and weltanschauung that gives the critical understanding of the viewpoint of the 
participant, as noted earlier in this chapter. These are nuances of the participants thinking, to 
truly understand why they feel and believe the way that they do .. Therefore in the author's 
opinion, it is crucial to go back to the key interviewees multiple times if necessary, using a 
constructive approach to ensure that the true meanings of ~heir statements can be obtained, In 
addition, through the use of a verification process as shown later in this thesis, the author was 
able to confirm with the original interviewees their intentions and opinions with written 
feedback. Finally, as mentioned earlier in this paper, for any transformation process to be 
successful, it must be judged on the three counts~ namely efficacy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
These are the criteria for which the Root Definitions and Conceptual Models were created, and 
which a validation procedure was followed. 
5.3.4 Building Purposeful Activity Models: The Root Definition 
A 'Root Definition' should be a concise description of an ideal system, and it expresses 
the core purpose of purposeful activity system, as well as a condensed representation of a system 
in its most fundamental form (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. 33; Jackson, 2000, p. 254). 
The purposeful activity models in SSM are devices -intellectual devices -whose 
role is to help structure an exploration of the problem situation being addressed ... They 
do not purport to be representations of anything in the real situation. They are accounts 
of concepts of pure purposeful activity, based on declared worldviews ... They are thus 
not models of anything, instead they are models relevant to debate about the situation ... " 
(Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. A21). 
Root Definitions are therefore often derived from pictures or diagrams, because they are a better 
means of recording relationships and connections then prose. Therefore representing Root 
Definitions via the development of Rich Pictures is a standard process for depicting the problem 
situation (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. 45). In addition, because the basic building block of 
the intellectual constructs of SSM is the Root Definition and Conceptual Model assembly, the 
proper development of the Root Definition is thus crucial to the overall success of the SSM 
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process (Wilson, 2001, p. xv). Finally, the Root Definition defines what the 'system is' and the 
Conceptual Model describes what the system 'must do' (Ibid). 
5.4 Building the Conceptual Models 
From the two Root Definitions, a total of two major and 12 minor Conceptual Models 
were built from the data gathered in the initial set of interviews. "Conceptual Models do not 
seek to describe the real world or some ideal system to be engineered, but are merely accentuated 
one-sided views of possible relevant human activity systems'' (Jackson, 2000, p. 254). So it is 
crucial that they are derived primarily from the Root Definitions, because they describe what the 
system 'is', while the Conceptual model will describe what the system 'does', because each of 
these major figures were 'fleshed' out with ~ix subsets, that used the information in the 
embedded as pmt of the 63 different CATWOE elements. The idea of each model was to try to 
take the Rich Pictures and Root Definitions of SSM, and develop figures or diagrams that would 
help to build examples or prototypes that would ultimately answer the research questions. In 
other words, "different descriptions of reality, based on different worldviews, embodied in Root 
Definitions; are then turned into Conceptual Models, which are in effect, one-sided 
representations ofweltanschauung" (Jackson, 2000, p. 249) All of these stages are part of the 
systems portion, mentioned earlier in Chapter Four, which is an example of the theoretical 
construct. For as noted throughout this study, it is in the development of these Conceptual 
Models, where the interviewees inevitably played a major role, with their input and their core 
ideas involving IO policy, personnel and organisation with respect to IO in the United States 
government. Taken together, the Root Definition and Conceptual Model develop a standard 
method or an explicit audit trail, in which both tools are used as part of the overall thinking 
process. This is because human activity is much more complex and requires a richer language to 
cope with the 'ill-defined' and 'messy' aspects of these 'soft' situations (Wilson, 2000, p. 187). 
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Mode1 Mode2 
F~ SSM as in the seven System Ideas stages or two streams version 
Reflection upon the 
fl1ethoq, 
SSM as in the seven everyday flux of 
stages or two streams events and ideas O/o{)Jt version (intervention) using SSM to make 
sense of it (interaction) 
Some part of the real The learning of 
Area of Wor1d e.g. NHS, a whoever does the 
Concern Company, the civil reflection noted above 
service, etc. 
Table 5.2 - Mode 1 and 2 SSM Defined 
(Checkland and Scholes, 1990, p. 283-284) 
Another interesting experience occurred with the development of the Conceptual Models, 
in that the SSM process began to become more 'internalised' for the participants. The issues 
became more situation-driven than problem oriented, and with it, a framework began to develop, 
which could be employed to enable rigorous but systematic use of this methodology in everyday 
events (Jackson, 2000, p. 257). In essence, users of SSM were transitioning to more of a Mode 2 
type of use of SSM, as they became more comfortable with its capabilities. These participants 
were coming to 'own' the study from the constant interviews and discussions over the years. 
This is a crucial aspect of SSM in its internalised form, when the participants feel comfortable 
enough to allow the process to 'come apart'- that is, to evolve into an experience with the 
greatest source ofleaming. Flexibility in use begins to appear as the practitioner begins to 
internalise its principles (Checkland, 2000, 13, 6, p. 800-801). 
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Figure 5. 7 - The Current '~Preferred" Representation of SSM 
(Checkland and Scholes, 1999, p. A9) 
Exploring the Situation and Taking Action: The Verification and Validation 
Process 
From the Conceptual Models, the next step then of the SSMtheory is to try to compare 
the prototypes developed from interviewee data with the reality of how IO is conducted and 
utilised in the United States government today. This is not always as easy as it appears. To start, 
the Conceptual Models are not models about the 'real-world,' but instead there are 'models 
relevant to the debate about the real world' (Checkland, 1995, 12, p. 50). Therefore, the validity 
of a model comes from two factors - whether the model is 'relevant' and whether the model is 
competently built. The question of relevance and validity must then be answered by the process 
itself. With respect to the verification process, a series of follow-up interviews were conducted 
starting on 1 March 2005 and extending until1 June 2005. All40 ofthe final group of 
interviewees were sent a follow-up detailed questionnaire, which included a request to them to 
respond to in a timely basis. As mentioned previously, all of these participants were selected for 
their in depth knowledge of the thesis subject, as well as their acceptance to continue to help with 
this project. In this step of the process, the follow-on questionnaires asked the interviewees to 
decide if they agreed on the aggregated personnel, policy and organisational issues gathered from 
the original set of interviews. This was done in a survey letter sent out and each participant was 
also asked to answer whether they agreed or not with the initial Root Definitions. In addition, 
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these participants were also asked to look at the Conceptual Models developed by the author and 
to comment on whether they agreed or disagreed with these ideas and to comment on as well. 
The basic concept of the verification letter was to ensure that the. Conceptual Models were built 
correctly from the data gained from the original interview process. 
The ultimate goal ofthese follow-on interviews was then to validate whether these 
Conceptual Models reflect the Root Definitions, using theCATWOE elements to ultimately tie 
back to the information received from the original participants. In addition, it was also desired to 
use the verified data to ensure tha~ the Conceptual Models. as developed are as accurate as 
possible. Finally of course, the aim of these questions was to compare and contrast the 
Conceptual Models to the actual structures that exist in reality, especially within the United 
States government. Once the follow-on interviewees returned their questionnaire forms, step 
five of the SSM process was initiated, namely to compare the Conceptual Models to reality. In 
each of the two models sent out for consideration, considerable comments were returned by the 
participants. Changes to the Conceptual Models were then made based on an amalgamation of 
the data from the survey letters to form the final diagrams. These new models represent concepts 
that most optimally describe the current and desired state of IO within the United States 
· government as reflected by the interviewees' statements. 
The verification of the Conceptual Models by the follow-on questionnaires allowed the 
surfacing of those features that were desirable and feasible from a realistic viewpoint. If there 
were ideas or attributes that were part of the original representation, that ultimately proved to be 
unrealistic in the reality of tactical operations ofiO, then it was this part of the methodology that 
brought those disconnects to light. This is step six of the SSM process, and it is at this point, that 
the data starts to form a final series of recommendations that ultimately attempt to answer the 
research questions. So it is obvious that the ability of this methodology to affect transformation 
ultimately depends on the accurate input from all participants in the process. Thus, throughout 
this entire methodology, there was need for constant feedback from the participants, to ensure the 
accuracy of their data. 
The validation session was conducted at the 4th Annual European Conference on 
International Warfare at the University of Glamorgan in Wales in 2005. This review was an 
important part of the thesis procedure because it ensures a direct link by the author to the 
theoretical construct, as well as ensuring that the entire procedure is correct from a methodology 
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aspect. Paper or electronic copies were kept of the data and referred to thfoughout this project, 
and the information from those conversations ultimately found its way not only into the Root 
Definitions. Efforts were made to be able to trace the data up and down the chain of evidence. 
In this matrix, portions of the CATWOE elements in the respective two Root Definitions were 
matched up to comments made by the various participants. It represents the best attempt that can 
be made to triangulate the data, to present the most effective and efficient match of interviewee 
comments to eventual Conceptual Model. 
5.6 Summary ofMethods used in this Research 
Overall, there was a concerted attempt to be consistent in his use of interviews and SSM 
to present a rigorous and academic approach to this 'messy issue. The use of IO by the United 
States government is easy to understand or explain, and so a qualitative approach such as utilized 
in this study appeared after much research to be the best methodology. Using a tailored process, 
that included the author as the central integrator of the data was also key, because it allowed a 
much greater mix of participants, weltanschauung and overall knowledge gain in the procedure. 
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Chapter 6 - Results 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the results from all of the interviewees are illustrated and analysed within 
the SSM construct. This data was derived from the participants through a set of the original 
survey questions, which tended to focus on three areas, namely the development and 
improvement of Information Operations policy, the organisation and the personnel within the 
United States government. The answers and information obtained from these participants was 
rough and incoherent, often without form or a method to analyse in detail. Thus a theoretical 
construct or methodology was needed to draw from the interviewee data, patterns, concepts and a 
cohesive explanation for what these participants in the thesis were attempting to understand and 
explain. The ultimate goal of this analysis of the data within the SSM process is to derive a set 
of Root Definitions, which are crucial to precisely describing a definition of the ideal situation 
that exists in the minds of the practitioners. From there, a set of Conceptual Models can then be 
developed to graphically portray the 'ideal' solution in order to improve the conduct ofiO within 
the United States government. In this case, the raw data was categorised and aggregated into a 
form that fits within this theoretical construct. That is, the tasks detailed later in this chapter was 
assimilated from these disparate interview sessions, conducted over a multi-year period, and 
were parsed and reformatted to fit into a coherent format utilizing the CATWOE mnemonic. 
From these initial answers to the research questions, all of the data was divided into themes in 
the CATWOE structure as an initial draft of the aggregated response. 
6.2 An Example of the Dichotomy of Weltanschauung in the Interviewee's 
Responses 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the answers to these survey questions and alternate 
queries that originated from these interviews, were often wide ranging and far-sighted but were 
not necessarily consistent across the spectrum of individuals. In fact, the input from the thesis 
participants tended to vary widely, with the dichotomy between some of the responses as very 
interesting and showing the truth depth and breadth of the weltanschauung of the participants. 
To demonstrate the varied participants' opinions, a number of examples are shown with respect 
to the questions that were discussed on the policy issue and probably the most contested of all of 
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the survey questions, namely is a comprehensive top-down national information strategy 
required? It was the first two of these survey answers that indicated the greatest dichotomy 
among the participants, where answers were split into radically different opinions. For example, 
interviewee #24 stated absolutely that a top-down national information strategy was needed. He 
believed this because a mandate was desired to: "sell United States values and to counter anti-US 
propaganda," but regretted that often the actions and funding of the federal government does not 
follow policy guidelines. In addition, this same participant stated as an example that in 
"Operation Iraqi Freedom, the .coalition had a strategic information campaign, yet the same 
cannot be said for the larger Global War on Terrorism", where he believed that ... "we do not 
have an information/campaign strategy." So in summary, his belief was that while there is a 
need for a long-term top down national information strategy for the United States that capability 
does not exist today. Interviewee #39 agreed that the United States needs a comprehensive 
Information Strategy, and he stated that "A Strategic Communication Policy is still a requirement 
in the interagency process to get the implementing strategies." He thought that there needed to 
be an information component to feed into the Theatre Engagement Plan's to drive the cascading 
strategies, as part of a full spectrum National Information Strategy that is more thanjust a 
communication plan, with a number of holistic and inclusive components. 
With regard to federal and coalition operations in an IO environment, Interviewee #38 
thought that the pie analogy is very good, a spin-off of Presidential Decision Directive 56, 
however in the end, he thought that the United States government did not follow the process of 
this Executive Committee in Operation Iraqi Freedom, that is: "we need to do what we say." 
This same participant stated that at the Interagency Deputies' and Principals' level, "everybody 
agreed that deputies needed to get information on the Operation Iraqi Freedom IO campaign on a 
weekly basis, "with an acknowledgement at the Interagency Principals level, that beyond war in 
Iraq, that sometime there ought to be dedicated at their meetings to talk big picture IO issues". 
The interviewee then described how the United States government interagency organisations 
should conduct strategic communications, but he acknowledged that with very few exceptions, 
this has not occurred. He thought that these senior level agencies mostly tended to deal with 
policy issues but in terms of a logical sequence that gives IO guidance, real world examples are 
virtually non-existent, and in fact it was a major achievement to recognize that IO is important. 
Finally, as an example of dichotomy among dissertation participants, interviewee #39 stated that 
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the State Department has International Information Programs, but that capability is not 
physically located at the Main State complex brit instead at another facility in Washington, DC 
(Building SA-44). He was adamant that these IO type functions. must instead be shifted back to 
the Main State building, with a communications and physical connectivity that is not technology 
and mentally separated. The concept that IO Policy is fragmented was also lamented by 
interviewee #3 5. He thought that the Department of Defense was trying to pull back perspective 
from everything to narrow it down to a lane, "not trying to strap on others, which is okay if other 
departments are stepping up to the plate, but Department of State and Dep1;1rtment of Homeland 
security are not." He thought that "Cyber Security is the red headed step child since Clarke and 
Schmidt left, plus public diplomacy is on shaky ground with the departure of Charlotte Beers." 
This same participant believed that "there needs to be an overarching policy, that the Office of 
Global Communications cannot do this, and that they can barely supervise, so there is nothing 
that brings together information as an element of power. 
6.3 Summary of Initial Responses from Interviewees from each Question 
As shown above, the wide variety of answers and world views from the interviewees, all 
tended to lead to large range of data points from which to begin the analysis process. Likewise 
of the answers provided in the interviews, which were collected over a long time period, the goal 
of this process was to compare and contrast to each other. However it rapidly became apparent 
during this process, that there was much duplication in the responses and so these 'extra' answers 
were culled out, in order for the discrete opinions to be represented only once. The CATWOE 
tool was then used to break these aggregated answers from the survey questions into discrete 
themes or definable areas that could be compared and contrasted. To do this, as the initial 
aggregated data were reviewed the CATWOE elements were then pulled out, identified and 
labelled. In this particular case, after reviewing all of the aggregated answers from all 
participants, a total of 63 subcategories were created under the six different CATWOE element 
categories. Thus each interviewee's data about the conduct ofiO in the United States 
government was ultimately funnelled into one of these 63 different CATWOE elements. For 
example, in one of the first analyses of participant data, interviewee #24 cited opinions about the 
clients, which relate to the development of three different types of clients, cited as C 1, C2 and 
C3, which relate to Foreign Audiences, key decision makers and United States citizens 
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respectfully. Likewise another interviewee developed thoughts on the Actors involved, which 
equated to CA TWO E element A 7, specifically that the two political coordinating committees at 
the State Department and the National Security Council had no decision making authority. This 
detailed analysis of each and all of the individual description of a participant's thoughts, which 
are considered as standalone data points were then labelled with each particular CATWOE 
element number. Ultimately then, all of aggregated answers from the thesis participants are 
fleshed out into these 63 individual CATWOE elements, which will then be linked explicitly 
back to the original data in the next chapter. This refinement or grouping of elements will allow 
as mentioned previously, the development of a series of Root Definitions. The 63 aggregated 
CATWOE answers as shown below are therefore the result of the initial analysis of the 
interviewee data. These responses are reviewed in much greater detail throughout this chapter, 
with the areas highlighted including the different CATWOE elements that were cited the most by 
the respective participants. The outcome of this first analysis is shown below in Diagrams 6.1 -
6.19, with explanatory language describing in much greater detail the meaning behind 
interviewee data. 
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Table 6-1: Aggregated CATWOE Answers 
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The CATWOE elements highlighted were the number one issue in each category that was cited 
by the participants as part of the interviews. The entire reordering of these elements will be 
delineated in much greater detail below, as each of the six CATWOE areas are analysed further. 
What is also important to recognize is that while the number of times a particular CATWOE 
element was mentioned are counted, overall, EVERY data point is accounted for and utilised as 
. part of this research effort. 
6.4 Clients 
As shown in Table 6.2, there were six different clients in the initial list developed from 
the interviewee's comments. These correspond to the general categories shown earlier in the 
Rich Picture process. 
Clients 
C-1 Foreign Audiences 
C-2 Key decision makers (foreign and domestic) 
C-3 US Citizens (general public) 
C-4 US Government including military 
C-5 Academia (foreign and domestic) 
C-6 Media including Hollywood 
Table 6.2 - Initial Data on Prospective Clients 
From this initial analysis, a tabulation of the clients given by the interviewees' responses was 
conducted as shown below. This kind ofbreakdown of the data was conducted in each of the six 
different CATWOE element areas to show which topics were cited the most frequently by the 
participants as part of the research process. The left column indicates the interview number and 
the six columns to the right correspond to one ofthe named Client$ in Diagrams 6.1 or 6. 2. The 
second to the bottom row, shows the actual number of citations, while the bottom row shows the 
numerical order of the Clients after the answers are tabulated. 
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Interviewee IC 1 C2 ICJ I :5 IC6 
7 
8 
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 
17 1 1 1 1 
21 1 1 1 1 
22 1 
_2~ 1 
24 1 
25 1 1 1 
26 1 1 1 1 
27 1 1 1 1 
28 1 1 1 
29 1 1 1 1 1 1 
30 1 1 1 1 
31 1 1 1 1 
32 1 1 1 1 
J~ 1 
34 1 1 
35 1 1 1 1 1 
37 1 1 1 1 
38 1 1 1 
39 1 1 1 1 
40 1 1 1 
16 17 8 10 5 
3 2 5 1 4 6 
Table 6.3 -Tabulated Data on Prospective Clients 
As you can see from the data C4, C2 and Cl were the most commonly mentioned clients from 
the interviewees. From this analysis, the final reordered version of the Clients with respect to 
this thesis is shown below. 
Clients 
C-4 US Govemment including military 
C-2 Key decision makers (foreign and domestic) 
C-1 Foreign Audiences 
C-5 Academia (foreign and domestic) 
C-3 US Citizens (general public) 
C-6 Media including Hollywood 
Table 6.4- Final Ordering of Client's based on Interviewees Cited Response 
What came through very prominently from the participants in their responses was in that order to 
change the way in which IO is conducted by the federal bureaucracy, then obviously you needed 
to affect or target the key decision-makers in the United States government. Foreign audiences 
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also ranked high as there was a large difference in the data between the top three clients as 
opposed to the rest of the available choices. These three top choices were mentioned by over 
65% of all participants with the number one client, the federal bureaucracy mentioned with 
almost 88% of the respondents citing this factor as important. 
6.5 Actors 
Likewise, the actors were derived from the participants themselves as shown below: 
Actors 
A-1 Media/Hollywood - reservists or liasion personnel needed? 
A-2 Planners and operators need to work together 
A-3 TRG and consultants - volunteers aka like civil defense? 
A-4 How many actors have been trained in IO? 
A-5 Standalone IO cells- have they worked well? 
A-6 Old USIA types/ State Department, are they integrated? 
A-7 DoS PCC and NSC PCC - no decision making authority 
A-8 4th POG - too tactical , to low on CoC 
A-9 International IO Operators - corporate IO 
A-10 Information Czar? What about an IO Corps or a CinC IO/Standing JHQ? 
A-ll NSC OGC and WH/DoD - relate to a National Information Council? 
A-12 Clearances and language skills are essential 
A-13 Do we need a surge capability? 
A-14 Senior level USG training & awareness is needed 
A-15 Alistair Campbell or KarenHuges h'Q_e of influence is desired 
Table 6.5 - Initial Data on Prospective Actors 
The same analysis was conducted on the actor data, with a tabulated count conducted of the 
number of times a partic'ular data point was cited by the participants. 
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_lruo;;• v u;;w cc [A 1 ,s A6 lA_! ~ ~ ~ lA 11 A12 A 13 [A14 [A 15 
7 1 _1 
8 1 1 _1 _1 
9 1 1 
10 1 1 1 
l7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
22 
23 1 1 1 1 1 1 
24 1 1 1 _1 _1 
25 J 1 1 _1 1 1 _1 
26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
27 1 1 1 1 
'28 1 1 1 
29 1 1 1 1 1 _1 1 _1 _1 
30 1 1 1 1 1 _1 
31 1 1 1 1 1 _1 
32 1 1 1 __.,_ _1 1 1 _1 _1 
33 1 
34 1 1 1 1 
35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
37 1 1 
38 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
39 1 1 1 1 _1 __.,_ 
40 
__! __! 
4 8 13 10 ~ 7 3 7 4 3 13 6 
10 1 10 1 6 3 5 15 7 13 7 10 13 3 9 
Table 6.6- Tabulated Data on Prospective Actors 
As can be seen, the most common Actors were A2, A4, Al4, and A6, with a large discrepancy 
between these first six data elements and the other nine. Both of the top two choices tied at 63% 
citation rate, with a tie again as well for positions three and four at 54% citation rate. After the 
top four positions, the choice of prospective Actors by the pati icipants expands rapidly with no 
individual selection receiving more than 33% of the citations noted. 
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Actors 
A-2 Planners and operators need to work together 
A-4 How many actors have been trained in IO? 
A-14 Senior level USG training & awareness is needed 
A-6 Old USIA types/ State Department, are they integrated? 
A-7 DoS PCC and NSC PCC - no decision making authority 
A-5 Standalone IO cells - have they worked well? 
A-9 . futernational IO Operators - corporate IO 
A-ll NSC OGC and WH/DoD -relate to a National fuformation Council? 
A-15 Alistair Camp bell or Karen Huges type of influence is desired 
A-12 . Clearances and language skills are essential 
A-1 Media/Hollywood - reservists or liasion personnel needed? 
A-3 TRG and consultants - volunteers aka like civil defense? 
A-10 fuformation Czar? What about an IO Corps or a CinC 10/Standing JHQ? 
A-13 Do we need a surge capability? · 
A-8 4th POG - too tactical , to low on CoC 
Table 6.7- Final Ordering of Actor's based on Interviewees Cited Response 
For the analysis of the Actors as shown above it was the need for integration among the 
government organisations, the overall lack of training, the need for greater decision making 
authority and an inadequate structure for conducting IO which were most frequently cited as the 
key findings. These issues will also be found in other areas of the CATWOE analysis, but they 
were especially prevalent here, when the data is compared to al115 possible choices. 
6.6 Transformation 
With regard to the transformation process, the 13 aggregated answers are listed below. 
These were the methodological activities that were deemed the most appropriate to improve the 
conduct of IO by the United States government. 
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Transformation 
T-1 Strategic Information Campaign, ie strategic PSYOP, 
integrating strategy which is coherent is very importimt 
T-2 hmovation occurs at the margins 
T-3 Flatten the process - integrate - dynamic 
T-4 Structure is bad - disorganized 
T-5 Hiring practives for military civilians dates from industrial era 
T-6 We need continuous training and education 
T-7 Effects based operations (EBO) 
T-8 Target analysis 
T-9 IORM- major reconnnendations for training 
T-10 Acccess to top leadership - overall guidance 
T-11 What are the overall goals? . 
T-12 Set ouftop-level nodes and missions- goals and o~jectives 
T-13 Cyber Security and PD related? 
Table 6.8 - Initial Data on the Prospective Transformation Process 
Similar to the first two CATWOE elements, the answers to the transformation process were 
tabulated and counted below. 
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Inter,. .... '"" T 1 T2 IT J IT 4 IT 5 '7 ITa IT9 T10 IT 11 T 12 IT13 
7 1 1 
8 
9 1 1 
10 _1_ 1 1 
17 1 1 1 1 1 
21 1 1 1 1 1 1 
22 1 
23 
24 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
25 1 1 1 1 ! 
26 1 1 1 1 
27 1 1 1 1 
28 1 1 
29 1 1 1 1 
30 1 1 1 1 
31 1 1 1 1 1 1 
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
33 1 1 1 
34 1 1 1 1 
35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
37 1 1 1 1 1 
38 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
39 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
40 1 1 
12 2 7 9 2 ' 5 6 5 8 12 1.2 6 
2 12 7 5 12 1 10 8 10 6 2 2 8 
Table 6.9 - Tabulated Data on Prospective Transformation Process 
Per this an.alysis, T6 was the number one response, with Tl, Tll and Tl2 all tied for second 
place. All of these data points received at least 50% of the citations recorded, and below these 
top four answers, no CATWOE element received more than 38% of the citations recorded, with 
most of the answers six of the 13, receiving 25% or less commonality. This diffuse spread of 
concepts demonstrates that the actual transformation process suggested by the participants is not 
as certain or clear to the interviewees. All of the answers for Transfmmation are displayed in 
their respective order below. 
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Transformation 
T-6 We need continuous training and education 
T-1 Strategic Information Campaign, ie strategic.PSYOP, 
integrating strategy which is coherent is verv important 
T-11 What are the overall goals? 
T-12 Set out top-level nodes and missions- goals and objectives 
T-4 Structure is bad - disorganized 
T~10 Acccess to top leadership - overall guidance 
T-3 Flatten the process - integrate - dynamic 
T-13 Cyber Security and PD related? 
T-8 Target analysis 
T-7 Effects based operations (EBO) 
T-9 IORM -major recommendations for training 
T-2 Innovation occurs at the margins 
T-5 Hiring practives for military civilians dates from industrial era 
Table 6.10- Final Ordering of the Transformation Process based on Interviewees Cited 
Response 
What this data emphasizes is the need once again for continuous training integrated with policy 
changes that are tied to the overall goals set out at the executive level. This emphasis on top-
down guidance and centralised process was very prevalent among the interviewees with a 
significant distribution of the data focused on the first four elements listed above. 
6.7 Weltanschauung (W orldviews) 
As mentioned earlier, attempts were made to find participants with divergent set of 
worldviews. The initial aggregated answers are shown below, which indicate that in some sense 
this effort was successful. 
World View 
W-1 Political, military, USG, engineers, IR professors 
W-2 Many practitioniers do not understand IO 
W-3 IORM almost reverting back to C2W - why? 
W-4 Is their difference between IO and PD lane? 
W-5 Do we need a National Information Policy? 
W-6 Or should we just update the NSS? 
Table 6.11 -Initial Data on Prospective World Views 
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The tabulated answers for Weltanschauung are shown below. 
J.lll<'l V IC:WC:C: W 1 3 IW4 lw5 IW6 
7 } 1 
8 1 1 
9 
10 1 
17 1 1 
21 1 1 
22 1 
23 
24 1 1 1 1 
25 1 1 
26 1 1 1 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 1 
30 1 1 
31 1 1 1 
32 1 1 1 1 
33 1 1 
34 1 1 1 
35 1 1 1 1 1 
37 1 1 1 
38 1 1 1 1 
39 1 1 1 
40 1 1 1 
8! 6 7 11 5 
3 5 4 2 6 
Table 6.12 - Tabulated Data on Prospective World Views 
As seen in the numerical analysis, the most common world view was W2, followed by W5 and 
Wl as shown below. Note that by far, a large majority of the patticipants (almost 80%) cited 
CATWOE element W2, and that there is a significant gap to the next element, W5 with only 
45% of the citations noted. 
World View 
W-2 Many practitioniers do not understand IO 
W-5 Do we need a National Information Policy? 
W-1 Political, military, USG, engineers, IRprofessors 
W-4 Is their difference between IO and PD lane? 
W-3 IORM almost reverting back to C2W - why? 
W-6 Or should we just update the NSS? 
Table 6.13- Final Ordering of World View based on Interviewees Cited Response 
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The data from the participants emphasised that across the spectrum, most participants and 
practitioners do not understand IO and that more training is needed. This near universal 
acknowledgement of the requirement for greater education in this capability across the board for 
all personnel associated with this thesis is a constant theme that will be noted in the next chapter 
with the development of the Root Definitions. 
6.8 Owners 
The owners of the process were also examined in particular in relation to their ability to 
control the evolution of IO within the United States government. 
Owners 
0-1 futeragency to include the Dos, DoD, NSC and WH - need more coord? 
0-2 Two PCCs are redundant 
0-3 Is their trust in the PM efforts ofthese organizations? USIA? 
0-4 fu the OSD, oversight ofiO is everywhere 
0-5 How many of the above have been trained in IO? 
0-6 DoD is building PD capability because it believes State is not doing enough 
0-7 WH is good at political domestic message and spin but often reacts to foreign events 
0-8 Need to quickly get decisions on PD from on high 
0-9 State needs a bigger role - bring back 
Table 6.14- Initial Data on Prospective Owners 
The tabulated responses for the owners are shown below. 
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Interv •<;; vv~;;~;; 01 i02 [03 :o4 [05 06 07 [08 
7 1 1 
8 1 1 
9 
10 1 1 
l7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
21 1 
22 
23 1 1 1 
24 1 1 1 1 
25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
26 1 1 1 1 1 1 
27 1 
28 1 1 1 1 
29 1 1 1 1 1 
30 
31 1 1 1 1 1 
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
33 1 
34 
35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
37 1 1 1 
38 1 1 1 1 
39 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
40 1 1 1 1 1 
1.3 9 10 1 11 8 10 10 
2 7 4 9 3 8 4 4 1 
Table 6.15- Tabulated Data on Prospective Owners 
In this analysis, 09 was selected most frequently with 01 and 0 5 trailing respectfully in 
second and third place, and the rest of the elements as shown below. What is interesting. to note 
from the data is that the nearly all of the data elements are centred in a relatively small band 
between 33-58% as shown here: 0 9 (58% of the citations), 01 (54%), 0 5 (45%), 0 7 and 08 tied 
at ( 4 1 %), 0 2 (37%) and 0 6 (33%). None of the elements enjoyed an overwhelming majority 
and one in particular (04), was only cited once by one patticipant in the entire thesis research. 
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Owners 
0-9 State needs a bigger role - bring back 
0-1 futeragency to include the Dos, DoD, NSC and WH 
need more coord? 
0-5 How many of the above have been trained in IO? 
0-3 Is their trust in the PM efforts of these 
organizations? USIA? 
0-:-7 WH is good at political domestic message and spin 
but often reacts to foreign events 
0-8 Need to quickly get decisions on PD from on high 
0-2 Two PCCs are redundant 
0-6 DoD is building PD capability because it believes 
State is not doing enough 
0-4 fu the OSD, oversight ofiO is everywhere 
Table 6.16- Final Ordering of Owner's ·based on Interviewees Cited Response 
Thus to continue the analysis of the data, what is interesting about this information is the tight 
variation (within a 25% band) of different phrases of similar themes by the participants. There is 
a very heavy emphasis on the need for a stronger State Department, with more trained officials, 
and the integration of the White House into Information Operations as part of a foreign policy. 
All of these themes come together to give a sense that while the Department ofDefense may be 
playing a major role today, a large majority of the interviewees desire to bring back capability to 
the State Department that was formerly resident in the United States Information Agency and to 
integrate that more tightly via the interagency process with the White House. 
6.9 Environment 
The final element of the CATWOE tool that was examined included the environment. In 
this area, a large number of divergent responses were recorded. 
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Environment 
E-1 Time is crucial, computers have increased change "!Jut products should be 
E-2 Key US values - freedom,_ Dol, Constitution, a nation of immi.e:rants 
E-3 Information is like terrain cannot leave unoccupied 
E-4 Money and resources drive capabilities 
E-5 US DOS liP has no directive voice for PD - spread PD officers everywhere? 
E-6 Interagency bureaucracies - will org change work? 
E-7 Need a 24/7 capability? Mode led on a campaign headquarters? Around the 
world (USIUK/ AU) ie follow the sun 
E-8 US PD must be faster, more reactive 
E-9 Truth is essential but being first is better 
E-10 10 is not new 
E-ll IW and Psyop are not good terms for interagency, 10 and SC are much better 
but EBO may be the best? 
E-12 Eat your own dog food (US) 
E-13 Training_ or lack of is badly needed for PD 
E-14 Themes need to be tied to_g_ether 
E-15 Top to bottom or bottom to top? 
E-16 What are we trying to protect? 
Table 6.17 - Initial Data on the Prospective Environment 
The tabulated results from the environmental data are shown below. 
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Interviewee lE 1 lE 2 IE3 IE4 IEs IE6 le7 l E 9 lE 10 lE 11 lE 12 lE 13 lE 14 lE 15 lE 1E 
7 1 1 
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
9 1 1 1 
lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2l 1 1 1 
22 1 1 
23 1 1 1 1 
24 1 
25 1 1 1 1 1 
26 1 1 1 1 1 
27 1 1 1 
28 1 1 
29 1 1 1 1 1 1 
30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
31 1 1 1 1 
32 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 
33 1 1 1 
34 1 1 1 1 
35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
37 1 1 1 1 
38 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
39 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
40 1 1 1 1 
4 6 3 8 5 13 3 2 13 5 3 12 11 11 7 
12 9 13 7 10 2 13 1 16 2 10 13 4 5 5 8 
Table 6.18- Tabulated Data on the Prospective Environment 
The results from the numerical analysis are shown below with the top three including E8, E6 and 
E lO, and the rest as delineated below. Only E8 broke out with more than 50% of the citations 
recorded, yet there was a relatively tight group of answers in the 45-58% range, with the top six 
environmental elements selected all recorded in that region. After those six citations, there was a 
significant gap down to 33% for any of the rest of the data points, with the last 10 answers 
ranging between 8-33% of the respondents. 
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Environment 
E-8 US PD must be faster, more reactive 
E-6 lnteragency bureaucracies - will org change work? 
E-10 IO is not new 
E-3 Information is like terrain cannot leave unoccupied 
E-13 Training or lack of is badly needed for PD 
E-14 Themes need to be tied together 
E-15 Top to bottom or bottom to top? 
E-4 Money and resources drive capabilities 
E-16 What are we trying to protect? 
E-2 Key US values - freedom, Dol, .Constitution, a nation of 
immigrants 
E-ll IW and Psyop are not good terms for interagency, IO and 
SC are much better but EBO ma_y_ be the best? 
E-5 US DOS liP has no directive voice for PD - spread PD 
officers everywhere? 
E-1 Time is crucial, computers have increased change but 
!products should be checked 
E-12 Eat your own dog food (US) 
E-7 Need a 24/7 capability? Modeled on a campaign 
headquarters? Around the world (USIUK/ AU) ie follow the sun 
E-9 Truth is essential but being first is better 
Table 6.19 - Final Ordering of Environmental Data based on Interviewees Cited Response 
This last category brings together many of the key ideas into one of the CATWOE elements. 
Namely in this issue area, there is a heavy emphasis on decision making skills, integration, the 
fact that IO is not new, and the environment must be understood as labelled by the participants, 
the importance of training and finally the need to develop coherent themes that are tied together. 
These data points which were noted in section were also set apart in the data by the participants 
with a wide discrepancy (too vague) or gap between the top six environmental elements selected 
and the bottom 10. 
In addition, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the actual priority and ordering of 
the interviewee data as shown earlier, is derived directly from the participants themselves. What 
this section demonstrates, is the first of three steps, where the input can be easily traced from a 
specific interview to a CATWOE element and eventually as shown in the next two chapters, 
where the Root Definitions and Conceptual Models are later developed. It is the direct 
applicability of the data, through the mnemonic tool, and then onto other portions of the SSM 
process, that allows the reader to follow the key points and ideas of the themes uncovered 
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6.10 Conclusion 
A general set of three primary survey questions were asked to the thesis participants over 
a wide variety of settings and a long period of time. The answers to these queries were then 
synopsised and correlated, where duplicates were culled to produce aggregated responses. These 
responses were then translated to match the CATWOE mnemonic tool and the 63 elements were 
reduced from this data per Diagram 6-1. The results of these individual elements were then 
. counted and tabulated across all interviewees, and elements were reordered as shown in 
Diagrams 6.4, 6.7, 6.10, 6.13, 6.16 and 6.19. It was these steps that prioritised the data collected 
from the participants in a meaningful way, so that in the next chapter, the top six selections of 
each category were selected and nmmalised in order that a series of Root Definitions could be 
developed. 
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Chapter 7- Root Definitions 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Six, final versions of the aggregated CATWOE elements were derived from 
the multiple and varied responses of the thesis participants. As shown in the figure below, an 
initial ranking ofthe data was tabulated but as alluded to in Chapter Five, numerical priority is 
not the 'true' or ultimate value of a CATWOE element, and in fact the SSM process assumes that 
everyone's opinion or weltanschauung are valid and each should be incorporated into the overall 
problem solution. Therefore, in order to develop valid Root Definitions, using the precepts of 
SSM, all the data from the weltanschauungs of the participants, namely the 63 CATWOE 
elements were incorporated into the model. This process of including all the interview data is 
the main thrust of this chapter, with the reader having the ability to trace the raw data from its 
initial collection to the final disposition as part of the Root Definition. As mentioned in Chapter 
Six and reiterated here, the ability to ultimately group this disparate information into a set of 
coherent Root Definitions was not a straight-forward process with a number of steps taken in 
order to make the interviewee data useful from a conceptual standpoint. 
c A T w 0 E 
1 C4 A2 T6 W2 09 E8 
2 C2 A4 T1 ws 01 E6 
3 Cl Al4 Tll Wl os ElO 
4 CS A6 T12 W4 03 E3 
5 C3 A7 T4 W3 07 El3 
6 C6 AS TlO W6 08 El4 
7 A9 T3 02 ElS 
8 All T13 06 E4 
9 AlS TB 04 El6 
10 A12 T7 E2 
11 Al T9 Ell 
12 A3 T2 ES 
13 AlO TS El 
14 Al3 El2 
15 AS E7 
16 E9 
Table 7.1- Aggregated Tabulated Data on CATWOE Elements 
7.2 Tailoring CATWOE Elements into Thematic Ideas 
As noted in Chapter Six, the CATWOE elements were tabulated and reordered as shown 
above, and colour coded based on 12 thematic ideas, to tailor the data into a useable format, as 
shown below. 
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~
Table 7.2- Aggregated Answers with Collated Information 
Key US values -
li'eedom, Dol, a land 
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From this phase, the actual answers to these elements were then inserted in the figure above 
(Table 7.2). This was a straight-fotward methodology, with each cel1 in Table 7.2 conesponding 
to the same cell in Table 7 .1. For example, the first column equates to the Clients, and so forth 
from left to tight until the last column equals the Environmental data~ so in Table 7 .2, the 
answers are colour-coded. In addition as shown in Table 7.3, the reduction of these 63 
CATWOE elements was conducted to nanow the data to accurately reflect all weltanschauungs 
of the participants, so as patt of this additional analysis, 12 broader thematic ideas ofiO were 
utilised as shown below to ensure all interviewt;:es infmmation was accurately reflected in this 
thesis. 
I 
!• tlon Themes 
~·~ . 
~~~-- Goals Training 
Table 7.3- Colour Coded Themes for CATWOE Elements 
To do that, the research and data has been tailored from the original 63 CA TWOE 
elements into 12 broader categories as shm~n above in Table 7.3, which reflect the overall intent 
and direction of !the patiicipants. This narrowing of the participant data was conducted by 
evaluating the actual information provided by the interviewees and then comparing as well as 
contrasting these specific CATWOE elements to look for similatities that could be grouped 
together. The goal of this tailoring of the data to_broader thematic ideas was conducted to not 
only allow the research to move fmward in a methodical manner but also with regard to SSM, to 
retain and bting fotih the actual meaning that the patiicipants imparted to the data. Colour codes 
will thus used throughout this chapter to show these new groupings, as this analysis moves 
toward developing a set of Root Definitions. For example all CATWOE elements that 
referenced IQ personnel were coloured "dark purple", IO integration "light blue", IQ policy 
"gray", broad IO themes as "dark orange", IO decision making processes as "medium blue", and 
the tactical versus strategic issues as "dark blue." Similarly, the fact that IQ is not a new warfare 
area was colour coded "light green", the need for overall IQ goals "light orange", IQ 
organizational structure, and IQ training (or the lack thereof) were coloured ' 'yellow". A good 
example of this is shown in the fact that the clients were divided into two broad categories that 
included the US govemment personnel "purple" and All Others as "green." These 12 different 
thematic areas are then represented in each ofthe six CATWOE elements of Clients, Actors, 
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Transformation, Worldview, Owners and Environment, as shown in Table 7.3, and ultimately it 
will be these colour coded blocks that will be utilised for the development of the Root 
Definitions throughout this chapter, as the data.is analysed to draw out the key information from 
the participants. 
7.2.1 Clients 
These steps to colour code each respective CATWOE element will be repeated, so that all 
viewpointsofthe data will be the sa,rne for each ofthe six different areas. For example, with 
regard to the Clients CATWOE elements, table 7.4 is a combination of Tables 6.3 and 6.4 from 
the last chapter, which show a large dichotomy in the data mentioned by the participants, with 
most of interviewees citing US Government personnel as the key clients, with a large spread of 
data to the lowest cited element of the media. So after further analysis and review of the six 
CATWOE informational cells, the interviewee's concepts can be reduced down to two broad 
themes- namely "US Government" and "All Others". Colour-coded light purple and brown as 
shown in Table 7.1 - 7.3, these two categories effectively cover all ofthe participants that 
participate in the conduct of Information Operations in the United States government, as noted in 
Table 7.4 below 
One of the goals of the SSM process is to be able to trace the data from the original 
interview, though the CATWOE methodology and then to the final Root Definitions. This has 
been done systematically through the development of the raw data in Chapters Six, and the Root 
Definitions in Chapter Seven. In each case, the data can be traced through each thematic 
CATWOE element from the original ordering of Table 7.1, to the colour coded version of Table 
7 .2, and ultimately to the final two Thematic ideas for the Root Definitions as shown in Table 7.4 
below. Tracing this data from the original participant interview information, can be achieved by 
starting in the top left corner with the two themes that fit the Clients CATWOE elements are "US 
Government" in light purple and "All Others". Data can then be traced to the copy of Table 7.2 
in the top right category, and while the US Government theme was most often cited. Likewise, it 
can be noticed that the other CATWOE elements are also well represented as shown in the 
bottom left corner of Table 7.4, from the interviewee's responses. Finally the two final key 
inputs are represented in the oval (s) at the bottom of the chart as shown below, which will 
eventually be utilised, later in this chapter to develop the final Root Definitions. This 
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methodology will be followed for the other five CATWOE elements to ensure that all data is 
tracked accordingly. 
Clients 
Cl Foreign Audiences 
C2 Key decision makers 
''foreign and domestic) 
CJ US Citizens (general 
loublic) 
C4 US Govemment including 
military 
CS Academia (foreign and 
domestic) 
C6 Media including 
Hollvwood 
Table 7.4 - Tracing of Client CATWOE Data from Interviews to Root Definitions 
7.2.2 Actors 
As mentioned previously, the process of parsing the data and then tracing the elements 
was continued for all five remaining CATWOE elements, with analysis on the Actors data 
conducted next. As shown in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 in Chapter Six, the data for each of the 15 
categories are shown below in Table 7.5. These 15 responses match to six different themes ofiO 
Personnel (Purple), Integration ofiO Organizations (Light Blue), IO Training (Yellow) or the 
lack thereof, Tactical IO vs. Strategic IO (Dark Blue), IO Decision Making (Medium Blue) and 
the Structure ofiO (Dark Green). A key idea that emerged for the Actor CA TWOE element 
included the need for better integration across the interagency spectrum. This concept shows up 
in numerous locations and discussions with the participants, and was cited throughout the 
interviews as shown in Table 7 .2. Training or the lack thereof was also crucial and will be cited 
186 
over and over throughout the analysis ofthe data, with vi1tually all of the thesis respondents in 
one f01m or the other, mentioning the need for more training and education in the IO realm. 
Actors 
Al Media/Hollywood- reservists or liasion 
[personnel needed? 
A2 Planners and operators need to work t ogether 
A3 TRG and consultants- volunteers aka like 
civil defense? 
A4 How many actors have been trained in IO? 
AS Standalone IO cells - worked well? 
A6 Old USIA types/ State Depattment, are they 
integrated? 
A7 DoS PCC and NSC PCC - no decision 
making authority 
A8 4th POG - too tactical to low on CoC 
A9 International IO Operators - corporate IO 
AlO Clearances and language ski lls are essential 
All NSC OGC and WH/DoD - relate to a 
National Infotmation Council? 
A12 Inf01mation Czar? What about an 10 Corps 
or a CinC 10/Standing JHQ? 
A13 Do we need a surge capability? 
Al4 Senior level USG trainjng & awareness is 
needed 
AlS Alistair Camp bell or Karen Huges type of 
influence is desired 
Table 7.5- Tracing of Actor CATWOE Data from Interviews to Root Defmitions 
What is interesting from the analysis of these 15 CATWOE elements is the diverse 
spread of data and themes, with six different thematic ideas noted. In tracing the data from the 
participants as shown below in Table 7.5, once the results were reordered as in Table 7.1 in the 
top right corner of the diagram, it would appear that the need for better integration and IQ 
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training were the most important aspects to apply to the Actor elements. However, when on 
further examination of the participant data, the differences between Tactical versus Strategic IO 
and IO Personnel issues, also rose in prominence, as shown in the ovals in the left lower corner 
ofTable 7.5. Thus, based on the tracing ofthe data from the original participants, tailoring it and 
then analysing the information, it became clear that the two aforementioned categories of IO 
. Personnel as well as Tactical versus Strategic were better suited to be used to develop "Actor" 
portion of the draft Root Definitions. However that being stated, the other four themes were 
. noted as well, and were. all eventually utilised as part of the development of Root Definitions for. 
other CATWOE 9ategories. 
7.2.3 Transformation 
Likewise for the Transformation CATWOE elements, the same methodology from 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 from Chapter Six were used, which shows that the need for overall goals and 
more training are the two key areas that can do the most to change the way in which Information 
Operations is conducted across the United States government. The analysis of the 
Transformation category was an interesting portion of the CATWOE elements, because the fact 
that three areas, namely the "Need for overall goals" or top-down guidance, "IO Integration,; and 
the fact that "IO is not a New" were cited frequently as shown in Table 7.6, but they were not the 
CATWOE element that received the most citations. 
The diversity of the 13 different Transformation data points was also very interesting. 
Six different CATWOE elements were noted to include IO Integration (Light Blue), IO is not 
New (Light Green), IO Personnel (Purple), IO Training (Yellow), IO Goals (Gold) and IO Policy 
(Gray). Similar themes were echoed in all of these interviewee comments with the training and 
integration of IO personnel with top-down goals in coherent organizational structures as clear 
desires for many thesis participants. Half of the six responses alluded to this theme, with some 
form of citation alluding to the need for greater training of the Information Operations personnel. 
Over and over again, examples were given by the research participants of untrained staff 
conducting operations and missions without truly understanding what they were supposed to be 
doing. However, on further analysis it was not only training that was needed as the most 
important Transformational element but a combination of integration and overall goals that arose 
from the tracing of the data as shown in Table 7.6 below. Consistently in the top right hand 
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comer of this diagram, the Light Blue (Integration) and Gold (Overall goals) colours were noted 
over and over in the CATWOE category. Therefore for the de~elopment of the draft Root 
Definition for Transformation, the two themes that will be utilised include "Overall Goals" and 
"IO Integration", while the other four noted will be used elsewhere in the CATWOE analysis. 
T1 
T2 
T3 
T4 
TS 
T6 
T7 
TS 
T9 
TlO 
Tll 
T 12 
T13 
Transformation 
Strategic Information Campaign, ie 
strategic PSYOP, integrating 
strategy which is coherent is very 
imoortant 
Innovation.occurs at the margins 
Flatten the process - integrate -
dynamic 
Structure is bad - disorganized 
Hiring practives for military 
civi lians dates from industrial era 
We need continuous training and 
education 
Effects based operations (EBO) 
!Target analysis 
IORM - major recommendations for 
training 
Acccess to top leadership - overall 
guidance 
What are the overall goals? 
Set out top-level nodes and missions 
- goals and objectives 
C_yber Security and PD related? 
Table 7.6 - Tracing of Transformation CATWOE Data from Interviews to Root 
Definitions 
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7.2.4 Weltanschauung 
As noted in Chapter Six, the weltanschauung among the interviewees was nearly 
universal in their need for a greater understanding of IO policy and the broader themes inherent 
in this area. This focus was brought out in the data from Tables 6.12 and 6.13 from Chapter Six, 
which drove the analysis to broader issues of the understanding of these Information Operations 
policy and themes as final Root Definition concepts. This emphasis can be seen in the statistics 
in Table 7.7, where the most often cited view is that IO is not understood by most practitioners 
who are often equated to a training issue. A significant gap exists between this.issue and the 
second rated citation (IO Policy) of the CATWOE elements which only received a third or less 
input from the participants. This disparate weltanshauung is also reflected in the four different 
thematic areas - IO Integration, IO Training, IO Policy and Overall Goals that were all cited by 
the participants. 
From this analysis, it would appear that the need for greater IO training (yellow) is the 
highest need, with a coherent national policy on Information Operations (gray) as another clear 
answer fi·om the participants. In particular, these two issues were emphasised over and over in 
the interviews as an item that needed to be applied across. the interagency spectrum. Likewise 
the need for coherent and consistent IO themes (gold) that are developed and coordinated at the 
interagency level were cited as well with the need for greater integration as well (light blue). 
However when the final tracing of the data in Table 7.7, it becomes apparent that IO policy and 
IO training were the key world view elements of importance to the participants of this study, as 
shown below. 
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World View 
Wl Political, military, USG, engineers, 
IR professors 
W2 Many practioniers do not understand 
10 
W3 IORM almost reverting back to C2W 
-whv? 
W4 Is their difference between IO and 
PD lane? 
ws Do we need a National Information 
Policv? 
W6 Or should we just update the NSS? 
Table 7.7- Tracing of Weltanschauung CATWOE Data from Interviews to Root 
Definitions 
7.2.5 Owners 
The data for the owners as shown in Tables 6.15 and 6.16 are very different than the 
other CATWOE elements as it showed a very tight spectmm (except for one outlier) ofthe 
number of citations by the participants. In this category, five discreet themes emerged including 
10 Structure (dark green), Integration (light blue), and the differences between Tactical versus 
Strategic (dark blue), IO Training (yellow) and 10 Decision Making (medium blue). While the 
.· 
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individual inf01mation is discreet, when analysed at a higher level, the overall themes can be 
reduced to broader concepts of ensuring that the proper decision - making authority is available 
within the con·ect organizational structure. 
Owners 
01 Interagency to include the Dos, DoD, 
NSC and WH - need more coord? 
02 Two PCCs are redundant 
03 Is their trust in the PM efforts of these 
organizations? USIA? 
04 In the OSD, oversight of 10 is 
everywhere 
os How many of the above have been 
trained in IO? 
06 DoD is building PD capabili ty because 
it believes State is not doing enough 
07 WH is good at political domestic 
message and spin but often reacts to 
foreign events 
08 Need to quickly get decisions on PD 
from on high 
09 State needs a bigger role- bring back 
Table 7.8 - Tracing of Owners CATWOE Data from Interviews to Root Definitions 
These key themes are reflected above in Diagram 7.8, and as the final versions of the Owners 
CA TWOE elements. In addition, as noted earlier, one of the key ideas to emerge from the 
analysis of the Owners CATWOE elements was a consensus among the thesis participants that 
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Decision Making was a key capability for the Owners. The need for more and better organized 
structure to conduct Information Operations was also readily apparent to these participants. 
Cited in five CATWOE element areas and across four of the six categories, this lack of 
coordinated structure was very apparent to the interviewees. This analysis can be traced in Table 
7.8 below, where these two issues are noted in each of the upper two boxes and then in the 
bottom left diagram. 
7.2.6 Environment 
The sixth area for CATWOE analysis was the environment. As shown in both Tables 
6.18 and 6.19 there was a real dichotomy among the data points. Previous categories such as 
decision making (medium blue), organizational structure (dark green) were mentioned as well as 
training (yellow), with seven different thematic elements cited overall as part of this research. 
Thus from further analysis, the overarching areas of tying together IO themes at the interagency 
level to be more reactive, in an environment that is not new, were developed from the data 
received from the thesis participants. These were the two key areas or issues that encompassed 
the majority of the participants input toward the overall environment of how IO is conducted by 
the United States government. The need for coherent Information Operations themes is also 
readily apparent, with multiple citations across the CATWOE categories. Likewise the fact that 
IO is not a new phenomenon was also a key thematic issue. Both of these ideas can be traced as 
part of the participant data in Table 7.9 below, overall analysis shows that the interviewees were 
consistent in how many different ways or methods that they discussed these two key issues. For 
example the need for IO Themes alluded to·five different times in CATWOE elements E2, E3, 
E9, E12 and E14. Likewise as mentioned earlier in Chapter One, a number of thesis participants 
also reiterated that Information Operations was not a new concept, but instead one that was 
finally being recognised through the improvement in technology to be able to reach its true 
potential, and this theme was noted three times as well in El, E4 and ElO. 
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, 
Environment 
El Time is cmcial, computers have 
increased change but products should 
be checked 
E2 Key US values - freedom, Dol, 
Constitution, a nation of immigrants 
E3 Information is like ten·ain, cannot 
leave unoccupied 
E4 Money and resources drive 
capabilities 
ES US DOS IIP has no directive voice for 
IPD - spread PD officers everywhere? 
E6 Jnteragency bureaucracies- will org 
change work? 
E7 Need a 2417 capability? Modeled on 2 
campaign headquarters? Around the 
world (USIUK/AU) ie follow the sun 
ES US PD must be faster, more reactive 
E9 Tmth is essential but being first is 
better 
ElO ro is not new 
Ell IW and Psyop are not good terms for 
interagency, 10 and se are much 
better but EBO may be the best? 
E12 Eat your own dog food (US) 
E13 Training or lack of is badly needed for 
PD 
E14 Themes need to be tied together 
ElS Top to bottom or bottom to top? 
E16 What are we trying to protect? 
Table 7.9- Tracing of Environment CATWOE Data from Interviews to Root Definitions 
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In summary, all of the 63 CATWOE elements were eventually utilised in the Root 
Definitions, as patt of the tailored 12 thematic issues described above. This is because the 
information data was parsed and mapped together in one chart that lays out the selected final 
versions of the CATWOE elements as shown in Diagram 7.3. Also as was noted earlier, there 
are overlaps and redundancy in certain areas such as the lack of training and the need to 
coordinate themes were cited multiple times, in multiple categories, by a large number of 
interviewees. But overall, the research indicated a relative large scale of coherence to the data 
obtained from the thesis patticipants. Therefore in this next section, the final two Root 
Defmitions will be developed, with detailed explanations. This is done using all63 CATWOE 
elements, reduced to 12 thematic ideas, whose goal is to build the Root Definitions and then the 
Conceptual Models in Chapter Eight. 
7.3 Final Root Definitions 
Much of the SSM literature and research indicates that there is a practicality to the 
realistic number of Root Definitions that can or should be utilised in any particular academic 
eff011. In most cases, 2-3 is the recommended limit to adequately model the altematives to the 
appropriate decision-maker. Thus to reduce the 63 CATWOE elements into the 12 
aforementioned themes, the patticipant data was analysed in detail and aggregated into broader 
categories, from which ultimately two distinct and different final Root Definitions emerged at the 
end of this chapter. When these 12 thematic ideas are reananged per their respective CATWOE 
elements, a new diagram is produced as shown in Table 7 .10 below. It is from thjs chart, that the 
draft Root definitions were developed as patt of an initial cut of the top six CATWOE elements, 
from which a series of coherent final Root Definitions are drafted as shown below. 
Table 7.10- Thematic Ideas arranged per CATWOE Elements 
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The same format will be followed for each of the draft Root definitions, with each of the 
CATWOE elements utilized as part of an attempt to develop a coherent statement of the data 
derived from the interviewees. 
The first final Root Definition is shown: below: 
Information Operations in the United States government needs to be differentiated between the 
tactical and strategic operations by key decision makers of the United States government for 
better integration and more IO training across the interagency spectrum, in an understanding 
that IO is not a new phenomenon. 
System 
Client 
Actors 
Transformation 
Worldview 
Owners 
Environment 
Information Operations in the United States government 
United States government · 
Tactical versus Strategic 
Better Integration 
More IQ Training 
Key decision makers 
IQ is not new 
The second final Root Definition is shown below: 
Information Operations in the United States government needs personnel and a better 
organizational infrastructure, to reach overall IO goals, focused at coordinated themes towards 
its targeted audience with coherent IO policy. 
System 
Client 
Actors 
Transformation 
Worldview 
Owners 
Environment 
Information Operations in the United States government 
All Others 
Personnel 
Overall Goals 
IQ Policy 
Better IQ structure needed 
IO Themes 
7.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the raw data from the CATWOE elements were reduced to key thematic 
issues which were used to develop a set of Root Definitions. As was demonstrated in this 
section, the evolution of these two final Root Definitions, can be traced directly back to the raw 
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data from the participant's interviews. This information was collated and tabulated, and then 
based on the interviewees' responses, the 63 CATWOE elements were tailored to a number (12) 
of thematic issues that were cited by the interviewees themselves. All data points were included 
in these thematic issues that were chosen by the participants, so in essence all participants' 
weltanschauung were included to ensure completeness with regard to the operation of IO within 
the United States government. Once these results were analysed and duplicates eliminated, 
further aggregation and collation resulted in the formation of two distinct and different Root 
Definitions as shown above. It will be these established parameters that will then be used in 
Chapter Eight to articulate a set Conceptual Models for this issue area. 
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Chapter 8 - Conceptual Models 
In Chapter Five under Research Methods, the preferred methodology of Soft Systems 
was outlined for the reader see Figure 5.1, which brought together the combination of Root 
Definitions and Conceptual Models that were considered the key to this process. ''The Root 
Definition defines what the system is and the Conceptual Model describes what the system must 
do" (Wilson, 2001, p. xv). This is because, it is in these two steps of SSM, where the thesis 
participants are able to debate the given situation, in this case the status ofiO in the United 
States government, with the vital exchanges occurring through the use of these Conceptual 
Models. For example, Checkland cited these models as "intellectual devices", whose role is to 
help structure an exploration of the problem situation being addressed (Checkland and Scholes, 
1999, p. A21). These academics do this in order to seek changes which would improve the 
situation by moving from the systems thinking view of Conceptual Models to the real-world, 
where comparisons can be made. Likewise Jackson states that the use of SSM will lead to the 
construction of a number of models to be compared with the real world, as opposed to one that 
would result from the use of a hard methodology (Jackson, 2000, p.247). It is these changes to 
the models which are typically regarded as both desirable and culturally feasible, with 
accommodations made between conflicting interests, which makes the SSM process so useful in 
the final actions to improve the problem situation, with a positive effect as shown in Figure 8.1 
below. 
8.1 The SSM Process in Use 
The initial theoretical frameworks that are used at the beginning of this process are 
defined as high-level task models and are derived solely from the ideal Root Definitions. 
Normally developed from the interview process, these Conceptual Models represent processes or 
methods of achieving a goal as defined in Chapter Five (Appendix E). To show the 
conceptualisation of this methodology, in Chapter Seven, two Root Definitions were developed 
from the interview data using the CATWOE elements and thematic areas. In this Chapter, two 
primary Conceptual Models and 12 sub Conceptual Models (for a total of 14 in all), were 
developed from the data gathered in the initial set of interviews. As noted earlier, Conceptual 
Models are not describing reality, but instead, they should describe what the system 'does'. This 
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is seen in the use of main models and subsidiary figures to 'broaden' the data, which in essence 
'fleshed' out the ideas from the interviewees with six subsets for each Conceptual Model, all of 
which was original information in the CATWOE elements. The goal of each model was 
therefore to trace the 'ideas' and 'concepts' of the thesis participants from the Rich Pictures and 
Root Definitions of SSM, to ultimately develop figures or diagrams that would help to build 
examples or prototypes to in theory, answer the original research questions. 
8.2 
The situation as 
a Culture 
Analysis of the 
Intervention 
"Social System" 
Analysis 
STREAM OF 
CULTURAL 
ANALYSIS 
Would-be improvers 
of the problem 
situation History 
0 
0 
0 
sttuatiQM 
D 
D 
0 
D1lferWicaa batwalen models 
and,.world 
L~SlREAM 
OF ANALYSIS 
Figure 8.1 -The Process of SSM (Checldand and Scholes, 1990) 
The Development of Conceptual Models 
In the next two sections, a total of two major and 12 minor Conceptual Models were 
developed from the Root Definitions and the data gathered in the initial set of interviews. A 
process to show how these models were developed in shown in Figure 8.2, and this methodology 
was carried throughout this Chapter for all 14 models. From a macro level view, these 
Conceptual Models are generally divided into two broad categ01ies- the first seven are more of 
a top down, centralised process, while the second seven are more of a bottom up, or 
decentralised version of the actions required to conduct IO across the United States government. 
The input for these models came from the thesis interviews, as they desctibed processes and 
methodologies desired to better accomplish this mission within the federal bureaucracy. In each 
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instance, a master model was developed - for example Conceptual Mode (CM) 1.0 (Table 8.3) 
and CM 2.0 in Table 8. 11. From these overarching themes, sub-models were constructed for 
each of the six individual tasks, which matched to the respective CA TWOE Elements via the 
Root Definitions, as shown for the first model in Tables 8.4 through 8.1 0, and the second model 
in Tables 8.12 through 8.1 8. The colour coded scheme developed in Chapters Six and Seven is 
also carried throughout this section as well to denote the respective CATWOE Categories and 
main areas of focus. 
Given: A Definition ofT, multiple "E 's", CATWOE and Root Definition 
(1) Using verbs in the imperative, write down activities necessary to carry out T 
(2) Select activities wblch could be done at once (ie not dependent on others) 
(3) Write these out on a line, then those dependents 
on these first activities on a line below, 
until all activities are accounted for 
- indicate the dependencies 
(4) Redraw to avoid overlapping arrows 
where possible and add monitoting I control 
Figure 8.2 -A Logical Process for Building CM's (Checkland and Scholes, 1999) 
8.2.1 Conceptual Modcll.O 
The relationship of the Conceptual Models to the Root Definitions will also be described 
in this chapter. In essence, the two main Conceptual Models milTor their respective Root 
Definitions and are diametrically opposite of each other. In this first master model, Conceptual 
Model 1.0, IQ in the United States govemment - A Top Down (Centralised) View as shown in 
Figure 8.3, is derived from the first Root Definition and interview data, where an enterptise wide 
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construct emerged with centralised authority to coordinate and conductIO campaigns utilising a 
number of federal agencies and capabilities in a timed and orchestrated manner. It is symbolised 
by the use of strategic goals, coordinating systems, 'that determine requirements early in the 
process, and then measure the effects afterwards are symptomatic of an overarching program. 
Many participants advocated a single interagency organisation with the authority and financial 
backing to execute these actions for the United States govemment. These interviewees believed 
that in order to get the best effect from IO, these disparate actions needed to be cenn:aUy 
managed and ~oordinated across functional agencies, to give a single coherent message to the 
world. 
CM 1.3 ·Investigate 
needs of 
CM 1.2- Set up 
coordinating systems 
between WH, DoS and DoD 
Goals: 
Develops a 
coordinated and 
integrated strategic 
USG 10 campaign 
1 
Information Operations in the United States government is derived from the perspective 
of the overall 10 themes to produce better integration implemented and run by tactical 
versus strategic 10 personnel for the benefit of the USG and under the control of key 
decision makers within the constraints of the fact that 10 is not a new warfare area. 
Weltanschauung 10 Themes 
Owners 
Environment 
Table 8.1 - Conceptual Modell.O 10 in the United States government: A Top Down 
(Centralised) View 
The key to understanding this first master Conceptual Model is to view the expressed 
opinion of the interviewees for a centralised, controlled and coordinated system. These 
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partic-ipants modelled a desire where key decision makers in the United States government were 
able through increased integration to execute 10 campaigns on a systemic and sustainable basis. 
They believed that if the cotTect governing structures were put into place that success could be 
achieved in the operation ofiO across the interagency structure. This can be seen in the actual 
CATWOE elements and categories that are matched up to the original data cells to develop 
specific Conceptual Models in which all info1mation from the research participants is coded to 
not only the final models but also the earlier Root Definitions. In this way, the data can be traced 
directly from a specific interviewee to a final Conceptual Model. An example for Conceptual 
Model 1.0 is shown below: 
- -- - .... - -..,....~ 
. - . 
Data Cells CM 
C4 1.4 
..,c .. a.-.te~o-... ___ El 
Clients 
t 
Actors . :- -:l AS, AS, A12 1.1 
Transformation Better Inte atlon of 10 actions Tl, T3 1.2 
Worldview 10 Tbemes W3, W4 1.5 
Owners Ke Decision Makers 01, 02, 06, 09 1.3 
El, E4, ElO 1.6 
Table 8.2 - The Relationship of Root Definition 1.0 to Conceptual Model 1.0 
Overall strategic goals, using integrated policies, training and coordinated systems was 
also considered key to this approach. This hierarchical view is seen in the next six tables, where 
Conceptual Models 1.1 -1.6 are examined, with further details provided about how these tactical 
actions could be undertaken in a centralised fashion, as shown where the following concepts 
were key: 
• CM l. l 
• CM 1.2 
• CM 1.3 
• CM 1.4 
• CM 1.5 
• CM 1.6 
Tactical versus Strategic 
Coordinating systems between WH, DoS and DoD 
Investigate needs of stakeholders 
Set up an 1nteragency IO campaign bureaucracy 
Execute IO Campaigns 
Measure 10 Campaign's success 
Moving on to Conceptual Model 1.1 (Figure 8.3), the focus is on the development of a 
series of strategic vice tactical goals for an enterprise-wide system for the conduct of IO in the 
United States government. From a top-down v-iew of the participants, the fo1mulation of a set of 
overarching themes or issues was often considered the most crucial step in this project, and this 
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attitude is reflected in the development of this conceptual model. Reviewing the interviewee 
data, a number of discrete tasks were listed below, that even further emphasise the need to focus 
on the strategic vice tactical element of implementing IO. These include: 
• Analyse government agencies plans with respect to IO 
• Develop similar type of IO plans and goals in each United States government agency 
• Develop a centralised series of committees and groups to monitor and adjust plans as 
needed 
• Ensure sh·ategic goals match interagency IO plans 
• Ensure that these IO plans are synchronised across the organizations 
• Match agency plans to sh·ategic IO goals for United States government 
Ensure strategic 
goals match 
interagency 10 plans 
Analyse agencies 
plans wrt 10 
Develop similar 
type of 10 plans 
and goals in each 
USG agency 
Develop a centralised series 
of committees and groups to 
monitor and adjust plans as 
needed 
~--, 
Ensure that these 10 plans 
are synchronised across the 
organisations 
Match agency plans 
to strategic 10 goals 
for USG 
Goals: 
Ensures a top-down, 
centrally executed plan 
that is integrated across 
the USG 
Monitoring 
system needs 
links through-out 
interagency 
Figure 8.3- Conceptual Modell.l: Tactical vs. Strategic Goals for United States 
government IO Systems 
By doing this, the ability to meet the primary goal of ensuring a top-down, centrally executed 
plan that is integrated across the United States government that targets an improved 
understanding of objectives by the key decision-makers. It was emphasised by the participants 
that a monitoring system was needed who contained links through-out the interagency system in 
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order to ensure the enterprise wide view of these goals. This is seen primarily in the major 
CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of Tactical versus Strategic, as part 
of the Actor CATWOE Category: 
• A5 Standalone IO cells - worked well? 
• A8 4th POG - too tactical , to low on Chain of Command 
• A12 Information Czar? What about an IO Corps or a Commander in Chief 
IO/Standing Joint Force Headquarters 
In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout 
the data, that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was tactically oi· 
sh·ategically miented. 
• 04 
• E15 
In the Office of Secretary of Defense, oversight of IO is everywhere 
Top to bottom or bottom to top? . 
Better Integration of 10 Actions 
Develop a coherent and 
integrate<! set of coordinating 
systems between all three 
organisations 
Ensure coordinating 
systems utilise similar 
standards 
Operations 
should be 24/7-
constant and 
continuous 
Need buy-in, resources and 
commitment from top 
leadership 
Utilise same SW and 
HW to communicate, 
operate and plan 
Systems should 
provide metrics 
for analysis 
Goals: 
Real-time integrated 10 
systems that are 
coordinated both 
vertically and horizontally 
across the interagency 
Targets: 
Instill a belief in 
effectiveness of USG 
10 plans, systems and 
operations 
Monitoring 
system that can 
transfer data 
seamlessly across 
all levels of USG 
Figure 8.4- Conceptual Model1.2: Coordinating systems between White House, 
Department of State and Department of Defense 
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In the next sub-model, a centralised coordinating system was deemed necessary as the 
second component of a top-down model. This interlacing of the three key Information 
Operations components - namely the White House, the State Department and the Department of 
Defense was seen as crucial by the participants of this thesis. They believed and stated on 
numerous occasions that in order to effectively conduct an IO campaign, that the integration of 
these three agencies, using similar themes, ideas, methods, etc, were all crucial to the overall 
success. This need to develop this centralised coordinating system was a key issue for many 
interviewees, as shown in the f)Ub-model tasks, as shown below: 
• Ensure coordinating systems utilise similar standards 
• Operations should be 24/7 constant and continuous 
• Need buy-in, resources and commitment from top leadership 
• Develop a coherent and integrated set of coordinating systems between all three 
organisations 
• Utilise same software and hardware to communicate, operate and plan 
• Systems should provide metrics for analysis 
These tasks equate quite well to the overall goal of a standardised and real-time integrated IO 
systems that are coordinated both vertically and horizontally across the interagency agencies. 
This theme was stated a number of times in the interviews, as they targeted the need to instil a 
belief in effectiveness of United States government IO plans, systems and operations. This 
desire for an overarching system was also expressed in the need for a monitoring system that can 
transfer data seamlessly across all levels of the federal agencies. This is seen primarily in the 
major CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of Better Integration ofiO 
Actions as part of the Transformation CATWOE Category: 
• Tl 
• T3 
• T4 
Strategic Campaign, that is, strategic psychological operations I IO, integrating 
coherent strategy - important 
Flatten the process - integrate - dynamic 
Integrate top-level nodes and missions- goals and objectives 
In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout 
the data, which also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented toward 
the integration of IO activities: 
• A2 
• A6 
Planners and operators need to work together 
Old United States Information Agency types/ State Department, are they 
integrated? 
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• All National Security Council Office Global Communications and White House I 
Department ofDefense- relate to a National Intelligence Council? 
• Wl Political, military, United States governments, engineers, intemational relations 
professors 
• 03 Is their trust in the perception management effmis of these organizations? United 
States Information Agency? 
Key Decision Makers 
Ensure that key USG 
agencies understand 
users needs and desires 
Define key decision 
· makers in the USG 
Develop system to 
understand 
stake holders 
needs and desires 
Develop overall guidance 
for key USG organisations 
Measure the 
needs of 
stakeholders 
Execute system on a 
consistent and 
repeatable basis 
Goals: 
Ensure Stakeholders 
needs are met 
Targets: 
Users defined as USG 
personnel and key 
decision makers 
Monitoring system 
feedback through 
interagency 
bureaucracy 
Figure 8.5- Conceptual Model1.3: Investigate Needs of Stakeholders 
As pa1i of the development of a series of goals and overarching systems for the execution 
of IO within the United States govemment, there is a need as expressed by the data of this thesis 
that the needs of the stakeholders must be researched and analysed. This was amplified in the 
third sub-model as shown above. Key themes that emerge from the information provided in this 
study include the belief that a deep and thorough understanding of the desires of these key 
decision-makers will be the fundamental concepts in the proper development of a centralised 
top-down system, as shown below: 
• Define key decision makers in the United States government 
• Develop system to understand stakeholders needs and desires 
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• Develop overall guidance for key United States government organisations 
• Ensure that key United States government agencies understand users needs and desires 
• Execute system on a consistent and repeatable basis 
• Measure the needs of stakeholders 
These tasks are desired to ensure that the stakeholders needs are met, which meant for many 
interviewees that the system users were defined as United States government personnel and key 
decision makers. A desirable feature of this monitoring of stakeholders was a monitoring system 
that produced feedback through interagency bureaucracy to ensure that the stakeholder's needs 
were met. This is seen primarily in the major CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this. 
sub-model of Key Decision Makers from the Owners CATWOE Category: 
• 07 
• 08 
White House - good political domestic message and spin -reacts to foreign events 
Need to quickly get decisions on public diplomacy from on high 
In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout 
the data, that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented to 
understand the importance of key decision makers in this process: 
• A7 Department of State Political Coordinating Committee and the National Security 
Council Political Coordinating Committee - no deCision making authority · 
• Al5 Alistair Campbell or Karen Hughes type of influence is desired 
• E5 Information Warfare- Psychological Operations not good terms for interagency, 
IO, Strategic Communications and effects based operations- better? 
• E8 United States public diplomacy must be faster, more reactive 
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L ... ' . _.,-_ ·---: . - . 
- - --· . - --- .,.. ....._ .. -~ 
is consistent, to execute a 
top-down system 
Ensure adequate training of 
personnel across USG to 
man this bureaucracy 
Develop consistent 10 
policy across the USG 
organisations 
Develop 10 
planning 
system for all 
of the USG 
Execute sirategic 
10 plans from 
~-~, single system 
Use 10 standards 
recognised across 
USG 
Goals: 
Ensure all USG personnel 
are well trained and know 
the policy and system 
developed to conduct 
strategic 10. 
key agencies plus 
other key USG 
decision makers 
Monitoring 
system uses 
recognised 10 
standards and 
systems 
Figure 8.6- Conceptual Model1.4: Set up an Interagency 10 Campaign Bureaucracy 
As part of top-down view of many of the thesis participants, an interagency bureaucracy 
was desir~d to organise and execute this enterprise-wide IO campaign. It was the opinion of 
these interviewees, that only a centrally coordinated office could be effective in conducting these 
tasks across the disparate federal offices and agencies. These beliefs from the personnel 
involved in the study led as shown in this fourth sub-model of Conceptual Model # 1, was a series 
of overarching tasks, that all strive to develop coherent and consistent actions by the United 
States government, with regard to the conduct of IO, as shown below: 
• Develop consistent IO policy across the United States govemment organisations 
• Develop IO planning system for all of the United States government 
• Ensure adequate training of personnel across United States government to man this 
bureaucracy 
• Ensure that IO architecture is consistent, to execute a top-down system 
• Execute strategic IO plans from single system 
• Use IO standards recognised across United States govemment 
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The obvious overall goal of these effmis was to ensure all United States government personnel 
involved with the conduct of strategic level IO missions were well trained, lmew the current 
policy as well as system parameters. Central to this centralised execution was coherent support 
by the staffs of the three key agencies plus other key United States government decision makers, 
who utilised a monitoring system comprised of recognised IO standards. This is seen primarily 
in the major CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of the United States 
government personnel as part of the Client CATWOE Category: 
• C4 US Government including miUtary 
Execute standard 10 
plans and operations 
24/7 across the USG 
Ensure compatibility of Incorporate 10 into 
IIOThemes I 
Ensure USG bureaucracy is 
capable of executing 10 
plans and operations 
interagency 10 DoD, NSC and DoS's, 
Execute 10 
campaigns 24/7 
around the world 
processes normal operational 
capability 
Develop feedback 
mechanisms for 10 
campaigns 
Goals: 
A well-run and timely 
series of 10 
campaigns 
Targets: Key decision 
makers and 
audiences in USG 
Monitoring 
system through 
USG sources 
Figure 8.7- Conceptual Modell.S: Execute 10 Campaigns 
From this overarching IO bureaucracy, many interviewees felt that they could execute 
well-organised and successful Information Operations campaigns, on a world-wide basis. The 
participants desired to deconflict the missions between federal agencies, in order to bring about 
to the greatest extent the power of information in this new era, where IO was seen as a new tool 
for conducting foreign policy. This vision of the power available and the ability to harness, all 
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depended in these interviewees minds on the coherent and coordinated use of Information 
Operation campaigns by the United· States government as shown below: 
• Ensure compatibility of interagency IO processes 
• Incorporate IO into Department ofDefense, National Security Council and the State 
Department's normal operational capability 
• Ensure United States government bureaucracy is capable of executing IO plans and 
operations . . . 
• · Execute standard IO plans and operations 24/7 across the United States government 
• Execute IO campaigns 24/7 around the world 
• Develop feedback mechanisms for IO campaigns · 
This ability to conduct well-run and timely series of IO campaigns was of course dependent on 
key decision makers and audiences in federal bureaucracy agreeing with these concepts and 
understanding the need for this enterprise-wide system. In order to be successful, this 
bureaucracy should have tight links into existing organizations, with a monitoring system that 
utilised normal government metrics and processes. This is seen primarily in the major 
CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model ofiO Themes aspart of the 
Weltanschauung CATWOE Category: 
• W3 
• W4 
IO Road Map almost reverting back to Command and Control Warfare- why? 
Is their difference between IO and public diplomacy lane? 
In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout 
the data that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented to 
understand IO Themes: 
• E9 Eat your own dog food (United States) 
• E12 Key United States values- freedom, Declaration oflndependence, a land of 
immigrants Constitution 
• E14 Information is like terrain, cannot leave unoccupied 
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A comprehensive and 
integrated set of 
measures of evaluate an 
10 Campaign 
Develop metrics 
that can utilised 
across USG 
Utilise global edia 
and ·usG to measure 
10 plans and 
strategy 
Ensure 10 standards, policies 
and procedures are developed 
and adhered to by the three 
key USG agencies 
Develop standard 
methodology to measure 
success of an 10 
campaign 
Incorporate 10 training, resources, 
planning and operations into one set 
of metrics for USG 
Goals: 
Match strategic 10 
plans to resources 
and capabilities 
Targets: 
Key USG decision 
makers and 
organisations 
Figure 8.8- Conceptual Model1.6: Measure 10 Campaign's Success 
The ability to measure and validate success is always a crucial metric in the performance 
of a task, and in this case the conduct of IO campaigns is no different. The participants who 
advocated this top-down approach also believed in a strong feedback mechanism, one that 
enabled them to learn lessons from their actions and to apply changes to the system as deemed 
appropriate. This methodology is shown in the last sub-model of Conceptual Model One, where 
a standardised process for measuring success is advocated for development as shown here: 
• Develop metrics that can be utilised across United States government 
• Utilise global media and United States government to measure IO plans and strategy 
• Ensure IO standards, policies and procedures are developed and adhered to by the three 
key United States government agencies 
• A comprehensive and integrated set of measures of evaluate an IO Campaign 
• Develop standard methodology to measure success of an IO campaign 
• Incorporate IO training, resources, planning and operations into one set of metrics for 
United States government 
This need for reliable metrics equates for the need in the minds of the thesis interviewees to 
match the strategic IO plans to the actual resources and capabilities of the federal government, 
_. 
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based on the desires of the key United States government decision makers and organizations. On 
multiple occasions, the need for a comprehensive monitoring system using feedback from a 
multitude of sources was mentioned as a desirable trait for the future developments of IO by the 
United States. This is seen primarily in the major CATWOE elements which were emphasised 
in this sub-model of the fact that IO is not a New Warfare Area as part of the Environment 
CATWOE Category:. 
• E 1 Time is crucial, computers have increased change 
• E4 Money and resources drive capabilities 
• E10 IO is not new 
In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout 
the data, that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented to the fact 
that IO is not a New Warfare Area: 
• T2 
• T7 
• TS 
. 8.2.2 
Innovation occurs at the margins 
Effects based operations 
Target analysis 
Conceptual Model 2.0 
Ifthe first Conceptual Model is more of a top-down or enterprise-wide view ofhow IO 
should be conducted in the United States, then the second Conceptual Model was radically 
different .:tnd was developed from comments made by many of participants, who advocated a 
much more unstructured or bottom-up approach. This attitude advocated a less cumbersome or a 
more market-based structure, one that was less controlled, but more open to interpretation, to 
give the system more flexibility in today's globalised world. Consistent in the comments from 
these interviews, was the belief that all information could not be controlled, and that a flattened 
set of interrelated groups, processes, policies and standards was a better method of trying to 
conduct IO in a disorganized environment. 
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CM 2.1 -Accept any and all CM 2.2-UUIIIIe• _.. 
10 actions conducted for the ~~--• variety of 10 tfalnlng 
United States government courses and Instruction Goals: 
CM 2.3 - Develop an 
10 policy broad 
enough to encompass 
all key US values 
CM 2.4 - Develop a 
decentralised 
communications and 
networking procedures 
to facilitate 10 
CM 2.5 - Provide 
Conduct 10 in a 
decentralised 
Information Operations in the United States government from the perspective of the 
development of 10 Policy to produce overall 10 goals implemented and run by 10 
Personnel for the benefit of all other personnel that are affected by 10 under the need for 
a better 10 structure within the constraints of the overall 10 training available. 
Weltanschauung 10 Policy 
Owners 10 Structure 
Envi ronment 10 Training 
Figure 8.9 - Conceptual Model2.0: 10 in the United States Government, a Bottom 
up View 
It can be noticed in this second Conceptual Model, a more decentralised approach to the 
coordinating of IO tasks and missions was utilised. Likewise Conceptual Model 2.0 and its 
subordinates were derived from the second Root Definition and the following CA TWOE 
elements as shown below and in Figure 8.11. Once again, attempts were made to be able to trace 
the data directly from a specific interviewee to a final Conceptual Model. An example for 
Conceptual Model 2.0 is shown below: 
• CM 2.1 
• CM 2.2 
• CM 2.3 
• CM 2.4 
• CM 2.5 
Accept any and all IO goals conducted for the United States government 
Develop a decentralised communications and networking procedures 
utilizing IO personnel to execute and facilitate IO activity 
Utilise a wide variety of IO training courses and instruction 
Develop an IO policy and strategy broad enough to encompass all key 
United States values 
Provide resources and adequate funding by using all other personnel to 
foster innovation in IO 
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• CM2.6 Develop a set of IO standards and structures that can be understood and 
utilised by all organisations 
Category Element Data Cells CM 
Clients All Others Cl, C2, C3, CS, C6 2.5 
Actors Al, A3, A9, AlO 2.6 
Transformation Ove rail Goals TlO, Tll, T12 2.1 
Worldview 10 Policy W5, W6 2.4 
Owners 10 Structure 01, 02, 06, 09 2.2 
Environment 10 Training E2, E3, E13 2.3 
Table 8.3 - A Comparison of Conceptual Model 2.0 to Root Definition 2.0 
This lack of centralisation or perhaps the input of more realism in the understanding of 
how the federal bureaucracy actually operates, is also evident in the six sub-models of 
Conceptual Model2.0 that follow. Instead of tr-ying to direct or coordinate IO tasks in an 
overarching or coherent manner, the patticipants noted in their comments that the United States 
should simply accept and take in, any IO missions conducted, whether these operations are pa1t 
of a campaign or not. · This is a fairly radical idea and extremely opposite of what was proposed 
by the advocates of Conceptual Model 1.0, but perhaps it also is more fiscally and politically 
acceptable. Therefore in the next six tables, this flattened or open view will be examined, with 
further details provided about how these tactical actions could be undertaken in a decentralised 
fashion. 
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Develop strategic 
goals from the 10 
actions conducted w/1 
the United States 
10 Goals 
Develop a decentralised 
accounting mechanism 
such as a portal, where 10 
activities can be reported 
Goals: 
Attempts to tie together 
in a bottom-up fashion 
the plethora of 10 
activities conducted by 
the United States 
Targets: Use opinion polls to determine US 
strategic goals 
Compare 10 
actions to long-
standing cultural 
va lues of US 
Utilise polls and reports from 
the media to undestand 
--~, impact of 10 activities A large variety of foreign 
and domestic populations 
Utilise academics and media 
to analyse effectiveness of 10 
campaigns wrt to targets Monitoring 
system is simply 
done by self 
reporting and the 
media 
7 
Figure 8.10 - Conceptual Mode12.1: Accept any and all 10 actions conducted for the 
United States government 
In this patticulat figure, the focus is on the use of any and all IO actions to develop a 
series of goals for a system that simply tries accept the disparate conduct of IO in the United 
States government. As to be expected, the f01mulation of a set of themes or issues based on a 
number of organizations and agencies that are not coordinating will be difficult at best, but in 
reality, it may offer an alternative view to a way ahead based on all participants' 
weltanschauung. The particular tasks are laid out in no pa1ticular priority by the interviewees: 
• Use opinion polls to dete1mine United States strategic goals 
• Compare IO actions to long-standing cultural values of United States 
• Develop a decentralised accounting mechanism such as a portal, where IO activities can 
be reported 
• Develop strategic goals from the IO actions conducted w/I the United States 
• Utilis'e polls and reports from the media to understand impact of IO activities 
• Utilise academics and media to analyse effectiveness of IO campaigns with regard to 
targets 
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As opposed to a centrally organised system, this approach attempts to tie together in a bottom-up 
fashion, the plethora of IO activities conducted by the United States. It does this by targeting a 
large variety of foreign and domestic populations, with a monitoring system is simply done by 
self reporting and the media. This lack of an overarching methodology or process, was 
mentioned by many as simply a realistic review of the current conditions that exist in today's 
federal bureaucracy. This is seen primarily in the major CATWOE elements that were 
emphasised in this sub-model of IO Goals as part of the Transformation CATWOE Category: 
• Tl 0 Access to top leadership - overall guidance 
• Tll What are the overall goals? 
• T12 Set out top-level nodes and missions - goals and objectives 
Develop a network bridge 
or portal that can accept a 
variety of communications 
systems and networks 
common standards 
110 Structure 
Attempt to foster a common 
set of procedures for 
reporting 10 activities 
Utilise compatible SW 
and HW to communicate, 
1---~, operate and plan 
Systems should 
provide metrics 
for analysis 
Goals: 
Real-time integrated 10 
systems that are 
coord inated both 
Monitoring 
system that can 
transfer data 
seamlessly across 
all organisations 
Figure 8.1- Conceptual Model2.2: Develop a Decentralised Communications and 
Networking Procedures to Execute and Facilitate 10 Activity 
In the next sub-model, a decentralised coordinating system was advocated for the 
communications and networking procedures to execute and facilitate IO activity. This lack of 
key or essential government organisation components was not deemed as crucial by the 
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participants of this thesis. Theybelieved and stated on numerous occasions that in order to 
effectively conduct an 10 campaign, that it was more important to have all participants involved, 
whether or not they utilised similar themes, ideas, methods, etc. Many thesis participants did not 
believe that that was needed to develop a centralised coordinating system, because other 
processes were instead available, as shown below: 
• . Advocate similar and common standards 
• Pursue a common commercial off the shelf functionality of systems for all 
• Attempt to foster a common set of procedures for reporting 10 activities 
• Develop a network bridge or portal that can accept a variety of communications systems 
and networks 
• Utilise compatible software and hardware to communicate, operate and plan 
• Systems should provide metrics for analysis 
These interviewees felt that real-time integrated 10 systems that are coordinated both vertically 
and horizontally across the interagency could be achieved by instilling an overall belief of the 
accuracy of the data no matter what the source. Coherence could be achieved by the transfer of 
data seamlessly across all organizations, due to the use of common standards. This is seen 
primarily in the major CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of 
as part of the Owners CATWOE Category: 
• 01 
• 02 
• 06 
• 09 
Interagency to include the Department of State, Department ofDefense, National 
Security Council and White House- need more coordination? 
Two Policy Coordinating Committees are redundant 
Department of Defense is building public diplomacy capability because it believes 
State is not doing enough 
State needs a bigger role - bring back 
In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout 
the data that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented to 10 
Structure themes: 
• Al3 
• E6 
• E7 
• E15 
Do we need a surge capability? 
Interagency bureaucracies - will org change work? 
24/7 capability? Model campaign headquarters? Around the world 
Top to bottom or bottom to top? 
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Attempt to develop an 
understanding of the 
many different users 
needs and desires 
Analyse strategic goals Develop a blended 
of different groups method of 10 instruction 
that utilises a number of 
academic techniques 
10 Training 
Develop tests to track level 
and competence of 10 users 
Ensure training 
is available in a 
number of 
·different venues 
Develop feedback 
mechanisms to 
evaluate training 
Goals: 
Ensure users training 
needs are met 
Targets: 
Users who need to 
conduct 10 activities 
Figure 8.12- Conceptual Model2.3: Utilise a Wide Variety of 10 Training Courses and 
· Instruction 
Training and execution are considered by all participants to be key to the execution of IO 
within the United States government, but in this sub-model, the participants that provided data 
expressed the belief that in order to be successful, a wide variety of IO courses and methods of 
instruction must be utilized. These interviewees felt construct a coherent series of overarching 
curricula could not be constructed and instead, the federal bureaucracy should instead allow 
courses to exist as they are today. Downsides to this approach include duplication, lack of 
standardisation and gaps in certain skill sets. However this group of IO experts also believed 
that realistically, this may be the only viable alternative due to costs and political considerations. 
The specific taskers needed for this rationalisation from the research participants are shown 
below: 
• Analyse strategic goals of different groups 
• Develop a blended method of IO instruction that utilises a number of academic 
techniques 
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• Develop tests to track level and competence of IO users 
• Attempt to develop an understanding of the many different users needs and desires 
• Ensure training is available in a number of different venues 
• Develop feedback mechanisms to evaluate training 
Realism about overall goals to ensure that users training needs are met, by existing courses and 
curricula were key themes by the interviewees. This sub-model targets the users who needed to 
conduct IO activities, with a monitoring system that utilised a bottom up feedback through the 
students themselves as well anecdotal evidence. This is seen primarily in the major CATWOE 
. . 
elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of IO Training as part of the Environment 
CATWOE Category: 
• E2 Key United States values - freedom, Declaration of Independence, a land of 
immigrants, Constitution 
Ell E3 Information is like terrain, cannot leave unoccupied 
o E 13 Training or lack of is badly needed for public diplomacy 
In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout 
the data that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented to IO 
Training themes: 
o A4 
o A14 
• T6 
o T9. 
• W2 
Ell 05 
How many actors have been trained in IO? 
Senior level United States government training & awareness is needed 
We need continuous training and education 
IO Road Map- major recommendations for training 
Many practitioners do not understand IO 
How many of the above have been trained in IO? 
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l1o Policy I 
Develop an 10 architecture 
broad enough to cover all 
US strategic goals 
Make training 
opportunities 
available to all 
10 users 
Tie together disparate 
10 strategies and policy 
with doctrine that 
stresses key US values 
Ensure that these 
broad themes are 
promulgated to all 
10 users 
Develop good horizontal 
1---~~ communications among 
key 10 policy makers 
Enlist the academic 
community to 
evaluate 10 efforts 
wrt key US values 
Goals: 
Develop 10 policies, 
strategies and doctrine 
and can encompass all 
key US values and 10 
activities 
Monitoring 
system using 
polls, surveys, the 
media and 
academic reports 
Figure 8.13 -Conceptual Model2.4: Develop an 10 Policy and Strategy Broad Enough to 
Encompass all Key United States Values 
Unlike in the first Conceptual Model, where you saw descriptions of the need for a series 
of overarching and comprehensive set ofiOpolicies, which describe how this mission area 
would be conducted across the federal government, this next sub-model follows a different 
approach. While many of the participants agreed that in theory, this would be good, many 
understood as well that the chance of getting this accomplished was slim. Instead some of the 
interviewees believed that instead to be successful, the practitioners of 10 should just develop an 
10 strategy that was broad enough to accomplish all key United States objectives. To do this, the 
10 policies in use should be incorporated into a broader plan, with the following features: 
• Tie together disparate 10 strategies and policy with doctrine that stresses key United 
States values 
o Ensure that these broad themes are promulgated to all 10 users 
• Make training opportunities available to all 10 users 
• Develop an 10 architecture broad enough to cover all United States strategic goals 
• Develop good horizontal communications among key 10 policy makers 
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0 Enlist the academic community to evaluate IO efforts with respect to key United States 
values 
This approach to developing IO strategies and doctrine, is an alternative methodology from the 
typical process, and in doing so, the key focus is to utilise current policies that can encompass all 
key United States values and IO activities. The thesis participants were targeting foreign and 
domestic populations with these IO strategies, and felt that a monitoring system based on polls, 
surveys, the media and academic reports, would sufficient in this process. This is seen primarily 
in the major CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of 
the Weltanschauung CA TWOE Category: 
0 W5 
o W6 
Do we need a National Information Policy? 
Or should we just update the National Security Strategy? 
-~as part of 
In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout 
the data that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented to IO Policy 
themes: 
o T13 
o Ell 
Cyber Security and public diplomacy related? 
Information Warfare- psychological operations not good terms for interagency, 
IO, strategic communications and effects based operations- better? 
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Develop a high level of 
understanding in the 
US of the value of 10 
All Others 
Promulgate a series of 
articles and reports of 
how the art of warfare 
has changed 
Survey US population 
towards attitudes on 
10 and key values 
Foster a spirit of 
cooperation toward 
the funding of 10 
activities in the US 
Develop reporting and 
accounting mechanisms 
to keep track of 
disparate 10 activities Targets: Groups and 
organisations that 
fund 10 activities 
Develop a set of 
goals that the 
various 10 activities 
can strive for 
Monitoring 
system common 
databases and 
reports 
Figure 8.14 - Conceptual Model 2.5: Provide Resources and Adequate Funding to Foster 
Innovation in 10 
Instead of a set of centralised funding, in this alternative model, the participants 
advocated cooperative and innovative methods of resourcing the conduct of IO by the federal 
government. The interviewees did not feel that IO could cortunand the large budget or 
discretionary spending of say a major weapons system and instead suggested the fostering of 
·collaborative efforts to ensure that these programs would get the money that they needed to 
conduct their mission. This was done by the following means: 
• Survey key portions of the United States population (that is, personnel and staff that are 
familiar with these concepts or deal with these issues) towards attitudes on IO and key 
values 
• Foster a spirit of cooperation toward the funding ofiO activities in the United States 
• Promulgate a series of articles and reports of how the art of warfare has changed 
• Develop a high level of understanding in the United States of the value of IO 
• Develop reporting and accounting mechanisms to keep track of disparate IO activities 
• Develop a set of goals that the various IO activities can strive for 
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The major goal of this sub-model was to ensure that the respective IO activities in the federal 
government were resourced adequately, especially targeting the groups and organisations that 
conduct IO activities. This was done by utilising a set of common databases and repmis as a 
standard monitoring system. This is seen primarily in the major CATWOE elements that were 
emphasised in this sub-model of All Other Personnel as part of the Client CATWOE Category: 
• Cl 
• C2 
.. C3 
• C5 
• C6 
Foreign Audiences 
Key decision makers (foreign and domestic) . 
United States Citizens (general public) . 
Academia (foreign and domestic) 
Media including Hollywood 
standards that can be 
utilised by all 10 activities 
Attempt to link 10 standards to 
policy, doctrine and strategy 
used by the various la 
activities in the US 
Determine if there 
are metrjcs that can 
be utilised by all 
organisations 
Utilise global media 
and academia to 
measure 10 plans 
and strategy 
Strive to integrate the 
disparate methodologies for 
10 organisations through 
common processes 
Analyse 10 training and 10 
standards for commonality 
Goals: 
Commonality among 
10 groups towards 
standards that are 
utilised 
Monitoring system 
a decentralised that 
colates standards, 
policy, training and 
10 activities 
Figure 8.15 - Conceptual Model 2.6: Develop a set of 10 standards that can be understood 
and utilised by all organisations 
As was also mentioned in sub-model 1.6, the ability to measure and validate success was 
considered a crucial metric in the performance of an IO task. While many participants advocated 
a top-down approach with a strong internal feedback mechanism, other interviewees instead 
223 
advocated a more decentralised methodology, which embraced any and all IO standards. This 
bottom-up view utilises a more liberal process for collecting metrics that attempts to bring 
together disparate activities into a collective force. To do this, data obtained as part of this 
research project, was sorted in the following manner: 
• Determine if there are metrics that can be utilised by all organisations 
• Utilise global media and academia to measure IO plans and strategy 
• Attempt to link IO standards to policy, doctrine and strategy used by the various Io 
activities in the United States 
• A comprehensive and decentralised set of standards that can be utilised by all IO 
activities 
• Strive to integrate the disparate methodologies for IO organisations through common 
processes 
• Analyse IO training and IO standard~ for commonality 
The goal of this effort was to support commonality among IO groups towards a series of 
standards to be utilised, by disparate IO organizations, to create a coherent but decentralised 
monitoring system that collates standards, policy, training and IO activities. This is seen 
primarily in the major CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of IO 
Personnel as part of the Actor CATWOE Category: 
• Al 
• A3 
• A9 
• AlO 
Media/Hollywood - reservists or liaison personnel needed? 
The Rendon Group and consultants - volunteers aka like civil defense? 
International IO - that is, corporate IO? 
Clearances and language skills are essential 
In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout 
the data that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system is oriented to IO 
Personnel themes: 
• TS Hiring practices for military civilians dated - industrial era 
8.3 Analysis of the Conceptual Models 
Outlined below again are the specific Conceptual Models, sub-models and an analysis of 
the validity of these representation's based on the reality of the development of IO across the 
United States government. In general, the first set of models, numbered 1.1 through 1.6 are more 
of the top-down, enterprise-wide view, while the latter set, numbered 2.1 through 2.6, tend to 
contain more of a bottom-up weltanshauung or worldview. A colour code will be used to show 
how these conceptual ideas relate to the actual conduct ofiO, for each of the 12 sub-Conceptual 
224 
Models'. Blue is considered exceptional and greatly above the standard, where the interviewees 
believed that the United States government was making great progress in improving the conduct 
of IO across the federal bureaucracy. Green is considered a little above average, while Yellow is 
slightly below average and Red is poor in overall performance. This schema will be used 
throughout this chapter to analyse the overall conduct of this warfare area as related by the 
participants themselves in both the original interviews and the follow-up sessions. 
8.3.1 Analysis of Conceptual Modell.l -Tactical vs. Strategic Goals for USG 10 
Systems 
This model is centred on the CATWOE Actor element, data cells A5, A8, A12, 04 and 
E15, while focusing on the differences between Tactical vs. Strategic Concepts as discussed in 
Chapter Eight. Key points from that section included: 
• CM 1.1.1 
• CM 1.1.2 
• CM 1.1.3 
• CM 1.1.4 
• CM 1.1.5 
• CM 1.1.6 
Analyse government agencies plans with respect to IO 
Develop similar type of IO plans and goals in each United States 
government agency 
Develop a centralised series of committees and groups to monitor, and 
adjust plans as needed 
Ensure strategic goals match interagency IO plans 
Ensure that these IO plans are synchronised across the organizations 
Match agency plans to strategic IO goals for United States government 
If the information brought forth in this research project is then dissected further, it can be seen 
that significant progress has been achieved in the development of a series of national goals and 
standards. The sheer breadth of national policies with their interlocking strategies can be 
epitomised by the IO Road Map and the new Joint Publication 3-13, both of which were released 
in 2003. Major efforts have also been conducted to analyse these new policies to ensure that 
they allowed for the ability to synchronise the actions and activities of these interagency units to 
better conductIO. An example of this development of new IO training and planning courses can 
be seen at the National Defense University and the Joint Forces Staff College. Other examples 
of this enterprise-wide effort for the United States government can be seen in the promulgation 
of new instructions such as the Department ofDefense Instruction 8570.1 which mandates the 
training and education of the Information Assurance workforce, including the enforcement of 
certifications, as an obvious reference to the understanding of the importance of standards. 
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While there has been progress, in many ways, much work still needs to be done in this 
specific CATWOE element. The early belief that these IO plans would be centralised, with 
federated and matching goals is still not a realised goal. Feedback from the separate verification 
and validation effmts reveal that more attention needs to be paid to matching the goals, from 
agency to agency, in both the vertical and horizontal planes. In addition, the diverse plans that 
are still originating across the Depa11ment of Defense and federal agencies have yet to embrace 
common standards for the conduct ofiO, all of which point to the need to continue efforts in this 
multifaceted warfare area. A nascent effort to start an IO Standards Working Group is 
underway, but still needs time and funding to succeed. 
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual 
issues of CM 1.1 .1 through CM 1.1 .6, to the re~lity of IO in use today by the United States 
govemment. 
Table 8.4- Analysing Effectiveness of CM 1.1 
These rankings came from a valiety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In 
pa11icular it was noted that while good work has been conducted on analysing and developing IO 
plans across the federal agencies, that the ability to match strategic goals to these plans is poor. 
Overall it still appears that many of the govemment organisations are still operating in a vacuum, 
and not integrating well across both the tactical and strategic IO areas. 
8.3.2 Conceptual Model 1.2 - Coordinating systems between White House, 
Department of State and the Department of Defense 
This model is centred on the CATWOE Transformation element, data cells Tl, T3, T4, 
A2, A6, All, Wl and 03 which focused on the differences between Better Integration of IO 
Actions as discussed in Chapter Eight. Key points from that section included: 
• CM 1.2.1 
• CM 1.2.2 
• CM 1.2.3 
• CM 1.2.4 
• CM 1.2.5 
• CM 1.2.6 
Ensure coordinating systems utilise similar standards 
Operations should be 24/7 - constant and continuous 
Need buy-in, resources and commitment from top leadership 
Develop a coherent and integrated set of coordinating systems between all 
three organisations 
Utilise same software and hardware to communicate, operate and plan 
Systems should provide metrics for analysis 
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This is an area that has not progressed as far as the development of new IO policy in the United 
States government. The lack of acknowledged enterprise-wide standards, requirements and 
mandates has hindered the development of dedicated hardware or software for coordinating 
systems to conduct 10. This was evidently apparent in the disparate IO organisations, which to 
date, have not required similar arcbitectures, definitions or rule sets. This lack of a coherent or 
integrated set of coordinating systems, that utilise similar software or hardware to implement IO 
was exceedingly obvious not only from the interviews, but in the review of changes in the 
federal bureaucracy. Overall it was evident by the information gathered from the thesis 
participants, that need for more and better integration ofiO systems was needed by the United 
States government. 
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when compa1ing the conceptual 
issues of CM 1.2.1 through CM 1.2.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States 
government. 
l t.2.t ! 1.2.2 !1.2.3 1.2.4 l • !' i 1.2.6 
Table 8.5- Analysing Effectiveness of CM 1.2 
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In 
particular it was noted that while good work has been achieved in conducting 2417 operations 
and getting top leadership buy-in required to ensure success. Less optimal was the use of the 
same or compatible hardware and software to communicate across the federal bureaucracy. 
Overall it still appears that many of the government organisations are not coordinating as well as 
desired and that not only is technology hindering progress, the lack of enterprise wide standards 
and systems are need to ensure better integration across these key agencies. 
8.3.3 Conceptual Model1.3- Investigate Needs of Stakeholders 
This model is centred on the CATWOE Owners element, data cells 07, 08, A7, Al5, E5, 
and E8 which focused on the differences between Key-Decision Mak~rs as discussed in Chapter 
Eight. Key points from that section included: 
• CM 1.3.1 
• CM 1.3.2 
• CM 1.3.3 
• CM 1.3.4 
Define key decision makers in the United States government 
Develop system to understand stakeholders needs and desires 
Develop overall guidance for key United States government organisations 
Ensure that key United States government agencies understand users 
needs and desires 
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• CM 1.3.5 
• CM 1.3.6 
Execute system on a consistent and repeatable basis 
Measure the needs of stakeholders 
This was an interesting process to investigate. It was obvious from the discussions involved in 
this project, that the needs of the stakeholders were key elements to the ultimate success ofthis 
effort. Tied into the need for more IO training, the lack of coherent policy, the need for more 
and better integration, are all crucial to achieving success for IO in the United States 
govemment. Many of the participants in this project, asked almost wistfully at times, for the key 
decision-makers in certain bureaucratic organisations such as the Depmtment ofDefense, State 
and the National Security Council to work together, to develop an enterprise-wide set of 
requirements. In this case, these needs would in the interviewees opinions, very similar and this 
would add incentives to collaborate across these disparate groups. 
Unf01tunately, data and anecdotal evidence point to little to no sharing of IO 
requirements across these key decision-makers or shareholders. The sheer breadth of disparate 
policy, instructions, mandates and inshuctions, leads instead to a situation in which each · 
organization is operating in a vertical vacuum without the horizontal integration desired by the 
pa1ticipants of this thesis. Much of this dichotomy is the result of the short te1ms of govemment 
appointee's, the need to abide by different agency dynamics, and the lack of an over-riding need 
to work together at a higher level. 
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when compa1ing the conceptual 
issues of CM 1.3 .1 through CM 1.3 .6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States 
government. 
Table 8.6 - Analysing Effectiveness of CM 1.3 
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In 
particular it was noted that great progress in defining the key decision-makers in the federal 
bureaucracy with regard to IO. Likewise, good progress was being made on developing 
stakeholder's needs and desires, as well as passing this guidance down through the chain of 
command. However, more development was desired to meet the needs ofboth the users and 
stakeholders on a consistent and standardized basis. Overall it still appears that that there is a 
significant gap around the power and capabilities inherent with regard to IO in the key decision 
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makers understanding what IQ can and cannot accomplish with regard to their agencies and 
personnel. 
8.3.4 Conceptual Model1.4 - Set up an Interagency 10 Campaign Bureaucracy 
This model is centred on the CA TWQE Clients element, data cell C4 which focused on 
the differences between US Government Clients as discussed in Chapter Eight. Key points· from 
that section included: 
411 CM 1.4.1 
411 CM 1.4.2 
• CM 1.4.3 
• CM 1.4.4 
411 CM 1.4.5 
• CM 1.4.6 
Develop consistent IQ policy across the United States government 
organisations 
Develop IQ planning system for all of the United States government 
Ensure adequate training of personnel across United States government to 
man this bureaucracy 
Ensure that IQ architecture is consistent, to execute a top-down system 
Execute strategic IQ plans from single system 
Use IQ standards recognised across United States government 
The security constraints of major portions ofiQ, especially in the computer network defense and 
cyber security arena, tend to lead to an environment, where the majority of the key personnel, 
from an American viewpoint, tend to reside in United States government organisations or 
agencies. Whether they are military, civil service or Department ofDefense contractors, these 
people all represent the federal bureaucracy to some extent, and thus characterise a major portion 
of the clients that actually 'utilise' IQ as a routine part of their operational capability. 
What this view of course doesn't represent, is the incredible explosion in commercial and 
industry capabilities with regard to the growth of computer, information technology, video and 
bandwidth rates available to the average citizen around the world. The real key to IQ is that it 
has transformed warfare and taken the power away from the sovereign nations and instead 
pushed it down and out to the people. This is the revolutionary aspect ofiQ, because it allows 
anyone to mount an IQ campaign, in essence bypassing the traditional centres of power which 
include military, diplomatic and economic. Instead, the ability to conduct an information-based 
campaign, from an individual's house or business has drastically altered the environment of the 
21st century, which is only being recognized now. That is the weakness of this CATWQE 
element, because it does not allow for the power of the individual. 
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Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when compa1ing the conceptual 
issues of CM 1.4.1 through CM 1.4.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States 
government. 
Table 8. 7 - Analysing Effectiveness of CM 1.4 
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In 
particular it was noted that while good work has been conducted on developing consistent IO 
policy and IO planning systems, with adequate training of personnel across United States 
government, there was very little progress on use of an enterprise-wide set of IO standards. 
Overall it still appears that the desire to set up an interagency IO campaign bureaucracy is still 
too optimistic and it will take more time for the US govemment clients to achieve this goal. 
8.3.5 Conceptual Model1.5 - Execute 10 Campaigns 
This model is centred on the CATWOE Weltanschauung element, data cells W3, W4, E9, 
E12 and E14 which focused on the differences in IO Themes as discussed in Chapter Eight. Key 
points from that sec.tion included: 
• CM 1.5.1 
• CM 1.5.2 
• CM 1.5.3 
• CM 1.5.4 
• CM 1.5.5 
• CM 1.5.6 
Ensure compatibility of interagency IO processes 
Incorporate IO into Depa1tment ofDefense, National SecUlity Council and 
DoS's, normal operational capability · 
Ensure United States government bureaucracy is capable of executing IO 
plans and operations 
Execute standard IO plans and operations 24/7 across the United States 
government 
Execute IO campaigns 24/7 around the world 
Develop feedback mechanisms for IO campaigns 
The successful execution ofiO campaigns was a core component of many interviewees' world 
view or weltanschauung. The ability to integrate and operate across bureaucratic boundaries in a 
seamless manner, to conduct worldwide IO campaigns, in a 24/7 manner was considered 
essential. Policy enforcement, the utilization of enterprise-wide standards and adequate feedback 
mechanisms were considered key to the conduct of these missions. Time· after time, in interview 
after interview, it became apparent that the desires of the thesis pa1ticipants did not match with 
the reality of how the United States govemment conducted IO campaigns. Disjointed tasks, 
overlapping requirements and priorities, the lack of synchronisation and coordination of the 
230 
disparate federal bureaucracies was instead very evident not only from the interviewees, but as 
well from a review of updates to IO policy and organization changes that have occurred over the 
last few years. Many reasons exist for this, but the lack of compelling reasons to cooperate, 
whether fiscal, political or operational, are probably the major reason that the conduct of IO 
campaigns has not been as successful as desired. 
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual 
issues of CM 1.5.1 through CM 1.5.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States 
govermp_ent. 
Table 8.8 - Analysing Effectiveness of CM 1.5 
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In 
particular it was noted the great progress in conducting IO operations 24 I 7 around the world, as 
well as steady improvement in the ability to incorporate IO into Department ofDefense, National 
Security Council and Depattment of State, normal operational capability, as well to ensure 
United States government bureaucracy is capable of executing IO plans and operations on a daily 
basis. However it still appears that the use of consistent and overarching IO Themes when 
conducting IO campaigns needs more effort. 
8.3.6 Conceptual Model1.6- Measure 10 Campaign' s Success 
This model is centred on the CATWOE Environment element, data cells El, E4, E10, T2, 
T7 and T8 which focused on the fact that IO is not a New Warfare Area as discussed in Chapter 
Eight. Key points from that section included: 
• CM 1.6.1 
• CM 1.6.2 
• CM 1.6.3 
• CM 1.6.4 
• CM 1.6.5 
• CM 1.6.6 
Develop metrics that can be utilised across United States government 
Utilise global media and United States govemment to measure IO plans 
and strategy 
Ensure IO standards, policies and procedures are developed and adhered 
to by the three key United States government agencies 
A comprehensive and integrated set of measures of evaluate an IO 
Campaign 
Develop standard methodology to measure success of an IO campaign 
Incorporate IO training, resources, planning and operations into one set of 
metrics for United States govemment 
The key to understanding this conceptual model is to truly understand that because IO is in fact 
not a new warfare area, but instead a combination of ancient and recent technologies and warfare 
,· _ 
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concepts, that in order to measure the success of an IO campaign, that a variety of methods and 
measures must be used. This particular process centres around the top down process, in which 
standardised policies, metrics, methodologies, tr·aining and education are all focused on 
determining the success or failure of an IO operation or mission. 
These stated desires are unfortunately not being implemented across the United States 
govemment for a va1iety of reasons. The lack of adequate fiscal assets is a major factor, but 
organization ineliia, . disinterested leadership, competing operational issues, infighting and the 
general inability to achieve the overwhelming acceptance of this requirement. As noted by the 
pa1iicipants, while the desire for an overall enterprise-wide IO capability in the federal 
bureaucracy is sh·ong, the lack of coherent set ofmehics, plans, sh·ategy, standards, policies, 
procedures, methodologies, h·aining and educat~on courses, all lead to a disorganised and an un-
coordinated function. In addition, even more tr·oublesome for IO is that because it is comp1ised 
of multiple, often disparate warfare areas such as Electronic Warfare, Psychological Operations, 
Deception, etc, which are sometimes not necessalily viewed as cooperative operational areas. 
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual 
issues of CM 1.6.1 through CM 1.6.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States 
govemment. 
Table 8.9 - Analysing Effectiveness of CM 1.6 
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In 
pmiicular it was noted that while good work has been conducted on developing metlics that can · 
utilised across United States government, as well as utilizing global media and United States 
government to measure IO plans and strategy, there was still a severe lack of a comprehensive 
and integrated set of measures of evaluate an IO Campaign. This inability to have the power to 
measure an IO campaign's success, combined with the fact that IO is not a new warfare area, and 
that these issues should have already been addressed, highlights even more, the current 
deficiencies with respect to the conduct of IO within the United States government. 
8.3.7 Conceptual Model2.1- Accept any and all 10 actions conducted for the 
United States government 
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This model is centred on the CATWOE Transfmmation element, data cells T10, T11 and 
T12 which focused on the differences between IO Goals of the federal bureaucracy as discussed 
in this chapter. Key points from that section included: 
• CM 2.1.1 
• CM 2.1.2 
• CM 2.1.3 
• . CM 2.1.4 
• CM 2.1.5 
• CM 2.1.6 
Use opinion polls to determine United States strategic goals 
Compare IO actions to long-standing cultural values of United States 
Develop a decentralised accounting mechanism such as a pmtal, where IO 
activities can be reported 
Develop strategic goals from the IO actions conducted within the United 
States 
Utilise polls and reports from the media to understand impact of IO 
activities 
Utilise academics and media to analyse effectiveness of IO campaigns 
with respect to targets 
This second set of Conceptual Models (2.1-2.6) were based on the interviewees, who felt that 
while an overarching federal capability to conductIO was desired, in reality, the only way to 
truly conduct this warfare area, was to do so on a dishibuted, and decentralized manner. This 
approach was seen in this sub-model, in which any and all IO actions that are accept~d, as pati of 
the development of goals in the federal bureaucracy. 
Key to this bottom-up methodology was the realization that control all aspects of a set of 
disparate organisations such as the White House, the State Department as well as the Depattment 
of Defense cannot be controlled. The thesis participants who advocated this methodology felt 
that the reliance on a wide-flung net of reports, polls, and other informational elements was the 
best strategy, and perhaps only mechanism for detetmining the effectiveness of an IO campaign. 
Part of this may have been cynicism on their pati, a realisation that the federal bureaucracy 
would not at this time, consh·uct a comprehensive and elaborate global reporting shucture to 
measure IO goals as desired to be most effective. Over and over, in comments as part of the 
interviews, ideas were mentioned, that a more loose and collaborative environment was needed 
to foster the patticipatory need of these different agencies and their respective needs. 
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below, when comparing the conceptual 
issues of CM 2.1.1 through CM 2.1.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States 
government. 
Table 8.10- Analysing Effectiveness of CM 2.1 
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These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thes~s participants. In 
particular it was noted that very good results were obtained from the use of opinion polls to 
determine US strategic goals, and this helped to compare IO actions to long-standing American 
cultural values, but the other areas in this issue area were all lacking solid improvement. In 
particular, the inability to link these goals to IO actions, via the media or academia was of 
concern. Overall it was felt from the participants of this project that the attainment ofiO goals 
was still in need of more and dedicated support, especially while trying to accept any and all 
actions as part of a broader IO effort in the United States. 
8.3.8 Conceptual Model2.2 - Develop a Decentralised Communications and 
·Networking Procedures to Execute and Facilitate 10 Activity 
This model is centred on the CATWOE Owners element, data cells 01, 02, 06, 09, 
A13, E6, E7 and El5 which focused on the differences in the IO Structure of the United States 
government as discussed in Chapter Eight. Key points from that section included: 
• CM2.2.1 
• CM2.2.2 
• CM2.2.3 
• CM2.2.4 
• CM2.2.5 
• CM2.2.6 
Advocate similar and common standards 
Pursue a common Commercial off the Shelf functionality of systems for 
all 
Attempt to foster a common set of procedures for reporting IO activities 
Develop a network bridge or portal that can accept a variety of 
communications systems and networks 
Utilise compatible software and hardware to communicate, operate and 
plan 
Systems should provide metrics for analysis 
This Conceptual Model follows a similar theme as part of a bottom-up approach to conducting 
IO in support of the United States government. The advocates who believed in these CATWOE 
elements, acknowledged that overarching communications and network systems while nice to 
have, would probably not berealised due to a variety of reasons and instead relied on a 
patchwork of existing platforms. 
Key to this methodology is the belief that a set of common or central standards, 
procedures and metrics can overcome the use of disparate hardware and software for an 
enterprise structure. It was understood by many participants that this method was not perhaps 
optimal to manage the conduct ofiO operations by the federal bureaucracy, but most of these 
interviewees with this weltanschauung, also expressed the opinion, that it may in fact be the only 
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choice. Resistance to a comprehensive anangement, whether organisational or fiscal, has to 
date, not allowed the development of a common IO network or an extensive communications 
system, thereby forcing participants to rely on the existing mechanisms that exist today. Thus, it 
was agreed by many of the thesis interviewees, that the current shucture ofiO within the United 
States government, while flawed and not perfect, was probably the best composition and 
configuration that they could expect at this time to conduct IO types of missions. 
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual 
issues of CM 2.2.1 through CM 2.2.6, to the real.ity of IO in use today by the United States 
government. 
Table 8.11 -Analysing Effectiveness of CM 2.2 
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In 
particular it was noted that the adoption and pursuit of common standards, systems and 
procedures was ongoing and improving, but the development of hardware, software, networks 
and systems to support the use ofbetter IO structures is still needed. Overall this sub-conceptual 
model was seen as simply average among the 12 different views, which is interesting, because 
the IO Shucture area of the CATWOE elements was cited many times (eight different data cells) 
and was considered important to the interviewees. The lack of significant improvement in this 
area is often athi.buted to the lack of a coherent focus by the federal bureaucracy on improving 
IO communications and network systems across the United States government as part of an 
enterprise or umbrella IO shucture. 
8.3.9 Conceptual Model2.3- Utilise a Wide Variety ofiO Training Courses and 
Instruction 
This model is centred on the CATWOE Environment element, data cells E2, E3, E13, 
A4, A14, T6, T9, W2 and 05 which focused on the need for integrated IO Training as discussed 
in Chapter Eight. Key points from that section included: 
• CM 2.3.1 
• CM2.3.2 
• CM 2.3.3 
• CM 2.3.4 
Anaiyse strategic goals of different groups 
Develop a blended method of IO inshuction that utilises a number of 
academic techniques 
Develop tests to track level and competence of IO users 
Attempt to develop an understanding of the many different users needs 
and desires 
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• CM 2.3.5 
• CM 2.3.6 
Ensure training is available in a number of different venues 
Develop feedback mechanisms to evaluate training 
The development of comprehensive and integrated training was mentioned and alluded to by 
many of the thesis patticipants. While a top-down approach was advocated in Conceptual Model 
One, a number of interviewees also advocated a more federated arrangement that understood the 
disparate needs of the different agencies and organisations. For example, it is commonly cited 
that in the United States Depattment ofDefense, there are over 70 different training courses that 
touch on some portion ofiO. Cries for consolidation and amalgamation of the cunicula have 
been heard, but also generally ignored because of competing requirements and mandates by the 
respective diverse groups. 
It was generally agreed by the interviewees that all IO training could help to improve the 
conduct of this warfare area for the federal bureaucracy and that the development of new and 
better themes would result, as more of the respective key government decision-makers 
understood IO better, due to more and diverse IO cunicula. Thus while the interviewees agreed 
that an integrated and coordinated approach to total IO training would have been nice, in reality, 
. . 
these personnel also understood that competing and often conflicting directives, will often not 
allow for a total merger of these disparate classes. A consensus among a number of these 
research pmticipants was that the development of broad standards, metrics, tests and processes to 
measure and track IO training and education, that is feasible and could accomplish many of the 
same goals as a more direct enterprise-wide, mandated cuniculum. 
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual 
issues of CM 2.3 .1 through CM 2.3 .6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States 
government. 
Table 8.12 - Analysing Effectiveness of CM 2.3 
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In 
particular it was noted as a good point that a large number of oppmtunities to participate in IO 
training are available, that these classes took into account many different strategic goals, with a 
blended method of instruction utilising a number of academic techniques. However progress 
was still needed to insure that these instructional techniques were relevant and complete to meet 
the needs of the IO users. The most often cited way to do this was through the use of feedback 
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mechanisms that better understand the different user's requirements with regard to IO Training 
in the United States government. 
8.3.10 Conceptual Model 2.4 - Develop an 10 Policy and Strategy Broad Enough to 
Encompass all Key United States Values 
This model is centred on the CATWOE Weltanschaaung element, data cells W5, W6, 
T13 and Ell which focused on the differences between 
Chapter Eight. Key points from that section included: 
concepts as discussed in 
Et CM 2.4.1 
Et CM 2.4.2 
Et CM 2.4.3 
Et CM2.4.4 
• CM2.4.5 
• CM2.4.6 
Tie together disparate IO strategies and policy with doctrine that stresses 
key US values 
Ensure that these broad themes are promulgated to all IO users 
Make training opportunities available to all IO users 
Develop an IO architecture broad enough to cover all United States 
strategic goals 
Develop good horizontal communications among key IO policy makers 
Enlist the academic community to evaluate IO efforts with respect to key 
US values 
This sub-Conceptual Model is very interesting because it is diametrically opposed to those in the 
first set of procedures, where instead of advocating the development of a comprehensive IO 
policy, instead what these themes seem to suggest, is that the United States, should simply tie 
together what is already being conducted today. In essence this set of CATWOE elements 
abandons the concept of trying to control the development of IO policy and instead advocates, 
simply knowing what is being done, and trying to bring together the parts and pieces that are 
most useful, and match the best themes, goals and training needs of the federal bureaucracy. 
The key to understanding this model is to view the American government for what it 
truly is, i.e. a diverse and incredibly complex organisation that no one can control, with 
competing interests and needs, that cannot in the end ever be totally controlled. In this pragmatic 
understanding of the situation, a solution can be obtained that perhaps works better by simply 
trying to coordinate a number of different agencies, by loosely tying their policies and strategies 
together, rather than mandating enterprise type actions. Likewise, the use of broad architectures, 
structures, standards and a loose consortium of academics and government decision-makers, 
working together to develop broad IO policy themes, was viewed by some interviewees as the 
best methodology to move ahead in the conduct of IO missions. 
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Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual 
issues of CM 2.4.1 through CM 2.4.6, to the reality of 10 in use today by the United States 
govemment. 
12.4.1 I 2.4.2 I 2.4.3 I 2.4.4 I 2.4.s I 2.4.6 
Table 8.13 - Analysing Effectiveness of CM 2.4 
These rankings came from a variety ofcomments and observations of the thesis participants. In 
particular it was noted that overall, the performance of the federal bureaucracy with regard to the 
development of a coherent set of 10 policy was below average. There were no great efforts that 
were brought forward that the participants believed strongly supported or felt that were 
contributing greatly to this issue area. Overall it was suggested that much more work was 
needed across the board in the development of 10 policy that was broad and coherent enough to 
encompass the key American values with regards to the United States govemment and federal 
bureaucracy. 
8.3.11 Conceptual Model 2.5: Provide Resources and Adequate Funding to Foster 
Innovation in 10 
This model is centred on the CATWOE Client element, data cells Cl, C2, C3, CS and C6 
was focused on the differences between All Other Personnel as discussed in Chapter Eight. Key 
points from that section included: 
• CM 2.5.1 
• CM 2.5.2 
• CM2.5 .3 
• CM 2.5.4 
• CM2.5.5 
• CM 2.5.6 
Survey United States population towards attitudes on 10 and key values 
Foster a spirit of cooperation toward the funding of 10 activities in the 
United States 
Promulgate a series of articles and repmis of how the art of warfare has 
changed 
Develop a high level of understanding in the United States of the value of 
10 
Develop reporting and accounting mechanisms to keep track of disparate 
10 activities 
Develop a set of goals that the various IO activities can strive for 
Likewise the pragmatic approach can be seen in this sub-model, where if all 10 actions cannot be 
controlled then, instead, the govemment should serve as an instrument to foster innovation. The 
ability to act as a catalyst was viewed as a crucial function to best support the development of a 
better set of IO personnel across the federal bureaucracy. 
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Key to the success of this methodology, was the understanding of what were the main 
values of the American population that should always be held as the core -namely the 
Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights, Constitution, etc. Likewise, an education campaign 
was also seen as crucial to teach the disparate IO personnel on how best to protect and foster 
these core values across the United States government. Features such as articles, conferences, 
additional funding and a heightened awareness were all suggested as methods to support the 
spirit of innovation in personnel, around the world that are affiliated with or are conducting some 
aspect of IO. The most important facet to remember, and this was empha.sised by a number of 
thesis participants, was that the points that the United States government must embrace and 
spread are exactly these key values cited above. It is these aspects of Ametica that are so 
chetished around the world that should be instead emphasised by all personnel when conducting 
IO. 
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when compating the conceptual 
issues of CM 2.5.1 through CM 2.5.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States 
govemment. 
Table 8.14- Analysing Effectiveness of CM 2.5 
These rankings came from a va1iety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In 
particular it was noted that great emphasis had been placed on building awareness among the 
clients through articles and reports on the importance ofiO with regard to the United States. 
These beliefs were also somewhat prevalent across the general Amedcan population, but that 
was as far as the efforts appeared to have been conducted per the project participants. Notably 
lacking was the ability to keep track of all of the disparate IO activities, as well as to gain 
additional funding or a coherent set of goals across the federal bureaucracy. All together, it 
appeared that the efforts to bring together the disparate personnel involved with 10, still needs 
additional focus and exertion. 
8.3.12 Conceptual Model 2.6: Develop a Set of IO Standards that can be 
Understood and Utilised by all Organisations 
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This model is centred on the CATWOE Actor element, data cells Al, A3, A9, AlO and 
T5 which focused on the need for more and better IO Personnel as discussed in this chapter. Key 
points from that section included: 
Eil CM 2.6.1 
Eil CM2.6.2 
Eil CM2.6.3 
Eil CM2.6.4 
Eil CM2.6.5 
Eil CM2.6.6 
Determine if there are metrics that can be utilised by all organisations 
Utilise global media and academia to measure IO plans and strategy 
Attempt to link IO standards to policy, doctrine and strategy used by the 
various IO activities in the United States . 
A comprehensive and decentralised set of standards that can be utilised by 
all IO activities 
Strive to integrate the disparate methodologies for IO organisations 
through common processes 
Analyse IO training and IO standards for commonality 
This was an interesting concept in that many of the interviewees believed that a more robust set 
of standards would facilitate the better development of IO personnel within the global sense. 
These participants felt that because the warfare areas of information warfare were so diverse, that 
a set of standards could do more than any action to unify the actors conducting these types of 
missions and the key to the successful development of these standards was to make them broad 
and encompassing of all different arenas ofiO. This discussion by the participants was based on 
the widely perceived need for a coherent set of IO Standards that are recognised across the 
interagency and coalition organisations. 
The problem is of course, that there are no recognised IO standards today, which are 
crucial to the recognition of any course, and standards as well standards give credence or 
relevance to a course. One of the reasons for this concern, and to understand why the need for 
standards are so important, is that it must be understood that there are a lot of different IO or IO 
related courses in existence today, of which most are unrelated and uncoordinated. Most of these 
courses are stove-pipe or standalone entities, which do not entitle the student to any commonly 
recognised qualification. The lack of standardisation in the IO training environment has 
hampered efforts to develop interagency and coalition support. The key will be to utilise a well-
recognised standards development approach such as led by the National Security Agency 
through its National Information Assurance Training and Education Centre. The latter is well 
recognised throughout the United States government as a leader in standardisation efforts in the 
Information Assurance realm, and this expertise could be translated to the 10 area to better 
support the development of IO personnel. 
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Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual 
issues of CM 2.6.1 through CM 2.6.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States 
government. 
Table 8.15 -Analysing Effectiveness of CM 2.6 
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis pmiicipants. In 
particular it was noted that the only area where the federal bureaucracy appeared to be 
progressing with regards to the development of IO personnel in patiicular, was its disparate 
attempts to link IO policy, doctrine and strategy together. Otherwise, most of the participants 
had few good comments on this patiicular CA TWOE element and in patiicular they felt that 
comprehensive and decentralised set of standards and methodologies or processes that can be 
utilised by all IO activities, was desperately needed. Of all of the 12 sub-conceptual models~ this 
one involving the need for a common set of IO standards was cited most often as to requiring the 
greatest attention and need for improvement. 
8.4 Bringing together tbe Disparate Conceptual Models with regard to the 
CATWOE Elements 
There are many ways to do this, but one method is to analyse the changes in the 
Department of Defense organization with respect to perspective management, over the last 
decade. Specifically a good place to start is actually a low point with the dismantling of the 
United States Infmmation Agency in 1999 by the State Depatiment. For 40 years, the United 
States Information Agency has served as the primary public diplomacy advocate and strategic 
information within the United States government. Its task was to fight communism and to 
highlight the benefits of democracy around world. And in a nutshell, the United States 
Information Agency did its job very well, maybe too well, because some analysts believe that it 
was these international information programs that played a major role in the demise of the Soviet 
Union. The end of the Cold War has rendered obsolete much of the raisin d'etre for the United 
States Information Agency, specifically regarding their programs affecting propaganda against 
the Soviet Union. The United States Information Agency has always enjoyed an independent 
status within the United States government since its founding in 1953. This lack of 
accountability was a main theme found resonating in State Department personnel, and so it was 
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only natural that any reform effort would focus on a clear command and control structure. From 
a number of conversations with senior staffers from Senator Helm's office, it was in the end, the 
influence of the domestic political agenda by the Republicans that probably more than any other 
factor directly resulted in the Refmm and Restructming Act. It was felt from the data received 
dming these interviews that the consolidation effmts at State were a direct result of elections of 
1994, and the perceived need to reduce govemment bureaucracy. 
8.4.1 A Comparison of Client CATWOE Elements 
What this vignette shows is that the ability of the United States govemment to affect the 
attitude of people around the world through the use of public diplomacy, a fmm of perception 
management and IO has greatly diminished wit~in the federal organisations and agencies over 
the last decade. As noted below in Table 8.16, the need to influence all other clients is extremely 
important as cited throughout this research in five different data cells and by over 90% of the 
interviewees. So here we have an expressed need for the ability of American bureaucracy to 
have a capability with IO that has instead been taken away due to overt use of domestic politics. 
This chatt shows the key IQ themes delineated earlier in Chapter Seven for the Clients 
CATWOE elements, specifically US Govemment personnel and All Other staff that are reflected 
in these changes expressed above. 
Table 8.16- Clients: Concepts vs. Reality 
8.4.2 A Comparison of Actors CATWOE Elements 
Clients were not the only CATWOE element affected by this series of decisions. What 
the demise of the United States Information Agency did for the United States govemrnent was to 
drastically alter the overall perception management capabilities of the State Department, which 
in retum, dramatically affected the principal actors conducting this type of IO. A key component 
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of the Reform and Restructming Act was to maintain a credible public diplomacy capability 
during the reorganisation plan by keeping the majority of the Foreign Service Officers intact as a 
new "cone" within the overall State Depa1tment organization. It was recognised that public 
diplomacy functioned more like a functional organisation than a regional bureau; therefore much 
emphasis was placed on building a new bureau or department with the enlarged State 
Depa1tment (John Dwyer, interview, 15 June 2001). This new division, which in reality was a 
briefed up version of the pre-consolidated "I" branch, would now house key components of the 
f01mer United States Inf01mation Agency, notably the Education and Cultural Affairs as well as 
the International Inf01mation Programs branches plus the public affairs section. Probably the 
most important feature of the consolidation effort in fact was development of this public 
diplomacy "cone". Supported by senior level management, this new section was eventually to be 
led by the new Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, whose main 
goal was to give a larger focus on public diplomacy within the State Department. Feedback from 
the interviewees repeatedly stated that these changes at the United States Information Agency 
were very dehimental to the overall capability of the United States actors involved in IO to 
conduct both public diplomacy and perception management. These actors noted themselves that 
they were affected both at the tactical and strategic level with regard to these changes in IO 
personnel. This cha1i shows the key IO themes delineated earlier in Chapter Seven for the 
Actors CATWOE elements, specifically IO Personnel and the Tactical vs Strategic options, that 
are reflected in these changes expressed above. 
At 
Table 8.17- Actors: Concepts vs. Reality 
8.4.3 A Comparison of Transformation CATWOE Elements 
As noted in Chapter Two, much of the early Department of Defense IO policy was in fact 
very broad, with Joint Publication 3-13 in particular, trying to encompass a large section of 
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warfare areas when it was originally published in 1998. For at once IO was everything, and 
perhaps nothing, which in the end, meant that military planners and operators had difficulty 
translating this somewhat academic theory into Department of Defense policy and operational 
funding. This early Department ofDefense policy, was often more hyperbole or over the top in 
its concepts, than that which is typically cited today. Part of this was due to the different 
weltanschauung of the project participants. Statements such as an electronic Pearl Harbor, Cyber 
Warfare, hackers taking down the Department ofDefense infrastructure, and others like this, 
were thrown about with random dming this period of 1989- 2001. At the same time, there 
tended to be more focus cenh·ed on the incredible advances in computer technology and anything 
related to Cyber Warfare- whether it was computer network attack, exploitation, defense or 
critical infrastructure protection, and there were a number of other areas of operations in this 
arena, that all tended to be amplified in this early era. This dichotomy has been resolved with 
more recent instructions and mandates such as the IO Road Map (IORM - 2003) and the new 
Joint Publication 3-13 (2003) which possesses a much more restricted focus. These changes in 
IO can be seen in the fact that current policy is more restricted and concentrated within the 
arenas that tr·aditionally the Depa1iment ofDefense could conh·ol, such as electronic warfare, 
deception, psychological operations, etc. These newest IO policies have not tried to be 
everything to everybody, but instead these more recent policies have concenh·ated on warfare 
areas that could be organized, trained and equipped for in a more typical military sense. This 
cha1i shows the key IO themes delineated earlier in Chapter Seven for the Transformation 
CATWOE elements, specifically the IO Overall Goals and IO Integration that are reflected in 
these changes expressed above. 
Transformation 
Overall Goals 
1ntegrat1on 
Table 8.18- Transformation: Concepts vs. Reality 
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8.4.4 A Comparison of Weltanschauung CATWOE Elements 
The differences between the desired IO structure and policy within the United States 
govemment are in some cases significant as this research indicates. Key themes throughout the 
data gathering and analysis phases featured the fact that in pa1ticular, one area of IO, namely 
perception management, could have the potential to effect the changes to the United States 
govemment as desired by the participants in this research project. That is attributed to a 
somewhat general belief among these personnel, that perception management is different than 
. other portions of IO, in. that it may be harder to conh·ol, because as the effmt is trying to affect 
the mind, vice a pure technology fix. Many interviewees thought that if utilised conectly, the 
potential of perception management as an element ofiO was in fact, much greater than other 
more publicised areas of IO, such as computer network operations. However while this potential 
IO element is still a desirable feature, it is probably not a feasible change for the federal 
bureaucracy, because for much of the general public, there is still a reticence toward this subject, 
with images of Goebbels or mind conh·ol. As alluded to earlier, many of the pa1ticipants in this 
project stated that they believe that perception management is now much more effective as an 
element ofiO - one that can reach out and touch the millions of people around the world who do 
not have connectivity of the wired world. This cha1t shows the key IO themes delineated earlier 
in Chapter Seven for the Weltanschauung CATWOE elements, specifically IO Policy and IO 
Training that are reflected in these changes expressed above. 
Weltanschauung 
Policy 
Training 
Table 8.19 - Weltanschauung: Concepts vs. Reality 
8.4.5 A Comparison of Owners CATWOE Elements 
Likewise from an organisational aspect, the differences between the conceptual models 
and real world have been interesting as well. Massive changes such as the establishment of the 
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Department of Homeland Security which were scoffed at prior to the events of9/11, have in fact 
occurred, while other suggested changes for the Department of Defense- that is, a Cyber 
Command, have still not been fully realised. In reality, the organisational landscape of the 
federal government is altered radically from a pre-September 11 111 , 2001 time frame with the 
stand-up and evolution of commands such as the Joint Task Force Global Network Operations, 
Joint Information Operations Warfare Command, Depattment of Homeland Security, as well as 
numerous others which have been transformed as the full effects of IO upon the federal 
government are realized. Areas such as computer network defen~e and critical infrastruc~re 
protection have grown as well because more integrated, institutionalising policies and 
procedures, were becoming more effective in a defensive role. In essence, the organisational 
emphasis before 9/11 concentrated on building awareness of the threats from IO, while afterward 
the emphasis tends to concenh·ate more on integration and training, with specificity around the 
use of standards. For what exists today in the United States is a series of federated organisations, 
that suppott each other, with the cunent structure of IO agencies and commands that while better 
than before, is still not fully evolved as the complete nature of the threat and capability evolve. 
This can be seen for example in the constant change of reporting chains for the different military 
computer emergency response teams or the services IO and information warfare centres. This 
chart shows the key IO themes delineated earlier in Chapter Seven for the Owners CATWOE 
elements, specifically IO Shucture and IO Decision Making that are reflected in these changes 
expressed· above. 
Owners 
Structure 
Dec1s1on Making 
Table 8.20 - Owners: Concepts versus Reality 
8.4.6 A Comparison of Environment CATWOE Elements 
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In reality, the actual ability of these cyber attacks to cripple the United States government 
and infrastructure is not as highly rated as originally envisioned. While these cyber assaults have 
undoubtedly hurt a variety of Department of Defense commands and federal agencies, they have 
not crippled the military and respective government organisations as predicted. A great example 
of this is the massive electrical grid failure of the north-eastern portion of the United States on 7 
August 2003, which many people initially thought to be the result of a possible terrorist attack, 
was in fact this major critical infrastructure protection failure was simply that, an overwhelming 
loss of power in a single Canadian station, that cascaded throughout the power grid, until much 
of the United States were affected. It was not accomplished by any malignant worms or virus's, 
but instead by the over use of electricity on a hot summer day. The most interesting aspect from 
an IO perspective is that in fact, life still goes on, the world does not stop, and in this case, most 
people just adapted for a day or so until power was regained. It was not a failure of computer 
network defense or critical infrastructure protection, but instead a mechanical issue, one in which 
a greater emphasis on policy and training with respect to IO and the United States government 
may have helped to lessen the impact. This vignette poirits to another interesting fact about early 
IO theorists as compared to the current reality of IO policy within: the United States government, 
that is, mainly that not many of these early theorists have survived the transformation ofiO over 
the last 15 years. Some of these initial concepts were considered just too radical or 
revolutionary, where these early philosophers wanted to change everything. Unfortunately when 
change did not occur fast enough for them, a segment of this group left the academic area, yet if 
you examine IO closely, in reality change has indeed been very rapid, with less than 10 years 
having passed from the initial date when the seminal IO publication for the Department of 
Defense, namely Joint Publication 3-13 was issued (1998). The reality is in fact that change with 
respect to IO in the federal government has been steady and can be measured, how IO has altered 
the United States in this transformational environment. This chart shows the key IO themes 
delineated earlier in Chapter Seven for the Environment CATWOE elements, specifically IO 
Themes and the fact that IO is not New, that are reflected in these changes expressed above. 
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Environment 
Table 8.21 - Environment: Concepts versus Reality 
The key to the synergy that was noted by the thesis patticipants was their willingness to 
tie together IO policy and organisation changes to big themes, to show success and changes, for 
what they wanted to happen and what really happened. These interviewees believed that 
perception management is the key, that there was a lack of progress because in essence the real 
issues is not involving zeros and ones but instead dealing with people's minds, which is always 
much more difficult to resolve. Perception management for future research therefore needs 
much work because it doesn 't have the policy and organisational structure of the computer 
network defense and critical infrastructure protection portions ofiO, because of the need for 
standards, which is a Depattment ofDefense Instruction 8570 counterpatt. Questions arise, such 
as where does perception management fit? Is it targeting, or effects-based operations? Or is it 
Public Affairs and Sh·ategic Communications? Actually perception management issues could fit 
nearly anywhere, yet the lack of a sponsor or money, has stalled growth, for this IO area needs a 
home that is more interagency in nature, but where? Some academics acknowledged that 
computer network defense I critical infrash·ucture protection issues also cross multiple 
organisational boundaties, yet they seem to work well? Why is this - perhaps because they are 
defensive in nature. These same academics opined that perhaps perception management does not 
work so well across boundaries, .maybe because it is different mediums, with different themes 
and goals, different views, missions and technologies, all of which are offensive and not 
defensive. 
8.5 The Verification and Validation Process 
The verification and validation process for the Conceptual Models was conducted in a 
two-part fashion. The first test was a series of follow-on questions that were sent to a smaller, 
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select group of the original project participants in February 2005. As mentioned earlier in this 
thesis, additional requests were forwarded to all 40 of the interviewees, in which the data was 
verified and validated, so that the author could ensure that he actually understood and conectly 
translated their viewpoints into the Root Definitions and Conceptual Models. This stage's 
ultimate goal was to most accurately ensure that the ideas or attributes that were part of the 
original representation or interviews would be adequately represented in this thesis. This effort 
was followed in July 2005, by a public verification and validation session at the 4th Annual 
European Conference on International Warfare at the University of Glamorgan in Wales .. Using 
a third-party independent group ofiO academics and professionals not associated with the 
original interviewees, additional analysis was conducted to also analyse the Conceptual Models. 
Together both of these verification and validation efforts were considered a very important part 
of the Soft System Methodology procedure, because not only does it ensure a direct link by the 
author to the theoretical construct, in addition, this approach also helped to ensure that the entire 
procedure is conect from a methodology aspect. 
For as mentioned previously in Chapter Five, the author made a very conscious attempt 
to ensure the validity of the data throughout the interview process. ·Paper or electronic copies 
were kept and referred to throughout this project, and the information from those conversations 
ultimately found its way not only into the Root Definitions but to the Conceptual Models as well, 
as seen in the matching of CATWOE elements to Categories as shown in this Chapter. 
Dedicated efforts were made so that one could trace the data up and down the chain of evidence, 
and the reader can see multiple examples where the data in the Root Definitions and Conceptual 
Models can be traced directly to one or more thesis participants. Finally, it is in step six of the 
Soft System Methodology process, in the verification and validation phase of the methodology, 
where the data is reviewed a final time, where a series of recommendations were made that may 
ultimately begin to answer the research questions and hypothesis of this thesis. So it is obvious 
that the ability of this methodology to affect transformation depends of course on the accurate 
input from all participants in the process, which is where the need for the next section is derived 
in the form of constant feedback from the participants, to ensure the accuracy of the overall data. 
8.5.1 Verification of the Original Data by the Project Interviewees 
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Of the 40 original interviewees, all received letters that were mailed out in the February 
2005 timeframe. A sizeable number of the participants returned the additional survey forms, 
verifying and validating their comments. These IO subject matter experts reviewed the 
CATWOE data and agreed with the notes taken from the original interviews, that their comments 
had been correctly interpreted and translated it to a series of 63 independent CATWOE 
informational elements. Subsequent follow-up and attempts to obtain additional feedback 
resulted in more responses for a valid level of feedback from these respondents. In addition, on 
13 July 2005, a two-hour discussion was lead by the author as part of the 4th Annual European 
Conference on Information Warfare at the University of Glamorgan, in Pontypridd, Wales. Co-
hosted by Dr William Hutchinson of Edith Cowan University, a panel was seated which 
consisted of IO subject matter experts from three different countries. In addition, in the audience 
were over 40 delegates, speakers, conference leads and IO I IW specialists, from around the 
world, which generated a healthy debate as the two main Conceptual Models were displayed and 
reviewed. As part of the conference dialogue, a series of questions were posed from the 
chairman that then led a rathet spirited discussion on the merits of these particular concepts. 
These questions were as follows: . 
• Which of these models includes your weltanschauung of the problem? Both, one or 
neither? 
• Do the models portray feasible systems? 
• Are the proposed systems desirable? 
• Are the proposed systems viable? 
• Do you think anything is missing or needs to be deleted? 
Individual and detailed comments are included in this chapter, in the next few sections, as an 
overview of the conference validation process is conducted. 
8.5.2 Conceptual Modell.O 
During this verification and validation phase, there was a lack of consensus on the 
validity of this model. Panellists thought that this model was in essence a top-down centralised 
approach, and many of the audience felt that the United States government is inherently 
fragmented, with little centralised control. Others felt the model was flawed because the United 
States IO should not be targeting the American population. For example, a question was asked 
on whether and how the domestic audience should be targeted. The United Kingdom central 
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department equivalent designs information campaigns that are sent throughout the government, 
yet in the United States, the Department ofDefense is the only organisation that is officially 
authorised to conduct 10. Discussions ensued that alluded to the fact that more emphasis should 
be placed on a National Information Strategy to include centralised 10 planning, which was a 
concern of this discussion, with questions arising as to where 10 policy was coming from? 
Concerns over political or social engineering were raised, and the lack of feedback loops, either 
in the political or social realm was noted as well. Likewise, the fact that the major media is not 
considered a satisfactory feedback mechanism, led to calls for additional feedbacl}: loops to be 
added in addition to the mainstream media. A major discussion point in the first model revolved 
around the best approach, that is should this process be centralised or decentralised? 
Specifically, conference participants wondered which methodology could best be utilised as ail 
objective to influence issues on a worldwide basis. From these talks at the 10 conference, it 
appeared that a consensus arose from the panellists and audience that suggested the selection of 
both models, with an emphasis on planning for Modell.O and implementation for Model 2.0. In 
fact, one participant noted that you needed Model2.0 to make sense ofModell.O. 
8.5.3 Conceptual Model 2.0 
In this discussion, the methodology of centralised control and decentralised action was 
advocated. This approach is symptomatic of the approach of the military and was noted as a 
desirable blend of the two models, where implementation could be done by those at the 
frontlines. A desire for strengthening of the feedback was expressed, with a thought that perhaps 
a monitoring system could help. This group also recognised the need for a variety of 
worldviews, and in addition, they believed that the media needs to be from various sources and 
not just mainstream outlets. 
A constant theme throughout the discussion at this conference was the need to emphasise 
key American values, which although somewhat viewed as a losing proposition to implement 
around the world, was still considered by many in the audience to be an action that should be 
implemented to support the conduct of 10. It was felt that these campaigns should be done 
where the people are, specifically that a narrow coordination system, needs a broader base and 
more inclusive system for strategic goals and objectives. While this was considered feasible, the 
comments from the symposium indicated that because of recent negative political input, that 
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maybe while initially desirable, a proposed system that had a broader economic base, with a long 
term view, was perhaps more viable. Likewise, the patticipants of the conference also suggested 
that the Rich Pictures should include allies and adversaries, and that these diagrams should have 
more political patticipants than the oliginal IO models. Likewise, the seminar attendees 
recognised that the actions of the different United States organisations might be in conflict with 
one another, but overall they should attempt to encompass all US values. Problems with the 
Smith-Mundt Act indicated that these actions might be okay for intemal American population 
but not perhaps for an extemal one. Heavy debate during the conference was also noted on the 
use of US values or perhaps UN values that may need to be replaced by human values instead. 
Overall, there was great discussion among the participants on these different Conceptual Models. 
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1.4 
1.5 
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CM2.6 
CM 2.1 
CM 2.2 
CM 2.3 
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CM 2.5 
Tactical vs Strategic 
Coordinating Systems between White 
Investigate needs of stakeholders 
Set up an interagency 10 campaign bureaucracy 
Execute 10 campaigns 
Measure 10 campaign 's successes 
CM 2.1 
CM 2.2 
CM 2.5 CM 2.4 
CM 1.4 
CM 1.1 
CM 1.2 
CM 1.6 
CM 1.3 
CM 1.5 
CM2.3 
Accept any and all IO actions 
Develop a decenh·alised communications plan 
Utilise a wide variety ofiO training courses 
Develop a broad IO policy and strategy 
Provide resources to foster innovation in IO 
8.6 Key Themes from the Conceptual Models 
In this next section, the data from the Rich Pictures, Root Definitions, Conceptual Models 
as well as the verification and validation sessions were all analysed to determine the key themes 
of this thesis. As noted earlier in this thesis, there were 40 different interviewees, who 
participated in a total of 54 sessions over a multi-year period. From these meetings, 63 
CATWOE elements were identified, that were spread over the six different CATWOE 
categories, which were used to develop two Root Definitions and two Main Conceptual Models, 
with 12 sub-models as a result. All weltanschauungs and interests were recognised with very 
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divergent opinions expressed as part of the process, yet as part of this methodology, a number of 
key themes and interests emerged across the board as part of this process. Shown on the 
previous page is at chart, which articulates where each of the 12 Sub-Conceptual Models fits in 
relation to each other, with respect to the interviewees, and their views on the progress across 
the United States goveml1).ent on the development of these particular areas ofiO. As can be 
noticed, there were three models that were considered more developed, namely CM 1.3, 1.5 and 
2.3 than the other nine. While these three models still need to progress further, by the direct 
questioning of the project participants, it was clear that in these areas, the state ofiO within the 
United States govemment had progressed the most of any of the areas highlighted. Also, two 
models were noted as progressing at least with respect to the conduct of IO in the United States 
govemment. Specifically CM 2.6 and to a lesser extent CM 2.5 were the weakest issues that had 
yet to be resolved within the federal bureaucracy. 
The data from the different sub-conceptual models can also be viewed as a coherent unit, 
when they are laid side by side together as shown below, in comparison with the CATWOE 
elements. 
Table 8.22 - Comparing CM's to Reality 
The horizontal axis depicts the 12 sub-Conceptual models, and the vertical axis shows the six 
CATWOE elements. In this analysis, it can be noticed there are five specific sub-issues (in blue) 
that were rated by the interviewees as far exceeding expectations for development within the 
United States govemment. Specifically these were: 
• CM 1.3.1 
• CM 1.5.5 
• CM 2.1.1 
• CM 2.3.5 
• CM 2.5.3 
Define key decision makers in the United States govemment 
Execute IO campaigns 24/7 around the world 
Use opinion polls to determine United States strategic goals 
Ensure training is available in a number of different venues 
Promulgate a series of atiicles and reports of how the art of warfare has 
changed 
These data elements represent the five best areas of 10 development that were by consensus of 
the interviewees conducting or in the process of being conducted at a superior level by the 
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federal bureaucracy. While there are no overriding linkages between these issues, it is 
interesting that the execution of IO campaigns, opinion polls and conducting IO training classes 
are all considered well in hand. These are often discrete tasks that do not require interagency 
coordination, funding, and can be conducted in relative isolation, which could be a reason that 
these issues tend to be more successful. 
On the other hand, seven specific issues (as shown in red) , were cited as being 
significant! y below expectations toward meeting the desires of the participants, as noted below: 
• CM 1.1.4 
• CM 1.2.5 · 
• CM 1.4.6 
• CM 1.6.4 
• CM2.5.5 
• CM2.6.4 
• CM2.6.5 
Ensure strategic goals match interagency IO plans 
Utilise same software and hardware to communicate, operate and plan 
Use IO standards recognised across United States government 
A comprehensive and integrated set of measures of evaluate an IO 
Campaign 
Develop reporting and accounting mechanisms to keep track of disparate 
IO activities 
A comprehensive and decentralised set of standards that can be utilised by 
all IO activities 
Analyse IO training and IO standards for commonality 
When these seven issues are reviewed and analysed, a series of common themes can be noticed-
namely the. desire for standardisation, enterprise activities, integrated systems, similar hardware 
and software to conduct IO activities across all federal agencies. As expected, these tasks are 
going to be much harder to conduct successfully because they require interagency coordination 
and dedicated funding in addition to the political will in order to be successful. 
Once the Conceptual Models were developed and analysed, the next step in the SSM was 
to compare and contrast them to the reality of how IO is conducted in the United States. For 
example, as continuously cited by the interviewees, the need for continued education and 
awareness efforts to key decision-makers in the United States government was required, to 
ensure that they understand the need for greater funding and integration of IO programs. The 
participants of this project also emphasised over and over again, the need for continuous training 
integrated with policy changes that are tied to the overall goals set out at the executive level. 
This focus on top-down, coordinated and centralised training process was also very prevalent 
among the interviewees. Likewise the data from virtually all of the participants also emphasised 
that across the spectrum, most participants and practitioners do not understand IO and that more 
training is needed. This near universal acknowledgement of the requirement for greater 
education in the IO field, was a very distinct thread, and it figured very prominently among the 
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participants in their responses. In addition, another common theme was the recognition that in · 
order to change the way in which IO is conducted by the federal bureaucracy, that needed to 
affect or target the key decision-makers in the United States government. 
Another key point from the analysis of the data, as pointed out by the participants was the 
need for greater integration among the government organisations. There was a very heavy 
emphasis on the need for a stronger State Department, with more trained officials in IO, as well 
as the increased integration of the White House into IO as part of a foreign policy. All of these 
. themes come together to give a sense that while the Department of Defense may be playing a 
major role today with respect to the conduct ofiO in the federal government, a large majority of 
the interviewees desire to bring back the capability to the State Department that was formerly 
resident in the United States Information Agency, and to integrate that more tightly via the 
interagency process with the White House. Finally, the interviewees also noted on a large 
number of occasions, that the current organisational structure for conducting IO in the United 
States was inadequate. Taken together, it can be seen that the key themes from the thesis 
participants concentrated a heavy emphasis on decision making skills, integration, the fact that 
IO is not new, an understanding ofthe environment, the importance oftraining and finally the 
need to develop coherent IO themes that are tied together. All of these deficiencies will be 
analysed in greater detail in this chapter as the changes in IO policy and organisational structure 
are compared across the United States with the specific recommendations suggested by the 
interviewees themselves in the next chapter. 
8.7 Conclusion 
In this section, a number of Conceptual Models were developed. These are considered as 
frameworks or reference points that the participants built into their recommendations depending 
on their particular weltanschauung, and while not based in, reality, they do offer particular views 
on how in the interviewees minds, that these problems inherent with the conduct ofiO in the 
United States can be mitigated. The two main Conceptual Models are widely divergent, offering 
very different solutions to solving these issues and it will be in the next chapter, utilising the 
verification and validation phase, where a comparison of these ideas with reality, will be 
conducted in order to understand how changes to the system could be utilised to enhance 
performance of this particular subject area. 
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Chapter 9 - Research Findings and Results: 
Applicability to Theory and Practice 
In this section, a broad comparison will be conducted to evaluate the differences between 
rhetoric and reality, especially in the evaluation of the employment of 10 across the federal 
government. The hypothesis in Chapter One stated that in the United States, a significant gap 
exists in regards to the conduct ofiO. While this warfare area is a relative newly defined 
activity, it has the potential to transform the traditional uses of power as well as revolutionising 
the manner in which war, diplomacy, business and a number of other areas are conducted. All 
too often, hyperbole and unrealistic desires hamper actual progress of these concepts. The 
analysis of this gap between the proposed capabilities and the actual conduct of 10 missions 
operations is the main thrust of the research. Specifically, as part of this thesis, a number of 
examples were surfaced during the interviews to validate the research hypothesis as well as to 
provide new information regarding the usefulness 10 with respect to the United States 
government. 
9.1 Introduction- Why does IO matter? 
One of the key goals of this research is to evaluate the delta between stated goals and 
actual operations of 10 across the United States federal government by using a qualitative 
interpretative approach through a systems process, specifically SSM. A total of 54 interviews 
were conducted over a five year period with 40 participants, to produce two very divergent 
Conceptual Models, which can be viewed as basically polar opposites of one another. This 
dichotomy was discussed in Chapter Eight, with one school of participants advocating a top-
down enterprise wide approach as the best method to conduct 10. Many of the interviewees 
stridently disagreed, declaring that the only way to make any progress in this particular area was 
via a bottom-up or decentralised route. This latter idea became a key point of this research, 
primarily because a significant number of participants believed that they were simply echoing a 
more 'realistic' view (weltanschauung) or understanding of what makes the power of 
information so unique. For unlike the traditional loci of power (military, diplomacy and 
economic), all of whose instruments the government normally controls, with regard to the power 
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of information, this is simply not the case. Specifically the power of information lies with the 
individual, as do the controls and tools. This is an extremely radical and a salient feature ofiO -
namely that the government can no longer control information· and instead this element of power 
has now been disseminated down to the masses. This inability to control this element of power, 
or to even understand that the government is no longer in control of information, is perhaps the 
most important point in this whole research. For it was repeatedly shown in the interviews 
responses that the enlightened government officials who understood this concept- namely that 
they could only influence the flow of information, and not dominate it - were the organisations in 
the federal bureaucracy that fared relatively well in this new environment. Also, it was 
demonstrated that those federal agencies and staff that refused to acknowledge the seismic shift 
that had occurred with regards to power and information- were ultimately the ones that 
repeatedly were unable to compete in this rapidly advancing field. 
9.2 An Analysis of the Key Areas of Deficiencies from the Soft System 
Methodology CATWOE Elements, Root Definitions and Conceptual Models 
It is these points, and their corollary functions, that are listed below, which will be 
discussed and analysed in great detail with respect to their impact on the federal bureaucracy, 
throughout this chapter. Specifically the fact that the power of information is distributed to the 
masses in a decentralised manner, which results in a loss of control to the central governmental 
organisations, combined with a much greater ease of entry and the great access to low cost IO 
tools, all of which have come together to radically change the power of information. Isolated as 
key areas in this thesis that were specifically derived from the SSM process, in addition there 
were seven specific Sub-Conceptual Model issues that were singled out in Chapter Eight as 
being particularly deficient in their current conduct of IO by the federal bureaucracy. In 
addition, a number of other areas of deficiency were noted, in both the Root Definitions (Chapter 
Seven) and Conceptual Models (Chapter Eight), specifically referring to areas where IO was not 
conducted as well as it could be the United States government. Taken together, all of these data 
points have been combined into four key themes as shown below, which are part of an overall 
analysis of the major deficiencies that succinctly articulate not only why the aforementioned 
delta in the performance of IO exists, but also what approaches could be useful in helping to 
formulate a way ahead for more successful efforts in the future. These issues are noted below, 
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and later in this chapter as well, where specific recommendations will be suggested, based on 
input from the interviewees, to improve the overall conduct of IO: 
11 Why is there no overall Strategic Theory in the United States for IO? 
11 Is IO really the best term to describe these activities? 
11 Why is Top-Down Approach to IO not working in the United States Government? 
111 Why is there no rhyme or reason to the IO training and education curricula? 
These four critical areas will become the main focus of the final analysis of research in 
this chapter. For example, the first question, was derived from the deficiencies cited by the 
interviewees during this research process, who were concerned about the lack of overarching 
theoretical construct for IO. Some participants posited that if the Information Age is as truly as 
radical as many suggest, shouldn't there be a more vigorous academic debate with a number of 
theories vying for ascendancy in this new era. For to date, not one comprehensive theory on IO 
has fallen into general acceptance across the United States government, and while much strategic 
military IO policy and doctrine have been promulgated, it has mainly come from the Department 
of Defense, without corresponding similar policy being developed across the other interagency 
organisations. The second question arose from the same issue area, in that because the actual. 
definition of IO is so broad and nebulous, as to be virtually all inclusive, in actuality it is still 
very much vague and barely understandable, with some research participants believing that 
harm is being imparted to IO as a concept by the broader academic, military and diplomatic 
community. Information is and always has been a somewhat a vague term, but in this new era it 
possesses a capability that is now considered crucial to the success of American national 
security, and so the proper definition and taxonomy are crucial to success. Another question 
came from that fact that in most cases, the actual conduct or approach of IO activities and 
campaigns, are normally performed at a more tactical level, or in a bottom-up fashion vice in a 
centralised or coordinated manner. However there are still many questions about the preferred 
method in which to most successfully utilise this element of power to the best extent by the 
United States government. Many of the interviewees noted this dichotomy in the fact that 
because IO crosses so many boundaries within the interagency processes, it is often very difficult 
to quantify exactly what constitutes an information campaign, and so success is often measured 
in different ways. Finally, the last question arose from the sheer number and diverse quality of 
IO training and education efforts across the federal bureaucracy which has led to much 
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inefficiency, which corresponds to the inability of the United States to maintain a profession 
corps of personnel. Specifically there is no coordination between these different schools of 
thought, no standards, certifications or linking mechanisms to show a synergy of effort. This 
lack of synchronisation acrossthe different agencies, commands and organisations is severely 
hampering the overall ability of these groups to conduct 10. Thus to summarise, it is these four 
concepts, that when taken together, continue to highlight the delta between higher level strategy 
and operational reality as discussed in the hypothesis. The reasons for this gap have been 
examined in previous sections, and specific factors will be noted as to why the federal 
bureaucracy is unwilling or unable to make the transformational changes that are needed to best 
utilise information as an element of power. It is hoped that these conclusions and 
recommendations developed may be useful for future IO planners, as well as senior level 
decision makers in the United States government. 
9.2.1 Why is there no overall Strategic Theory in the United States for IO? 
The problem is that without a strategic theory or academic model to serve as a basis to 
explain the rise in power of information across the entire United States government that this lack 
of an overall theoretical construct ultimately endangers the overall stability ofiO. Theory serves 
as a foundation - a basis on which to build a model of a complex subject such as IO so that it can 
be better understood. Yet with regard to this academic field, it appears that an overarching 
academic theoretical construct on the order of realism or international liberalism, which can 
explain IO with sufficient rigor, does not presently exist. That is not to say that there have not 
been influential academics that have set forth theories for discussion and review, such as Soft 
Power and Noopolitik, however to date, there has not been an overwhelming acceptance of either 
of these constructs (Nye, 2004; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999). For example, as part of the 
literature review in Chapter Two, the arguments regarding Soft Power as set forth in the seminal 
book, Power and Interdependence, are described in detail (Keohane and Nye, 1989). These 
academics portray how the use of information is changing the idea of what is looked for in the 
power capabilities within the world political structure (Ibid, p. 23). Robert Nye also captured 
the excitement and the power inherent in information in other books as well such as Bound to 
Lead, and later amplified in other publications (Nye, 1990; Nye and Owens, 1996; Nye, 2004; 
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Nye, 2006). However none of these publications, set forth an overall academic theory that has 
been accepted for IO. 
This research is really about is a focus power, and its transformation as the world enters 
the information age. It is in this chaotic early stage of a new era, when the disconnect between 
theory and reality is perhaps greatest, and in particular the inability to match a strategic theory to 
the changes in the power structure of the federal government are the most noticeable and very 
evident in the United States. So while Soft Power and Noopolitik may have struck a chord within 
the Department ofDefense and a number of federal agencies at some point, to date, none of these 
attempts to develop an overall encompassing IO academic theory for what is happening with 
regard to information has been formally adopted across the United States as a whole. Even the 
authors of Noopolitik themselves - Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2007) note as much in a recap to their 
book The Promise ofNoopolitik, published eight years after the original publication of their 
seminal book .Their initial enthusiasm for this theoretical construct has been dampened 
considerably not only be the events of9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, but also by the way the Internet and the intellectual community have evolved in the 
last decade. The hopeful optimism of the 1990's with regard to the World Wide Web and the 
Internet, has instead turned in the last few years to the awful realisation that given the power of 
information, many individuals and groups have instead used this new technology to their 
advantage, whether for their political; financial or social gain (Ibid). Likewise Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt also admit in their postscript that the early promises of a global community are instead 
overwhelmed by the day-to-day events, which tend to mitigate the promise of revolutionary 
change. Although they still believe that Noopolitik is an idea for the future, and while they 
remain optimistic, they are also dismayed as well by a number of trends as shown below that 
have effectively mitigated much of the promised potential of this theoretical construct: 
o Notions like Noopolitik are gaining credibility, but all too slowly 
o Soft Power lies behind them all, but the concept needs further clarification 
o Activist Non-Governmental Organizations representing global civil society are major 
practitioners ofNoopolitik, but the most effective may be the global network of jihadist 
o American public diplomacy would benefit from a course correction (Ibid) 
So none of these concepts reviewed here can be properly considered a rigorous academic theory 
on IO, but instead more of a series of ideas around similar topics that are attempting to define 
this radical change in power. All of these arguments are very interesting, because as represented 
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in the interviewee data, changes are occurring slowly in the development of overall theoretical 
construct, definitions are not defined, and the federal government as a network is not that 
responsive as desired, specifically because the United States government public diplomacy 
efforts are considered insufficient. Perhaps an argument can be made that, in reality, a revolution 
in warfare is occurring wi~h regard to IO, yet perhaps not at the rate initially desired - but instead 
at a more evolutionary pace. 
In this vein, a thread has emerged from the participants' data that the reason that no 
overall IO theory has emerged, is because IO is a concept that supports so many different and 
disparate academic areas -which makes it difficult to unify a community around a single 
concept. The sheer diverseness of this transforming idea is easily seen at IO conferences where 
the hard and soft topics are instantly separated into separate streams and only rarely touching 
each other at the plenary sessions. Computer security, psychological operations, electronic 
warfare, public affairs and the other portions of IO by themselves are all incredibly complex 
areas, and to find a single comprehensive academic theory that can encompass the use of these 
warfare areas and the others that comprise IO, is incredibly difficult as can be imagined. 
9.2.1.1 Does Military Doctrine equal 10 Strategic Theory? 
So while no overall academic theory has emerged to adequately explain the rising power 
of information, the same cannot be set for the avalanche of policy that has been promulgated by 
the Defertse Department. Military doctrine is different than academic theory, but for the 
Department ofDefense, it serves much the same purpose- mainly to ground the operational 
missions, in a series of overlapping policy and strategy. IO doctrine is no different, and was 
developed over a number of years as part of a maturation process of theory in the United States. 
The first of these policies, the Department ofDefense Directive TS3600.1, was published in 
1992, and kept at the Top Secret level throughout its use, due to the restrictive nature of its 
contents. So while this document was an attempt to start a dialogue on this new capability, 
namely Information Warfare within the Department of Defense, its security classification in 
general restrained a more rigorous doctrinal exchange. The need for a general theory or overall 
strategy to fit these revolutions in technology still existed, which prompted a new concept 
entitled Command and Control Warfare. Officially released as a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Memorandum of Policy 30 Command and Control Warfare on 8 March 1993, this 
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document laid out for the first time in an unclassified format, the interaction of the previously 
mentioned disciplines such as electronic warfare, operations security, deception, and 
psychological operations, and was designed to give the American the war-fighters the advantage 
in this new information environment. Interestingly enough, Command and Control Warfare is a 
more restricted concept than Information Warfare, which means that the Department of Defense 
backed down from their initial broader. strategy published in 1992 with regard to Information 
Warfare and instead issued a more constrained policy in 1993. This change centred on those 
core disciplines that the United States military were the most familiar with and had a greater 
history of use. This pattern was to be repeated again a decade later in 2003 with the publication 
of the IO Road Map. 
IO doctrine also continued to be developed during this period, after the publication of the 
original Command and Control Warfare doctrine in 1993. There was a concerted push for 
declassification and better understanding of these concepts within the Defense Department, 
which resulted in the publication ofDepartment ofDefense Directive S3600.1, Information 
Operations on 9 December 1996. By downgrading this document to the Secret level, the 
Depatiment ofDefense opened IO to an even wider audience. In a related effort, the Defense 
Science Board also published its report on Information Warfare- Defense in November 1996. 
Together these documents attempted to clarify the differences between the older doctrine and 
introduced for the first time, the concept of computer network attack as an IO capability. There 
were still however questions regarding IO definitions and lexicon that would not be fully 
addressed until the release ofthe seminal publication, Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for 
Information Operations on 9 October 1998. It is in this document, that for the first time, the 
military had released an unclassified document that widely disseminated the doctrinal principles 
involved in conducting IO. A key lesson learned from the release of this document was the 
realisation that both the White House and Department of Defense staff needed to understand that 
they needed better coordination. This is due to the fact that IQ efforts are often conducted long 
before the traditional beginning of active hostilities, so the Pentagon may not always have the 
lead in every operation. This early and sustained interaction between federal agencies within the 
executive branch has also brought about a renewed emphasis on the IO organisational structure, 
and in fact an entire section of this thesis, in Chapter Two, is dedicated to the intricate and 
complicated relationships of the ever-evolving IO organisational structure. 
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In addition, following the release of Joint Publication 3-13 in 1998, new military doctrine 
continued to be published, with the IO Road Map released in a classified format in 2003. The 
publication of the Secretary ofDefense's IO Road Map was five years after the release of the 
Joint Publication 3-13, and was considered a major step forward in the development of this 
warfare area within the Defense Department. This is because of the cumulative efforts during 
this period of 1998-2003 to update and change the military's strategy on 10 based upon real-
world operations and missions conducted by the services around the world. In doing so, the 
resulting document, the IO Road Map, concentrated more on the traditional aspects ofiO 
including and in many regards was seen as a revalidation of the old concept of Command and 
Control Warfare. Subjects such as perception management, strategic communications, public 
diplomacy and influence campaigns were Sl1bsequently minimised in the IO Road Map, and 
instead this document developed a more tailored doctrine on 10. This latest policy in the form of 
the IO Road Map also chose to concentrate more on the 'traditional' aspects of 10 including 
electronic warfare, psychological operations and computer network operations, and to not try to 
coordinate areas that the military did not control. This because the IO Road Map is an official 
Department of Defense publication, and it is now probably in most aspects, the best official 
document which broadly defines the American military strategic policy, sinc.e it concentrates 
much more of the 'traditional' aspects ofiO. This document is also probably more 
representative of the manner in which the Department ofDefense operates, thus in effect, the IO 
Road Map may have in fact, really 'narrowed' the gap, between strategic theory and tactical 10 
operations, by 'lowering' the expectations of higher level 10 policy for the United States. 
Obviously this is a preliminary conclusion, but it will be interesting to see if over time, that the 
IO Road Map leads to a greater understanding by the United States government as a whole, 
about the overall power and capability of information as an element of power in this new era. 
So while in one view, this new policy (the IO Road Map) could be considered a failure 
because its more narrow focus on the traditional areas of 10, it also once again highlights the 
huge mismatch between the strategic transformational promise of 10 doctrine and the operational 
reality of how the Defense Department tactically conducts information activities and campaigns, 
for in reality the IO Road Map may very well be the best pragmatic solution for the conduct of 
10 by the United States military. The new Joint Doctrine for 10, Joint Publication 3-13, which 
was published in 2006, also built on the changes inherent in the IO Road Map and is another 
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major step forward, for it marked the growing comfort level with the embedded role of 10 within 
basic military strategy and operations. The year 2006 may also come to be seen as the period 
when every aspect of 10 in the national power structure moved forward. The information 
assurance community also saw the publication of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 
while the strategic communications arena saw the development of a long-awaited draft strategy, 
all of which when combined with the 10 Road Map and the new Joint Publication 3-13, give the 
military approved doctrine on which to base future 10 plans and operations. The real question of 
course is whether this growing set of policy and guidance documents and proliferation of 10 
related organizations, indicates a greater understanding by the United States government as a 
whole and its constituent elements about the power and capability of 10 specifically and 
information in general as an element of power in this new era. 
The end of 2006 also saw the emergence of additional pieces of strategic guidance and 
policy, one from the Department ofDefense and one at the interagency level, which could show 
alignment with many of the major themes promulgated in this thesis. Specifically, in September 
2006, the DoD released the Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap for Strategic 
Communication, which briefly summarised the problem facing the Defense Department in this 
operational area and laid out 55 tasks intended to remedy those problems. Strategic 
communication was defined earlier in the 10 Road Map as "Focused US Government processes 
and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions 
favourable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated 
information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national 
power" (U.S. Department ofDefense, 2003). This new approach and definition was significantly 
better than previous doctrine that emphasised the "transmission of themes and messages". The 
new view also recognised that if there is a hope to have any likelihood of positively influencing 
an audience, the first step must be listening to and understanding that audience, and thus 
hopefully avoiding the widespread (and sometimes accurate) global perception that the United 
States is so busy talking that it can't afford the time and effort to listen. Likewise the 10 Road 
Map also stated that the United States military is not 'sufficiently organised, trained, or 
equipped' to engage in full-spectrum strategic communication and that 'changes in the global 
information environment' require a more coordinated and integrated effort. It emphasised the 
importance of' credibility and trust', and noted that that all elements of the United States 
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Government share the responsibility for this (Ibid). For not only is effective strategic 
communications a government-wide responsibility, the Department ofDefense is by no means 
the senior player in this effort, and in fact it must support the efforts of the State Department to 
integrate these efforts. Within the Department of Defense however, several key capabilities 
require improvement, most of which fall within the umbrella of IO in some way, including 
public affairs, psychological operations and defense support to public diplomacy. The 
Department ofDefense also defined three key objectives in this IO Road Map, that if met would 
significantly improve its ability to conduct effective strategic communications. First, the 
Defense Department needed to institutionalise a process through which goals and objectives in 
this issue area which could be embedded within the development and execution of plans across 
all operational levels. Next, the doctrine needed to be developed to clearly define the roles, 
responsibilities and relationships for strategic communications and its constituent elements. 
Finally, and not surprisingly, all of this would not happen if not properly resourced, and the 
Military Departments (such as the Department of the Army, etc) and Combatant Commands (like 
the Central Command) must be provided the means to organise, train and equip capabilities for 
this (Quadrennial Defense Review, 25 September 2006). 
9.2.1.2 Why is the State Department not issuing Strategic Guidance? 
While the Strategic Communications Roadmap provided the Department of Defense with 
authoritative guidance with which to shape capabilities and operations, the interagency 
organisations had no such guidance, however there is hope, that eventually broader policy may 
eventually be adopted. In the second of the major IO federal policies that was released in 2006, 
the former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, 
circulated for coordination a memo in October of that year entitled U.S. National Strategy for 
Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, under her hand as chair of the Presidential 
Coordinating Committee for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications. This was a much 
longer and more strategic document that set forth three strategic imperatives to guide American 
public diplomacy and strategic communications programs. The first of these initiatives was 
stressing the importance of presenting a positive vision ofhope and opportunity, which would be 
rooted in basic American values. Next was the need to isolate and undermine violent extremists, 
while the final imperative was to nurture common interests and values while emphasising those 
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that cross cultures, borders, and creeds. The draft strategy then went on to identify critical 
influencers who are able to reach 'strategic audiences' and 'vulnerable populations'. The plan 
also emphasised the need for interagency coordination, because every arm of the United States 
Government has an urgent mission in this arena. Its 'action plan' was based on these three 
strategic imperatives, and nearly 40% of the entire document was devoted to specific and 
detailed plans and proposals. Finally, the draft strategy also examined several critical elements 
of communication, such as broadcasting or public opinion analysis, that would be necessary 
supports for a successful strategy, and it emphasised the need to be accountable for operations 
and to gauge whether any specific plan or program was being successful ( U.S. National Strategy 
for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, 18 October 2006). 
This plan was broad and inclusive, a major step forward that went well beyond anything 
that had existed previously. One major improvement over earlier efforts was that the 
Presidential Coordinating Committee charged with developing this strategy was not 'eo-chaired' 
as in previous incarnations and thus did not suffer from divided leadership. Instead this 
interagency group was instead led by only one person - indeed the Presidential Coordinating 
Committee was led by one of the most influential members of the Bush Administration, namely 
Karen Hughes. Her unique power stemmed from her key relationship with the President and her 
position as one of his key advisors, so that her guidance always had an 'ex cathedra' aspect to it. 
It was thought at the time, that this initiative provided a unique 'window of opportunity' in 
which perhaps real progress could be made before the pressures of the pending 2008 elections 
and an administration changeover in 2009, regardless of which party was victorious, and would 
bring efforts back from full speed. There were however weaknesses in the plan, and the first of 
these were its insistent focus on the Moslem/Islamic world. While that was quite normal in one 
regard, especially in its connection to the 'Global War on Terror', in other ways that emphasis 
was unfortunate, because there were other areas of the world, Latin America, Asia, sub-Saharan 
Africa, to name just three, in which America needs to be fully engaged in support of vital 
national interests. Another area in which the plan was even more inadequate was the almost 
perfunctory section on resources. Instead of a powerful and compelling call for greatly increased 
resources with which to wage the 'war of ideas', and a detailed explanation of how those 
resources would enable the United States to advance its interests, the strategy instead only 
provided a weak one-liner about the need for "increased support". This is a fatal flaw, especially 
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in a fiscal environment in which every dollar has several worthwhile programs calling for it. 
Such a weak request has virtually no chance of actually gaining the needed resources, which to 
date has unfortunately spelled a quick demise for this noble effort. 
To summarise, there are many reasons why there is no strategic academic theory on IO 
that has been developed over the last 15 years, all of which can probably be categorised into that 
fact that most of the intellectual thinking on this topic area has resided within the Department of 
Defense. While there have been books written and articles published from the academic 
community, in general this issue area has not fully matured into its own discipline, which has 
precluded intense focus on IO as a theoretical construct. 
9.2.2 Is Information Operations the best term? 
Not really. Information Operations is only the latest in a series of Department ofDefense 
names for this concept which has existed for over 30 years, and it is too limiting because it tends 
to be only associated with the military vice the entire United States government. Variously 
called Information Operations, Information Warfare, Command and Control Warfare, Public 
Diplomacy, International Public Information, Psychological Operations, Perception 
Management, Net Centric Warfare, NetWar, Soft Power, Noopolitik and Strategic 
Communications, all.ofthese terms are inadequate to explain the true breadth and depth of 
transformation of power across the international community. The capabilities such as deception, 
psychological operations and electronic warfare, which can all shape and influence the 
information environment, have all existed as part of the military repertoire for a long time, but 
the umbrella term ofiO is a relatively recent doctrinal definition, with much of the critical 
thinking beginning in the mid-1970s. The first known use of the term 'Information Warfare' was 
in a brief delivered by Dr Tom Rona, an analyst at Boeing Aircraft Corporation, for Andrew 
Marshall, a senior Defense Department official in May 1976. Much of this concern came from 
United States military analysts and planners who were looking at intelligence estimates of the 
size ofthe former Soviet Union's military. From 1975-85, the former Union of Soviet 
Socialist's Republic often outnumbered United States conventional forces 3:1, and, while the 
United States may have had a qualitative advantage, there are still times when only sheer 
numbets count. In the Pentagon, military strategists were looking for methods to cut down on 
the former Soviet Union's advantage by attempting to counter traditional strengths with 
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asymmetric non-nuclear attacks. In addition, these analysts noted that the former Soviet Union 
relied heavily on electronic warfare or radioelectrionyaborba (Radio Electronic Combat) in 
much of its doctrine, and there was a feeling that the United States must combat this threat as 
well (Munro, 1991). It was also in this era, that some of the early ideas about IO and effects-
based planning began to evolve. Likewise, the demise of the Soviet threat to the United States in 
1989 and the shift from bipolar to multi-polar political scenarios also seriously affected 
American force structure and military doctrine. This combined with the huge technological 
changes that have evolved over the last 20 years in computers, software, telecommunications, 
networks, etc. have all revolutionised the way the United States conducts military operations, and 
there has been a marked concentration on understanding the role of information in conflict. It 
was becoming increasing clear during the late 1980s and early 1990s to the war-fighters and 
policy makers in the Pentagon that the side that controlled and retained the ability to conduct 
information campaigns accurately as well as to manipulate, use and disseminate information was 
going to be victorious. Strategic planners at the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to think and write 
new strategy, most of which was highly classified, that would utilise information as a war-
fighting tool. .The evolution of these different IO terms is laid out in the next few sections. 
9.2.2.1 Problems with the use ofiO as a term 
To begin with, the very term of IO was a compromise from Information Warfare. The 
military understood Information Warfare to an extent, but just as quickly as that term started 
gaining acceptance over Command and Control Warfare in the armed forces during the 1990s, a 
newer term in the form ofiO was foisted on the Department ofDefense in 1998. The reason for 
this was of course to broaden acceptance of this new form of warfare across the federal 
government, where many agencies were anaemic to the term 'warfare' itself, and so new 
language was needed which would 'soften' and allow this warfare area to be utilised across the 
different federal interagency organisations. And so IO was adopted as a neutral label, one that 
could be used by all government agencies in the United States involved in these types of 
activities. The term IO ran into trouble right away, because it included the older Command and 
Control Warfare areas such as operations security, psychological operations and electronic 
warfare with corollary functions such as civil and public affairs. It is widely known that the 
psychological operations and public affairs communities are very separate and distinct areas, 
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with disparate missions, which could make it unethical in many personnel's mind ofworking 
together. Huge discussions and debates were conducted on how to separate these two activities 
in an IO cell, and options including 'fire-walling' the respective groups, etc. No matter what was 
suggested, the idea that any public affairs official would ever be involved in any operations that 
conduct psychological operations, influence operations or perception management type activities 
is anti-ethical to their whole mission which in many cases spelled disaster from the beginning. A 
great example of this was mentioned earlier in this thesis with the demise of the Office of 
Strategic Influence in February 2002, after the senior Department ofDefense Public Affairs 
officer, Tori Clarke torpedoed the entire concept of this new organisation. It is exactly this area 
of IO, namely perception management or the newest term of strategic communications, which 
promises the most changes with regard to the power of information. The ability to use the latest 
technology to influence people around the world is the form and articulation of power and 
informational capabilities that grabs the attention of many proponents ofiO. So the correct label 
is very important, as this new set of tools is the crux of the potential power ofiO. 
However that is not always possible. Many military theorists contend that information 
warfare is what you do when IO fails. That is one difference, but there are also subtleties 
between these two warfare areas as well. The main distinction between these two doctrinal terms 
. . 
is that information warfare contains six elements and is mostly involved with the conduct of 
operations during actual combat, while IO on the other hand, includes these six capabilities and 
two sometimes integrated or related activities (Joint Publication 3-13, 1998, p. I-9). Therefore 
IO is much broader and comprehensive than information warfare, and is intended to be 
conducted as a strategic campaign throughout the full spectrum of conflict from peace to war and 
back to peace. It is in only IO that the full integration across government agencies and with 
private industry can occur. Thus a common complaint about 10 is that because its definition is 
so broad, at once it is everything and also nothing. The elements, capabilities and related 
activities of information warfare and 10 are separate and discrete warfare elements. Most have 
very old traditions and long-standing histories that do not necessarily mean that every action 
conducted in these areas is always associated with IO. A Swedish information warfare academic 
-relates, "While the activities gathered under the umbrella concept of 10 are not new in 
themselves, the attempt to coordinate and integrate them into an overall strategy which utilizes 
the rapid advances in information and communications technology ... " (Riegert, 2002, p. 79). 
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For example, there are elements of destruction that are not part of an IO campaign, likewise not 
every public affairs activity has to be tied to information operations. In reality, if done correctly, 
all elements and their components of national power can be integrated into a satisfactorily 
planned, designed and executed strategy to allow the United States to attain its national security 
goals in the new millennium. 
9.2.2.2 The Need for Taxonomy 
Labels are incredibly important. Portions of IO such as psychological operations and 
. . . 
electronic warfare are distinctly military terms, yet functions very similar to these tasks such 
diplomatic information activities or worldwide communications efforts such as Radio SAW A are 
conducted routinely by other agencies in the United States. Thus we see the difficulties in 
determining what exactly IO means and why changing labels have occurred so much in these 
areas over the last two decades. For example, the term Command and Control Warfare, was 
routinely accepted by the Department ofDefense in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The focus 
was on nodes and connections, with an emphasis on physical items such as network operations 
. centres, transformers, etc. This was a primary mission that the Department ofDefense could and 
did excel in this warfare era; witness the triumph of the First Gulf War and the informational 
components. The evolution to a warfare area beyond the limitations of the command and control 
warfare label continues to vex the United States 15 years after the publication of the original 
Department ofDefense 3600 series in 1993. That is because, the moment you move the military 
beyond the traditional areas of operations security, electronic warfare, psychological operations, 
etc and move to terms or mission areas that include components such as influence operations or 
perception management- that is when the Defense Department begins to have difficulties with 
the theoretical aspects ofiO. The broadening of Command and Control Warfare to Information 
Warfare was the next logical step in the mid-1990s as the Revolution in Military Affairs was the 
rage, and policy was formulated which ultimately resulted in the seminal doctrinal statement of 
Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, in October 1998. This was supposed to be the 
pre-eminent manual on how to conduct missions in this new era, where information reigned 
supreme. The problem was that this publication was not a 'how to' manual, but instead an 
attempt to redefine how the military conducted operations, a reach for a 'new' way of warfare. 
And with all things revolutionary, it was a bridge too far, for not only did the various military 
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services have trouble trying to implement this new military strategy, but also of organising, 
training and equipping to it as well. Funding was also crucial, because it was very hard to fund 
these nebulous concepts. All of these issues led to a realisation that the original Joint Publication 
3-13 was an over reach in terms of military theory, and since that time, there has been a 
concerted effort by the Department ofDefense to 'reign' in 10 policy and doctrine to mission 
areas that are more traditionally focused on the respective armed services. Combine these ideas, 
with the lack of a proper definition and taxonomy for 10, one's that centre more around the 
information warfare concepts that are executable by the respective federal agencies, and runs into 
problems implementing 10 across the United States government, and the realisation by many 
interviewees, that the future of this transformational capability may never be fully realised. 
Therefore what is truly needed is a comprehensive set of taxonomies, with an accompanying 
ontology that is recognised by all practitioners of 10. 
9.2.3 Why is Top-Down Approach to 10 not working in the United States 
Government? 
For while these incredible changes in technology are drastically changing the role of 
information with respect to power, and many parts of the military and business communities 
have embraced these changes, it still appears based on the interviews and literature reviews that 
within the United States the executive branches and the State Department are still very slow to 
understand the power inherent in information. The lack of a set of coherent theories or 
overarching doctrine is creating a gap between the new changes that are occurring with the 
tactical agencies, while there is still a need for a basic understanding at a more strategic level. 
The fundamental fact is that the growth of information technology has accelerated the process of 
transferring power down and away from a centralised authority, and into the lower levels of an 
organisation. This decentralisation of power, command and control as well as decision-making 
authority can be seen in many instances in new Department of Defense weapon systems such as 
Future Combat System, where every Army infantryman will have more information at their 
disposal than could have been fathomed a mere decade or two ago. The same can be seen in the 
economic globalisation efforts, where the market is truly worldwide, and no longer is a business 
confined to a local geographic area. The intemet and World Wide Web have forever broken 
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down these barriers to communication and information transfer, bringing the power to groups 
that formerly did not have access to these capabilities. 
9.2.3.1 Is the Revolution in Military Affairs I Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs an 
answer? 
Is the Revolution in Military Affairs still a viable concept? How about the Revolution in 
Diplomatic Affairs? Is the United States government really ready to radical change its 
organisational structure to conduct operations in the Information Age? The answer to all of these 
questions is probably not, for while everyone understands that nation-state to nation-state 
communication will never be limited as in previous eras to pin-striped diplomats, cables, 
message traffic or official communiques, it is not apparent from the data gained in this research 
that the radical leap needed to transform the Department of Defense or State Department is 
happening very quickly, especially in the area of strategic communications or perception 
management. Unfortunately it appears that the United States has been very slow to take 
advantages of this new technology and instead is relying on the tried and true communication 
apparatus that has been the backbone of public diplomacy for the last 60 years. The demise of 
the United States Information Agency and the incredible slowness of the States Department to 
properly absorb the public diplomacy community, has also contributed immensely to this 
incredible gap in the strategic capability of the American government to adequately project its 
message as well attempt to influence people around the world. The Clinton and second Bush 
Administration are to blame for this gap, because while they have repeatedly 'talked' the talk, 
about the need for a 'beefed up' public diplomacy capability for the United States, their actions 
(or inactions in the case of lack of funding), have contributed significantly to the drastic decline 
in the ability for the State Department to 'project' its message. In this gap, the National Security 
Council has 'tried' to do public diplomacy or strategic communications, and has finally given up 
after the retirement of their main proponent in 2005, and in fact are quoted as stating that is no 
longer a capability of that office anymore (Waller, 2007a, p. 389). 
The diplomatic corps is also greatly at fault as well. It was a resentment by the traditional 
segment of this federal agency toward the independence of the United States Information 
Agencythat allowed it to be 'absorbed' in 1999, and while there is 'lip-service' to the 
development of a public diplomacy core in the 'I' group, in reality in discussions with a number 
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of Department ofDefense professionals, it rapidly becomes apparent, that public diplomacy is 
not considered a fast-track to promotion. This apathetic attitude or indifference is telling in the 
staffing of public diplomacy positions, the funding of public diplomacy initiatives, and even in 
the leadership of public diplomacy within the State Department. The inability of the National 
Security Council and Department of State to jointly lead a Presidential Coordinating Committee 
in this very area since 9/11 is also very telling of the importance that these organisations put into 
this capability. In addition, the protracted search for a leader of public diplomacy in-the State 
Department, in the form of the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is also 
very telling as well. First it was Charlotte Beers, a Texas advertising executive, who lasted less 
than 18 months, followed by rumours of Margaret Tutweiller, a Bush Administration speech 
writer, followed by a gap of two years with an acting official until the long heralded Karen 
Hughes, a President Bush confidante and campaign manager took over the position in 2005 amid 
much fanfare and hype. However only two years later she had left Washington for good, with 
some changes made, but no continuity in the role. It is the belief of many of the interviewees in 
this thesis, that the lack of a long term, dedicated 10 professional to coordinate this very 
important role has damaged the ability of the federal government immensely in this area. 
9.2.3.2 Why is the State Department failing in its Public Diplomacy Role? 
This is mainly because the public diplomacy community is still embracing antiquated 
tools to transmit their message. Little effort is made comparatively to understand and use new 
avenues such as blogs, websites, intemet chat rooms, or instant messaging to pass information to 
all segments of society. There are a variety of reasons for this, but one could be the loss of 
control. The State Department has traditional preferred to centralise the 'message' that it 
promulgates to other nations, and thus the use of media that are under their centralised control, 
such as radio, TV shows, embassy visits, etc. The problem of course is that these methods while 
laudable are not enough in today's technically savvy world. Adversaries and enemies of 
America are filling these other mediums with hatred, lies and distortions of the truth that only 
serve to hurt the United States. A vacuum is abhorrent to nature and once discovered will be 
filled. That is exactly what is happening today with the effort by the American federal agencies 
to 'spread' the word. Because the federal agencies are fighting the fight with one hand tied 
behind their back due to the unwillingness to use the latest technological assets and archaic laws 
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(the Smith-Mundt Act for example), the United States is losing in this war of ideas. And it is a 
war, as stated by many IO experts (Waller, 2007b ). Our enemies understand that they cannot 
defeat the United States on a militarily or economic basis, but they can hobble this superpower 
with a w;ell-run information campaign. It was done before in Vietnam, and many of these same 
tactics are being utilised again, albeit this time with newer technology and communication paths. 
Of course, it must be asked why is it that the Department of Defense can trust the latest 
technology with its youngest recruits by the United States government and yet in particular the 
State Department, is unwilling to trust the citizens of this great nation into spreading the words 
and ideas of freedom and democracy. The awareness level of the intended recipients of these 
messages from the American sources are often more savvy than assumed and nuances be better 
understood than thought. That is the key to success in this war of words and the United States 
must use all sources at its disposal to promulgate the message about freedom and democracy, 
about the core values that make up America, and it is then and only then, that the tide will turn in 
this battle, which currently it appears that the coalition is losing. We talk about a Revolution in 
Military Affairs and a Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs -which are really the use of information 
to transform these traditional forms ofpower - we talk about globalisation, which is really the 
use of information to transform economic power, and yet there is no talk about Revolution in 
Information Affairs, which of course asks the question - why not? Perhaps it is because 
information is still not viewed as a source of power but instead only as an enabler- that is, it is 
technology, specifically information technology that is seen as driving the Revolution in Military 
Affairs, the Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs and the globalisation transformations. Yet is it also 
not information and the flow of information as well? 
9.2.4 Why is there no rhyme or reason to the 10 Training and Education 
curricula? 
When evaluating the sheer multitude of IO courses by the United States government, it 
must be realised that the major problem is that none of these courses have any standards or 
common learning objectives upon which to base their curriculum. These different classes are 
normally based on different theories (service and agency), different skill levels of users 
(beginners to advanced), different ranks or grades of the audience (enlisted to flag/ general 
officer), as well as different foci (strategic, operational and tactical). So it should not be 
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surprising that there are over 70 10 courses in existence today, taught by a variety of United 
States government organisations and commands, all of which have little to no interaction or 
integration. For example, 10 training cannot be obtained in ohe service and then serve in a joint 
organisation without needing additional specialised training. Additionally, there are no common 
denominators or goals that translate well across the American armed forces with regard to 10 
training and educational requirements. These and other standardisation issues have thwarted the 
United States government and academia in moving toward the development of curricula 
emphasising the power of information in general and 10 in particular. 
9.2.4.1 Can Lessons be learned from the Information Assurance Community? 
The participants of this project have noted this dichotomy between the Information 
Assurance and 10 communities, and have presented this subject a number of times in 
conferences around the world as well published their findings in a number of scholarly articles. 
One good example of this was a sponsored collaborative discussion session among British, 
American and Australian academics and military officers at the 2nd Annual 10 Conference 
hosted in London (July 2003) .. During this daylong session, a tremendous amount of energy and 
analysis was devoted towards finding a solution to help develop better access to 10 training and 
education capabilities across the three nations. The figure below, is a synopsis of those efforts, 
and reiterates what the participants of this project have been advocating for a long time, mainly 
that any curriculum developed must be based on open and accessible standards and that a web or 
internet based set of courseware was the best answer to deliver content globally. 
IO.'educatiorfa.nd. Training Goats Means 
Deliv~ of training must be chea_g_ and fast Internet 
Access must be worldwide and standard Portal 
Clear, concise, authoritative and readable Textbook 
I nforrnation Battlespace COP 
Planning Tool/Checklist Excel! App 
StucJy_ Real World Operations Case Studies 
Common 10 Definition/Language Taxonomy 
Change Perceptions and generate interest Exercises 
Parallel Play/Multiple Courses Interfaces 
Worldwide 10 Game Everquest? 
Standard 10 Training Material CD-ROMs 
Training must be standardized Qualifications 
Red Teaming must be incorporated VATeams 
Table 9.1 -Options for Improving 10 Training and Education Goals 
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While this matrix is not the sole answer to the problem, the authors believe that it may help to act 
as a checklist or guide to focus the attention on possible solutions to these 10 education and 
training goals. However, there is still a gap between the large number of military oriented 10 
courses and the study of this academic concentration by civilian universities. 
9.2.4.2 Issues that still exist with developing commonality with respect to the IO 
Training and Education Situation 
The dichotomy between increased emphasis by the American military on the conduct of 
10 and the lack of corresponding academic programs within academia is not unprecedented. 
Early work at National Information Assurance Training and Education Centre to develop a set of 
standards, led to several industry professional standards, National Institute of Standards 
publication 800-16 and the Committee for National Security Systems series of publications. 
These standards, developed by the National Security Agency, are now widely recognised 
throughout the Department ofDefense and interagency as the de facto baseline of tasks for 
Information Assurance across the federal bureaucracy. In addition, the Committee for National 
. Security Systems series has become widely used in academia, through National Security Agency 
sponsored Information Assurance programs and curriculum. Together these .groups are a hub of 
Information Assurance activity in which a tremendous amount of activity has occurred in the last 
decade. An entire cadre of Information Assurance professionals has been trained and now 
occupy key and influential positions within the federal government as a result of the education 
that they received from these programs. The key component of this success has proven to be the 
development ofthe Committee for National Security Systems standards, which are grouped into 
six categories ( 4011 to 40 16). Updated on a regular basis, these serve as a baseline for all the 
certifications and academic programs sponsored by the National Security Agency and National 
Information Assurance Training and Education Program as well as the Information Assurance 
academic community in general. 
If the problem of developing academic interest in 10 is to be solved, several steps are 
required. They can be modelled on the steps originally recommended for the Information 
Assurance discipline, over a decade ago. The first is to build personnel capacity, for if 10 is to 
become· a civilian academic field, there must be sufficient faculty. The main problem as noted in 
this research is that are very few college professors are trained in 10 in the United States. 
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Currently, the computer science, information assurance, or information systems programs in the 
United States are able to adequately respond to the increased demand for IO courses. For the 
long-term it will be necessary to increase faculty in all areas of information technology, not just 
Information Assurance and IO. Current IO practitioners should be encouraged to enter the 
professoriate by creating academic positions for professionally qualified individuals. In the 
United States - and this is key - there. are currently no comprehensive IO curricula or graduate 
programs in academia. Nascent master's curricula are underway at the National Defense 
University as well as Norwich University, but more institutes and programs are needed to help 
close this gap, if significant progress is to be made. Likewise, the role of industry also cannot be 
overlooked in making faculty retention and development easier for the IO initiative. It is also 
imperative to attract quality students to programs producing IO specialists. As demonstrated in 
various information assurance initiatives, an undergraduate scholarship program has the largest 
potential influence to solve the short-term problem. In the absence of some form of graduate 
stipend program, there will probably still continued to be a dearth of individuals to become the 
next generation professoriate and to fill governmental and industrial needs. Production of 
master's and doctoral students is also essential. Finally traditional undergraduate and graduate 
programs alone cannot meet the need for information operations professionals, and any 
comprehensive solution must include ongoing professional education for the existing workforce. 
9.3 Key Findings of this Thesis 
Information has always been an element of power, but is often seen as an enabler or 
supporting component, and not as the decisive factor in conducting operations. The very nature 
of modern day operations, with its persuasive and never ending 24 I 7 global media coverage, has 
shown over and over the need to utilise all the tools or elements of power at one's disposal. 
Information is a key component of any sort of influence type of operations, and its effectiveness 
has been demonstrated repeatedly, especially over the last two decades, with the rise in 
technological capabilities. However the very factors that make information useful as an element 
of power, are also adding to the difficulties for nation-states and in this case, America, to conduct 
information campaigns, or IO, on a successful basis. The shifting of power away from a 
centralised authority, the loss of control from the federal bureaucracy and the low cost as well as 
ease of entry, into this domain, all have combined together to signal a revolutionary and radical 
277 
shift in the manner that information is utilised around the world. Therefore it is not surprising 
that non-governmental organisations, non-state actors, corporations, terrorists and individuals 
have all benefited from this shift in power, due to the advent of new information technology 
capabilities. 
It is also not surprising that the federal bureaucracy of the United States is struggling to 
come to grips with the ramification of these changes. Specifically the flow, content and 
communication paths of information, as well as the loss of control have all radically altered the 
method in which the administration and other branches of the federal government interact with 
their counterparts around the world. Combined with the heightened expectations of the increased 
capabilities inherent in 10, the lack of a coherent theoretical construct, definition or taxonomy, 
and a virtual smorgasbord of training classes, with varying curriculum and content, none of 
which are integrated or coordinated, have all combined together to spell disaster for the success 
of IO in the United States. Too much is expected, and too much has been promised, and with no 
radical changes in funding across the federal agencies, progress has overall been disappointing. 
Many of the same organisations that were doing Command and Control Warfare over 15 years 
ago, are still the key agencies conducting 10, just renamed and slightly expanded, but with no 
true increase in scope and capability. Therefore it is not surprising that in many aspects, the 
Defense Department is moving backwards with regard to strategy, capabilities and scope. The 
inability of the military forces to organise, train and equip to the nebulous original Joint 
Publication 3-13 directive of 1998, have instead pushed the Defense Department to revert back 
to an instruction, in the form of the 10 Road Map in 2003, that more closely resembles the 
original Command and Control Warfare doctrine of 10 years earlier. This was because it is 
precisely these latter capabilities incorporated in electronic warfare, deception, operations 
security, psychological operations and physical destruction, are all ones that the military has total 
control over, as opposed to more nebulous related IO warfare areas such as perception 
management, strategic communications, etc. This 'boxing' in of the Department ofDefense, is 
actually a sound strategy, because it concentrates success on these issues, and to what units and 
personnel are under its control. Taken together then, the specific key findings that align with this 
assessment include the following areas: 
11 IO needs to be limited in its scope to be effective- a lessening of expectations 
11 Only the Department of Defense will continue to have IO Policy and Doctrine 
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11 IO Training I Education are useless unless tied to taxonomy and standards 
11 IO Metrics are key to future success and acceptance . 
All of these issues will be addressed below, as part of an overall plan to provide a way forward 
with regard to the more efficient conduct of IQ by the United States government. 
9.4 Suggestions for Improvement Based on the Soft System Methodology and 
Literature Review 
From this analysis, a number of specific recommendations were made that were both 
feasible and desirable from the data collected. These suggestions are listed over the next few 
pages and represent the collection of several years of interviews, conferences and workshops, in 
an attempt to ensure that the specific recommendations of this research met all of the criteria of 
the participants. For as many academics have tried to articulate, this new emphasis on the use of 
information, is an attempt by the United States to develop a strategy to better control all of its 
power capabilities, in order to affect the many issues that it must deal with in the post Cold War 
era. Federal officials in the United States have come to the realisation that militarily, the 
government could not solve all of its problems through kinetic means. 10 is therefore an attempt 
to bring these different facets of power to bear on an adversary, whether it is a nation-state, 
terrorist group or individual. Thus, the real key to making the management of information 
effective is to ensure that the horizontal integration and coordination of the interagency 
organisations are conducted early on, that is in the peacetime environment vice waiting until 
hostilities start. As mentioned earlier, 10 can be a very effective tool for shaping the 
environment in the pre-hostilities phase, so that the actual need for hostilities may actually be 
avoided or minimised. So while the publication of Joint Publication 3-13 was lauded in the late 
1990s with its attempt to define everything as 10, in fact it's very overstretch could actually be 
responsible for the lack of understanding and the eventual withdrawal of this strategy into a more 
manageable set ofiO doctrine five years later with the promulgation of the 10 Road Map. 
This latter argument is a key point of this thesis -namely that in trying to be everything 
for everybody, 10 as defined in the original Joint Publication 3-13, has in effect became nothing. 
Over and over, participants emphasised that in order to be successful, 10 needs to be more 
strictly defined and standardised, with a series of overarching policy, taxonomy, certification and 
methodologies that are recognised and understood by all practitioners. In order to do this, many 
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interviews recommended that a limiting of the 10 definition must occur, one in which a more 
realistic view must occur, in which goals and capabilities are attainable. It was stated repeatedly 
by the participants in this research project, that a nebulous set of policies and the desire to 
include all warfare areas into 10, have actually hobbled the ability ofthe United States 
government to organise, train and equip its forces in a practical manner to conduct these 
operations. 
9.4.1 Suggestions and a Plan to Develop an Overarching 10 Theory 
10 is not a part of the liberalism or realism theoretical academic theories. It is something 
that is in between, as noted in Chapter Two, because it is much more oriented around power. It 
has its own language such as virus's or worms, that is somewhat medical in nature. It also can 
be very technical, especially when concerned with information assurance or cyber security 
issues. This dichotomy of needs and requirements has hampered the ability to develop an 
overarching 10 theoretical constmct, and yet many comments from this research project 
interviewees, centred on the desire for more progress to occur, especially in the areas ofiO 
standards, training, and integration. The use of 10 policy and themes are very different across 
United States government, particularly in the perception management arena, while computer 
network defense and critical infrastructure protection are considered more uniform in nature. 
Concerns were raised in this thesis about why is 10 so easy to visualise and so hard to 
accomplish? It is the 'softer areas' ofiO, as referenced by the participants, mainly the concepts 
that involved efforts to affect the mind, in the form of perception management and strategic 
communications, that the United States was having the most difficulty in conducting operations. 
These skill sets are considered an art, with many of the interviewees believing that the long view 
needs top be taken for success in this area, and yet these same participants also noted that in the 
United States, federal organisations often wanted to rely on technology to answer the questions, 
to overwhelm the adversary quickly. These interviewees commented often sadly, that in reality, 
the fast results are not successful, and instead history should be explored to understand that quick 
answers are not the norm and instead understanding of how the military actors in the past have 
really succeeded should be obtained. For example, was the bombing really effective in Kosovo 
in 1999, or was the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation coalition just making rubble bounce, and 
not really understanding how to really affect the hearts and minds of a populace? For many of 
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the research interviewees, IO is not that radical, and in fact, some that instead it should just really 
be entitled as "Operations in the Information Age". But that idea doesn't solve the need for an 
overarching construct, and developing new academic theory often hinges on radical concepts 
such as those espoused in the Third Wave or Noopolitik (Toffler, 1984; Arquilla and Rand, 
1999). These concepts along with Soft Power are perhaps the best examples of academics that 
have successfully crossed the theoretical construct boundary into Department ofDefense policy 
(Nye, 1990). 
So in this aspect, there is a huge dichotomy in the goals of these two policy attempts at 
developing strategic IO academic theory, with the more pragmatic Department ofDefense (The 
10 Road Map) and the State Department (Defense Science Board Report on Strategic 
Communications), documents. But in another view, these mandates are also entirely 
representative of the way in which IO is conducted today throughout the federal bureaucracy. 
Because the 10 Road Map has a much narrower focus than the mandate from the Defense 
Science Board, it tends to highlight the huge mismatch between the strategic transformational 
promise of IO doctrine, with the operational reality of how the Defense Department tactically 
conducts information activities and campaigns. So in reality, the 10 Road Map may very well be 
just the pragmatic solution needed to solve the difficulties in trying to conduct these types of 
information campaigns on a day-to-day basis. This as opposed to the lofty and somewhat more 
ambitious goals of the Defense Science Board report, which while utterly correct from a 
perception management perspective, may in fact never occur due to political and fiscal reality. 
The 10 Road Map and to a lesser extent the new Joint Publication 3-13 (2006) are not the 
only way ahead for the federal bureaucracy with respect to the future of IO, within the United 
States. In September 2004, a new Defense Science Board Task Force of the Report on Strategic 
Communications was released, as a follow-on effort to an earlier study by the Defense Science 
Board in October 2001. Many critics felt the first study was overshadowed by the tragic events 
of September 11th, 2001 and the opening campaign of Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan. So a primary duty of this new Report on Strategic Communications, was to not 
only look at the changes that had failed to occur since the original report, but also to reflect on 
the prior publication to see if its recommendations were still valid. While the author could 
paraphrase the document, the opening statement is so crystal clear, that it is worth repeating for 
verbatim, so as to not lose any of its effectiveness. 
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This Task Force concludes that U.S. strategic communication must be 
transformed. America's negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to 
persuade are consequences of factors other than failure to implement communications 
strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our 
friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance. Strategic communication is 
not the problem, but it is a problem (Defense Science Board Task Force of the Report on 
Strategic Communications, 2004, p.l ). 
The report went on to cite seven key factors for success with regards to strategic communications 
by the United States.· All of these areas were important, but without an Administration and 
federal bureaucracy that understands the problem, leads by example and encourages a strong · 
Government-Private Sector partnership, this Defense Science Board report saw little chance of 
success for strategic communications, notwithstanding its recommendations which are laid out 
below: 
e Issue a National Policy Security Directive on Strategic Communications from the 
National Security Council 
• Establish a permanent strategic communication structure within the National Security 
Council to include a Deputy National Security Advisor and a Strategic Communication 
Committee 
• The creation of an independent, non-profit and non-partisan Centre for 
Strategic Communication to support the National Security Council 
• Redefine the role and responsibility of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy 
and Public Affairs to be both policy advisor and manager for public diplomacy 
• The public diplomacy office directors in the Department of State should be at the level of 
deputy assistant secretary or senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary 
• The Under Secretary ofDefense for Policy should act as the Department ofDefense focal 
point for strategic communication 
• The Under Secretary ofDefense for Policy and the Joint Command Staff ensure that all 
military plans and operations have appropriate strategic communication components 
(Ibid, p.l 0) 
What is very interesting from an academic standpoint is that many of the personnel interviewed 
for this Defense Science Board project, also participated in this thesis research, and many of the 
recommendations of this report, in this author's opinion mirror the overall tone of this 
dissertation. In addition, all the key interviewees of the Defense Science Board worked at one 
time or are still associated with the public diplomacy, strategic communications or international 
public information community, which in many aspects validated their findings. Therefore in a 
manner, this Defense Science Board also serves as a verification of sorts with respect to the 
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research conducted as part of this thesis, to confirm that the assumptions are on track with 
regards to the needs and deficiencies of IO within the United States government. 
Thus, the way ahead with regard to developing a strategic IO theory will have to involve 
the academic community, yet unfortunately as mentioned earlier, there are very few American 
university professors who expressed interest or expertise in IO, so the ability to house this effort 
solely in a United States based academic venue is probably not going to happen. However an 
academic IO theory does not have to be developed by an American, to be useful. A tremendous 
amount of talented and innovative research on IO is being conducted outside of the United States 
and so a collaborative approach is suggested, where the three main IO and information warfare 
academic conferences are utilised as the backbone for this effort. Entitled the European 
Conference on Information Warfare (ECIW), the Australian Information Warfare Conference 
(AIWC) and the International Conference on Information Warfare (ICIW), these three gatherings 
are held annually. Typically, they have many of the same participates attend from around the 
world, which supports a good atmosphere to allow a vigorous debate, in which a number of 
aspects and options to developing a strategic IO theoretical construct are analysed with sufficient 
academic rigor.· 
9.4.2 A Model to Establish a Taxonomy and set of Definitions for 10 
Ultimately the lack of a standardised nomenclature or taxonomy also hurts the ability to 
conduct IQ by the United States government. Basic questions are raised, including those of a 
semantic nature, such as why could not other United States government agencies agree on a 
common taxonomy, or a set of terms, such as information warfare? Was it too warlike, hence the 
switch to IO? Maybe so, but even the latter term is still not routinely adopted across the federal 
bureaucracy, and there are no common terms in other organizations for IO, or its different sub-
themes like perception management, international public information, public affairs, strategic 
communications, etc. 
So it is suggested as part of this thesis that a set of definitive definitions and taxonomy 
needs to be developed to support the entire federal bureaucracy with regard to IO. A top-down 
approach has been suggested as part of the interviewee process as well as shown in section 9.4.2, 
specifically that the use of the three main IO and information warfare academic conferences 
could offer a way forward in solving this issue. Specifically, at these latter venues, streams 
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should be set up to develop an ontology, taxonomy and a lmowledge base ofiO, based on the 
author's role on the editorial staff of these conference committees. Ontology is a hierarchy of 
what you lmow and understand about a subject. A lmowledge base is a web of relationships 
among the items in the ontology. This web of items and how they are related defines this 
lmowledge base. As part of this effort, it is also suggested from interviewees that a portal should 
be developed or at the least, a web service, that academics can use to access this lmowledge base, 
ontology and taxonomy. It is proposed that the following items will also need to be addressed at 
these academic conferences, and then be included in this web application as it is developed: 
1111 A clear definition of what IO is and how it works 
111 A glossary ofiO, Information Assurance, Information Warfare and other terms, by the 
user 
1111 A mind map of important things of all sorts related to IQ and how they are related is 
multiple ways. - discuss these relationships connections in the mind map indicate a 
variety of relationships among the items on the mind map. 
111 A components list (that is part of and is contained by) breakdown ofiO things, (that is, 
methods, processes, who uses them, what they are, how they relate to action states-
offense, defense, and collaboration). 
111 A mental model of how IO is used, by whom, where appropriate, all players, info, data 
and lmowledge common among them 
9.4.3 An Analysis of which Approaches and Processes work best to support 10 
What all these policy developments and organisational changes have recommended 
and attempted to explain is a much greater emphasis on the use of the information environment 
across the spectrum of national security activities, from perception management capabilities by 
the federal bureaucracy to engage in strategic operations in the Global War on Terrorism to 
securing critical information infrastructures against terrorist attack to. military employment of the 
full range ofiO's core competencies. The participants were also very vocal and adamant in their 
desires for changes to be made in the conduct of 10 by the United States government, of which 
most of these changes can be grouped into the offensive IO category. Questions were asked 
repeatedly such as- 'Can offensive IO succeed'? 'Should we try to do offensive IO'? 'Does 
offensive perception management work better when done naturally'? These questions and other 
suggestions were noted as part of this research so much so that the interviewees believed that 
there might be methods to allow IO to become more of a useful weapon for the United States. In 
addition, some participants also noted, that more emphasis should be placed on the publicising of 
key American documents such as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of 
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Rights, etc, all of which should be emphasised more in these type of IO missions. The key to 
success in offensive perception management as opined by a number of participants was to keep it 
simple, to use a small number of common themes and goals, that recap the lessons learned over 
and over, and to do it across all the federal government organisations in a consistent manner. In 
order to succeed, these same participants also noted, top level buy in was needed and then to go 
out and preach as well teach at all levels, with freedom and democracy as constant themes. 
Success in this kind of approach was considered more of a long term approach, not something 
that can be ~onsidered an overnight success. A good example of this kind of methodology as 
mentioned earlier was the United States Information Agency, which at its peak, concentrated on 
the economy, social and diplomatic areas in their effort to combat communism, instead of the 
military missions. These efforts were considered as huge successes with regard to perception 
management, where the federal government let other organisations lead the effort, vice the 
Department of Defense. 
This research was conducted over a long time period, with preliminary research 
beginning before the horrific events of9/11, and continued throughout the Operation Enduring 
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom campaigns. Early on the research focused more on 
computer network attack, computer network defense and critical infrastructure protection, all of 
which are more computer centric issues that were considered key to success in the conduct of IO, 
because of the enormous changes that were foreseen with the rise of the Internet at that time. As 
the research continued however, it became clear that while the information assurance, computer 
network defense and critical infrastructure protection issues are still very important and vital 
areas to conduct research, they are all to an extent in the federal government, under some sort of 
control. There are organisations in the United States government, around which IO policy and 
personnel are in place to handle or coordinate many of these defensive issues, and while these 
areas may not be totally solved, at least to some extent there are a series of standard operating 
procedures, methodologies and processes at work. The same cannot be said for IO issue areas 
such as perception management, strategic communications, etc. Therefore the thrust of this 
research is also to examine the different methods that work well for different parts of IO -
namely that a top down approach on defensive options in the computer network defense and 
critical infrastructure protection areas may work better, as opposed to a more bottom up 
approach that centres around perception management and strategic communications. Overall, 
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the participants also agreed that one methodology is not the best for all areas ofiO. There were 
many reasons for this, but perhaps the easiest to explain is that because 10 is such a complex 
operational area, combining multiple diverse and time honoured warfare areas such as electronic 
warfare, psychological operations, deception, etc with new and complex capabilities such as 
computer network defense, critical infrastructure protection, computer network attack, etc., all of 
which have their own traditions and histories. Into this mix, IO is laid as an umbrella type 
concept and it is no wonder that one single approach to conduct will not succeed and instead, and 
that a more varied methodology is probably required. Therefore in order to continue moving 
ahead with respect to IO in the United States government, it is suggested per the interviewee data 
that a combination of techniques, methodologies and processes must be utilised by the federal 
bureaucracy. 
If the new Joint Publication 3-13 and the 10 Road Map published in 2006 and 2003 are 
now considered the pre-eminent Department of Defense policies on the power of information, it 
has to be wondered if they really are the ultimate solution to the problems affecting the federal 
government with regard to the operational capabilities ofiO. Or are they as some interviewees 
have suggested instead, a series of compromises by the military services and an attempt to 
publish a more 'realistic' answer to 'operationalising' IQ across the Depattrnent ofDefense? 
This 'narrowing' of the 10 policy is in opposition to what many of the interviewees 
recommended, for as noted throughout this section per the interviewee data as well as in a large 
number of documents in the literature review, a much greater emphasis on the use of perception 
management capabilities by the federal bureaucracy was suggested to engage in strategic 
operations in the global war on terrorism. For example, the IO Road Map which was 
promulgated by the Department of Defense in 2003, does not appear to follow these 
recommendations as suggested by the participants, and instead appears to 'consolidate' 10 into 
more 'discrete' military warfare areas, more aligned to the older command and control warfare 
policy. Thus the recommendation for this key theme of this research is to fund and promote 
understanding of where the true changes in 10 will probably come in a decentralised manner, or 
as one interviewee stated, "that change occurs best at the edges" (Rendon, 2003). Opportunities 
to evolve policy, organisations, training and tools, in small but significant areas, should be 
viewed as a good approach to follow for the conduct of IO across the federal bureaucracy, with 
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the understanding that they offer the most hope in the near term, to eventually produce the 
revolutionary effects, that were envisioned from IO nearly 15 years ago. 
9.4.4 Establish an International Standards Effort with respect to 10 Training and 
Education 
Based on the interviewee data, a suggestion has arisen that involves the establishment of· 
an international based IO Standards Working Group to conduct the following activities: 
• Creation of the IO Standards Working Group manifesto 
• Creation of relationships with the Police, the Military, professional bodies, other defence 
agencies, and the corporate world, in the participating countries 
• Coordination of a series of International Information Operations Standards for 
Information Operations workshops 
• Development and publication of Information Operations standards for Information 
Operations 
Specifically after a recent International Conference on Information Warfare that was held in the 
Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterey, California (March 2007), the following deficiencies in 
IO were identified: 
• Information Operations is a field that has no current standards. 
• After the recent technological developments, the stakeholders of the Information 
Operations are not just nation states and military groups any more, but commercial and 
governmental organisations that are members ofthe Critical National Infrastructure of a 
nation. 
• Information Operations is a cross disciplinary discipline that brings together specialists in 
computer science, sociology, psychology, communications international relations and 
military science. 
• There is a need for the aforementioned parties to be able to cooperate and collaborate for 
producing standards and defining the science ofiO. 
The first step to mitigate these issues is proposed the creation of a virtual community, bringing 
together the members of the working group for identifying and producing a course of action. It 
is suggested that this steering group will utilise a web site, creating a series of mailing lists, and 
the use of existing scientific conferences for disseminating results. The steering committee of 
the Information Operations Working Group will be expected to promote the principles of 
Information Operations in their respective countries and identify and establish relationships with 
stakeholders: the academia, professional bodies, the corporate world, the military forces, other 
defence agencies, and law enforcement. This involves organising a series of meetings, organising 
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workshops and disseminating results following traditional publication approaches. At this stage it 
is considered that one annual workshop will be adequate. 
The second milestone is the development of the group's manifesto. Once the steering 
committee of the Information Operations Standards Working Group is established it will produce 
a manifesto, and the future actions of the Group will be dictated by it. The group will develop a 
collaborative set of Information Operations standards that will be disseminated via journal 
papers, conferences, workshops and press-releases. The third milestone is the creation of 
relationships with the European Network & Information SecurityAgency, the United States 
Department ofDefense, the United Kingdom and Finnish Ministry of Defence, and the Research 
Network for a Secure Australia. Ultimately, the main outcome will be the creation of 
international Information Operations standards that will be released, possibly two sets, one for 
military operations and one for the public. It is hoped that the establishment of this IO Standards 
Working Group will greatly improve the capabilities of a set of IO standards, especially across 
the United States and its federal bureaucracy. 
Developing standards alone will not meet all of the needs for IO training, and there is no 
fast and simple solution. By encouraging and increasing the capacity of current programs, there 
will be an immediate, increase in flow created by accelerating the progress of students currently 
in the programs. Currently the production of IO graduates of training and education courses has 
been increased to a few hundred a year. Experience with the IA scholarship program indicates 
that de novo programs take as long as 4 - 5 years to produce the first individuals with 
baccalaureate degrees focusing on information operations. To produce individuals at the masters 
level takes an additional year and a half and yet an additional 2 - 3 years to produce a PhD. The 
foregoing discussion provides investment solutions that initiate and rapidly build an IO 
educational infrastructure for the long term national interest. It involves: 
• Investing in undergraduate and graduate students to encourage them to enter the 
profession 
• Investing in current faculty to keep them in academia 
• Investing in converting faculty to support information operations initiatives 
• Investing in research to maintain the state of the art and advance the profession 
• Aiding in the development of information operations as a recognized discipline in 
conjunction with information assurance 
• Aiding faculty in professional development and publication of research results 
288 
The following nine-point program would establish an integrated academic infrastructure 
dedicated to providing the education and training required to support the using 10 to protect of 
elements of the critical national information infrastmcture. Specific actions proposed include: 
• Creation of a scholarship program to encourage both undergraduate and graduate 
students to enter the profession 
• Creation of distinguished professorships and associated stipends to encourage faculty 
both to join and to remain in the academic ranks 
• Creation of joint research opportunities with government 
• Creation of mechanisms to maintain currency of teaching and research facilities 
• Encouragement of government, industry and academic personnel interchanges 
• Encouragement of joint academic - industry research consortia to address current 
needs 
• Creation of an information operations training program to increase the number of 
faculty teaching and researching in the area 
• Creation of joint education and training programs to keep current practitioners 
current 
• Encouragement of the creation of innovative research outlets for faculty 
The emphasis of this push to upgrade the 10 training and education curricula is to help support 
the attraction of qualified personnel and students to the profession, with the development of a 
sufficiently large and well-informed faculty to guide education, training, and research programs. 
for these personnel and students. In addition improved infrastmcture is needed to support such 
programs, as well as strengthening ties between industry, government, and academia through 
joint education, training, and research initiatives and opportunities. Finally as has been 
emphasised in Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008, the use ofCyber Warfare tactics are 
becoming more prevalent. Training and education in lA and 10 capabilities, with the 
development of appropriate standards could also help to alleviate some of these risks and 
vulnerabilities. 
9.5 Areas for Future Research 
All of the areas addressed above are considered as key findings, and if extended, could 
also be logical areas to conduct additional research in the future, with specific focus areas to 
include the following suggested topics: 
11 The reasons why the Department of Defense limited its 10 policy 
111 The reasons for the lack of a strategic academic 10 theory 
111 Research attempts to link 10 Training and Education to taxonomy and st~ndards 
11 The use and success of metrics in 10 missions 
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In addition, since this research was primarily conducted in the United States, opportunities exist 
to research similar test cases outside of America. Likewise, this paper also emphasised the fact 
that no longer will it require a large organisations to execute this element of power, but instead it 
will be the nimble and smaller activities and agencies that will succeed in this new era. Future 
research could also be conducted on the optimal size of an agency or group that is best in this 
new informational environment. Likewise other academic issues that are available for research 
could revolve around which organisational structure can be used to best maximise their 
capabilities in the information age, whether it is at the strategic, operational or tactical level. Or 
additional research could be conducted in the key features that were mentioned in the first 
chapter section, namely wide open communication links, little censorship, truthfulness of 
information and whether strengthening networks will decide the future of the world's political 
structure. Finally in this thesis, definitions and models were developed that articulate not only 
why this divide between strategic theory and tactical operational missions exists, but also 
specific strategies for utilising IO in a manner that best optimises the inherent capabilities of this 
element of power. Taken together, all of these areas mentioned above could be lucrative source 
for research by academics in the future, because of the incredible change that is occurring within 
this issue area. 
9.6 Summary of 10 Changes with Desired Recommendations of Participants 
In conclusion, what all of the interviewees emphasise and acknowledge, which is also 
alluded in the books, articles, conferences and reports that make up this thesis, is that in essence 
a drastic change in the conduct and use of power has occurred during the Information Age. In 
this research project, these changes in the evolution of power were discussed with a large number 
of personnel as part of this research, and focus sed not only on the changing nature of power with 
respect to information, but also on the growing power of information itself. In addition, analysis 
of how these recommendations gathered from the data gathered compares to the actual 
development of IO by the United States government was also attempted. Likewise, this research 
also compared the changes recommended in the Conceptual Models, to other literature on this 
subject, to analyse if other authors agreed with the research participants as the way ahead to 
further the progress ofiO, as compared to those that did not. With regard to the literature itself, 
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some of these books and articles were prescient and seminal, while others were less useful and 
have quickly faded into obscurity. There are many reasons for this, but as the author's 
hypothesis suggests, 10 policy often does not readily translate into the tactical operations. 
Therefore what the literature review in Chapter Two and its analysis in that section have 
attempted to do, is to reiterate and show the gaps in literature between strategic doctrine and the 
day-to-daY.reality of this new warfare area, and how this research intends to fill that void. 
Finally, an attempt of this research, was to show the gap in knowledge that exists today, not only 
from a literature analysis prospective, but also by comparing it to the requirements for the 
continuing development ofiO, with an extensive series of interviews over a multi-year period. 
In conclusion, what all of these texts as well as the interviewees recognise is that there is 
a new role for information as an element of power. It is understood that it is the fungibility of 
information which makes it so truly useful, and this dissertation has attempted to emphasise that 
the ability to transform information, to move it or display its capability, all relates directly to its 
power. This is the concept of strategic 10 that quickly captures the minds of so many because of 
its great potential. Many of these texts also point to a more realistic appraisal of the current 
capabilities of the United States government, and often suggest a more pragmatic approach of 
continuation and maturation of the 10 process within the federal bureaucracy as the best way 
forward. The challenge of this research therefore has been an attempt to analyse the delta 
between the strategic concepts of the power of information envisioned by the United States and 
how 10 is actually conducted by the government, to help formulate a plan to lessen the gap based 
on the suggestions of the interviewees. 
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Appendix A - Interview Schedule 
The primary methodology of this research has been active interViews combined with Soft System 
Methodology. 100 interviews were conducted since 1999 in which the researcher repeatedly met 
with a variety of government officials to discuss the role and evolution of 10 within the United 
States government. Of these interviews, 40 key participants were selected for the final analysis 
of this study, due to their positional and institutional knowledge, breadth of information and 
willingness to undergo repeated interviews. 
# First Interview Second Interview Third Interview Affiliation 
1 19-Feb-03 NPGS 
2 19-Feb-03 NPGS 
3 14-Apr-03 26-Apr-04 Aerobureau Corp 
4 15-Apr-03 DoD 
5 16-Apr-03 CFR 
6 16-Apr-03 Highlands Forum 
7 16-Apr-03 24-Nov-03 26-Mar-04 State Department 
8 17-Apr-03 25-Mar-04 Consultant 
9 17-Apr-03 25-Mar-04 Consultant 
10 18-Apr-03 1-Apr-04 The Rendon Group 
11 21-Apr-03 RAND Institute 
12 21-Apr-03 Ctr Naval Analysis 
13 21-Apr-03 Consultant 
14 22-Apr-03 NDU 
15 22-Apr-03 RAND Institute 
16 22-Apr-03 31-Mar-04 State D~_artment 
17 23-Apr-03 1-Apr-04 DoD 
18 23-Apr-03 GWU 
19 24-Apr-03 OGC 
20 25-Apr-03 RAND Institute 
21 13-May-03 RAND Institute 
22 10-Jun-03 DoD 
23 10-Jun-03 1-Apr-04 State Department 
24 10-Jun-03 DoD 
25 10-Jun-03 DoD 
26 10-Jun-03 GWU 
27 2-Jul-03 TRC 
28 2-Jul-03 FCO 
29 3-Jul-03 University of Leeds 
30 3-Jul-03 Consultant 
31 3-Jul-03 SNDC 
32 4-Jul-03 ADF 
33 4-Jul-03 Deacon University 
34 4-Jul-03 Kings College 
35 4-Jul-03 1-Apr-04 NDU 
36 6-Aug-03 Monash University 
37 7-Aug-03 JFSC 
38 12-Aug-03 19-Nov-03 23-Apr-04 C4ISR 
39 13-Aug-03 1-Apr-04 NSC 
40 13-Aug-03 24-Mar-04 State Department 
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Appendix B - Rich Pictures 
What miSt the United States frderal 
bmauJoucy aa:orrplish fivm a pdicy, 
pmonnd and m~Fnizatimal rffmt, 
to b:tter utilize irfanrntion as an 
eknmt cf fXJW!r to rmt the threats 
cf the fiaure? 
us ~ 
Wl - Government 
W2 - Academic 
W3 -Public 
Rich Picture # 1 
US Politicians Official 
USG 
Citizens 
.................... x ......... 
World Opinion '""" 11,." 
& Events? •" 
Rich Picture #2 
~ 
Media 
Academia 
~ 
Religious 
Leaders 
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Rich Picture #3 
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Appendix C- CATWOE Elements 
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Appendix D ~ Root Definitions 
Initial Root Definitions 
1. Information Operations in the United States government is coordinated by the planners and 
operators under the centralised control of three key organisations (White House, State 
Department and the Department ofDefense), to achieve a strategic Information Operations 
campaign to key decision makers in both foreign and domestic populations, including the global 
media, which promulgates the United States political/military weltanschauung within the 
constraints ofreal-time, 24/7 operations. 
System - Information Operations in the United States government 
11 Client 
ill Actors 
ill Transformation 
lil Worldview 
Ill! Owners 
11 Environment 
key decision makers in both foreign and domestic popuhitions, 
Including the global media 
planners and opei·ators 
strategic Information Operations campaigns 
political/military 
three key organizations (White House, State Department and the 
Department of Defense) 
real-time, 24/7 operations 
2. Information Operations in the United States government is achieved in an ad-hoc fashion by a 
variety of operators; both international and corporate planners, as well as the global media, for 
the American public, to facilitate a bottom-up IO campaign to target to key decision makers in 
both foreign and domestic populations, which promulgates the United States academic/civilian 
weltanschauung within the constraints of resources and key American values. 
System- Information Operations in the United States government 
Ill! Client 
Ill Actors 
11 Transformation 
11 Worldview 
11 Owners 
Ill! Environment 
Target audiences include both foreign and domestic populations 
International and Corporate operators, including the global media 
bottom up Information Operations campaigns 
academic/ civilian 
American public 
resource constraints and key American values 
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Final Root Definitions 
The two final Root Definitions are shown below. The same format will be followed for each of 
the draft Root definitions, with each of the CATWOE elements utilized as part of an attempt to 
develop a coherent statement of the data derived from the interviewees. 
Information Operations in the United States government needs to be differentiated between the 
tactical and strategic operations by key decision makers of the United States government for 
· better integration and more IO training across the interagency spectrum,·in an understanding that 
IO is not a new phenomenon. 
System 
Client 
Actors 
Transformation 
Worldview 
Owners 
Environment 
Information Operations in the United States government 
United States government 
Tactical versus Strategic 
Better Integration 
More IO Training 
Key decision makers 
IO is not New 
The second final Root Definition is shown below: 
Information Operations in the United States government needs personnel and a better 
organisational infrastructure, to reach overall IO goals, focused at coordinated themes towards its 
targeted audience with coherent IO policy. 
System 
Client 
Actors 
Transformation 
Worldview 
Owners 
Environment 
Information Operations in the United States government 
All Others 
Personnel 
Overall Goals 
IO Policy 
Better IO structure needed 
IO Themes 
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Appendix E - Conceptual Models 
CM 1.3 - Investigate 
needs of 
stakeholders 
CM 1.2 ·Set up 
coordinating systems 
between WH, DoS and DoD 
succesa 
Goals: 
Develops a 
coordinated and 
integrated strategic 
USG 10 campaign 
Targets: 
Improved perception 
of US policies by 
USG personnel 
1 
Information Operations in the United States government is derived from the perspective 
of the overall 10 themes to produce better integration implemented and run by tactical 
versus strategic 10 personnel for the benefit of the USG and under the control of key 
decision makers within the constraints of the fact that 10 is not a new warfare area. 
Clients Weltanschauung 10 Themes 
Actors Owners Decision Makers 
Transformation 10 Integration Environment IOisnotNew 
Conceptual Model 1.0- IO in the United States govemment: A Top Down (Centralised) View 
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Ensure strategic 
goals match 
interagency 10 plans Develop a centralised series 
of committees and groups to 
monitor and adjust plans as 
needed 
Goals: 
Ensures a top-down, 
centrally executed plan 
that is integrated across 
the USG 
Develop similar 
type of 10 plans 
and goals in each 
USG agency 
Ensure that these 10 plans 
are synchronised across the 
organisations 
Match agency plans 
to strategic 10 goals 
for USG 
Conceptual Model 1.1: Tactical vs. Strategic Goals for US govemment IO Systems 
Better Integration of 10 Actions 
Develop a coherent and 
integrated set of coordinating 
systems between all three 
organisations 
Ensure coordinating 
systems utilise simlar 
standards 
Operations 
should be 2417 -
constant and 
continuous 
Need buy-in, resources and 
commilment from top 
leadership 
Utilise same SW and 
HW to communica te, 
-----1 operate and plan 
Systems should 
provide metrics 
for analysis 
Goals: 
Real-time integrated 10 
systems that are 
coordinated both 
vertically and horizontally 
across the interagency 
Targets: 
Instill a belief in 
effectiveness of USG 
10 plans, systems and 
operations 
Monitoring 
system that can 
transfer data 
seamessly across 
all levels of USG 
Conceptual Model 1.2: Coordinating systems between White House, Department of State and 
Department of Defense 
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Key Decision Makers 
Ensure that key USG 
agencies understand 
users needs and desires 
Develop system to 
understand 
stakeholders 
needs and desires 
Develop overall gu idance 
for key USG organisations 
Measure the 
needs of 
stakeholders 
. Execute system on a 
ccnsistent and 
repeatable basis 
needs are met 
personnel and key 
decision makers 
Conceptual Model 1.3: Investigate Needs of Stakeholders 
Ensure adequate training of 
personnel across USG to 
man this bureaucracy 
Develop 10 
planning 
system for all 
of the USG 
Use 10 standards 
recognised across 
USG 
Execute strategic 
10 plans from 
single system 
Goals: 
Ensure all USG personnel 
are well trained and know 
the policy and system 
developed to conduct 
strategic 10. 
Targets: 
The staffs of the three 
key agencies plus 
other key USG 
decision makers 
Conceptual Model 1.4: Set up an Interagency IO Campaign Bureaucracy 
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!10 Themes I 
Ensure USG bureaucracy is 
capable of executing 10 
plans and operations 
Conceptual Model 1.5: Execute IO Campaigns 
A comprehensive and 
integrated set of 
measures of evaluate an 
10 Campaign 
Ensure 10 standards, policies 
and procedures are developed 
and adhered to by the three 
key USG agencies 
Develop standard 
methodology to measure 
success of an 10 
campaign 
Incorporate 10 training, resources, 
planning and operations into one set 
of metrics for USG 
Goals: 
Match strategic 10 
plans to resources 
and capabilities 
Targets: 
Key USG decision 
makers and 
Monitoring system 
a comprehensive 
system using 
feedback from a 
multitude of sources 
Conceptual Model 1.6: Measure IO Campaign's Success 
1 
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CM 2.1 - Accept any and all CM 2.2 ·Utilise a wide 
10 actions conducted for the ~ --' variety of 10 training 
United States government courses and instruction 
CM 2.3 - Develop an 
10 policy broad 
enough to encompass 
all key US values 
CM 2.4 - Develop a 
decentralised 
communications and 
networking procedures 
to facilitate 10 
CM 2.5 - Provide 
Goals: 
Conduct 10 in a 
decentralised 
envi ronment 
Information Operations in the United States government from the perspective of the 
development of 10 Policy to produce overa/110 goals implemented and run by 10 
Personnel for the benefit of all other personnel that are affected by 10 under the need for 
a better 10 structure within the constraints of the overa/110 training available. 
Weltanschauung 10 Policy 
Owners 10 Structure 
Environment 10 Training 
Conceptual Model 2.0: IO in the United States Government, A Bottom Up View 
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Develop strategic 
goals from the 10 
actions conducted w/1 
the United States 
Compare 10 
actions to long-
standing cultural 
values of US 
10 Goals 
Develop a decentralised 
accounting mechanism 
such as a portal , where 10 
activities can be reported 
Utilise polls and reports from 
the media to undestand 
____ ,, impact of 10 activities 
Utilise academics and media 
to analyse effectiveness of 10 
campaigns wrt to targets 
Goals : 
Atlempts to tie together 
in a bottom-up fashion 
the plethora of 10 
activities conducted by 
the United States 
Targets : 
A large variety of foreign 
and domestic populations 
Conceptual Model 2.1: Accept any and all IO actions conducted for the United States 
Develop a ne~'ork bridge 
or portal that can accept a 
variety of comm.Jnica tions 
systems and neworks 
government 
l1o Structure I 
Attempt to foster a common 
set of procedures for 
reporting 10 activities 
Goals: 
Real-time integrated 10 
systems that are 
coordinated both 
verti ca lly and horizonta lly 
across the interagency 
Conceptual Model2.2: Develop a Decentralised Communications and Networking Procedures to 
Execute and Facilitate IO Activity 
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10 Training 
Develop tesls to track level 
and competence of 10 users 
Develop a blended Ensure training 
method of 10 instruction is avai lable in a 
that utilises a number of 
academic techniques 
number of 
different venues 
Goals: 
Ensure users training 
needs are met 
c9nduct 10 activities 
Conceptual Model2.3: Utilise a Wide Variety ofiO Training Courses and Instruction 
Ensure that these 
broad themes are 
promulgated to all 
10 users 
10 Policy 
Make training 
opportunities 
available to all 
10 users 
Enlist the academic 
community to 
evaluate 10 efforts 
wrt key US values 
Goals: 
Develop 10 policies, 
strategies and doctrine 
and can encompass all 
activities 
key US values and 10 1 
Conceptual Model 2.4: Develop an IO Policy and Strategy Broad Enough to Encompass all Key 
United States Values 
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Fqster a spi ri t of 
cooperation toward 
the funding of 10 
activities in the US 
All Others 
Promulgate a series of 
artides and reports of 
how the art of warfare 
has changed 
Develop reporting and 
accounting mechaniSms 
to keep track of 
disparate 10 activities 
Conceptual Model 2.5: Provide Resources and Adequate Funding to Foster Innovation in IO 
Utilise global media 
and academia to 
measure 10 plans 
and strategy 
Attempt to link 10 standards to 
policy, doctrine and strategy 
used by the various la 
activi ties in the US 
Strive to integrate the 
disparate methodologies for 
- - -" 10 organisations through 
common processes 
Analyse 10 training and 10 
standards for commonality 
Goals: 
Commcnali ty among 
10 groups towards 
standards that are 
utilised 
Targets: 
Disparate la 
organisations 
Conceptual Model 2.6: Develop a Set of IO Standards that can be Understood and Utilised by all 
Organisations 
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